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PREFACE
This book off ers an accessible introduction to the topic of impact evaluation 
and its practice in development. It provides practical guidelines for design-
ing and implementing impact evaluations, along with a nontechnical over-
view of impact evaluation methods.
This is the second edition of the Impact Evaluation in Practice handbook. 
First published in 2011, the handbook has been used widely by development 
and academic communities worldwide. The ﬁ rst edition is available in 
English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish.
The updated version covers the newest techniques for evaluating 
 programs and includes state-of-the-art implementation advice, as well as an 
expanded set of examples and case studies that draw on recent develop-
ment interventions. It also includes new material on research ethics and 
partnerships to conduct impact evaluation. Throughout the book, case 
studies illustrate applications of impact evaluations. The book links to com-
plementary instructional material available online.
The approach to impact evaluation in this book is largely intuitive. We 
have tried to minimize technical notation. The methods are drawn directly 
from applied research in the social sciences and share many commonalities 
with research methods used in the natural sciences. In this sense, impact 
evaluation brings the empirical research tools widely used in economics 
and other social sciences together with the operational and political econ-
omy realities of policy implementation and development practice.
Our approach to impact evaluation is also pragmatic: we think that the 
most appropriate methods should be identiﬁed to ﬁt the operational con-
text, and not the other way around. This is best achieved at the outset of a 
program, through the design of prospective impact evaluations that are 
built into project implementation. We argue that gaining consensus among 
key stakeholders and identifying an evaluation design that ﬁts the political 
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and operational context are as important as the method itself. We also 
believe that impact evaluations should be candid about their limitations and 
caveats. Finally, we strongly encourage policy makers and program manag-
ers to consider impact evaluations as part of a well-developed theory of 
change that clearly sets out the causal pathways by which a program works 
to produce outputs and inﬂuence ﬁnal outcomes, and we encourage them 
to combine impact evaluations with monitoring and complementary evalu-
ation approaches to gain a full picture of results.
Our experiences and lessons on how to do impact evaluation in practice 
are drawn from teaching and working with hundreds of capable govern-
ment, academic, and development partners. The book draws, collectively, 
from dozens of years of experience working with impact evaluations in 
almost every corner of the globe and is dedicated to future generations of 
practitioners and policy makers.
We hope the book will be a valuable resource for the international devel-
opment community, universities, and policy makers looking to build better 
evidence around what works in development. More and better impact eval-
uations will help strengthen the evidence base for development policies and 
programs around the world. Our hope is that if governments and develop-
ment practitioners can make policy decisions based on evidence—including 
evidence generated through impact evaluation—development resources 
will be spent more eff ectively to reduce poverty and improve people’s lives.
Road Map to Contents of the Book
Part 1–Introduction to Impact Evaluation (chapters 1 and 2) discusses why 
an impact evaluation might be undertaken and when it is worthwhile to 
do  so. We review the various objectives that an impact evaluation can 
achieve and highlight the fundamental policy questions that an evaluation 
can tackle. We insist on the necessity of carefully tracing a theory of change 
that explains the channels through which programs can inﬂuence ﬁnal out-
comes. We urge careful consideration of outcome indicators and anticipated 
eff ect sizes.
Part 2–How to Evaluate (chapters 3 through 10) reviews various meth-
odologies that produce comparison groups that can be used to estimate 
 program impacts. We begin by introducing the counterfactual as the crux of 
any impact evaluation, explaining the properties that the estimate of the 
counterfactual must have, and providing examples of invalid estimates of 
the counterfactual. We then present a menu of impact evaluation options 
that can produce valid estimates of the counterfactual. In particular, 
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we  discuss the basic intuition behind ﬁ ve impact evaluation methodologies: 
randomized assignment, instrumental variables, regression discontinuity 
design, diff erence-in-diff erences, and matching. We discuss why and how 
each method can produce a valid estimate of the counterfactual, in which 
policy context each can be implemented, and the main limitations of each 
method.
Throughout this part of the book, a case study—the Health Insurance 
Subsidy Program (HISP)—is used to illustrate how the methods can be 
applied. In addition, we present speciﬁc examples of impact evaluations 
that have used each method. Part 2 concludes with a discussion of how to 
combine methods and address problems that can arise during implementa-
tion, recognizing that impact evaluation designs are often not implemented 
exactly as originally planned. In this context, we review common challenges 
encountered during implementation, including imperfect compliance or 
spillovers, and discuss how to address these issues. Chapter 10 concludes 
with guidance on evaluations of multifaceted programs, notably those 
with diff erent treatment levels and crossover designs.
Part 3–How to Implement an Impact Evaluation (chapters 11 through 14) 
focuses on how to implement an impact evaluation, beginning in chapter 11 
with how to use the rules of program operation—namely, a program’s avail-
able resources, criteria for selecting beneﬁ ciaries, and timing for 
 implementation—as the basis for selecting an impact evaluation method. 
A simple framework is set out to determine which of the impact evaluation 
methodologies presented in part 2 is most suitable for a given program, 
depending on its operational rules. Chapter 12 discusses the relationship 
between the research team and policy team and their respective roles in 
jointly forming an evaluation team. We review the distinction between inde-
pendence and unbiasedness, and highlight areas that may prove to be sensi-
tive in carrying out an impact evaluation. We provide guidance on how to 
manage expectations, highlight some of the common risks involved in con-
ducting impact evaluations, and off er suggestions on how to manage those 
risks. The  chapter concludes with an overview of how to manage impact 
evaluation activities, including setting up the evaluation team, timing the 
evaluation, budgeting, fundraising, and collecting data. Chapter 13 provides 
an overview of the ethics and science of impact evaluation, including the 
importance of not denying beneﬁ ts to eligible beneﬁ ciaries for the sake of 
the evaluation; outlines the role of institutional review boards that approve 
and monitor research involving human subjects; and discusses the impor-
tance of registering evaluations following the practice of open science, 
whereby data are made publicly available for further research and for repli-
cating results. Chapter 14 provides insights into how to use impact 
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evaluations to inform policy, including tips on how to make the results 
 relevant; a discussion of the kinds of products that impact evaluations can 
and should deliver; and guidance on how to produce and disseminate ﬁ nd-
ings to maximize policy impact.
Part 4–How to Get Data for an Impact Evaluation (chapters 15 through 
17) discusses how to collect data for an impact evaluation, including choos-
ing the sample and determining the appropriate size of the evaluation 
sample (chapter 15), as well as ﬁ nding adequate sources of data (chapter 
16). Chapter 17 concludes and provides some checklists.
Complementary Online Material
Accompanying materials are located on the Impact Evaluation in 
Practice website (http://www.worldbank.org/ieinpractice), including 
solutions to the book’s HISP case study questions, the corresponding 
data set and analysis code in the Stata software, as well as a technical 
companion that provides a more formal treatment of data analysis. 
Materials also include PowerPoint presentations related to the chapters, 
an online version of the book with hyperlinks to websites, and links to 
additional materials.
The Impact Evaluation in Practice website also links to related mate-
rial  from the World Bank Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund (SIEF), 
Development Impact Evaluation (DIME), and Impact Evaluation Toolkit 
websites, as well as the Inter-American Development Bank Impact 
 Evaluation Portal and the applied impact evaluation methods course at 
the University of California, Berkeley.
Development of Impact Evaluation in Practice
The ﬁ rst edition of the Impact Evaluation in Practice book built on a core set 
of teaching materials developed for the “Turning Promises to Evidence” 
workshops organized by the Offi  ce of the Chief Economist for Human 
Development, in partnership with regional units and the Development 
 Economics Research Group at the World Bank. At the time of writing the 
ﬁ rst edition, the workshop had been delivered more than 20 times in all 
regions of the world.
The workshops and both the ﬁ rst and second editions of this handbook 
have been made possible thanks to generous grants from the Spanish gov-
ernment, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development 
(DFID), and the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF UK), 
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through contributions to the Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund (SIEF). 
The  second edition has also beneﬁ ted from support from the Offi  ce of 
Strategic Planning and Development Eff ectiveness at the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB).
This second edition has been updated to cover the most up-to-date tech-
niques and state- of-the-art implementation advice following developments 
made in the ﬁ eld in recent years. We have also expanded the set of examples 
and case studies to reﬂ ect wide-ranging applications of impact evaluation in 
development operations and underline its linkages to policy. Lastly, we have 
included applications of impact evaluation techniques with Stata, using the 
HISP case study data set, as part of the complementary online material.
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INTRODUCTION TO 
 IMPACT  EVALUATION
Part 1
The fi rst part of the book presents an overview of impact evaluation. Chapter 1 
discusses why impact evaluation is important and how it fi ts within the context of 
ethical, evidence-based policy making. We contrast impact evaluation with moni-
toring, introduce the defi ning features of impact evaluation, and discuss com-
plementary approaches, including cost-benefi t analysis and  cost-effectiveness 
analysis. We introduce a core focus of the book: namely, how a program’s 
available resources, eligibility criteria for selecting benefi ciaries, and timing for 
implementation serve to structure options in the selection of impact evaluation 
methods. Finally, we introduce different modalities of impact evaluation—such 
as prospective and retrospective evaluation, and effi cacy versus effectiveness 
 trials—and conclude with a discussion on when to use impact evaluations.
Chapter 2 discusses how to formulate evaluation questions and hypoth-
eses that are useful for policy. These questions and hypotheses determine 
the focus of the evaluation. We also  introduce the fundamental concept of a 
theory of change and the related use of results chains and performance indica-
tors. Chapter 2 provides the fi rst introduction to the fi ctional case study, the 
Health Insurance Subsidy Program (HISP), that is used throughout the book 
and in the accompanying  material found on the Impact Evaluation in Practice 
website (www.worldbank .org/ieinpractice). 
 3
Why Evaluate?
Evidence-Based Policy Making
Development programs and policies are typically designed to change out-
comes such as raising incomes, improving learning, or reducing illness. 
Whether or not these changes are actually achieved is a crucial public policy 
question, but one that is not often examined. More commonly, program 
managers and policy makers focus on measuring and reporting the inputs 
and immediate outputs of a program—how much money is spent, how many 
textbooks are distributed, how many people participate in an employment 
 program—rather than on assessing whether programs have achieved their 
intended goals of improving outcomes.
Impact evaluations are part of a broader agenda of evidence-based policy 
making. This growing global trend is marked by a shift in focus from inputs 
to outcomes and results, and is reshaping public policy. Not only is the focus 
on results being used to set and track national and international targets, but 
results are increasingly being used by, and required of, program managers to 
enhance accountability, determine budget allocations, and guide program 
design and policy decisions.
Monitoring and evaluation are at the heart of evidence-based policy 
making. They provide a core set of tools that stakeholders can use to 
 verify and improve the quality, effi  ciency, and eff ectiveness of policies 
and programs at various stages of implementation—or, in other words, to 
focus  on results. At the program management level, there is a need to 
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understand which program design options are most cost-eff ective, or 
make the case to decision makers that programs are achieving their 
intended results in order to obtain budget allocations to continue or 
expand them. At the country level, ministries compete with one another 
to obtain funding from the ministry of ﬁnance. And ﬁnally, governments 
are accountable to citizens to inform them of the performance of public 
programs. Evidence can constitute a strong foundation for transparency 
and accountability.
The robust evidence generated by impact evaluations is increasingly 
serving as a foundation for greater accountability, innovation, and  learning. 
In a context in which policy makers and civil society are demanding results 
and accountability from public programs, impact evaluation can provide 
robust and credible evidence on performance and, crucially, on whether a 
particular program has achieved or is achieving its desired outcomes. 
Impact evaluations are also increasingly being used to test innovations in 
program design or service delivery. At the global level, impact evaluations 
are central to building knowledge about the eff ectiveness of development 
programs by illuminating what does and does not work to reduce poverty 
and improve welfare.
Simply put, an impact evaluation assesses the changes in the well-being 
of individuals that can be attributed to a particular project, program, or 
 policy. This focus on attribution is the hallmark of impact evaluations. 
Correspondingly, the central challenge in carrying out eff ective impact 
 evaluations is to identify the causal relationship between the program or 
policy and the outcomes of interest.
Impact evaluations generally estimate average impacts of a program, 
program modalities, or a design innovation. For example, did a water and 
sanitation program increase access to safe water and improve health out-
comes? Did a new curriculum raise test scores among  students? Was the 
innovation of including noncognitive skills as part of a youth  training pro-
gram successful in fostering entrepreneurship and raising incomes? In 
each of these cases, the impact evaluation provides information on 
whether the program caused the desired changes in  outcomes, as con-
trasted with speciﬁc case studies or anecdotes, which can give only partial 
information and may not be representative of overall program impacts. In 
this sense, well-designed and well-implemented impact evaluations are 
able to provide convincing and comprehensive evidence that can be used 
to inform policy decisions, shape public  opinion, and improve program 
operations.
Classic impact evaluations address the eff ectiveness of a program 
against the absence of the program. Box 1.1 covers the well-known impact 
evaluation of Mexico’s conditional cash transfer (CCT) program, 
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Box 1.1: How a Successful Evaluation Can Promote the Political 
Sustainability of a Development Program: Mexico’s Conditional 
Cash Transfer Program
In the 1990s, the government of Mexico 
launched an innovative conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) program fi rst called Progresa 
(the name changed, together with a few ele-
ments of the program, to Oportunidades, 
and then to Prospera). Its objectives were to 
provide poor households with short-term 
income support and to create incentives for 
investments in children’s human capital, pri-
marily by providing cash transfers to moth-
ers in poor households conditional on their 
children regularly attending school and visit-
ing a health center.
From the beginning, the government 
considered it essential to monitor and evalu-
ate the program. The program’s offi cials con-
tracted a group of researchers to design an 
impact evaluation and build it into the pro-
gram’s expansion at the same time that it 
was rolled out successively to the participat-
ing communities.
The 2000 presidential election led to a 
change of the party in power. In 2001, 
Progresa’s external evaluators presented 
their fi ndings to the newly elected 
 administration. The results of the program 
were impressive: they showed that the 
program was well targeted to the poor and 
had engendered promising changes in 
households’ human capital. Schultz (2004) 
found that the program signifi cantly 
improved school  enrollment, by an average 
of 0.7 additional years of schooling. Gertler 
(2004) found that the incidence of illness in 
children decreased by 23  percent, while 
the number of sick or disability days fell by 
19 percent among adults. Among the nutri-
tional outcomes, Behrman and Hoddinott 
(2001) found that the program reduced 
the probability of  stunting by about 1 centi-
meter per year for children in the  critical 
age range of 12–36 months.
These evaluation results supported a 
political dialogue based on evidence and con-
tributed to the new administration’s decision 
to continue the program. The government 
expanded the program’s reach, introducing 
upper-middle school scholarships and 
enhanced health programs for adolescents. 
At the same time, the results were used to 
modify other social assistance programs, 
such as the large and less well-targeted torti-
lla subsidy, which was scaled back.
The successful evaluation of Progresa 
also contributed to the rapid adoption of 
CCTs around the world, as well as Mexico’s 
adoption of legislation requiring all social 
projects to be evaluated.
Sources: Behrman and Hoddinott 2001; Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Gertler 2004; Levy and Rodríguez 2005; 
Schultz 2004; Skoufi as and McClafferty 2001.
illustrating how the evaluation contributed to policy discussions 
 concerning the expansion of the program.1
Box 1.2 illustrates how impact evaluation inﬂ uenced education  policy in 
Mozambique by showing that community-based preschools can be an 
aff ordable and eff ective way to address early education and prompt children 
to enroll in primary school at the right age.
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In addition to addressing the basic question of whether a program is 
eff ective or not, impact evaluations can also be used to explicitly test alter-
native program modalities or design innovations. As policy makers become 
increasingly focused on better understanding how to improve implemen-
tation and gain value for money, approaches testing design alternatives are 
rapidly gaining ground. For example, an evaluation might compare the 
performance of a training program to that of a promotional campaign to 
Box 1.2: The Policy Impact of an Innovative Preschool Model: 
Preschool and Early Childhood Development in Mozambique
While preschool is recognized as a good invest-
ment and effective approach to preparing chil-
dren for school and later life, developing countries 
have struggled with the question of how to intro-
duce a scalable and cost- effective preschool 
model. In Mozambique, only about 4 percent of 
children attend  preschool. Upon reaching pri-
mary school, some children from rural commu-
nities show signs of developmental delays and 
are often not prepared for the demands of the 
education system. Moreover, despite the pri-
mary school enrollment rate of nearly 95 per-
cent,  one-third of children are not enrolled by the 
appropriate age.
In 2006, Save the Children piloted a 
community-based preschool program in 
rural communities of Mozambique aiming 
to improve children’s cognitive, social, 
emotional, and physical development. In 
what is believed to be the fi rst randomized 
evaluation of a preschool program in rural 
Africa, a research team conducted an 
impact evaluation of the program in 2008. 
Based on the evaluation’s positive results, 
the government of Mozambique adopted 
and decided to expand Save the Children’s 
community-based preschool model to 600 
communities.
The evaluation found that children who 
attended preschool were 24 percent more 
likely to enroll in primary school and 10 per-
cent more likely to start at the appropriate 
age than children in the comparison group. In 
primary school, children who had attended 
preschool spent almost 50 percent more 
time on homework and other school-related 
activities than those who did not. The evalua-
tion also showed positive gains in school 
readiness; children who attended preschool 
performed better on tests of cognitive, socio-
emotional, and fi ne motor development in 
comparison to the comparison group.
Other household members also benefi t-
ted from children’s enrollment in preschool 
by having more time to engage in productive 
activities. Older siblings were 6 percent 
more likely to attend school and caregivers 
were 26 percent more likely to have worked 
in the previous 30 days when a young child 
in the household attended preschool.
This evaluation showed that even in a 
low-income setting, preschools can be an 
effective way to foster cognitive develop-
ment, prepare children for primary school, 
and increase the likelihood that children will 
begin primary school at the appropriate age.
Source: Martinez, Nadeau, and Pereira 2012.
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see which one is more eff ective in raising ﬁnancial literacy. An impact 
evaluation can test which combination of nutrition and child stimulation 
approaches has the largest impact on child development. Or the evalua-
tion might test a design innovation to improve an existing program, such 
as using text messages to prompt compliance with taking prescribed 
medications.
What Is Impact Evaluation?
Impact evaluation is one of many approaches that support evidence-based 
policy, including monitoring and other types of evaluation.
Monitoring is a continuous process that tracks what is happening within 
a program and uses the data collected to inform program implementation 
and day-to-day management and decisions. Using mostly administrative 
data, the process of monitoring tracks ﬁ nancial disbursement and program 
performance against expected results, and analyzes trends over time.2 
Monitoring is necessary in all programs and is a critical source of  information 
about program performance, including implementation and costs. Usually, 
monitoring tracks inputs, activities, and outputs, although occasionally 
it can include outcomes, such as progress toward achieving national devel-
opment goals.
Evaluations are periodic, objective assessments of a planned, ongoing, or 
completed project, program, or policy. Evaluations are used selectively to 
answer speciﬁc questions related to design, implementation, and results. In 
contrast to continuous monitoring, they are carried out at discrete points in 
time and often seek an outside perspective from technical experts. Their 
design, method, and cost vary substantially depending on the type of ques-
tion the evaluation is trying to answer. Broadly speaking, evaluations can 
address three types of questions (Imas and Rist 2009):3
 • Descriptive questions ask about what is taking place. They are con-
cerned with processes, conditions, organizational relationships, and 
stakeholder views.
 • Normative questions compare what is taking place to what should 
be  taking place. They assess activities and whether or not targets 
are accomplished. Normative questions can apply to inputs, activities, 
and outputs.
 • Cause-and-eff ect questions focus on attribution. They ask about what dif-
ference the intervention makes to outcomes.
Key Concept
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There are many types of evaluations and evaluation methods, draw-
ing on both quantitative and qualitative data. Qualitative data are 
expressed not in numbers, but rather by means of language or some-
times images. Quantitative data are numerical measurements and are 
commonly associated with scales or metrics. Both quantitative and qual-
itative data can be used to answer the types of questions posed above. In 
practice, many evaluations rely on both types of data. There are multiple 
data sources that can be used for  evaluations, drawing on primary data 
collected for the purpose of the evaluation or available secondary data 
(see chapter 16 on data sources). This book focuses on impact evalua-
tions using quantitative data, but underscores the value of monitoring, 
of complementary evaluation methods, and of using both quantitative 
and qualitative data.
Impact evaluations are a particular type of evaluation that seeks to answer 
a speciﬁ c cause-and-eff ect question: What is the impact (or causal eff ect) of 
a program on an outcome of interest? This basic question incorporates an 
important causal dimension. The focus is only on the impact: that is, the 
changes directly attributable to a program, program modality, or design 
innovation.
The basic evaluation question—what is the impact or causal eff ect of 
a program on an outcome of interest?—can be applied to many contexts. 
For instance, what is the causal eff ect of scholarships on school atten-
dance and academic achievement? What is the impact of contracting 
out primary care to private providers on access to health care? If dirt 
ﬂoors are replaced with cement ﬂoors, what will be the impact on 
 children’s health? Do improved roads increase access to labor markets 
and raise households’ income, and if so, by how much? Does class size 
inﬂuence student achievement, and if it does, by how much? As these 
examples show, the basic evaluation question can be extended to 
 examine the impact of a program modality or design  innovation, not just 
a program.
The focus on causality and attribution is the hallmark of impact eval-
uations. All impact evaluation methods address some form of cause-and-
eff ect question. The approach to addressing causality determines the 
methodologies that can be used. To be able to estimate the causal eff ect 
or impact of a program on outcomes, any impact evaluation method cho-
sen must estimate the so-called counterfactual: that is, what the outcome 
would have been for program participants if they had not participated in 
the program. In practice, impact evaluation requires that the evaluation 
team ﬁnd a comparison group to estimate what would have happened to 
the program participants without the program, then make comparisons 
with the treatment group that has received the program. Part 2 of the 
Key Concept
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Why Evaluate? 9
book describes the main methods that can be used to ﬁnd adequate 
 comparison groups.
One of the main messages of this book is that the choice of an impact 
evaluation method depends on the operational characteristics of the 
program being evaluated. When the rules of program operation are 
equitable and transparent and provide accountability, a good impact 
evaluation design can almost always be found—provided that the impact 
evaluation is planned early in the process of designing or implementing 
a program. Having clear and well-deﬁ ned rules of program operations 
not only has intrinsic value for sound public policy and program man-
agement, it is also essential for constructing good comparison groups—
the foundation of rigorous impact evaluations. Speciﬁ cally, the choice 
of  an impact evaluation method is determined by the operational 
 characteristics of the program, notably its available resources,  eligibility 
criteria for selecting beneﬁ ciaries, and timing for program implementa-
tion. As we will discuss in parts 2 and 3 of the book, you can ask three 
questions about the operational context of a given program: Does your 
 program have resources to serve all eligible beneﬁ ciaries? Is your 
 program  targeted or universal? Will your program be rolled out to 
all  beneﬁ ciaries at once or in sequence? The answer to these three 
 questions will  determine which of the methods presented in part 
2— randomized  assignment, instrumental  variables, regression disconti-
nuity,  diff erence-in-diff erences, or matching—are the most suitable to 
your operational context.
Prospective versus Retrospective Impact 
Evaluation
Impact evaluations can be divided into two categories: prospective and ret-
rospective. Prospective evaluations are developed at the same time as the 
program is being designed and are built into program implementation. 
Baseline data are collected before the program is implemented for both the 
group receiving the intervention (known as the treatment group) and the 
group used for comparison that is not receiving the intervention (known as 
the comparison group). Retrospective evaluations assess program impact 
after the program has been implemented, looking for treatment and com-
parison groups ex post.
Prospective impact evaluations are more likely to produce strong and 
credible evaluation results, for three reasons. First, baseline data 
can  be   collected to establish measures of outcomes of interest before 
the  program  has  started. Baseline data are important for measuring 
Key Concept
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pre-intervention outcomes. Baseline data on the treatment and comparison 
groups should be analyzed to ensure that the groups are similar. Baselines 
can also be used to assess targeting eff ectiveness: that is, whether or not the 
program is reaching its intended beneﬁciaries.
Second, deﬁning measures of a program’s success in the program’s plan-
ning stage focuses both the program and the evaluation on intended results. 
As we shall see, impact evaluations take root in a program’s theory of change 
or results chain. The design of an impact evaluation helps clarify program 
objectives—particularly because it requires  establishing well-deﬁned mea-
sures of a program’s success. Policy makers should set clear goals for the 
program to meet, and clear questions for the evaluation to answer, to ensure 
that the results will be highly relevant to policy. Indeed, the full support of 
policy makers is a prerequisite for carrying out a successful evaluation; 
impact evaluations should not be undertaken unless policy makers are con-
vinced of the legitimacy of the evaluation and its value for informing impor-
tant policy decisions.
Third and most important, in a prospective evaluation, the treatment and 
comparison groups are identiﬁed before the intervention being evaluated is 
implemented. As we will explain in more depth in the chapters that follow, 
many more options exist for carrying out valid evaluations when the evalu-
ations are planned from the outset before implementation takes place. We 
argue in parts 2 and 3 that it is almost always possible to ﬁ nd a valid estimate 
of the counterfactual for any program with clear and transparent  assignment 
rules, provided that the evaluation is designed prospectively. In short, pro-
spective evaluations have the best chance of generating valid counterfactu-
als. At the design stage, alternative ways to estimate a valid counterfactual 
can be considered. The design of the impact evaluation can also be fully 
aligned to program operating rules, as well as to the program’s rollout or 
expansion path.
By contrast, in retrospective evaluations, the team that conducts the eval-
uation often has such limited information that it is diffi  cult to analyze 
whether the program was successfully implemented and whether its par-
ticipants really beneﬁted from it. Many programs do not collect baseline 
data unless the evaluation has been built in from the beginning, and once 
the program is in place, it is too late to do so.
Retrospective evaluations using existing data are necessary to assess pro-
grams that were established in the past. Options to obtain a valid estimate of 
the counterfactual are much more limited in those situations. The evalua-
tion is dependent on clear rules of program operation regarding the assign-
ment of beneﬁts. It is also dependent on the availability of data with suffi  cient 
coverage of the treatment and comparison groups both before and 
after  program implementation. As a result, the feasibility of a retrospective 
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evaluation depends on the context and is never guaranteed. Even when fea-
sible, retrospective evaluations often use quasi-experimental methods and 
rely on stronger assumptions; they thus can produce evidence that is more 
debatable.4
Effi cacy Studies and Effectiveness Studies
The main role of impact evaluation is to produce evidence on program 
 performance for the use of government offi  cials, program managers, civil 
society, and other stakeholders. Impact evaluation results are particularly 
useful when the conclusions can be applied to a broader population of 
 interest. The question of generalizability is key for policy makers, for it 
determines whether the results identiﬁed in the evaluation can be replicated 
for groups beyond those studied in the evaluation if the program is scaled up.
In the early days of impact evaluations of development programs, a large 
share of evidence was based on effi  cacy studies: studies carried out in a spe-
ciﬁ c setting under closely controlled conditions to ensure ﬁ delity between 
the evaluation design and program implementation. Because effi  cacy stud-
ies are often carried out as pilots with heavy technical involvement from 
researchers while the program is being implemented, the impacts of these 
often small-scale effi  cacy pilots may not necessarily be informative about 
the impact of a similar project implemented on a larger scale under normal 
circumstances. Effi  cacy studies explore proof of concept, often to test the 
viability of a new program or a speciﬁ c theory of change. If the program 
does not generate anticipated impacts under these carefully managed con-
ditions, it is unlikely to work if rolled out under normal circumstances. For 
instance, a pilot intervention introducing new medical treatment protocols 
may work in a hospital with excellent managers and medical staff , but the 
same intervention may not work in an average hospital with less attentive 
managers and limited staff . In addition, cost-beneﬁt computations will vary, 
as ﬁxed costs and economies of scale may not be captured in small effi  cacy 
studies. As a result, whereas evidence from effi  cacy studies can be useful to 
test an innovative approach, the results often have limited generalizability 
and do not always adequately represent more general settings, which are 
usually the prime concern of policy makers.
By contrast, eff ectiveness studies provide evidence from interventions that 
take place in normal circumstances, using regular implementation channels, 
and aim to produce ﬁ ndings that can be generalized to a large population. 
When eff ectiveness evaluations are properly designed and implemented, the 
results may be generalizable to intended beneﬁ ciaries beyond the evaluation 
sample, so long as the expansion uses the same  implementation structures 
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Box 1.3: Testing for the Generalizability of Results: A Multisite 
Evaluation of the “Graduation” Approach to Alleviate Extreme 
Poverty
By evaluating a program in multiple con-
texts, researchers can examine  whether the 
results from an impact evaluation are gener-
alizable. These so-called multisite  evaluations 
contribute to the growing body of evidence 
about what works and what does not in 
development and can provide important 
insights for policy makers across countries.
For example, in 2007, Banerjee and oth-
ers began a multisite evaluation of the 
“graduation” approach to alleviating extreme 
poverty. The model had received much 
attention worldwide after yielding impres-
sive results in Bangladesh. Developed by 
the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC), a large global develop-
ment organization, the model aimed to help 
“graduate” the very poor from extreme pov-
erty through transfers of cash, productive 
assets, and intensive training.
Banerjee and his colleagues sought to 
explore whether the graduation approach 
would work across countries through six 
simultaneous randomized impact evalua-
tions in Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, India, 
Pakistan, and Peru. In each country, the 
researchers worked with local nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) to implement a 
similar graduation program. While the pro-
gram was adjusted to fi t the different con-
texts in each country, the key principles 
remained the same. The program targeted 
the poorest households in villages in the 
poorest regions of each country. For 24 
months, benefi ciary households were given 
productive assets, training, support, life 
skills coaching, cash, health information, and 
help with fi nancial inclusion. The impact 
evaluation assessed the effectiveness of 
providing this bundle of benefi ts.
The study evaluated the impacts of the 
program on 10 sets of outcomes. One year 
after the program ended in the six countries, 
there were signifi cant improvements in 8 
out of the 10 sets of outcomes: per capita 
consumption, food security, asset value, 
fi nancial inclusion, time spent working, 
income and revenue, mental health, and 
political involvement. The magnitude of the 
impacts varied across countries, with sub-
stantial impacts on asset value in all but one 
country. There were no statistically signifi -
cant impacts on the physical health index.
The results varied country by country. 
Improvements in per capita consumption 
were not signifi cant in Honduras and Peru, 
and improvements in asset value were not 
signifi cant in Honduras. In the aggregate, 
however, the evaluation pointed to the 
promise of this type of multifaceted inter-
vention in improving the lives of the very 
poor across a range of settings.
Sources: Banerjee and others 2015; BRAC 2013.
and reaches similar populations as in the evaluation sample. This external 
validity is of critical importance to policy makers because it allows them to 
use the results of the evaluation to inform program-wide decisions that 
apply to intended beneﬁciaries beyond the evaluation sample (see box 1.3).
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Complementary Approaches
As noted, impact evaluations answer speciﬁ c cause-and-eff ect questions. 
Other approaches—including close monitoring of the program, as well as 
the complementary use of other evaluation approaches such as ex ante 
simulations, mixed method analysis drawing on both qualitative and 
quantitative data, and process evaluations—can serve as valuable 
 complements to impact evaluations. These other approaches have many 
useful applications, such as to estimate the eff ect of reforms before they 
are implemented, to help focus core impact evaluation questions, to 
track program implementation, and to interpret the results from impact 
evaluations.
Impact evaluations conducted in isolation from other sources of 
information are vulnerable in terms of both their technical quality and 
their policy relevance. While impact evaluation results can provide 
robust evidence as to whether there has been an eff ect, they are often 
limited in providing insights into the channels by which the policy or 
program aff ected the observed results. Without information from 
 process evaluations on the nature and content of the program to 
 contextualize evaluation results, policy makers can be left puzzled about 
why certain results were or were not achieved. Additionally, without 
monitoring data on how, when, and where the program is being 
 implemented, the evaluation will be blind as to whether and when 
 beneﬁ ts were received by the intended beneﬁ ciaries, or whether beneﬁ ts 
reached the comparison group unintentionally.
Monitoring
Monitoring program implementation, most often through the use of 
 administrative data, is critical in an impact evaluation. It lets the evalua-
tion team verify whether activities are being implemented as planned: 
which participants received the program, how fast the program is 
expanding, and how resources are being spent. This information is criti-
cal to implementing the evaluation, for example, to ensure that baseline 
data are collected before the program is introduced within the evalua-
tion sample and to verify the integrity of the treatment and comparison 
groups. Monitoring is critical to checking that a beneﬁ ciary actually par-
ticipates in the program and that a nonbeneﬁ ciary does not participate. 
In addition, administrative data can provide information on the cost of 
implementing the program, which is also needed for cost-beneﬁt and 
cost-eff ectiveness analyses.
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Ex Ante Simulations
Ex ante simulations are evaluations that use available data to simulate the 
expected eff ects of a program or policy reform on outcomes of interest. 
They can be very useful in assessing the relative expected eff ectiveness of 
a range of alternative program design options on results. These are com-
monly used methods that depend on the availability of ample high-quality 
data that can be used to apply simulation models appropriate to the ques-
tion at hand (see box 1.4). In contrast to impact evaluations, these meth-
ods are used to simulate potential future eff ects, rather than measuring 
actual impacts of implemented programs. These types of methods can be 
extremely useful in benchmarking likely program eff ects and establishing 
realistic objectives, as well as in estimating costs, rates of return, and 
other economic parameters. They are often used as the basis for the eco-
nomic analysis of projects, notably before a reform is introduced or a proj-
ect is implemented.
Box 1.4: Simulating Possible Project Effects through Structural 
Modeling: Building a Model to Test Alternative Designs Using 
Progresa Data in Mexico
A certain type of ex ante simulation— 
structural modeling—can be used to esti-
mate the effects of a program under a range 
of alternative designs. In the Progresa/
Oportunidades/Prospera evaluation described 
in box 1.1, the data collected were rich 
enough for researchers to build a model that 
could simulate expected effects of alternative 
program designs.
Todd and Wolpin (2006) used baseline 
data from the impact evaluation to build a 
model of parental decisions about their chil-
dren, including child schooling. They simu-
lated what the effects would be under 
different program designs. They found that if 
the program eliminated cash incentives for 
school attendance for lower grades and 
used the money to increase the cash incen-
tives for students in higher grades, the 
effects on average schooling completed 
would likely be larger.
In this case, the projections were done 
using the baseline survey of an impact eval-
uation that had been completed. The results 
of the predictions could be tested to see if 
they yielded the same impacts as the actual 
program experiment. This is not generally 
possible, however. These types of simula-
tion methods are often used before the pro-
gram is actually implemented to examine 
the likely effects of various alternative pro-
gram designs. Thus, they can provide a basis 
to narrow down the range of options to test 
in practice.
Source: Todd and Wolpin 2006.
Note: For another example of structural modeling, see Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003).
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Mixed Methods
Mixed method approaches that combine quantitative and qualitative data 
are a key supplement to impact evaluations based on the use of quantitative 
data alone, particularly to help generate hypotheses and focus research 
questions before quantitative data are collected and to provide perspectives 
and insights on a program’s performance during and after program imple-
mentation. There are many qualitative methods, and they comprise their 
own research domain.5 Methods generating qualitative data generally 
employ open-ended approaches that do not rely on predetermined 
responses from those being interviewed. Data are generated through a 
range of approaches, including focus groups, life histories, and interviews 
with selected beneﬁciaries and other key informants (Rao and Woolcock 
2003). They can also include various observational and ethnographic assess-
ments. Although the observations, views, and opinions gathered during 
qualitative work are usually not statistically representative of the program’s 
beneﬁciaries—and thus are not generalizable—they are useful to understand 
why certain results have or have not been achieved (see box 1.5).
Evaluations that integrate qualitative and quantitative analysis are char-
acterized as using mixed methods (Bamberger, Rao, and Woolcock 2010). 
Box 1.5: A Mixed Method Evaluation in Action: Combining a 
Randomized Controlled Trial with an Ethnographic Study in India
Mixed methods approaches can be espe-
cially helpful when evaluating programs with 
outcomes that are diffi cult to measure in 
quantitative surveys. Programs in democ-
racy and governance are one such example.
When designing an evaluation strategy 
for the People’s Campaign program, which 
aimed to improve citizen participation in vil-
lage governments, Ananthpur, Malik, and 
Rao (2014) integrated a randomized con-
trolled trial (RCT, see glossary) with an eth-
nographic study conducted in a subset of 
10 percent of the evaluation sample used 
for the RCT. Matching methods were used 
to ensure similar characteristics between 
treatment and comparison villages in the 
sample for the qualitative study. An experi-
enced fi eld investigator was assigned to 
live in each village and study the impacts of 
the program on the village social and politi-
cal structures.
The ethnographic study continued for 
two years after the RCT ended, allowing for 
observations of longer-term effects. While 
the RCT found that the intervention had no 
statistically signifi cant impact, the qualita-
tive study provided insights into why the 
intervention failed. The qualitative research 
identifi ed several factors that hampered the 
effectiveness of the intervention: variations 
(continued)
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In  developing a mixed method approach, Creswell (2014) deﬁ nes three 
basic approaches:
1. Convergent parallel. Both quantitative and qualitative data are collected 
at the same time and used to triangulate ﬁ ndings or to generate early 
results about how the program is being implemented and perceived by 
beneﬁ ciaries.
2. Explanatory sequential. Qualitative data provide context and  explanations 
for the quantitative results, to explore outlier cases of success and  failure, 
and to develop systematic explanations of the program’s  performance as 
it was found in the quantitative results. In this way,  qualitative work can 
help explain why certain results are observed in the quantitative analysis, 
and can be used to get inside the “black box” of what happened in the 
program (Bamberger, Rao, and Woolcock 2010).
3. Exploratory sequential. The evaluation team can use focus groups, 
 listings, interviews with key informants, and other qualitative  approaches 
to develop hypotheses as to how and why the program would work, and 
to clarify research questions that need to be addressed in the quantitative 
impact evaluation work, including the most relevant program design 
alternatives to be tested through the impact evaluation.
Process Evaluations
Process evaluations focus on how a program is implemented and operates, 
assessing whether it conforms to its original design and documenting its 
development and operation. Process evaluations can usually be carried out 
in the quality of program facilitation, lack of 
top-down support, and entrenched local 
power structures.
The qualitative evidence also uncovered 
some less tangible and unexpected program 
impacts. In treatment villages, the program 
improved dispute resolution concerning 
 service delivery and increased women’s par-
ticipation in village development activities. 
Moreover, the fi eld researchers observed 
that the village governments functioned 
 better in treatment villages.
Without the nuanced understanding of 
context and local dynamics provided by the 
qualitative component, the researchers 
would not have been able to understand 
why the quantitative data found no impacts. 
The ethnographic study was able to provide 
a richer evaluation, with insights into ele-
ments useful to improving the program.
Source: Ananthpur, Malik, and Rao 2014.
Box 1.5: A Mixed Method Evaluation in Action: Combining a Randomized Controlled Trial with an 
Ethnographic Study in India (continued)
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relatively quickly and at a reasonable cost. In pilots and in the initial stages 
of a program, they can be a valuable source of information on how to improve 
program implementation and are often used as ﬁ rst steps in developing a 
program so that operational adjustments can be made before the program 
design is ﬁ nalized. They can test whether a program is operating as designed 
and is consistent with the program’s theory of change (box 1.6).
Box 1.6: Informing National Scale-Up through a Process 
Evaluation in Tanzania
There are many facets to a program’s perfor-
mance. Evidence from process evaluations 
can complement impact evaluation results 
and provide a more complete picture of pro-
gram performance. This can be particularly 
important for pilot programs to shed light on 
how new institutions and new processes 
are functioning.
In 2010, the government of Tanzania 
decided to pilot a community-based condi-
tional cash transfer (CCT) in three districts. 
The program provided a cash transfer to 
poor households based on compliance with 
certain education and health requirements. 
Community groups assisted in assigning the 
cash transfer to the most vulnerable house-
holds in their communities. To evaluate 
whether this community-driven system 
worked in the Tanzanian context, a group of 
World Bank researchers decided to integrate 
a process evaluation into a traditional impact 
evaluation.
The process evaluation used both qualita-
tive and quantitative data. A year after 
 fi elding the baseline survey in pilot dis-
tricts, researchers organized a community 
scorecard exercise to rate aspects of the pro-
gram, drawing on focus groups consisting 
of community members. The focus groups 
were also used to hold in-depth discussions 
about program impacts that can be harder to 
quantify, such as changes in relationships 
among household members or community 
dynamics. The aim of the process evaluation 
was to understand how the program oper-
ated in practice and to provide recommenda-
tions for improvements.
The impact evaluation found that the pro-
gram had positive and statistically signifi cant 
impacts on key education and health out-
comes. Children in participant households 
were about 15 percent more likely to com-
plete primary school and 11 percent less 
likely to be sick. Focus groups with teachers 
further revealed that students in treatment 
groups were more prepared and attentive.
However, focus groups with community 
members indicated there was a level of dis-
content with the process of selecting benefi -
ciaries. Participants complained about a lack 
of transparency in benefi ciary selection and 
delays in payments. The process evaluation 
allowed program managers to address these 
issues, improving program operations.
The evaluation work informed the 
Tanzanian government’s decision to scale up 
the program. The community-based CCT is 
expected to reach almost 1 million house-
holds by 2017, drawing on lessons from this 
evaluation.
Sources: Berman 2014; Evans and others 2014.
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A process evaluation should include the following elements, often drawn 
from a results chain or logic model (see chapter 2), complemented by pro-
gram documents and interviews with key informants and beneﬁ ciary focus 
groups:6
 • Program objectives and the context in which the program is operating
 • Description of the process used to design and implement the program
 • Description of program operations, including any changes in operations
 • Basic data on program operations, including ﬁ nancial and coverage 
indicators
 • Identiﬁ cation and description of intervening events that may have 
aff ected implementation and outcomes
 • Documentation, such as concept notes, operations manuals, meeting 
minutes, reports, and memoranda.
Applying an impact evaluation to a program whose operational processes 
have not been validated poses a risk that either the impact evaluation 
resources are misspent when a more simple process evaluation would have 
been suffi  cient, or that needed adjustments in program design are intro-
duced once the impact evaluation is underway, thereby changing the nature 
of the program being evaluated and the utility of the impact evaluation.
Cost-Benefi t and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
It is critically important that impact evaluation be complemented with 
information on the cost of the project, program, or policy being evaluated.
Once impact evaluation results are available, they can be combined with 
information on program costs to answer two additional questions. First, for 
the basic form of impact evaluation, adding cost information will allow you 
to perform a cost-beneﬁt analysis, which will answer the question: What is 
the beneﬁt that a program delivers for a given cost? Cost-beneﬁt analysis 
estimates the total expected beneﬁts of a program, compared to its total 
expected costs. It seeks to quantify all of the costs and beneﬁts of a program 
in monetary terms and assesses whether beneﬁts outweigh costs.7
In an ideal world, cost analysis based on impact evaluation evidence 
would exist not only for a particular program, but also for a series of pro-
grams or program alternatives, so that policy makers could assess which 
program or alternative is most cost eff ective in reaching a particular goal. 
When an impact evaluation is testing program alternatives, adding cost 
information allows you to answer the second question: How do various 
Key Concepts
Cost-benefi t analysis 
estimates the total 
expected benefi ts of a 
program, compared to 
its total expected 
costs. Cost-
effectiveness analysis 
compares the relative 
cost of two or more 
programs or program 
alternatives in 
reaching a common 
outcome.
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program implementation alternatives compare in cost-eff ectiveness? This 
cost-eff ectiveness analysis compares the relative cost of two or more pro-
grams or program alternatives in reaching a common outcome, such as agri-
cultural yields or student test scores.
In a cost-beneﬁt or cost-eff ectiveness analysis, impact evaluation 
estimates the beneﬁt or eff ectiveness side, and cost analysis provides 
the cost information. This book focuses on impact evaluation and does 
not discuss in detail how to collect cost data or conduct cost-beneﬁt or 
cost-eff ectiveness analysis.7 However, it is critically important that 
impact evaluation be complemented with information on the cost of the 
project, program, or policy being evaluated. Once impact and cost infor-
mation are available for a variety of programs, cost-eff ectiveness 
 analysis can identify which investments yield the highest rate of return 
and allow policy makers to make informed decisions on which interven-
tion to invest in. Box 1.7 illustrates how impact evaluations can be used 
to identify the most cost-eff ective programs and improve resource 
allocation.
Box 1.7: Evaluating Cost-Effectiveness: Comparing Evaluations of 
Programs That Affect Learning in Primary Schools
By evaluating a number of programs with simi-
lar objectives, it is possible to compare the rel-
ative cost-effectiveness of different approaches 
to improving outcomes, such as learning in 
primary schools. For this to be possible, evalu-
ators must make available not only impact 
evaluation results, but also detailed cost infor-
mation on the interventions. In a meta-analysis 
of learning  outcomes in developing countries, 
Kremer, Brannen, and Glennerster (2013) used 
cost information from 30 impact evaluations to 
analyze the cost-effectiveness of different 
types of education interventions.
The authors compared several types 
of  education interventions, including access 
to education, business-as-usual inputs, peda-
gogical innovations, teacher accountability, 
and school-based management. In particular, 
they investigated the improvement in test 
scores, in terms of standard deviations, that 
could be gained per US$100 spent on the pro-
gram. Though it is likely that costs would fall if 
programs were implemented at scale, the 
researchers used the costs as reported in the 
evaluations for  consistency. They found that 
pedagogical reforms and interventions that 
improve accountability and increase teacher 
incentives tend to be the most cost-effective. 
On the other hand, the researchers  concluded 
that providing more of the same inputs 
 without  changing pedagogy or accountabil-
ity had  limited impacts on test scores. 
For example, a program in Kenya that 
increased the number of teachers in schools 
(continued)
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Ethical Considerations Regarding Impact 
Evaluation
When the decision is made to design an impact evaluation, some important 
ethical issues must be considered. Questions have even been raised about 
whether impact evaluation is ethical in and of itself. One point of departure 
for this debate is to consider the ethics of investing substantial public 
resources in programs whose eff ectiveness is unknown. In this context, the 
lack of evaluation can itself be seen as unethical. The information on pro-
gram eff ectiveness that impact evaluations generate can lead to more eff ec-
tive and ethical investment of public resources.
Other ethical considerations relate to the rules used to assign program 
beneﬁts, to the methods by which human subjects are studied, and to the 
transparency in documenting research plans, data, and results. These issues 
are discussed in detail in chapter 13.
The most basic ethical principle in an evaluation is that the delivery of 
interventions with known beneﬁ ts should not be denied or delayed solely 
for the purpose of the evaluation. In this book, we argue that evaluations 
should not dictate how beneﬁts are assigned, but that instead evaluations 
should be ﬁtted to program assignment rules that are equitable and 
 transparent. In this context, any ethical concerns about the rules of program 
assignment do not stem from the impact evaluation itself but directly from 
the program operational rules. Planning evaluations can be helpful in 
had no signifi cant impact on test scores for 
students.
Programs that empowered local commu-
nities through school-based management 
interventions seemed to be the most suc-
cessful and cost-effective, especially when 
these reforms were formalized. For instance, 
while creating and training local school com-
mittees in Indonesia did not have signifi cant 
impacts on test scores, making the commit-
tees more representative through elections 
was highly cost-effective.
As the study by Kremer, Brannen, and 
Glennerster (2013) illustrates, comparing 
evaluations of interventions that have similar 
objectives can shed light on the effective-
ness of different interventions across differ-
ent contexts. Nonetheless, researchers 
must recognize that contexts vary consider-
ably across programs and settings. It also 
remains relatively rare to have rich cross-
program data with comparable outcome 
measures, impact evaluations, and cost 
information.
Source: Kremer, Brannen, and Glennerster 2013.
Box 1.7: Evaluating Cost-Effectiveness: Comparing Evaluations of Programs That Affect Learning in 
Primary Schools (continued)
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clarifying program operational rules and helping to review whether they 
are equitable and transparent, based on clear criteria for eligibility.
Randomized assignment of program beneﬁts often raises ethical 
 concerns about denying program beneﬁts to eligible beneﬁciaries. Yet most 
programs operate in operational contexts with limited ﬁnancial and 
 administrative resources, making it impossible to reach all eligible 
beneﬁciaries at once. From an ethical standpoint, all subjects who are 
equally eligible to participate in any type of social program should have the 
same chance of receiving the program. Randomized assignment fulﬁlls this 
ethical requirement. In situations where a program will be phased in over 
time, rollout can be based on randomly selecting the order in which equally 
deserving beneﬁciaries will receive the program. In these cases, beneﬁciaries 
who enter the program later can be used as a comparison group for earlier 
beneﬁciaries, generating a solid evaluation design, as well as a transparent 
and fair method for allocating scarce resources.
The ethics of impact evaluation go beyond the ethics of program assign-
ment rules. They also include the ethics of conducting research on human 
subjects, as well as the ethics of conducting transparent, objective, and 
reproducible research, as explored in chapter 13.
In many countries and international institutions, review boards or ethics 
committees have been set up to regulate research involving human subjects. 
These boards are charged with assessing, approving, and monitoring 
research studies, with the primary goals of protecting the rights and pro-
moting the welfare of all subjects. Although impact evaluations are primar-
ily operational undertakings, they also constitute research studies and as 
such should adhere to research guidelines for human subjects.
Making your impact evaluation objective, transparent, and reproducible 
is an equally important ethical component of doing research. To make 
research transparent, impact evaluation plans can be included in a pre- 
analysis plan and submitted to a study registry. Once the research is com-
pleted, the data and code used in the analysis can be made publicly available 
so that others can replicate the work, while protecting anonymity.
Impact Evaluation for Policy Decisions
Impact evaluations are needed to inform policy makers on a range of deci-
sions, from curtailing ineffi  cient programs, to scaling up interventions that 
work, to adjusting program beneﬁts, to selecting among various program 
alternatives. They are most eff ective when applied selectively to answer 
important policy questions, and they are often applied to innovative 
pilot  programs that are testing an unproven, but promising approach. 
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The  Mexican conditional cash transfer evaluation described in box 1.1 
became inﬂuential not only because of the innovative nature of the program, 
but also because its impact evaluation provided credible and strong evi-
dence that could not be ignored in subsequent policy decisions. The pro-
gram’s adoption and expansion both nationally and internationally were 
strongly inﬂuenced by the evaluation results.
Impact evaluations can be used to explore diff erent types of policy ques-
tions. The basic form of impact evaluation will test the eff ectiveness of a 
given program. In other words, it will answer the question, is a given pro-
gram or intervention eff ective compared to the absence of the program? As 
discussed in part 2, this type of impact evaluation relies on comparing a 
treatment group that received the innovation, program, or policy to a com-
parison group that did not in order to estimate eff ectiveness. The core chal-
lenge in an impact evaluation is to construct a comparison group that is as 
similar as possible to the treatment group. The degree of comparability 
between treatment and comparison groups is central to the evaluation’s 
internal validity and is therefore fundamental to assessing a program’s 
causal impact.
Impact evaluations are also increasingly being used to test design innova-
tions within a program without a pure comparison group selected from out-
side of the program. These types of evaluations are often done to see whether 
a particular design innovation can boost program eff ectiveness or lower 
costs (see box 1.8).
Evaluations can also be used to test the eff ectiveness of program imple-
mentation alternatives. For instance, they can answer the following ques-
tion: When a program can be implemented in several ways, which one is the 
most eff ective or  cost-eff ective program modality? In this type of evaluation, 
two or more approaches or design features within a program can be com-
pared with one another to generate evidence as to which is the most cost-
eff ective  alternative for reaching a particular goal. These program 
alternatives are often referred to as treatment arms. For example, a program 
may wish to test alternative outreach campaigns and select one group to 
receive a mailing campaign, while another receives house-to-house visits, 
and yet another receives short message service (SMS) text messages, to 
assess which is most cost-eff ective. Impact evaluations testing alternative 
program treatments normally include one treatment group for each of the 
treatment arms, as well as a pure comparison group that does not receive 
any program intervention. These types of evaluations allow decision makers 
to choose among implementation alternatives, and can be very useful for 
enhancing program performance and saving costs (box 1.9).
In addition, comparisons can be made among subgroups of recipients 
within a given evaluation, to answer the following question: Is the program 
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Box 1.8: Evaluating Innovative Programs: The Behavioural Insights 
Team in the United Kingdom
Created in 2010 by the British government, 
the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) was the 
fi rst government institution dedicated to 
improving public services through the appli-
cation of behavioral science. The objectives 
of the organization include improving the 
cost-effectiveness of public services, intro-
ducing realistic models of human behavior 
to policy analysis, and enabling people to 
make better choices. With this aim, the BIT 
uses experiments with built-in impact evalu-
ations to test innovative ideas in public pol-
icy. Since its creation, the organization has 
implemented over 150 randomized con-
trolled trials in a wide variety of domestic 
policy areas, often using administrative data.
The BIT has conducted evaluations of 
innovations to public services that draw 
on behavioral science literature. The organi-
zation collaborated with a London bor-
ough to introduce a lottery incentive to 
increase voter registration before elections. 
Residents were randomly assigned to three 
groups—no lottery, a lottery with a prize of 
£1,000 if they registered before a certain 
date, and a lottery with a prize of £5,000 
if they registered before the same date. 
The BIT found that the lottery incentive 
signifi cantly increased voter registration. 
Moreover, it saved the local government a 
lot of money; the government had previ-
ously relied on an expensive door-to-door 
canvas to increase voter registration.
In another innovative evaluation, the BIT 
partnered with the National Health Service 
and the Department of Health to examine 
how to cost-effectively encourage people to 
register as organ donors. This was one of 
the largest randomized controlled trials ever 
in the U.K. public sector. The researchers 
found encouraging results from an interven-
tion that tested the use of different mes-
sages on a high traffi c government webpage. 
The best performing short phrase was 
based on the idea of reciprocity and asked, 
if you needed an organ transplant, would 
you have one? If so, help others.
The BIT is jointly owned and fi nanced by 
the British government; the innovation char-
ity, Nesta; and the employees themselves. 
The model has spread outside of the United 
Kingdom, with BIT offi ces created in 
Australia and the United States. Moreover, 
the United States followed the BIT model to 
establish a Social and Behavioral Science 
Initiative in the White House in 2015.
Source: Behavioural Insights Team, http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk.
more eff ective for one subgroup than it is compared with another subgroup? 
For example, did the introduction of a new curriculum raise test scores 
more among female students than male students? This type of impact evalu-
ation questions seeks to document whether there is some heterogeneity in 
program impacts across subgroups. Such questions need to be considered 
upfront, as they need to be incorporated into the design of an impact evalu-
ation and require suffi  ciently large samples to carry out the analysis of the 
diff erent subgroups of interest.
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Box 1.9: Evaluating Program Design Alternatives: Malnourishment 
and Cognitive Development in Colombia
In the early 1970s, the Human Ecology 
Research Station, in collaboration with the 
Colombian ministry of education, imple-
mented a pilot program to address childhood 
malnutrition in Cali, Colombia, by providing 
health care and educational activities, as well 
as food and nutritional supplements. As part 
of the pilot, a team of evaluators was tasked 
to determine how long such a program should 
last to reduce malnutrition among preschool 
children from low-income families, and 
whether the interventions could also lead to 
improvements in cognitive development.
The program was eventually made avail-
able to all eligible families, but during the 
pilot, the evaluators were able to compare 
similar groups of children who received dif-
ferent durations of treatment. The evalua-
tors fi rst used a screening process to 
identify a target group of 333 malnourished 
children. These children were then classifi ed 
into 20 sectors by neighborhood, and each 
sector was randomly assigned to one of four 
treatment groups. The groups differed only 
in the sequence in which they started the 
treatment, and thus in the amount of time 
that they spent in the program. Group 4 
started the earliest and was exposed to the 
treatment for the longest period, followed 
by groups 3, 2, and then 1. The treatment 
itself consisted of six hours of health care 
and educational activities per day, plus addi-
tional food and nutritional supplements. At 
regular intervals over the course of the pro-
gram, the evaluators used cognitive tests to 
track the progress of children in all four 
groups.
The evaluators found that the children 
who were in the program for the longest 
time demonstrated the greatest gains in 
cognitive improvement. On the Stanford-
Binet intelligence test, which estimates 
mental age minus chronological age, group 4 
children averaged −5 months, and group 1 
children averaged −15 months.
This example illustrates how program 
implementers and policy makers are able to 
use evaluations of multiple treatment arms 
to determine the most effective program 
alternative.
Source: McKay and others 1978.
Beyond the various design features already discussed, it is useful to 
consider the channels through which impact evaluations aff ect policy. 
This can happen within a program with respect to decisions about con-
tinuing, reforming, or ending a program. Impact evaluation results can 
also inform the scale-up of pilots, as the Mozambique case in box 1.2 
illustrates.
Evaluations can also bring evidence from one country to another or 
can be used to explore fundamental questions such as those concerning 
 behavior. Venturing beyond the borders of an individual program evalu-
ation raises the question of generalizability. As chapter 4 discusses in 
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the context of a particular evaluation, the evaluation sample is designed 
to be statistically representative of the population of eligible units from 
which the evaluation sample is drawn, and thus externally valid. Beyond 
external validity, generalizability concerns whether results from an eval-
uation carried out locally will hold true in other settings and among 
other population groups. This more expansive and ambitious concept 
depends on the accumulation of credible empirical evidence across a 
range of settings.
Increasingly, the impact evaluation ﬁ eld is seeking to build on the grow-
ing stock of credible evaluations to achieve broadly generalizable ﬁ ndings. 
This eff ort centers on testing whether a particular theory of change holds in 
diff erent contexts and on exploring whether a similar program tested in dif-
ferent settings yields similar results (see box 1.10). The use of multiple eval-
uations to answer core questions or assemble evidence through 
meta-analyses, systematic reviews, and evaluation registries is growing rap-
idly and opening a new frontier in evaluation work. If results are consistent 
across multiple settings, this gives policy makers greater conﬁ dence in the 
viability of the program across a range of contexts and population groups. 
This is an important consideration, as debates about the ability to replicate 
results are fundamental to questions about the broader eff ectiveness and 
scalability of a particular program.
Box 1.10: The Impact Evaluation Cluster Approach: Strategically 
Building Evidence to Fill Knowledge Gaps
Although the generalizability of a single 
impact evaluation may be low, in combination 
with similar evaluations across different con-
texts, development practitioners can develop 
more broadly applicable conclusions about 
what works and what does not. Increasingly, 
impact evaluation initiatives such as the 
World Bank’s Strategic Impact Evaluation 
Fund (SIEF) and Development Impact 
Evaluation (DIME), as well as the International 
Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3IE), aim to 
provide policy makers with insights into how 
program and policy interventions can be 
more broadly applied, using a research clus-
ter approach.
Often calls for proposals are oriented 
around a set of research questions aimed to 
inform program and policy design, to gener-
ate impact evaluations that will contribute to 
a coordinated evidence base. The objective 
is to orient research and the generation of 
evidence around types of interventions or 
types of outcomes.
Within these clusters, evaluations are 
 generated to fi ll gaps in the existing body of 
evidence. For example, there is solid evidence 
(continued)
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Deciding Whether to Carry Out an Impact 
Evaluation
Not all programs warrant an impact evaluation. Impact evaluations should 
be used selectively when the question being posed calls for a strong exami-
nation of causality. Impact evaluations can be costly if you collect your own 
data, and your evaluation budget should be used strategically. If you are 
starting, or thinking about expanding, a new program and wondering 
whether to go ahead with an impact evaluation, asking a few basic questions 
will help with the decision.
The ﬁrst question to ask is, what is at stake? Will evidence about the 
success of the program, program modality, or design innovation inform 
important decisions? These decisions often involve budgetary alloca-
tions and program scale. If there are limited budget implications or if the 
results will aff ect only a few people, it may not be worth doing an impact 
evaluation. For example, it may not be worth conducting an impact eval-
uation of a program in a small clinic that provides counseling to hospital 
patients using volunteers. By contrast, a pay reform for teachers that will 
eventually aff ect all primary teachers in the country would be a program 
with much higher stakes.
If you determine that the stakes are high, then the next question is, does 
any evidence exist to show that the program works? In particular, do you 
showing that children who receive a combi-
nation of nutrition, cognitive stimulation, 
and health support in the fi rst 1,000 days 
of life are more likely to avoid developmental 
delays. However, there is a lack of research 
on how to best deliver this combined 
 support in scalable and cost-effective ways. 
SIEF is supporting research to explore 
this question in Bangladesh, Colombia, 
India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Nepal, and Niger.
Clustering evaluations around a common 
set of research questions and using a core 
set of metrics to measure outcomes helps 
policy makers and development practitio-
ners see which types of programs work in 
multiple settings. They can then review their 
own policy and program designs with a bet-
ter sense of the contexts in which particular 
programs have worked or not worked or 
with respect to how particular outcomes 
have been achieved across several cases.
Sources: DIME (http://www.worldbank.org/dime); SIEF (http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/sief-trust-fund); 
3IE (http://www.3ieimpact.org).
Box 1.10: The Impact Evaluation Cluster Approach: Strategically Building Evidence to 
Fill Knowledge Gaps (continued)
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know how big the program’s impact would be? Is there evidence available 
from similar programs under similar circumstances? If no evidence is 
 available about the potential of the type of program being contemplated, 
you may want to start out with a pilot that incorporates an impact  evaluation. 
By contrast, if evidence is available from similar circumstances, the cost of 
an impact evaluation will probably be justiﬁed only if it can address an 
important and new policy question. That would be the case if your program 
includes some important innovations that have not yet been tested.
To justify mobilizing the technical and ﬁnancial resources needed to 
carry out a high-quality impact evaluation, the intervention to be evaluated 
should be:
 • Innovative. It will test a new, promising approach.
 • Replicable. It can be scaled up or can be applied in a diff erent setting.
 • Strategically relevant. The evidence provided by the impact evalua-
tion will inform an important decision concerning the interven-
tion.  This could relate to program expansion, reform, or budget 
allocations.
 • Untested. Little is known about the eff ectiveness of the program or design 
alternatives, globally or in a particular context.
 • Inﬂuential. The results will be used to inform policy decisions.
A ﬁ nal question to ask is, do we have the resources necessary for a 
good impact evaluation? These resources concern technical elements 
such as appropriate data and time, ﬁ nancial resources to carry out the 
evaluation, as well as institutional resources with respect to the teams 
involved and their interest in and commitment to building and using 
causal evidence. As discussed in more depth in chapter 12, an evaluation 
team is essentially a partnership between two groups: a team of policy 
makers and a team of researchers. The teams need to work toward the 
common goal of ensuring that a well-designed, technically robust evalu-
ation is implemented properly and delivers results relevant to key policy 
and program design questions. A clear understanding of the premise and 
the promise of impact evaluation by the evaluation team will help ensure 
its success.
If you decide that an impact evaluation makes sense given the ques-
tions at hand and the related need to examine causality, the stakes asso-
ciated with the results, and the need for evidence about your program’s 
performance, then keep reading—this book is for you and your evalua-
tion team.
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Additional Resources
 • For accompanying material to this chapter and hyperlinks to additional 
 resources, please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (www 
. worldbank.org/ieinpractice).
 • For additional information on impact evaluations, see Khandker, Shahidur 
R., Gayatri B. Koolwal, and Hussain Samad. 2009. Handbook on Quantitative 
Methods of Program Evaluation. Washington, DC: World Bank.
 • For a good overview of randomized controlled trials, see Glennerster, Rachel, 
and Kudzai Takavarasha. 2013. Running Randomized Evaluations: A Practical 
Guide. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
 • Other resources on randomized controlled trials include the following:
  – Duﬂ o, E., R. Glennerster, and M. Kremer. 2007. “Using  Randomization 
in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit.” In Handbook of 
 Development Economics, volume 4, edited by T. Paul Schultz and John 
Strauss, 3895–962. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
  – Duﬂo, Esther, and Michael Kremer. 2008. “Use of Randomization in 
the Evaluation of Development Eff ectiveness.” In Vol. 7 of Evaluating 
 Development Eff ectiveness. Washington, DC: World Bank.
 • Other useful impact evaluation resources include the following:
  – Leeuw, Frans, and Jos Vaessen. 2009. Impact Evaluations and Development: 
NONIE Guidance on Impact Evaluation. Washington, DC: NONIE.
  – Ravallion, Martin. 2001. “The Mystery of the Vanishing Beneﬁts: 
Ms. Speedy Analyst’s Introduction to Evaluation.” World Bank Economic 
Review 15 (1): 115–40.
  – ———. 2007. “Evaluating Anti-Poverty Programs.” In Vol. 4 of Handbook of 
Development Economics, edited by T. Paul Schultz and John Strauss. 
Amsterdam: North Holland.
  – ———. 2009. “Evaluation in the Practice of Development.” World Bank 
Research Observer 24 (1): 29–53.
Notes
1. For an overview of conditional cash transfer programs and the inﬂuential role 
played by Mexico’s program and its impact evaluation, see Fiszbein and Schady 
(2009).
2. Administrative data are those data routinely collected as part of program admin-
istration and include information on costs, registration and transactions, usually 
as part of service delivery.
3. There many typologies for evaluations and evaluation questions. See Berk and 
Rossi (1998) and Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman (2003)
4. Quasi-experimental methods are impact evaluation methods that use a counter-
factual but are distinct from experimental methods in that quasi- experimental 
methods are not based on randomized assignment of the  intervention. See 
section 2 for a discussion of both types of methods.
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5. For an overview of qualitative research methods, see Patton (1990).
6. Adapted from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (1997, 97–98 and 102–3).
7. For a detailed discussion of cost-beneﬁt analysis, see Zerbe and Dively (1994); 
Brent (1996); Belli and others (2001); and Boardman and others (2001).
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Preparing for an Evaluation
CHAPTER 2
Initial Steps
This chapter reviews the initial steps in setting up an evaluation. The steps 
include constructing a theory of change that outlines how the project is sup-
posed to achieve the intended results, developing a results chain as a useful 
tool for outlining the theory of change, specifying the evaluation question(s), 
and selecting indicators to assess performance.
These steps are necessary to prepare for an evaluation. They are 
best taken at the outset of the program or reform being evaluated, when 
it is ﬁ rst being designed. The steps involve engaging a range of 
 stakeholders—from policy makers to program implementers—to forge a 
common vision of the program’s goals and how they will be achieved. 
This engagement builds consensus regarding the focus of the evaluation 
and the main questions to be answered, and will strengthen links 
between the evaluation, program implementation, and policy. Applying 
the steps lends clarity and speciﬁcity that are useful both for developing 
a good impact evaluation and for designing and implementing an eff ec-
tive  program. Each step is clearly deﬁned and articulated within the 
logic model embodied in the results chain—from a precise speciﬁcation 
of goals and questions, to the articulation of ideas embodied in the the-
ory of change, to the identiﬁ cation of the outcomes the program aims to 
provide. A clear speciﬁ cation of the particular indicators that will be 
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used to measure program success is needed not only to ensure that the 
evaluation is focused, but also that the program has well-deﬁ ned objec-
tives. It also provides a basis for determining anticipated eff ect sizes 
from the program. These parameters are essential to establishing tech-
nical elements of the evaluation, including the size of the sample 
required for the evaluation and power calculations, as reviewed in 
chapter 15.
In most impact evaluations, it will be important to include an assess-
ment of cost-beneﬁ t or cost-eff ectiveness, as discussed in chapter 1. 
Policy makers are always concerned with learning not only which 
 programs or reforms are eff ective, but also at what cost. This is a cru-
cial  consideration for informing decisions about whether a program 
could  be  scaled up and replicated—a concern that is central to policy 
decisions.
Constructing a Theory of Change
A theory of change is a description of how an intervention is supposed to 
deliver the desired results. It describes the causal logic of how and why a 
particular program, program modality, or design innovation will reach its 
intended outcomes. A theory of change is a key underpinning of any impact 
evaluation, given the cause-and-eff ect focus of the research. As one of the 
ﬁrst steps in the evaluation design, constructing a theory of change can help 
specify the research questions.
Theories of change depict a sequence of events leading to outcomes; 
they explore the conditions and assumptions needed for the change to 
take place, make explicit the causal logic behind the program, and map 
the program interventions along logical causal pathways. Working with 
the program’s stakeholders to put together a theory of change can clar-
ify and improve program design. This is especially important in programs 
that seek to inﬂuence behavior: theories of change can help disentan-
gle the intervention’s inputs and activities, the outputs that are delivered, 
and  the outcomes that stem from expected behavioral changes among 
beneﬁciaries.
The best time to develop a theory of change for a program is at the 
beginning of the design process, when stakeholders can be brought 
together to develop a common vision for the program, its goals, and the 
path to achieving those goals. Stakeholders can then start implementing 
the program from a common understanding of the program, its objectives, 
and how it works.
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Program designers should also review the literature for accounts of 
experience with similar programs, and verify the contexts and assumptions 
behind the causal pathways in the theory of change they are outlining. For 
example, in the case of the project in Mexico (described in box 2.1) that 
replaced dirt ﬂ oors with cement ﬂ oors, the literature provided valuable 
information on how parasites are transmitted and how parasite infestation 
leads to childhood diarrhea.
Box 2.1: Articulating a Theory of Change: From Cement Floors to 
Happiness in Mexico
In their evaluation of the Piso Firme or “fi rm 
fl oor” project, Cattaneo and others (2009) 
examined the impact of housing improve-
ments on health and welfare. Both the proj-
ect and the evaluation were motivated by a 
clear theory of change.
The objective of the Piso Firme project is 
to improve the living standards—especially 
the health—of vulnerable groups living in 
densely populated, low-income areas of 
Mexico. The program was fi rst started in the 
northern State of Coahuila and was based on 
a situational assessment conducted by the 
state government.
The program’s results chain is clear. Eligible 
neighborhoods are surveyed door to door, 
and households are offered up to 50 square 
meters of cement. The government purchases 
and delivers the cement, and the households 
and community volunteers supply the labor to 
install the fl oor. The output is the construction 
of a cement fl oor, which can be completed in 
about a day. The expected outcomes of the 
improved home environment include cleanli-
ness, health, and happiness.
The rationale for this results chain is 
that dirt fl oors are a vector for parasites 
because they are harder to keep clean. 
Parasites live and breed in feces and 
can be ingested by humans when they are 
tracked into the home by animals or peo-
ple. Evidence shows that young children 
who live in houses with dirt fl oors are more 
likely to be infected with intestinal para-
sites, which can cause diarrhea and malnu-
trition, often leading to impaired cognitive 
development or even death. Cement 
fl oors interrupt the transmission of para-
sitic infestations. They also control tem-
perature  better and are more aesthetically 
pleasing.
Those expected outcomes informed 
the research questions that Cattaneo and 
others (2009) addressed in the evalua-
tion. They hypothesized that replacing dirt 
fl oors with cement fl oors would reduce 
the  incidence of diarrhea, malnutrition, and 
micronutrient defi ciency. In turn, improved 
health and nutrition should result in 
improved  cognitive development in young 
children. The researchers also anticipated 
and tested for improvements in adult wel-
fare, as measured by people’s increased 
satisfaction with their housing situation and 
lower rates of depression and perceived 
stress.
Source: Cattaneo and others 2009.
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Developing a Results Chain
A results chain is one way of depicting a theory of change. Other 
approaches include theoretical models, logic models, logical frameworks, 
and outcome models. Each of these models includes the basic elements of 
a theory of change: a causal chain, a speciﬁ cation of outside conditions 
and inﬂuences, and key assumptions. In this book, we will use the results 
chain model because we ﬁnd that it is the simplest and clearest model to 
outline the  theory of change in the operational context of development 
programs.
A results chain establishes the causal logic from the initiation of the 
program, beginning with resources available, to the end, looking at long-
term goals. It sets out a logical, plausible outline of how a sequence of 
inputs, activities, and outputs for which a program is directly responsible 
interacts with behavior to establish pathways through which impacts 
are  achieved (ﬁgure 2.1). A basic results chain will map the following 
elements:
• Inputs. Resources at the disposal of the project, including staff  and 
budget.
• Activities. Actions taken or work performed to convert inputs into 
outputs.
• Outputs. The tangible goods and services that the project activities pro-
duce; these are directly under the control of the implementing agency.
• Outcomes. Results likely to be achieved once the beneﬁciary population 
uses the project outputs; these are usually achieved in the short to medi-
um term and are usually not directly under the control of the implement-
ing agency.
• Final outcomes. The ﬁnal results achieved indicating whether project 
goals were met. Typically, ﬁ nal outcomes can be inﬂuenced by multiple 
factors and are achieved over a longer period of time.
The results chain covers both implementation and results. Implementation 
concerns the work delivered by the project, including inputs, activities, 
and outputs. These are the areas under the direct responsibility of the 
project that are usually monitored to verify whether the project is deliv-
ering the goods and services as intended. Results consist of the out-
comes and ﬁnal outcomes, which are not under the direct control of the 
project and which are contingent on behavioral changes by program 
beneﬁciaries. In other words, they depend on the interactions between 
Key Concept
A results chain sets 
out the sequence of 
inputs, activities, and 
outputs that are 
expected to improve 
outcomes and fi nal 
outcomes.
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the supply side (implementation) and the demand side (beneﬁciaries). 
These are the areas typically subject to impact evaluation to measure 
eff ectiveness.
A good results chain will help surface assumptions and risks implicit in 
the theory of change. Policy makers are best placed to articulate the causal 
logic and the assumptions on which it relies—as well as the risks that 
may aff ect the achievement of intended results. The team that conducts 
the evaluation should draw out these implicit assumptions and risks in 
consultation with policy makers. A good results chain will also reference 
evidence from the literature regarding the performance of similar 
programs.
Results chains are useful for all projects—regardless of whether or not 
they will include an impact evaluation—because they allow policy makers 
and program managers to make program goals explicit, thus helping to 
clarify the causal logic and sequence of events behind a program. They 
can also identify gaps and weak links in program design and therefore can 
help improve program design. Results chains also facilitate monitoring 
and evaluation by making evident what information needs to be moni-
tored along each link in the chain to track program implementation and 
what outcome indicators need to be included when the project is 
evaluated.
Figure 2.1 The Elements of a Results Chain
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mobilized to 
support 
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Specifying Evaluation Questions
A clear evaluation question is the starting point of any eff ective evaluation. 
The formulation of an evaluation question focuses the research to ensure 
that it is tailored to the policy interest at hand. In the case of an impact eval-
uation, it needs to be structured as a testable hypothesis. The impact evalu-
ation then generates credible evidence to answer that question. As you will 
remember, the basic impact evaluation question is, what is the impact 
(or causal eff ect) of a program on an outcome of interest? The focus is on the 
impact: that is, the changes directly attributable to a program, program 
modality, or design innovation.
The evaluation question needs to be guided by the core policy interest at 
hand. As discussed in chapter 1, impact evaluations can explore a range 
of  questions. The evaluation team should clarify which question will be 
examined as a ﬁ rst step, drawing on the theory of change before looking at 
how the evaluation will be conducted.
Traditionally, impact evaluations have focused on the impact of a fully 
implemented program on ﬁ nal outcomes, compared with the results 
observed in a comparison group that did not beneﬁ t from the program. The 
use of impact evaluations is expanding. The evaluation team can ask, is the 
key evaluation question the “classic” question about the eff ectiveness of a 
program in changing ﬁ nal outcomes? Or is it about testing whether one pro-
gram modality is more cost eff ective than another? Or is it about introducing 
a program design innovation that is expected to change behaviors, such as 
enrollment? New approaches to impact evaluation are being introduced in 
creative ways to tackle questions of policy concern across a range of disci-
plines (see box 2.2).
In an impact evaluation, the evaluation question needs to be framed as a 
well-deﬁ ned, testable hypothesis. You need to be able to frame the question in 
such a way that you can quantify the diff erence between the results obtained 
contrasting the treatment and comparison groups. The results chain can be 
used as a basis for formulating the hypothesis that you would like to test using 
the impact evaluation. As illustrated in box 2.3, there are often a few hypoth-
eses associated with the program, but not all can or should be explored in an 
impact evaluation. In the mathematics curriculum example in box 2.2, the 
evaluation question was derived from fundamental elements of the theory of 
change and formulated as a clear, testable, and quantiﬁ able hypothesis: What 
is the eff ect of a new mathematics curriculum on test scores? In the example 
that we will apply throughout the book, the Health Insurance Subsidy 
Program (HISP), the evaluation question is, what is the eff ect of HISP on 
poor households’ out-of-pocket health expenditures?
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Box 2.2: Mechanism Experiments
A mechanism experiment is an impact evalua-
tion that tests a particular causal mechanism 
within the theory of change. Say you have 
identifi ed an issue and a possible program to 
remedy the issue. You are thinking of designing 
an evaluation to test the effectiveness of the 
program. Should your evaluation directly test 
the impact of the program? A recent stream of 
thought argues that such a program evaluation 
might not always be the best way to start out, 
and that in some cases it might be preferable 
not to carry out a program evaluation but rather 
to test some of the underlying assumptions or 
mechanisms. Mechanism experiments do not 
test a program: they test a causal mechanism 
that underlies the choice of a program.
For example, you might be worried that 
people living in poor neighborhoods of a city 
have higher rates of obesity than people liv-
ing in more affl uent parts of the same city. 
After some research, you observe that poor 
neighborhoods have fewer shops and stalls 
that sell fresh fruits and vegetables and 
other nutritious food. You think that this lack 
of supply may be contributing to obesity, and 
that you may be able to remedy the situation 
by offering subsidies to greengrocers to set 
up more sales points. A simple results chain 
is outlined below (see fi gure B2.2.1).
A program evaluation would focus on test-
ing the impact of subsidies to greengrocers 
in a set of poor neighborhoods. By contrast, a 
mechanism experiment might more directly 
test your underlying assumptions. For exam-
ple, it might test the following assumption: If 
residents of poor neighborhoods have more 
access to nutritious food, they will eat more 
of it. One way of testing this would be to dis-
tribute a free weekly basket of fruits and veg-
etables to a group of residents and compare 
their intake of fruits and vegetables to that of 
residents who do not receive the free basket. 
If you fi nd no differences in fruit and vegeta-
ble intakes in this mechanism experiment, it 
is unlikely that providing subsidies to green-
grocers would have a signifi cant impact 
(continued)
INPUTS
• Funds. • Subsidies to
  greengrocers.
• Increased number of
  shops/stalls that sell
  fruits and vegetables.
• Increased availability
  of nutritious food in
  poor neighborhoods.
• Residents of poor
  neighborhoods eat
  more nutritious food.
• Lower prevalence
  of obesity among
  residents of poor
  neighborhoods.
ACTIVITIES OUTPUTS OUTCOMES FINAL
OUTCOMES
Implementation (SUPPLY SIDE) Results (DEMAND SIDE + SUPPLY SIDE)
Figure B2.2.1 Identifying a Mechanism Experiment from a Longer Results Chain
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Box 2.2: Mechanism Experiments (continued)
either, because one of the underlying causal 
mechanisms is not working.
A mechanism experiment should normally 
be much cheaper to implement than a full 
program evaluation because you can carry it 
out at a smaller scale. In the obesity example, 
it would be quite expensive to provide subsi-
dies to greengrocers in many neighborhoods 
and survey a large number of residents in 
those neighborhoods. By contrast, the free 
grocery baskets would be much cheaper, and 
it would be suffi cient to enroll a few hundred 
families. If the mechanism experiment shows 
that the mechanism works, you would still 
need to carry out a policy experiment to 
assess whether the subsidies are an effec-
tive way of making fruits and vegetables avail-
able to residents of poor neighborhoods.
Source: Ludwig, Kling, and Mullainathan 2011.
Box 2.3: A High School Mathematics Reform: Formulating a 
Results Chains and Evaluation Question
Imagine that the ministry of education of 
country A is thinking of introducing a new 
high school mathematics curriculum. This cur-
riculum is designed to be more intuitive for 
teachers and students, improve  students’ per-
formance on standardized mathematics tests, 
and ultimately, improve students’ ability to 
complete high school and access better jobs. 
The following results chain outlines the  theory 
of change for the program (see fi gure B2.3.1).
• The inputs include staff from the minis-
try of education to spearhead the 
reform, high school mathematics teach-
ers, a budget to develop the new math 
curriculum, and the municipal facilities 
where the mathematics teachers will be 
trained.
• The program’s activities consist of 
 designing the new mathematics curricu-
lum; developing a teacher training pro-
gram; training the teachers; and 
commissioning, printing, and distributing 
new textbooks.
• The outputs are the number of teach-
ers trained, the number of textbooks 
 delivered to classrooms, and the adapta-
tion of standardized tests to the new 
curriculum.
• The short-term outcomes consist of 
teachers’ use of the new methods and 
textbooks in their classrooms and their 
application of the new tests.
• The medium-term outcomes are improve-
ments in student performance on the 
standardized mathematics tests.
• Final outcomes are increased high school 
completion rates and higher employment 
rates and earnings for graduates.
Several hypotheses underlie the theory of 
change:
• Trained teachers use the new curriculum 
effectively.
(continued)
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  The Health Insurance Subsidy Program (HISP): An 
Introduction
The Health Insurance Subsidy Program (HISP) is a ﬁ ctional case of a 
government undertaking large-scale health sector reform. Questions 
related to this case will be used throughout the book. The Impact 
Evaluation in Practice website (www.worldbank.org/ieinpractice) con-
tains solutions for the HISP case study questions, a data set, and the anal-
ysis code in Stata, as well as an online technical companion that provides 
a more formal treatment of data analysis.
Box 2.3: A High School Mathematics Reform: Formulating a Results Chains and 
Evaluation Question (continued)
• If the teachers are trained and the text-
books are distributed, these will be applied 
and the students will follow the curriculum.
• The new curriculum is superior to the old 
one in imparting knowledge of 
mathematics.
• If implementation is carried out as 
planned, then the math test results will 
improve by 5 points, on average.
• Performance in high school mathemat-
ics influences high school completion 
rates, employment prospects, and 
earnings.
The core evaluation question developed 
by the evaluation team of policy makers in 
the ministry of education and the research-
ers engaged in determining the effective-
ness of the program is, what is the effect of 
the new mathematics curriculum on test 
scores? This question goes to the heart of 
the policy interest concerning the effective-
ness of the new curriculum.
INPUTS
• Budget for new
  mathematics
  program.
• Staffing from
  ministry of
  education, high
  school teachers.
• Municipal
  training facilities.
• Design of new
  curriculum.
• Teacher training.
• Development,
  printing,
  distribution of
  new textbooks.
• 5,000 high school
  mathematics
  teachers trained.
• 100,000 textbooks
  delivered to
  classrooms.
• Teachers using the
  textbooks and new
  curriculum in class.
• Students following
  curriculum.
• Improved student
  performance on
  mathematics tests.
• Improved
  completion rates.
• Higher earnings.
• Higher employment.
ACTIVITIES OUTPUTS OUTCOMES
FINAL
OUTCOMES
Implementation (SUPPLY SIDE) Results (DEMAND SIDE + SUPPLY SIDE)
Figure B2.3.1 A Results Chain for the High School Mathematics Curriculum Reform
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The ultimate objective of HISP is improving the health of the coun-
try’s population. The innovative—and potentially costly—HISP is being 
piloted. The government is concerned that poor rural households are 
unable to aff ord the costs of basic health care, with detrimental conse-
quences for their health. To address this issue, HISP subsidizes health 
insurance for poor rural households, covering costs related to primary 
health care and medicine. The central objective of HISP is to reduce the 
cost of health care for poor families and, ultimately, to improve health 
outcomes. Policy makers are considering expanding HISP to cover the 
whole country, which would cost hundreds of  millions of dollars.
The results chain for HISP is illustrated in ﬁ gure 2.2. The hypotheses 
related to the HISP reform assume the following: that households will 
enroll in the program once it is off ered, that enrollment in the  program 
will lower households’ out-of-pocket health expenditures, that costs are 
preventing rural populations from accessing available health care and 
medicine, and that out-of-pocket expenditures on health-related costs are 
a core contributor to poverty and poor health outcomes.
The key evaluation question is this: What is the impact of HISP on 
poor households’ out-of-pocket health expenditures? Throughout the 
book and in the online material, we will answer this same evaluation 
question with regard to HISP several times, using diff erent methodologi-
cal approaches. You will see that diff erent—and sometimes conﬂ icting—
answers will emerge, depending on what evaluation methodology is 
used.
Figure 2.2 The HISP Results Chain
INPUTS
• Budget for HISP
  pilot.
• Network of health
  facilities.
• Staff in central and
  local government
  health offices.
• Design of HISP
  benefits and
  operation.
• Training of staff in
   rural clinics in pilot
   villages.
• Establishment of
  payments and
  management
  information systems.
• Launch of HISP in 100
  rural pilot villages.
• Information and
  education campaign.
• Health facilities in
  100 rural pilot
   villages participating
   in program.
• Campaign to reach
  4,959 eligible
  households in pilot
  villages.
• Number and percentage
  of eligible households
  enrolled in year 1.
• Lower health
  expenditures for poor,
  rural households.
• Improved access to
  primary care.
• Satisfaction with HISP
  program.
• Improved
  health
  outcomes.
ACTIVITIES OUTPUTS OUTCOMES
FINAL
OUTCOMES
Implementation (SUPPLY SIDE) Results (DEMAND SIDE + SUPPLY SIDE)
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Selecting Outcome and Performance Indicators
A clear evaluation question needs to be accompanied by the speciﬁ cation of 
which outcome measures will be used to assess results, including in the case of 
multiple outcomes. The outcome measures selected will be used to determine 
whether or not a given program or reform is successful. They are also the 
 indicators that can be referenced in applying power calculations used to deter-
mine the sample sizes needed for the evaluation, as discussed in chapter 15.
Once the main indicators of interest are selected, clear objectives in 
terms of program success need to be established. This step amounts to 
determining the anticipated eff ect of the program on the core outcome indi-
cators that have been selected. Eff ect sizes are the changes expected as a 
result of the program or the reform, such as the change in test scores or the 
take-up rate of a new type of insurance policy. Expected eff ect sizes are 
the basis for conducting power calculations.
It is critical to have the main stakeholders in the evaluation team (both 
the research team and the policy team) agree on both the primary outcome 
indicators of interest in the impact evaluation and the eff ect sizes antici-
pated as a result of the program or innovation (for more on the evaluation 
team, see chapter 12). These are the indicators that will be used to judge 
program success and form the basis for the power calculations. Impact eval-
uations can fail because they do not have sample sizes large enough to detect 
the changes that have resulted from the program; they are “underpowered.” 
Minimum expected eff ect sizes should be determined to establish basic 
 criteria for success of the program or innovation. When data are available, 
ex ante simulations can be conducted to look at diff erent outcome scenarios 
to benchmark the type of eff ect sizes that can be expected across a range of 
indicators. Ex ante simulations can also be used to look at initial measures of 
cost-beneﬁ t or cost-eff ectiveness and to compare alternative interventions 
for generating changes in the outcomes of interest.
A clearly articulated results chain provides a useful map for selecting the 
indicators that will be measured along the chain. They will include indica-
tors used both to monitor program implementation and to evaluate results. 
Again, it is useful to engage program stakeholders from both the policy and 
research teams in selecting these indicators, to ensure that those selected 
are good measures of program performance. A widely used rule of thumb to 
ensure that the indicators used are good measures is summed up by the 
acronym SMART. Indicators should be the following:
• Speciﬁc: To measure the information required as closely as possible
• Measurable: To ensure that the information can be readily obtained
Key Concept
Good indicators are 
SMART (specifi c, 
measurable, 
attributable, realistic, 
and targeted).
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• Attributable: To ensure that each measure is linked to the project’s eff orts
• Realistic: To ensure that the data can be obtained in a timely fashion, with 
reasonable frequency, and at reasonable cost
• Targeted: To the objective population.
When choosing indicators, remember that it is important to identify 
indicators all along the results chain, and not just at the level of outcomes, so 
that you will be able to track the causal logic of any program outcomes that 
are observed. Indeed, with implementation evaluations that focus on test-
ing two or more design alternatives, the results of interest may occur earlier 
in the results chain, as an earlier output or early-stage outcome. Even if you 
are only interested in outcome measures for evaluation, it is still important 
to track implementation indicators, so you can determine whether inter-
ventions have been carried out as planned, whether they have reached their 
intended beneﬁciaries, and whether they have arrived on time. Without 
these indicators all along the results chain, the impact evaluation risks 
 producing a “black box” that identiﬁes whether or not the predicted results 
materialized; however, it will not be able to explain why that was the case.
Checklist: Getting Data for Your Indicators
As a ﬁ nal checklist once indicators are selected, it is useful to consider the 
arrangements for producing the data to measure the indicators. A full 
 discussion of where to get data for your evaluation is provided in Section 4. 
This checklist covers practical arrangements needed to ensure that you 
can  produce each of the indicators reliably and on time (adapted from 
UNDP 2009):
¸ Are the indicators (outputs and outcomes) clearly speciﬁ ed? These are 
drawn from the core evaluation questions and should be consistent with 
program design documents and the results chain.
¸ Are the indicators SMART (speciﬁ c, measurable, attributable, realistic, 
and targeted)?
¸ What is the source of data for each of the indicators? There needs to be 
clarity on the source from which data will be obtained, such as a survey, 
a review, or administrative data.
¸ With what frequency will data be collected? Include a timeline.
¸ Who is responsible for collecting the data? Delineate who is responsible 
for organizing the data collection, verifying data quality and source, and 
ensuring compliance with ethical standards.
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¸ Who is responsible for analysis and reporting? Specify the frequency of 
analysis, analysis method, and responsibility for reporting.
¸ What resources are needed to produce the data? Ensure that the resourc-
es required are clear and committed to producing the data, which is often 
the most expensive part of an evaluation if collecting primary data.
¸ Is there appropriate documentation? Plans should be in place for how 
the data will be documented, including using a registry and ensuring 
anonymity.
¸ What are the risks involved? Consider the risks and assumptions in 
 carrying out the planned monitoring and evaluation activities, and 
how  they might aff ect the timing and quality of the data and of the 
indicators.
Additional Resources
• For accompanying material to this chapter and hyperlinks to additional 
 resources, please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (www 
. worldbank.org/ieinpractice).
• A theory of change ﬁ gure, a results chain template, and examples of 
indicators for results-based ﬁ nancing are presented in Module 1 of the 
World Bank’s Impact Evaluation Toolkit (www.worldbank.org/health 
/ impactevaluationtoolkit).
• A good review of theories of change appears in Imas, Linda G. M., and 
Ray C. Rist. 2009. The Road to Results: Designing and Conducting Eff ective 
Development Evaluations. Washington, DC: World Bank.
• For discussions on how to select performance indicators, see the following:
  – Imas, Linda G. M., and Ray C. Rist. 2009. The Road to Results: Design-
ing and Conducting Eff ective Development Evaluations. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
  – Kusek, Jody Zall, and Ray C. Rist. 2004. Ten Steps to a Results-Based 
 Monitoring and Evaluation System. Washington, DC: World Bank.
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HOW TO EVALUATE
Part 2
Part 2 of this book explains what impact evaluations do, what questions they 
answer, what methods are available for conducting them, and the advantages 
and disadvantages of each. The approach to impact evaluation advocated in 
this book favors the selection of the most rigorous method compatible with a 
program’s operational characteristics. The menu of impact evaluation options 
discussed includes randomized assignment, instrumental variables, regres-
sion discontinuity design, difference-in-differences, and matching. All of these 
approaches share the objective of constructing valid comparison groups so that 
the true impacts of a program can be estimated.
We begin in chapter 3 by introducing the concept of the counterfactual as the 
crux of any impact evaluation, explaining the properties that the estimate of 
the counterfactual must have, and providing examples of invalid or counter-
feit estimates of the counterfactual. Chapters 4–8 then discuss each method-
ology,  covering randomized assignment in chapter 4, instrumental variables in 
 chapter 5, regression discontinuity design in chapter 6, difference-in- differences 
in chapter 7, and matching in chapter 8. We discuss why and how each method 
can produce a valid estimate of the counterfactual, in which policy context each 
can be implemented, and the main limitations of each method. We illustrate the 
use of each method using specific real-world examples of impact evaluations 
that have used these methods, as well as the Health Insurance Subsidy Program 
(HISP) case study that was introduced in chapter 2. In chapter 9, we discuss 
how to address problems that can arise during implementation,  recognizing that 
impact evaluations are often not implemented exactly as designed. In this con-
text, we review common challenges including imperfect compliance, spillovers, 
and attrition, and provide guidance on how to address these issues. Chapter 
10 concludes with guidance on evaluations of multifaceted programs, notably 
those with different treatment levels and multiple treatment arms.
Throughout part 2, you will have a chance to apply methods and test your under-
standing using the HISP case study. Remember that the key evaluation question 
for HISP policymakers is, what is the impact of HISP on poor households’ out-
of-pocket health expenditures? We will use the HISP data set to illustrate each 
evaluation method and try to answer this question. You should assume that the 
data have already been properly assembled so as to eliminate any data-related 
problems. The book will provide you with the results of the analysis, which you 
will be asked to interpret. Specifi cally, your task will be to determine why the 
estimate of the impact of HISP changes with each method and to decide which 
results are suffi ciently reliable to serve as a justifi cation for (or against) expand-
ing HISP. Solutions to the questions are provided on the Impact Evaluation in 
Practice website (www.worldbank.org/ieinpractice). If you are interested in rep-
licating the analysis, you will also fi nd the data set, analysis code in the Stata 
software, and a technical companion that provides a more formal treatment of 
data analysis on this website.
Part 3 begins with how to use the rules of program operation—namely, a 
 program’s available resources, criteria for selecting benefi ciaries, and timing 
for implementation—as the basis for selecting an impact evaluation method. 
A  simple framework is set out to determine which of the impact evaluation 
methodologies presented in part 2 is most suitable for a given program, depend-
ing on its operational rules.
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CHAPTER 3
Causal Inference and 
Counterfactuals
Causal Inference
We begin by examining two concepts that are integral to the process of 
 conducting accurate and reliable impact evaluations—causal inference and 
counterfactuals.
Many policy questions involve cause-and-eff ect relationships: Does 
teacher training improve students’ test scores? Do conditional cash transfer 
programs cause better health outcomes in children? Do vocational training 
programs increase trainees’ incomes?
Impact evaluations seek to answer such cause-and-eff ect questions 
 precisely. Assessing the impact of a program on a set of  outcomes is the 
equivalent of assessing the causal eff ect of the program on those outcomes.1
Although cause-and-eff ect questions are common, answering them accu-
rately can be challenging. In the context of a vocational training program, for 
example, simply observing that a trainee’s income increases after she has 
completed such a program is not suffi  cient to establish causality. The trainee’s 
income might have increased even if she had not taken the training—because 
of her own eff orts, because of changing labor market conditions, or because 
of many other factors that can aff ect income. Impact evaluations help us over-
come the challenge of establishing causality by empirically establishing to 
what extent a particular program—and that program alone— contributed to 
Key Concept
Impact evaluations 
establish the extent to 
which a program—and 
that program 
alone—caused a 
change in an outcome.
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the change in an outcome. To establish causality between a program and an 
outcome, we use impact evaluation methods to rule out the possibility that 
any factors other than the program of interest explain the observed impact.
The answer to the basic impact evaluation question—what is the impact 
or causal eff ect of a program (P) on an outcome of interest (Y)?—is given by 
the basic impact evaluation formula:
Δ = (Y | P = 1) − (Y | P = 0).
This formula states that the causal impact (Δ) of a program (P) on an 
outcome (Y) is the diff erence between the outcome (Y) with the program (in 
other words, when P = 1) and the same outcome (Y) without the program 
(that is, when P = 0).
For example, if P denotes a vocational training program and Y denotes 
income, then the causal impact of the vocational training program (Δ) is the 
diff erence between a person’s income (Y) after participation in the voca-
tional training program (in other words, when P = 1) and the same person’s 
income (Y) at the same point in time if he or she had not participated in the 
program (in other words, when P = 0). To put it another way, we would like 
to measure income at the same point in time for the same unit of observa-
tion (a person, in this case), but in two diff erent states of the world. If it 
were possible to do this, we would be observing how much income the 
same individual would have had at the same point in time both with and 
without the program, so that the only possible explanation for any diff er-
ence in that person’s income would be the program. By comparing the 
same individual with herself at the same moment, we would have managed 
to eliminate any outside factors that might also have explained the diff er-
ence in outcomes. We could then be conﬁdent that the relationship between 
the vocational training program and the change in income is causal.
The basic impact evaluation formula is valid for any unit that is being 
analyzed—a person, a household, a community, a business, a school, a hospi-
tal, or other unit of observation that may receive or be aff ected by a program. 
The formula is also valid for any outcome (Y) that is related to the program 
at hand. Once we measure the two key components of this formula—the 
outcome (Y) both with the program and without it—we can answer any 
question about the program’s impact.
The Counterfactual
As discussed, we can think of the impact (Δ) of a program as the diff er-
ence in outcomes (Y) for the same unit (person, household, community, 
and so on) with and without participation in a program. Yet we know 
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that  measuring the same unit in two diff erent states at the same time is 
impossible. At any given moment in time, a unit either participated in 
the program or did not participate. The unit cannot be observed simul-
taneously in two diff erent states (in other words, with and without the 
program). This is called the counterfactual problem: How do we mea-
sure what would have happened if the other circumstance had pre-
vailed? Although we can observe and measure the outcome (Y) for a 
program participant (Y | P = 1), there are no data to establish what her 
outcome would have been in the absence of the program (Y | P = 0). In 
the basic impact evaluation formula, the term (Y | P = 0) represents the 
counterfactual. We can think of this as what would have happened to 
the outcome if a person or unit of observation had not participated in 
the program.
For example, imagine that “Mr. Unfortunate” takes a pill and then dies 
ﬁve days later. Just because Mr. Unfortunate died after taking the pill, 
you cannot conclude that the pill caused his death. Maybe he was very 
sick when he took the pill, and it was the illness that caused his death, 
rather than the pill. Inferring causality will require that you rule out 
other potential factors that could have aff ected the outcome under con-
sideration. In the simple example of determining whether taking the pill 
caused Mr.  Unfortunate’s death, an evaluator would need to establish 
what would have happened to Mr. Unfortunate if he had not taken the 
pill. Since Mr. Unfortunate did in fact take the pill, it is not possible to 
observe directly what would have happened if he had not done so. What 
would have happened to him if he had not taken the pill is the counter-
factual. In order to identify the impact of the pill, the evaluator’s main 
challenge is determining what the counterfactual state of the world for 
Mr. Unfortunate actually looks like (see box 3.1 for another example).
When conducting an impact evaluation, it is relatively straightforward 
to obtain the ﬁrst term of the basic formula (Y | P = 1)—the outcome with a 
 program (also known as under treatment). We simply measure the outcome 
of interest for the program participant. However, we cannot directly 
observe the second term of the formula (Y | P = 0) for the participant. 
We  need to ﬁll in this missing piece of information by estimating the 
counterfactual.
To help us think through this key concept of estimating the counterfac-
tual, we turn to another hypothetical example. Solving the counterfactual 
problem would be possible if the evaluator could ﬁ nd a “perfect clone” for a 
program participant (ﬁgure 3.1). For example, let us say that Mr. Fulanito 
starts receiving US$12 in pocket money allowance, and we want to measure 
the impact of this treatment on his consumption of candies. If you could iden-
tify a perfect clone for Mr. Fulanito, the evaluation would be easy: you could 
Key Concept
The counterfactual is 
what would have 
happened—what the 
outcome (Y ) would 
have been for a 
program participant—
in the absence of the 
program (P ).
Key Concept
Since we cannot 
directly observe the 
counterfactual, we 
must estimate it.
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Box 3.1: The Counterfactual Problem: “Miss Unique” and the Cash 
Transfer Program
“Miss Unique” is a newborn baby girl 
whose mother is offered a monthly cash 
transfer so long as she ensures that Miss 
Unique receives regular health checkups at 
the local health center, that she is immu-
nized, and that her growth is monitored. 
The government posits that the cash trans-
fer will motivate Miss Unique’s mother to 
seek the health services required by the 
program and will help Miss Unique grow 
strong and tall. For its impact evaluation of 
the cash transfer, the government selects 
height as an outcome indicator for long-
term health.
Assume that you are able to measure 
Miss Unique’s height at the age of 3. Ideally, 
to evaluate the impact of the program, you 
would want to measure Miss Unique’s 
height at the age of 3 with her mother hav-
ing received the cash transfer, and also Miss 
Unique’s height at the age of 3 had her 
mother not received the cash transfer. You 
would then compare the two heights to 
establish impact. If you were able to com-
pare Miss Unique’s height at the age of 3 
with the program to Miss Unique’s height at 
the age of 3 without the program, you would 
know that any difference in height had been 
caused only by the cash transfer program. 
Because everything else about Miss Unique 
would be the same, there would be no other 
characteristics that could explain the differ-
ence in height.
Unfortunately, however, it is impossible 
to observe Miss Unique both with and with-
out the cash transfer program: either her 
family follows the conditions (checkups, 
immunizations, growth monitoring) and 
receives the cash transfer or it does not. In 
other words, we cannot observe what the 
counterfactual is. Since Miss Unique’s 
mother actually followed the conditions and 
received the cash transfer, we cannot know 
how tall Miss Unique would have been had 
her mother not received the cash transfer.
Finding an appropriate comparison for 
Miss Unique will be challenging because 
she is, precisely, unique. Her exact socio-
economic background, genetic attributes, 
and personal and household characteristics 
cannot be found in anybody else. If we were 
simply to compare Miss Unique with a child 
who is not enrolled in the cash transfer 
 program—say, “Mr. Inimitable”—the com-
parison may not be adequate. Miss Unique 
cannot be exactly identical to Mr. Inimitable. 
Miss Unique and Mr. Inimitable may not look 
the same, they may not live in the same 
place, they may not have the same parents, 
and they may not have been the same height 
when they were born. So if we observe that 
Mr. Inimitable is shorter than Miss Unique at 
the age of 3, we cannot know whether the 
difference is due to the cash transfer pro-
gram or to one of the many other differences 
between these two children.
just compare the number of candies eaten by Mr. Fulanito (say, 6) when he 
receives the pocket money with the number of candies eaten by his clone 
(say, 4), who receives no pocket money. In this case, the impact of the pocket 
money would be 2 candies: the diff erence between the number of can-
dies consumed under treatment (6) and the number of candies consumed 
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without treatment (4). In reality, we know that it is impossible to identify 
 perfect clones: even between genetically identical twins, there are important 
diff erences.
Estimating the Counterfactual
The key to estimating the counterfactual for program participants is to 
move from the individual or unit level to the group level. Although no per-
fect clone exists for a single unit, we can rely on statistical properties to 
generate two groups of units that, if their numbers are large enough, are 
statistically indistinguishable from each other at the group level. The 
group that participates in the program is known as the treatment group, 
and its outcome is (Y | P = 1) after it has participated in the program. The 
statistically identical comparison group (sometimes called the control 
group) is the group that remains unaff ected by the program, and allows us 
to estimate the counterfactual outcome (Y | P = 0): that is, the outcome 
that would have prevailed for the treatment group had it not received the 
program.
So in practice, the challenge of an impact evaluation is to identify a 
treatment group and a comparison group that are statistically identical, 
on average, in the absence of the program. If the two groups are identi-
cal, with the sole exception that one group participates in the program 
Figure 3.1 The Perfect Clone
Beneficiary Clone
6 candies 4 candies
 Impact = 6 – 4 = 2 candies
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and the other does not, then we can be sure that any diff erence in out-
comes must be due to the program. Finding such comparison groups is 
the crux of any impact evaluation, regardless of what type of program is 
being evaluated. Simply put, without a comparison group that yields an 
accurate estimate of the counterfactual, the true impact of a program 
cannot be established.
The main challenge for identifying impacts, then, is to ﬁ nd a valid com-
parison group that has the same characteristics as the treatment group in the 
absence of a program. Speciﬁcally, the treatment and comparison groups 
must be the same in at least three ways.
 First, the average characteristics of the treatment group and the com-
parison group must be identical in the absence of the program.2 Although 
it is not necessary that individual units in the treatment group have “per-
fect clones” in the comparison group, on average the characteristics of 
treatment and comparison groups should be the same. For example, the 
average age of units in the treatment group should be the same as in the 
comparison group.
Second, the treatment should not aff ect the comparison group either 
directly or indirectly. In the pocket money example, the treatment group 
should not transfer resources to the comparison group (direct eff ect) or 
aff ect the price of candy in the local markets (indirect eff ect). For example, 
if we want to isolate the impact of pocket money on candy consumption, the 
treatment group should not also be off ered more trips to the candy store 
than the comparison group; otherwise, we would be unable to distinguish 
whether additional candy consumption is due to the pocket money or to the 
extra trips to the store.
Third, the outcomes of units in the control group should change the same 
way as outcomes in the treatment group, if both groups were given the pro-
gram (or not). In this sense, the treatment and comparison groups should 
react to the program in the same way. For example, if incomes of people in 
the treatment group increased by US$100 thanks to a training program, 
then incomes of people in the comparison group would have also increased 
by US$100, had they been given training.
When these three conditions are met, then only the existence of the pro-
gram of interest will explain any diff erences in the outcome (Y) between the 
two groups. This is because the only diff erence between the treatment and 
comparison groups is that the members of the treatment group receive the 
program, while the members of the comparison group do not. When the dif-
ference in outcome can be entirely attributed to the program, the causal 
impact of the program has been identiﬁed.
Key Concept
Without a comparison 
group that yields an 
accurate estimate of 
the counterfactual, the 
true impact of a 
program cannot be 
established.
Key Concept
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group (1) has the same 
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Returning to the case of Mr. Fulanito, we saw that in order to esti-
mate the impact of pocket money on his consumption of candies would 
require the implausible task of ﬁ nding Mr. Fulanito’s perfect clone. 
Instead of looking at the impact solely for one individual, it is more real-
istic to look at the average impact for a group of individuals (ﬁgure 3.2). 
If you could identify another group of individuals that shares the same 
average age, gender composition, education, preference for candy, and 
so on, except that it does not receive additional pocket money, then you 
could estimate the pocket money’s impact. This would simply be the 
diff erence between the average consumption of candies in the two 
groups. Thus if the treatment group consumes an average of 6 candies 
per person, while the comparison group consumes an average of 4, the 
average impact of the additional pocket money on candy consumption 
would be 2 candies.
Having deﬁned a valid comparison group, it is important to consider 
what would happen if we decided to go ahead with an evaluation without 
ﬁ nding such a group. Intuitively, an invalid comparison group is one that 
diff ers from the treatment group in some way other than the absence of the 
treatment. Those additional diff erences can cause the estimate of impact to 
be invalid or, in statistical terms, biased: the impact evaluation will not esti-
mate the true impact of the program. Rather, it will estimate the eff ect of 
the program mixed with those other diff erences.
Key Concept
When the comparison 
group does not 
accurately estimate the 
true counterfactual, 
then the estimated 
impact of the program 
will be invalid. In 
statistical terms, it will 
be biased.
Figure 3.2 A Valid Comparison Group
Average Y = 4 candies
Impact = 6 – 4 = 2 candies
Average Y = 6 candies
ComparisonTreatment
54 Impact Evaluation in Practice
Two Counterfeit Estimates of the Counterfactual
In the remainder of part 2 of this book, we will discuss the various methods 
that can be used to construct valid comparison groups that will allow you 
to estimate the counterfactual. Before doing so, however, it is useful to dis-
cuss two common, but highly risky, methods of constructing comparison 
groups that many times lead to inappropriate (“counterfeit”) estimates of 
the counterfactual:
• Before-and-after comparisons (also known as pre-post or reﬂ exive com-
parisons) compare the outcomes of the same group before and after 
 participating in a program.
• Enrolled-and-nonenrolled (or self-selected) comparisons compare the 
 outcomes of a group that chooses to participate in a program with those 
of a group that chooses not to participate.
Counterfeit Counterfactual Estimate 1: Comparing Outcomes 
Before and After a Program
A before-and-after comparison attempts to establish the impact of a 
program by tracking changes in outcomes for program participants 
over time. Returning to the basic impact evaluation formula, the out-
come for the treatment group (Y | P = 1) is simply the outcome after 
participating in the program. However, before-and-after comparisons 
take the estimated counterfactual (Y | P = 0) as the outcome for the 
treatment group before the intervention started. In essence, this com-
parison assumes that if the program had never existed, the outcome (Y) 
for program participants would have been exactly the same as their 
situation before the program. Unfortunately, for a majority of programs 
implemented over a series of months or years, this assumption simply 
does not hold.
Consider the evaluation of a microﬁnance program for poor, rural 
 farmers. The program provides microloans to farmers to enable them to 
buy  fertilizer to increase their rice production. You observe that in the 
year before the program starts, farmers harvested an average of 1,000 kilo-
grams (kg) of rice per hectare (point B in ﬁ gure 3.3). The microﬁnance 
scheme is launched, and a year later rice yields have increased to 1,100 kg 
per hectare (point A in ﬁ gure 3.3). If you were trying to evaluate impact 
using a before-and-after comparison, you would use the baseline outcome 
as an estimate of the counterfactual. Applying the basic impact evaluation 
formula, you would conclude that the program had increased rice yields 
by 100 kg per hectare (A−B).
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However, imagine that rainfall was normal in the year before the  program 
was launched, but a drought occurred in the year the program operated. 
Because of the drought, the farmers’ average yield without the microloan 
scheme is likely to be lower than B: say, at level D. In that case, the true impact 
of the program would be A−D, which is larger than the 100 kg estimated 
using the before-and-after comparison. By contrast, if rainfall actually 
improved between the two years, the counterfactual rice yield might have 
been at level C. In that case, the true program impact would have been 
smaller than 100 kg. In other words, unless our impact analysis can account 
for rainfall and every other factor that can aff ect rice yields over time, 
we  simply cannot calculate the true impact of the program by making a 
before-and-after comparison.
In the previous microﬁ nance example, rainfall was one of myriad outside 
factors which might aff ect the program’s outcome of interest (rice yields) 
over time. Likewise, many of the outcomes that development programs aim 
to improve, such as income, productivity, health, or education, are aff ected 
by an array of factors over time. For that reason, the baseline outcome is 
almost never a good estimate of the counterfactual. That is why we consider 
it a counterfeit estimate of the counterfactual.
Figure 3.3 Before-and-After Estimates of a Microfi nance Program
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  Evaluating the Impact of HISP: Doing a Before-and-After 
Comparison of Outcomes
Recall that the Health Insurance Subsidy Program (HISP) is a new pro-
gram in your country that subsidizes the purchase of health insurance for 
poor rural households and that this insurance covers expenses  related to 
health care and medicine for those enrolled. The objective of HISP is to 
reduce what poor households spend on primary care and medicine and 
ultimately to improve health outcomes. Although many outcome indica-
tors could be considered for the program evaluation, your government is 
particularly interested in analyzing the eff ects of HISP on per capita 
yearly out-of-pocket expenditures (subsequently referred to simply as 
health expenditures).
HISP will represent a hefty proportion of the national budget if scaled 
up nationally—up to 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by some 
estimates. Furthermore, substantial administrative and logistical com-
plexities are involved in running a program of this nature. For these rea-
sons, a decision has been made at the highest levels of government to 
introduce HISP ﬁrst as a pilot program and then, depending on the results 
of the ﬁrst phase, to scale it up gradually over time. Based on the results of 
ﬁnancial and cost-beneﬁt analyses, the president and her cabinet have 
announced that for HISP to be viable and to be extended nationally, it 
must reduce yearly per capita health expenditures of poor rural house-
holds by at least US$10 on average, compared to what they would have 
spent in the absence of the program, and it must do so within two years.
HISP will be introduced in 100 rural villages during the initial pilot 
phase. Just before the start of the program, your government hires a sur-
vey ﬁrm to conduct a baseline survey of all 4,959 households in these 
villages. The survey collects detailed information on every household, 
including their demographic composition, assets, access to health ser-
vices, and health expenditures in the past year. Shortly after the baseline 
survey is conducted, HISP is introduced in the 100 pilot villages with 
great fanfare, including community events and other promotional cam-
paigns to encourage households to enroll.
Of the 4,959 households in the baseline sample, a total of 2,907 enroll 
in HISP, and the program operates successfully over the next two years. 
All health clinics and pharmacies serving the 100 villages accept patients 
with the insurance scheme, and surveys show that most enrolled house-
holds are satisﬁed with the program. At the end of the two-year pilot 
period, a second round of evaluation data is collected on the same sample 
of 4,959 households.3
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The president and the minister of health have put you in charge of 
overseeing the impact evaluation for HISP and recommending whether 
or not to extend the program nationally. Your impact evaluation question 
of interest is, what is the impact of HISP on poor households’ out-of-
pocket health expenditures? Remember that the stakes are high. If HISP 
is found to reduce health expenditures by US$10 or more, it will be 
extended nationally. If the program did not reach the US$10 target, you 
will recommend against scaling it up.
The ﬁrst “expert” consultant you hire indicates that to estimate the 
impact of HISP, you must calculate the change in health expenditures 
over time for the households that enrolled. The consultant argues that 
because HISP covers all health costs, any decrease in expenditures over 
time must be attributable to the eff ect of HISP. Using the subset of 
enrolled households, you calculate their average health expenditures 
before the implementation of the  program and then again two years 
later. In other words, you perform a before-and-after comparison. The 
results are shown in table  3.1. You observe that the treatment group 
reduced its out-of-pocket health expenditures by US$6.65, from 
US$14.49 before the introduction of HISP to US$7.84 two years later. As 
denoted by the value of the t-statistic (t-stat), the diff erence between 
health expenditures before and after the program is statistically 
signiﬁcant.4 This means that you ﬁ nd strong evidence against the claim 
that the true diff erence between expenditures before and after the inter-
vention is zero.
Even though the before-and-after comparison is for the same group of 
households, you are concerned that other circumstances may have also 
changed for these households over the past two years, aff ecting their 
health expenditures. For example, a number of new drugs have recently 
become available. You are also concerned that the reduction in health 
expenditures may have resulted in part from the ﬁnancial crisis that your 
country recently experienced. To address some of these concerns, your 
consultant conducts a more sophisticated regression analysis that will try 
to control for some additional factors.
Table 3.1 Evaluating HISP: Before-and-After Comparison
After Before Difference t-stat
Household health expenditures (US$) 7.84 14.49 −6.65** −39.76
Note: Signifi cance level: ** = 1 percent.
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Counterfeit Counterfactual Estimate 2: Comparing Enrolled and 
Nonenrolled (Self-Selected) Groups
Comparing a group of individuals that voluntarily signs up for a program to 
a group of individuals that chooses not participate is another risky approach 
to evaluating impact. A comparison group that self-selects out of a program 
will provide another counterfeit counterfactual estimate. Selection occurs 
when program participation is based on the preferences, decisions, or 
Regression analysis uses statistics to analyze the relationships between 
a dependent variable (the variable to be explained) and explanatory vari-
ables. The results appear in table 3.2. A linear regression is the simplest 
form: the dependent variable is health expenditures, and there is only 
one explanatory variable: a binary (0−1) indicator that takes the value 0 if 
the observation is taken at baseline and 1 if the observation is taken at 
follow-up.
A multivariate linear regression adds explanatory variables to con-
trol for, or hold constant, other characteristics that are observed for the 
households in your sample, including indicators for wealth (assets), 
household composition, and so on.5
You note that the result from the linear regression is equivalent to 
the  simple before-and-after diff erence in average health expenditures 
from table 3.1 (a reduction of US$6.65 in health expenditures). Once you 
use multivariate linear regression to control for other factors available in 
your data, you ﬁnd a similar result—a decrease of US$6.71 in health 
expenditures.
 HISP Question 1
A. Does the before-and-after comparison control for all the factors that 
aff ect health expenditures over time?
B. Based on these results produced by the before-and-after analysis, 
should HISP be scaled up nationally?
Table 3.2 Evaluating HISP: Before-and-After with Regression Analysis
Linear regression Multivariate linear regression
Estimated impact on 
household health 
expenditures (US$)
−6.65**
(0.23)
−6.71**
(0.23)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signifi cance level: ** = 1 percent.
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unobserved characteristics of potential participants. 
Consider, for example, a vocational training program for unemployed 
youth. Assume that two years after the program has been launched, an 
evaluation attempts to estimate its impact on income by comparing the 
average incomes of a group of youth who chose to enroll in the program 
versus a group of youth who, despite being eligible, chose not to enroll. 
Assume that the results show that youth who chose to enroll in the pro-
gram make twice as much as those who chose not to enroll. How should 
these results be interpreted? In this case, the counterfactual is estimated 
based on the incomes of individuals who decided not to enroll in the 
program. Yet the two groups are likely to be fundamentally diff erent. 
Those individuals who chose to participate may be highly motivated to 
improve their livelihoods and may expect a high return to training. In 
contrast, those who chose not to enroll may be discouraged youth who 
do not expect to beneﬁt from this type of program. It is likely that these 
two types would perform quite diff erently in the labor market and would 
have diff erent incomes even without the vocational training program.
The same issue arises when admission to a program is based on unob-
served preferences of program administrators. Say, for example, that the 
program administrators base admission and enrollment on an interview. 
Those individuals who are admitted to the program might be those who the 
administrators think have a good chance of beneﬁ ting from the program. 
Those who are not admitted might show less motivation at the interview, 
have lower qualiﬁ cations, or just lack good interview skills. Again, it is 
likely that these two groups of young people would have diff erent incomes 
in the labor market even in absence of a vocational training program.
Thus the group that did not enroll does not provide a good estimate of 
the counterfactual. If you observe a diff erence in incomes between the two 
groups, you will not be able to determine whether it comes from the train-
ing program or from the underlying diff erences in motivation, skills, and 
other factors that exist between the two groups. The fact that less moti-
vated or less qualiﬁ ed individuals did not enroll in the training  program 
therefore leads to a bias in the program’s impact.6 This bias is called selec-
tion bias. More generally, selection bias will occur when the reasons for 
which an individual participates in a program are correlated with outcomes, 
even in absence of the program. Ensuring that the estimated impact is free 
of selection bias is one of the major objectives and challenges for any impact 
evaluation. In this example, if the young people who enrolled in vocational 
training would have had higher incomes even in the absence of the pro-
gram, the selection bias would be positive; in other words, you would over-
estimate the impact of the vocational training  program by attributing to the 
program the higher incomes that  participants would have had anyway.
Key Concept
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  Evaluating the Impact of HISP: Comparing Enrolled and 
Nonenrolled Households
Having thought through the before-and-after comparison a bit further 
with your evaluation team, you realize that there are still many other 
factors that can explain part of the change in health expenditures over 
time (in particular, the minister of ﬁnance is concerned that a recent 
ﬁnancial crisis may have aff ected households’ income, and may explain 
the observed change in health expenditures).
Another consultant suggests that it would be more appropriate to 
estimate the counterfactual in the post-intervention period: that is, 
two years after the program started. The consultant correctly notes 
that of the 4,959 households in the baseline sample, only 2,907 actu-
ally enrolled in the program, so approximately 41 percent of the 
households in the sample remain without HISP coverage. The 
 consultant argues that all households within the 100 pilot villages 
were eligible to enroll. These households all share the same health 
 clinics and are subject to the same local prices for pharmaceuticals. 
Moreover, most households are engaged in similar economic activi-
ties. The consultant argues that in these circumstances, the out-
comes of the nonenrolled group after the intervention could serve to 
estimate the counterfactual outcome of the group enrolled in HISP. 
You therefore decide to calculate average health expenditures in the 
post-intervention period for both the households that enrolled in the 
program and the households that did not. The results are shown in 
table 3.3. Using the average health expenditures of the nonenrolled 
households as the estimate of the counterfactual, you ﬁnd that the 
program has reduced average health expenditures by approximately 
US$14.46.
When discussing this result further with the consultant, you raise 
the question of whether the households that chose not to enroll in the 
program may be systematically diff erent from the ones that did enroll. 
For example, the households that signed up for HISP may be ones that 
Table 3.3 Evaluating HISP: Enrolled-Nonenrolled Comparison of Means
Enrolled Nonenrolled Difference t-stat
Household health 
expenditures (US$) 7.84 22.30 −14.46** −49.08
Note: Signifi cance level: ** = 1 percent.
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expected to have higher health expenditures, or people who were bet-
ter informed about the program, or people who care more for the 
health of their families. Alternatively, perhaps the households that 
enrolled were poorer, on average, than those who did not enroll, given 
that HISP was targeted to poor households. Your consultant argues 
that regression analysis can control for these potential diff erences 
between the two groups. She therefore carries out an additional multi-
variate regression that controls for all the household characteristics 
that she can ﬁ nd in the data set, and estimates the impact of the pro-
gram as shown in table 3.4.
With a simple linear regression of health expenditures on an indicator 
variable of whether or not a household enrolled in the program, you ﬁnd 
an estimated impact of minus US$14.46; in other words, you estimate that 
the program has decreased average health expenditures by US$14.46. 
However, when all other characteristics in the data are controlled for, you 
estimate that the program has reduced health expenditures by US$9.98 
per year.
 HISP Question 2
A. Does this analysis likely control for all the factors that determine 
 diff erences in health expenditures between the two groups?
B. Based on these results produced by the enrolled-nonenrolled method, 
should HISP be scaled up nationally?
Table 3.4 Evaluating HISP: Enrolled-Nonenrolled Regression Analysis
Linear regression Multivariate linear regression
Estimated impact on 
household health 
expenditures (US$)
−14.46**
(0.33)
−9.98**
(0.29)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signifi cance level: ** = 1 percent.
Additional Resources
 • For accompanying material to the book and hyperlinks to additional resourc-
es, please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (www.worldbank.org 
/ieinpractice).
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Notes
1. We use the Rubin Causal Model as a framework for causal inference (Imbens 
and Rubin 2008; Rubin 1974).
2. This condition will be relaxed in some impact evaluation methods, which will 
require instead that the average change in outcomes (trends) is the same in the 
absence of the program.
3. We are assuming that no households have left the sample over two years (there 
is zero sample attrition). This is not a realistic assumption for most household 
surveys. In practice, families that move sometimes cannot be tracked to their 
new location, and some households break up and cease to exist altogether.
4. Note that a t-statistic (t-stat) of 1.96 or more (in absolute value) is statistically 
signiﬁ cant at the 5 percent level.
5. For more on multivariate analysis, see the online technical companion on the 
Impact Evaluation in Practice website (www.worldbank.org/ieinpractice).
6. Another example, if youth who anticipate beneﬁting considerably from the 
training scheme are also more likely to enroll (for example, because they 
anticipate higher wages with training), then comparing them to a group with 
lower expected returns that does not enroll will yield a biased estimate of 
impact.
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CHAPTER 4
Randomized Assignment
Evaluating Programs Based on the Rules of 
Assignment
Having discussed two “counterfeit” estimates of the counterfactual that are 
commonly used but have a high risk of bias—before-and-after comparisons 
and enrolled-nonenrolled comparisons—we now turn to a set of methods 
that can be applied to estimate program impacts more accurately. Such 
 estimation, however, is not always as straightforward as it might seem at 
ﬁrst glance. Most programs are designed and implemented in a complex and 
changing environment in which many factors can inﬂuence outcomes for 
both program participants and those who do not participate. Droughts, 
earthquakes, recessions, changes in government, and changes in interna-
tional and local policies are all part of the real world. In an evaluation, we 
want to make sure that the estimated impact of our program remains valid 
despite these myriad factors.
A program’s rules for selecting participants will be the key parameter for 
determining the impact evaluation method. We believe that in most cases, 
the evaluation methods should try to ﬁt within the context of a program’s 
operational rules (with a few tweaks here and there)—and not the other way 
around. However, we also start from the premise that all programs should 
have fair and transparent rules for program assignment. One of the fairest 
and most transparent rules for allocating scarce resources among equally 
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deserving populations turns out to be giving everyone who is eligible an 
equal opportunity to participate in the program. One way to do that is sim-
ply to run a lottery.
In this chapter, we will examine a method that is akin to running a lot-
tery that decides who enters a program at a given time and who does not: 
the randomized assignment method, also known as randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs). This method not only provides program administrators 
with a fair and transparent rule for allocating scarce resources among 
equally deserving populations, but also represents the strongest method 
for evaluating the impact of a program. Thus the application of this 
method to evaluate impacts of social programs has increased substantially 
in recent years.
Randomized Assignment of Treatment
When a program is assigned at random—that is, using a lottery—over a large 
eligible population, we can generate a robust estimate of the counterfactual. 
Randomized assignment of treatment is considered the gold standard of 
impact evaluation. It uses a random process, or chance, to decide who is 
granted access to the program and who is not.1 Under randomized assign-
ment, every eligible unit (for example, an individual, household, business, 
school, hospital, or community) has the same probability of being selected 
for treatment by a program.2
Before we discuss how to implement randomized assignment in prac-
tice and why it generates a strong estimate of the counterfactual, let us 
take a few moments to consider why randomized assignment is also a fair 
and transparent way to assign scarce program resources. Once a target 
population has been deﬁned (say, households below the poverty line, chil-
dren under the age of 5, or roads in rural areas in the north of the coun-
try), randomized assignment is a fair allocation rule because it allows 
program managers to ensure that every eligible unit has the same chance 
of receiving the program and that the program is not being assigned using 
arbitrary or subjective criteria, or even through patronage or other unfair 
practices. When excess demand for a program exists, randomized assign-
ment is a rule that can be easily explained by program managers, is under-
stood by key constituents, and is considered fair in many circumstances. 
In addition, when the assignment process is conducted openly and 
 transparently, it cannot easily be manipulated, and therefore it shields 
program managers from potential accusations of favoritism or corrup-
tion. Randomized assignment thus has its own merits as a rationing 
mechanism that go well beyond its utility as an impact evaluation tool. 
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In fact, a number of programs routinely use lotteries as a way to select 
participants from the pool of eligible individuals, primarily because of 
their advantages for administration and governance.3 Box 4.1 presents 
two such cases from Africa.
Randomized assignment can often be derived from a program’s 
 operational rules. For many programs, the population of intended 
Box 4.1: Randomized Assignment as a Valuable Operational Tool
Randomized assignment can be a useful 
rule for assigning program benefi ts, even 
outside the context of an impact evaluation. 
The following two cases from Africa illus-
trate how.
In Côte d’Ivoire, following a period of cri-
sis, the government introduced a temporary 
employment program that was initially tar-
geted at former combatants and later 
expanded to youth more generally. The pro-
gram provided youth with short-term 
employment opportunities, mostly to clean 
or rehabilitate roads through the national 
roads agency. Youth in participating munici-
palities were invited to register. Given the 
attractiveness of the benefi ts, many more 
youth applied than places where available. 
In order to come up with a transparent and 
fair way of allocating the benefi ts among 
applicants, program implementers put in 
place a public lottery process. Once regis-
tration had closed and the number of appli-
cants (say N) in a location was known, a 
public lottery was organized. All applications 
were called to a public location, and small 
pieces of paper with numbers from 1 to N 
were put in a box. Applicants would then be 
called one by one to come and draw a num-
ber from the box in front of all other applica-
tions. Once the number was drawn, it would 
be read aloud. After all applicants were 
called, someone would check the remaining 
numbers in the box one by one to ensure 
that they were applicants who did not come 
to the lottery. If N spots were available for 
the program, the applicants having drawn 
the lowest numbers were selected for the 
program. The lottery process was organized 
separately for men and women. The public 
 lottery process was well accepted by par-
ticipants, and helped provide an image of 
fairness and transparency to the program in 
a post-confl ict environment marked by 
social tensions. After several years of opera-
tions, researchers used this allocation rule, 
already integrated in the program operation, 
to undertake its impact evaluation.
In Niger, the government started to roll 
out a national safety net project in 2011 with 
support from the World Bank. Niger is one of 
the poorest countries in the world, and the 
population of poor households deserving 
the program greatly exceeded the available 
benefi ts during the fi rst years of operation. 
Program implementers relied on geographi-
cal targeting to identify the departments and 
communes where the cash transfer pro-
gram would be implemented fi rst. This could 
be done, as data existed to determine 
the  relative poverty or vulnerability status 
of the  various departments or communes. 
However, within communes, very limited 
(continued)
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participants—that is, the set of all units that the program would like to 
serve—is larger  than the number of participants that the program  can 
actually accommodate at a given time. For example, in a single year an edu-
cation program might be able to provide school materials to 500 schools 
out of thousands of eligible schools in the country. Or a rural road improve-
ment program may have a goal of paving 250 rural roads, although there 
are hundreds more that the program would like to improve. Or a youth 
employment program may have a goal of reaching 2,000 unemployed 
youth within its ﬁrst year of operation, although there are tens of thou-
sands of unemployed young people that the program would ultimately like 
to serve. For a variety of reasons, programs may be unable to reach the 
entire population of  interest. Budgetary constraints may simply prevent 
administrators from off ering the program to all eligible units from the 
beginning. Even if budgets are available to cover an unlimited number of 
participants, capacity constraints will sometimes prevent a program from 
being rolled out to everyone at the same time. For example, in the case of 
the youth employment training program, the number of unemployed 
data were available to assess which villages 
would be more deserving than others based 
on  objective criteria. For the fi rst phase of 
the project, program implementers decided 
to use public lotteries to select benefi ciary 
 villages within targeted communes. This 
decision was made in part because the 
 available data to prioritize villages objectively 
were limited, and in part because an impact 
evaluation was being embedded in the 
 project. For the public lotteries, all the village 
chiefs were invited in the municipal center, 
and the names of their villages were written 
on a piece of paper, and put in a box. A 
child would then randomly draw benefi ciary 
 villages from the box until the quotas were 
fi lled. The procedure was undertaken 
 separately for sedentary and nomadic vil-
lages to ensure representation of each 
group. (After villages were selected, a sepa-
rate  household-level targeting mechanism 
was implemented to identify the poorest 
 households, which were later enrolled as 
benefi ciaries.) The transparency and fairness 
of the public lottery was greatly appreciated 
by local and village  authorities, as well as by 
program  implementers—so much that the 
public  lottery process continued to be used 
in the second and third cycle of the project 
to select over 1,000  villages throughout the 
country. Even though the public lottery was 
not necessary for an impact evaluation at 
that point, its value as a transparent, fair, 
and widely accepted operational tool to allo-
cate benefi ts among equally deserving pop-
ulations justifi ed its continued use in the 
eyes of program implementers and local 
authorities.
Sources: Bertrand and others 2016; Premand, Barry, and Smitz 2016.
Box 4.1: Randomized Assignment as a Valuable Operational Tool (continued)
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youth who want vocational training may be greater than the number of 
slots available in technical colleges during the ﬁrst year of the program, 
and that may limit the number who can enroll.
When the population of eligible participants is larger than the number 
of program places available, someone must make a decision about who will 
enter the program and who will not. In other words, program administra-
tors must deﬁne a rationing mechanism to allocate the program’s services. 
The program could be assigned on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served basis, or based 
on observed characteristics (for example, serving the poorest areas ﬁrst); 
or selection could be based on unobserved characteristics (for example, 
letting individuals sign up based on their own motivation and knowledge) 
or on a lottery. Even in contexts where it is possible to rank potential 
 participants based on a measure of need, it may be desirable to allocate 
some of the beneﬁ ts by lottery. Take for example a program that targets 
the   poorest 20  percent of households based on a measure of income. If 
income can only be measured imperfectly, the program could use this 
measure to include all potential participants who are identiﬁ ed as extreme 
poor (for example the bottom 15 percent). But since income is measured 
imperfectly, households just below the eligibility threshold at the 20th 
 percentile may or may not be eligible in reality (if we could measure true 
income), while households just above the 20th percentile may also be 
 eligible or not. In this context, running a lottery to allocate beneﬁ ts for 
households around the 20th percentile (for example between the 15th and 
25th percentile of the income distribution) could be a fair way to allocate 
beneﬁ ts in this group of households.
Why Does Randomized Assignment Produce an Excellent 
Estimate of the Counterfactual?
As discussed, the ideal comparison group would be as similar as possible to 
the treatment group in all respects, except with respect to its participation 
in the program that is being evaluated. When we randomly assign units to 
treatment and comparison groups, that randomized assignment process in 
itself will produce two groups that have a high probability of being statisti-
cally identical—as long as the number of potential units to which we apply 
the randomized assignment process is suffi  ciently large. Speciﬁcally, with a 
large enough number of units, the randomized assignment process will pro-
duce groups that have statistically equivalent averages for all their 
characteristics.4
Figure 4.1 illustrates why randomized assignment produces a compari-
son group that is statistically equivalent to the treatment group. Suppose the 
population of eligible units (the pool of potential participants, or  population 
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of interest for the evaluation) consists of 1,000 people. Half are randomly 
assigned to the treatment group, and the other half are randomly assigned to 
the comparison group. For example, you could imagine writing the names of 
all 1,000 people on individual pieces of paper,  mixing them up in a bowl, and 
then asking someone to blindly draw out 500 names. If the ﬁrst 500 names 
make up the treatment group, then you would have a randomly assigned 
treatment group (the ﬁrst 500 names drawn), and a randomly assigned com-
parison group (the 500 names left in the bowl).
Now assume that of the original 1,000 people, 40 percent were women. 
Because the names were selected at random, of the 500 names drawn 
from the bowl, approximately 40 percent will also be women. If among 
the 1,000 people, 20 percent had blue eyes, then approximately 20 percent 
of both the treatment and the comparison groups should have blue eyes, 
too. In general, if the population of eligible units is large enough, then the 
randomized assignment mechanism will ensure that any characteristic of 
the population will transfer to both the treatment group and the compari-
son group. Just as observed characteristics such as sex or the color of a 
person’s eyes transfer to both the treatment group and the comparison 
group, then logically characteristics that are more diffi  cult to observe 
(unobserved variables), such as motivation, preferences, or other person-
ality traits that are diffi  cult to measure, would also apply equally to both 
the treatment and comparison groups. Thus, treatment and comparison 
groups that are generated through randomized assignment will be similar 
not only in their observed characteristics but also in their unobserved 
characteristics. Having two groups that are similar in every way guaran-
tees that the estimated counterfactual approximates the true value of the 
outcome in the absence of treatment, and that once the program is imple-
mented, the estimated impacts will not suff er from selection bias.
Key Concept
In randomized 
assignment, each 
eligible unit has the 
same probability of 
being selected for 
treatment, ensuring 
equivalence between 
the treatment and 
comparison groups in 
both observed and 
unobserved 
characteristics.
Figure 4.1 Characteristics of Groups under Randomized Assignment 
of Treatment
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When an evaluation uses randomized assignment to treatment and com-
parison groups, in theory the process should produce two groups that are 
equivalent, provided it relies on a large enough number of units. With the 
baseline data from our evaluation sample, we can test this assumption 
empirically and verify that in fact there are no systematic diff erences in 
observed characteristics between the treatment and comparison groups 
before the program starts. Then, after we launch the program, if we observe 
diff erences in outcomes between the treatment and comparison groups, we 
will know that those diff erences can be explained only by the introduction 
of the program, since by construction the two groups were identical at the 
baseline, before the program started, and are exposed to the same external 
environmental factors over time. In this sense, the comparison group con-
trols for all factors that might also explain the outcome of interest.
To estimate the impact of a program under randomized assignment, we 
simply take the diff erence between the outcome under treatment (the mean 
outcome of the randomly assigned treatment group) and our estimate of the 
counterfactual (the mean outcome of the randomly assigned comparison 
group). We can be conﬁdent that our estimated impact constitutes the true 
impact of the program, since we have eliminated all observed and unob-
served factors that might otherwise plausibly explain the diff erence in out-
comes. In boxes 4.2 through 4.6, we discuss real world applications of 
randomized assignment to evaluate the impact of a number of diff erent 
interventions around the world.
In ﬁgure 4.1 we assumed that all units in the eligible population would be 
assigned to either the treatment group or the comparison group. In some cases, 
however, it is not necessary to include all units in the evaluation. For example, 
if the population of eligible units includes 1 million mothers and you want to 
evaluate the eff ectiveness of cash bonuses on the probability that they will get 
their children vaccinated, it may be suffi  cient to select a representative random 
sample of, say, 1,000 mothers, and assign those 1,000 to either the treatment 
group or the comparison group. Figure 4.2 illustrates this  process. By the same 
logic explained above, selecting a random sample from the population of eli-
gible units to form the evaluation sample preserves the characteristics of the 
population of eligible units. Within the evaluation sample, randomized assign-
ment of individuals to the treatment and  comparison groups again preserves 
the characteristics. We discuss sampling further in chapter 15.
External and Internal Validity
The steps outlined above for randomized assignment of treatment will 
ensure both the internal and the external validity of the impact estimates 
(ﬁgure 4.2).
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Box 4.2: Randomized Assignment as a Program Allocation Rule: 
Conditional Cash Transfers and Education in Mexico
The Progresa program, now called 
“Prospera,” provides cash transfers to 
poor mothers in rural Mexico condi-
tional on their children’s enrollment in 
school and regular health checkups (see 
box 1.1 in chapter 1). The cash transfers, 
for children in grades 3  through 9, 
amount to about 50   percent to 75  per-
cent of the private cost of schooling and 
are guaranteed for three years. The com-
munities and households eligible for the 
program were determined based on a 
poverty index created from census data 
and baseline data collection. Because of 
a need to phase in the large-scale social 
program, about two-thirds of the locali-
ties (314 out of 495) were randomly 
selected to receive the program in the 
ﬁ rst two  years, and the remaining 181 
served as a comparison group before 
entering the program in the third year.
Based on the randomized assign-
ment, Schultz (2004) found an average 
increase in enrollment of 3.4  percent 
for all students in grades 1–8, with the 
largest increase among girls who had 
completed grade 6, at 14.8  percent.a 
The  likely reason is that girls tend to 
drop out of school at greater rates as 
they get older, so they were given a 
slightly larger transfer to stay in school 
past the primary grade levels. These 
short-term impacts were then extrapo-
lated to predict the longer-term impact 
of the Progresa program on lifetime 
schooling and earnings.
Source: Schultz 2004.
a. To be precise, Schultz combined randomized assignment with the difference-in-differences method discussed 
in chapter 7.
Box 4.3: Randomized Assignment of Grants to Improve 
Employment Prospects for Youth in Northern Uganda
In 2005, the government of Uganda began a 
program aimed at decreasing youth unemploy-
ment and promoting social stability in the 
 confl ict-affected northern region. The Youth 
Opportunities Program invited groups of young 
adults to submit grant proposals for business 
activities and vocational training. Thousands of 
proposals were submitted, but the govern-
ment was able to fund only a few hundred.
Taking advantage of the high demand 
for the program, evaluators worked with 
the government to randomize which 
groups received funding. The central gov-
ernment asked district governments to 
submit more than twice the number of 
proposals that they could fund. After 
screening the  proposals, the government 
determined a list of 535 proposals eligible 
for the program. The proposals were then 
randomly assigned to the treatment or the 
comparison group, with 265 in the treat-
ment and 270 in the comparison group.
(continued)
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Box 4.3 Randomized Assignment of Grants to Improve Employment Prospects for Youth in 
Northern Uganda (continued)
The grant amount in the treatment group 
averaged US$382 per person. Four years 
after the disbursements, youth in the treat-
ment group were more than twice as likely 
to practice a skilled trade as youth in the 
comparison group. They also earned 38 per-
cent more and had 57 percent more capi-
tal stock. However, researchers found no 
impact on social cohesion or antisocial 
behavior.
Source: Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2014.
Box 4.4: Randomized Assignment of Water and Sanitation 
Interventions in Rural Bolivia
Starting in 2012, the Bolivian government, 
with support from the Inter-American 
Development Bank, implemented a random-
ized assignment of water and sanitation 
interventions for small rural communities. 
Within the 24 municipalities in the country 
with the greatest need, the program identi-
fi ed over 369 communities that were eligible 
for the intervention. Since resources were 
available to cover only 182 communities, the 
program used randomized assignment to 
give each eligible community an equal 
chance to participate. Together with munici-
pal governments, program administrators 
organized a series of events where they 
held public lotteries in the presence of com-
munity leaders, the press, and civil society.
First, communities were divided up 
according to their population size. Then, 
within each group, community names 
were drawn at random and placed on a 
list. The communities that were on the top 
of the list were assigned to the treatment 
group. Each lottery was monitored by an 
independent notary public, who subse-
quently registered and certifi ed the 
results, granting an additional level of legit-
imacy to the process. For communities left 
out of the program, municipal govern-
ments committed to using the same ran-
domly ordered list to allocate future 
funding after completing the evaluation. In 
this way, no communities would be left 
out of the intervention for the sole pur-
poses of the evaluation, but a comparison 
group would exist so long as budget con-
straints limited the number of projects in 
each municipality.
Source: Inter-American Development Bank Project No. BO-L1065, http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/project 
- description-title,1303.html?id=BO-L1065.
Note: See the public lottery for randomized assignment at https://vimeo.com/86744573.
Internal validity means that the estimated impact of the program is 
net of all other potential confounding factors—or, in other words, that 
the comparison group provides an accurate estimate of the counter-
factual, so that we are estimating the true impact of the program. 
Remember that randomized assignment produces a comparison group 
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Box 4.5: Randomized Assignment of Spring Water Protection to 
Improve Health in Kenya
The link between water quality and health 
impacts in developing countries has been 
well documented. However, the health value 
of improving infrastructure around water 
sources is less evident. Kremer and others 
(2011) measured the effects of a program 
providing spring protection technology to 
improve water quality in Kenya, randomly 
assigning springs to receive the treatment.
Approximately 43 percent of households 
in rural Western Kenya obtain drinking water 
from naturally occurring springs. Spring 
 protection technology seals off the source of 
a water spring to lessen contamination. 
Starting in 2005, the NGO International Child 
Support (ICS) implemented a spring protec-
tion program in two districts in western 
Kenya. Because of fi nancial and administra-
tive constraints, ICS decided to phase in the 
program over four years. This allowed evalua-
tors to use springs that had not received the 
treatment yet as the comparison group.
From the 200 eligible springs, 100 were 
randomly selected to receive the treatment 
in the fi rst two years. The study found that 
spring protection reduced fecal water con-
tamination by 66 percent and child diarrhea 
among users of the springs by 25 percent.
Source: Kremer and others 2011.
Box 4.6: Randomized Assignment of Information about HIV Risks 
to Curb Teen Pregnancy in Kenya
In a randomized experiment in western 
Kenya, Dupas (2011) tested the effectiveness 
of two different HIV/AIDS education treat-
ments in reducing unsafe sexual behavior 
among teens. The fi rst treatment involved 
teacher training in the national HIV/AIDS cur-
riculum, which focused on risk aversion and 
encouraged abstinence. The second treat-
ment, the Relative Risk Information Campaign, 
aimed to reduce sex between older men and 
younger girls by providing information on HIV 
rates disaggregated by age and gender.
The study took place in two rural districts in 
Kenya, with 328 primary schools in the sample. 
The researchers randomly assigned 163 
schools to receive the fi rst treatment, stratifi ed 
by location, test scores, and student gender 
ratio. Seventy-one schools were then randomly 
assigned to the second treatment, stratifying 
for participation in the fi rst treatment. This pro-
duced four groups of schools: schools receiv-
ing treatment one, schools receiving treatment 
two, schools receiving both treatments, and 
schools receiving neither treatment.
The randomized assignment of schools 
ensured there would be no systematic differ-
ence in the information students were 
exposed to before the program started. 
A year after the program ended, Dupas found 
that the Relative Risk Information Campaign 
led to a 28 percent decrease in the likelihood 
that a girl would be pregnant. In contrast, 
schools that received only treatment one 
showed no effect on teenage pregnancy.
Source: Dupas 2011.
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that is statistically equivalent to the treatment group at baseline, before 
the program starts. Once the program starts, the comparison group is 
exposed to the same set of external factors as the treatment group over 
time; the only exception is the program. Therefore, if any diff erences in 
outcomes appear between the treatment and comparison groups, they 
can only be due to the existence of the program in the treatment group. 
The internal validity of an impact evaluation is ensured through the pro-
cess of randomized assignment of treatment.
External validity means that the evaluation sample accurately repre-
sents the population of eligible units. The results of the evaluation can 
then be generalized to the population of eligible units. We use random 
sampling to ensure that the evaluation sample accurately reﬂ ects the pop-
ulation of  eligible units so that impacts identiﬁ ed in the evaluation sample 
can be extrapolated to the population.
Note that we have used a randomization process for two diff erent 
 purposes: random selection of a sample (for external validity), and ran-
domized assignment of treatment as an impact evaluation method 
(for internal validity). An impact evaluation can produce internally valid 
estimates of impact through randomized assignment of treatment; how-
ever, if the evaluation is performed on a nonrandom sample of the popula-
tion, the estimated impacts may not be generalizable to the population of 
eligible units. Conversely, if the evaluation uses a random sample of the 
population of eligible units, but treatment is not assigned in a randomized 
way, then the sample would be representative, but the comparison group 
may not be valid, thus jeopardizing internal validity. In some contexts 
programs may face constraints that demand a trade-off  between internal 
Key Concept
An evaluation is 
internally valid if it 
provides an accurate 
estimate of the 
counterfactual through 
a valid comparison 
group.
Key Concept
An evaluation is 
externally valid if the 
evaluation sample 
accurately represents 
the population of 
eligible units. The 
results of the 
evaluation can then be 
generalized to the 
population of eligible 
units.
Figure 4.2 Random Sampling and Randomized Assignment of Treatment
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and external validity. Take the program discussed previously that targets 
the bottom 20 percent of households based on income. If this program 
incorporates all households below the 15th  percentile, but conducts a 
randomized assignment impact evaluation among a random sample of 
households in the 15th to 25th percentiles, this evaluation will have inter-
nal validity thanks to the randomized assignment: that is, we will know 
the true impact for the subset of households in the 15th to 25th  percentiles. 
But external validity of the impact evaluation will be  limited, since results 
cannot be extrapolated directly to the entire  population of beneﬁ ciaries: 
in particular, to households below the 15th percentile.
When Can Randomized Assignment Be Used?
Randomized assignment can be used as a program allocation rule in one of 
two speciﬁ c scenarios:
1. When the eligible population is greater than the number of program 
spaces available. When the demand for a program exceeds the supply, 
a lottery can be used to select the treatment group within the eligible 
population. In this context, every unit in the population receives the 
same chance (or a known chance greater than zero and less than one) 
of being selected for the program. The group that wins the lottery is 
the treatment group, and the rest of the population that is not off ered 
the program is the comparison group. As long as a constraint exists 
that prevents scaling the program up to the entire population, the 
comparison groups can be maintained to measure the short-term, 
medium-term, and long-term impacts of the program. In this context, 
no ethical dilemma arises from holding a comparison group 
indeﬁnitely, since a subset of the population will necessarily be left 
out of the program because of capacity constraints.
 As an example, suppose the ministry of education wants to provide 
school libraries to public schools throughout the country, but the 
ministry of ﬁnance budgets only enough funds to cover one-third of 
them. If the ministry of education wants each public school to have 
an equal chance of receiving a library, it would run a lottery in which 
each school has the same chance (1 in 3) of being selected. Schools 
that win the lottery receive a new library and constitute the treat-
ment group, and the remaining two-thirds of public schools in the 
country are not offered the  library and serve as the compari-
son group. Unless additional funds are allocated to the library pro-
gram, a group of schools will remain that do not have funding for 
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libraries, and they can be used as a comparison group to measure the 
counterfactual.
2. When a program needs to be gradually phased in until it covers the entire 
eligible population. When a program is phased in, randomization of the 
order in which participants receive the program gives each eligible unit 
the same chance of receiving treatment in the ﬁrst phase or in a later 
phase of the program. As long as the last group has not yet been phased 
into the program, it serves as a valid comparison group from which the 
counterfactual for the groups that have already been phased in can be 
estimated. This setup can also allow for the evaluation to pick up the 
eff ects of diff erential exposure to treatment: that is, the eff ect of receiving 
a program for more or less time.
 For example, suppose that the ministry of health wants to train all 
15,000 nurses in the country to use a new health care protocol but 
needs three years to train them all. In the context of an impact evalu-
ation, the ministry could randomly assign one-third of the nurses to 
receive training in the ﬁrst year, one-third to receive training in the 
second  year, and one-third to receive training in the third  year. To 
evaluate the eff ect of the training program one year after its imple-
mentation, the group of nurses trained in year 1 would constitute the 
treatment group, and the group of nurses randomly assigned to train-
ing in year 3 would be the comparison group, since they would not yet 
have received the training.
How Do You Randomly Assign Treatment?
Now that we have discussed what randomized assignment does and why 
it produces a good comparison group, we will turn to the steps to 
 successfully assign treatment in a randomized way. Figure 4.3 illustrates 
this process.
Step 1 is to deﬁne the units that are eligible for the program. Remember 
that depending on the particular program, a unit could be a person, a health 
center, a school, a business, or even an entire village or municipality. The 
population of eligible units consists of those for which you are interested in 
knowing the impact of your program. For example, if you are implementing 
a training program for primary school teachers in rural areas, then primary 
school teachers in urban areas or secondary school teachers would not 
belong to your population of  eligible units.
Once you have determined the population of eligible units, it will be nec-
essary to compare the size of the group with the number of observations 
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required for the evaluation. The size of the evaluation sample is determined 
through power calculations and is based on the types of questions you would 
like answered (see chapter 15). If the eligible population is small, all of the 
eligible units may need to be included in the evaluation. Alternatively, 
if  there are more eligible units than are required for the evaluation, then 
step 2 is to select a sample of units from the population to be included in the 
evaluation sample.
This second step is done mainly to limit data collection costs. If it is 
found that data from existing monitoring systems can be used for the 
evaluation, and that those systems cover the full population of eligible 
units, then you may not need to draw a separate evaluation sample. 
However, imagine an evaluation in which the population of eligible units 
includes tens of thousands of teachers in every school in the country, and 
you need to collect detailed information on teacher pedagogical knowl-
edge and practice. Interviewing and assessing every teacher in the coun-
try could be prohibitively costly and logistically infeasible. Based on your 
power calculations, you might determine that to answer your evaluation 
question, it is suffi  cient to take a sample of 1,000 teachers distributed over 
Figure 4.3 Steps in Randomized Assignment to Treatment
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2. Select the evaluation
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200 schools. As long as the sample of teachers is representative of the 
whole population of teachers, any results found in the evaluation will 
be externally valid and can be generalized to the rest of the teachers in 
the  country. Collecting data on this sample of 1,000 teachers in 200 
schools will be much cheaper than collecting data on every teacher in all 
schools in the country.
Step 3 is to form the treatment and comparison groups from the units in 
the evaluation sample through randomized assignment. In cases where ran-
domized assignment needs to be done in a public forum, say on television, 
you may need to use a simple hands-on technique such as ﬂ ipping a coin or 
picking names out of a hat. The following examples assume that the unit of 
randomization is an individual person, but the same logic applies to ran-
domizing more aggregated units of observation such as schools, businesses, 
or communities:
1. If you want to assign 50 percent of individuals to the treatment group and 
50 percent to the comparison group, ﬂip a coin for each person. You must 
decide in advance whether heads or tails on the coin will assign a person 
to the treatment group.
2. If you want to assign one-third of the evaluation sample to the treatment 
group, you can roll a die for each person. First, you must decide on a rule. 
For example, a thrown die that shows a 1 or a 2 could mean an assignment 
to the treatment group, whereas a 3, 4, 5, or 6 would mean an assignment to 
the comparison group. You would roll the die once for each person in the 
evaluation sample and assign them based on the number that comes up.
3. Write the names of all of the people on pieces of paper of identical size 
and shape. Fold the papers so that the names cannot be seen, and mix 
them thoroughly in a hat or some other container. Before you start draw-
ing, decide on your rule: that is, how many pieces of paper you will draw 
and that drawing a name means assigning that person to the treatment 
group. Once the rule is clear, ask someone in the crowd (someone 
 unbiased, such as a child) to draw out as many pieces of paper as you 
need participants in the treatment group.
If you need to assign many units (say, over 100), using simple approaches 
such as these will take too much time, and you will need to use an auto-
mated process. To do this, you must ﬁrst decide on a rule for how to assign 
participants based on random numbers. For example, if you need to assign 
40 out of 100 units from the evaluation sample to the treatment group, you 
may decide to assign those 40 units with the highest random numbers to 
the treatment group and the rest to the comparison group. To implement 
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the randomized assignment, you will assign a random number to each unit 
in the evaluation sample, using a spreadsheet’s random number generator, 
or specialized statistical software (ﬁgure 4.4), and use your previously 
chosen rule to form the treatment and comparison groups. It is important 
to decide on the rule before you generate the random numbers; otherwise, 
you may be tempted to decide on a rule based on the random numbers you 
see, and that would invalidate the randomized assignment.
The logic behind the automated process is no diff erent from randomized 
assignment based on a coin toss or picking names out of a hat: it is a mecha-
nism that randomly determines whether each unit is in the treatment or the 
comparison group.
Whether you use a public lottery, a roll of dice, or computer-generated 
random numbers, it is important to document the process to ensure that it is 
transparent. That means, ﬁrst, that the assignment rule must be decided in 
advance and communicated to members of the public. Second, you must 
stick to the rule once you draw the random numbers. Third, you must be 
able to show that the process was really random. In the cases of lotteries and 
throwing dice, you could videotape the process; computer-based assign-
ment of random numbers requires that you provide a log of your computa-
tions, so that the process can be replicated by auditors.5
Figure 4.4 Using a Spreadsheet to Randomize Assignment to Treatment
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At What Level Do You Perform Randomized Assignment?
Randomized assignment can be done at various levels, including the 
 individual, household, business, community, or region. In general, the level 
at which units are randomly assigned to treatment and comparison groups 
will be greatly aff ected by where and how the program is being imple-
mented. For example, if a health program is being implemented at the health 
clinic level, you would ﬁrst select a random sample of health clinics and 
then randomly assign some of them to the treatment group and others to the 
comparison group.
When the level of the randomized assignment is higher or more 
 aggregate, such as at the level of regions or provinces in a country, it can 
become diffi  cult to perform an impact evaluation because the number of 
regions or provinces in most countries is not suffi  ciently large to yield bal-
anced treatment and comparison groups. For example, if a country has 
only six  provinces, then the treatment and comparison groups would 
only  have three provinces each, which is insuffi  cient to ensure that the 
baseline characteristics of the treatment and comparison groups are 
 balanced. Furthermore, for randomized assignment to yield unbiased esti-
mates of impact, it is important to ensure that time-bound external factors 
(such as the weather or local election cycles) are on average the same in 
the treatment and comparison groups. As the level of assignment increases, 
it becomes increasingly unlikely that these factors will be balanced across 
treatment and comparison groups. For example, rainfall is a time-bound 
external factor because it varies systematically from one year to another. 
In an evaluation in the agriculture sector, we would want to ensure that 
droughts aff ect the treatment and comparison provinces equally. With 
only three provinces in the treatment and comparison groups, it would be 
easy for this balance to be lost. On the other hand, if the unit of assignment 
were lowered to the subprovince level such as a municipality, it is more 
likely that rainfall will be balanced between treatment and comparison 
groups over time.
On the other hand, as the level of randomized assignment gets lower—
for example, down to the individual or household level—the chances 
increase that the comparison group will be inadvertently aff ected by the 
 program. Two particular types of risks to consider when choosing the 
level of assignment are spillovers and imperfect compliance. Spillovers 
occur when the treatment group directly or indirectly aff ects outcomes in 
the comparison group (or vice versa). Imperfect compliance occurs when 
some members of the comparison group participate in the program, or 
some members of the treatment group do not (see further discussion of 
these concepts in chapter 9).
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By carefully considering the level of randomized assignment, the risk 
of spillovers and imperfect compliance can be minimized. Individuals 
can be assigned in groups or clusters such as students in a school or 
households in a community, to minimize information ﬂ ows and contacts 
between individuals in the treatment and comparison groups. To reduce 
imperfect  compliance, the level of assignment should also be chosen in 
accordance with the program’s capacity for maintaining a clear distinc-
tion between treatment and comparison groups throughout the inter-
vention. If the program includes activities at the community level, it 
may be diffi  cult to avoid exposing all individuals from that community 
to the program.
A well-known example of spillovers is the provision of deworming 
medicine to children. If households in the treatment group are located 
close to a household in the comparison group, then children in the com-
parison households may be positively aff ected by a spillover from the 
treatment because their chances of contracting worms from neighbors 
will be reduced (Kremer and Miguel 2004). To isolate the program 
impact, treatment and comparison households need to be located 
 suffi  ciently far from one another to avoid such spillovers. Yet as the 
 distance between households increases, it will become more costly both 
to implement the program and to administer  surveys. As a rule of thumb, 
if spillovers can be reasonably ruled out, it is best to perform randomized 
assignment of the treatment at the lowest possible level of program 
implementation; that will ensure that the number of units in the treat-
ment and comparison groups is as large as possible.
Estimating Impact under Randomized Assignment
Once you have selected a random evaluation sample and assigned treat-
ment in a randomized fashion, it is quite straightforward to estimate the 
impact of the program. After the program has run for some time, out-
comes for both the treatment and comparison units will need to be mea-
sured. The impact of the program is simply the diff erence between the 
average outcome (Y) for the treatment group and the average outcome 
(Y) for the comparison group. For instance, in the generic example in 
ﬁgure 4.5, the average outcome for the treatment group is 100, and the 
average outcome for the comparison group is 80; thus the impact of the 
program is 20. For now we are assuming that all units in the treatment 
group are eff ectively treated and no units of the comparison group 
are treated. In our example of the teacher training program, all teachers 
assigned to the treatment group receive the training and none of the 
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comparison teachers do. In chapter 5, we discuss the (more realistic) 
scenario where compliance is incomplete: that is, where less than 
100 percent of the units in the treatment group actually participate in 
the intervention or some comparison units gain access to the  program. 
In this case, an unbiased estimate of program impact can still be obtained 
through randomized assignment, though the interpretation of the results 
will vary.
Checklist: Randomized Assignment
Randomized assignment is the most robust method for estimating 
 counterfactuals; it is considered the gold standard of impact evaluation. 
Some basic tests should still be considered to assess the validity of this eval-
uation strategy in a given context.
¸ Are the baseline characteristics balanced? Compare the baseline 
 characteristics of the treatment group and the comparison group.6
¸ Has any noncompliance with the assignment occurred? Check whether 
all eligible units have received the treatment and that no ineligible units 
have received the treatment. If noncompliance has occurred, you will 
need to use the instrumental variable method (see chapter 5).
¸ Are the numbers of units in the treatment and comparison groups 
 suffi  ciently large? If not, you may want to combine randomized assign-
ment with diff erence-in-diff erences (see chapter 7).
¸ Is there any reason to believe that outcomes for some units may  somehow 
depend on the assignment of other units? Could there be an impact of the 
treatment on units in the comparison group (see chapter 9)?
Figure 4.5 Estimating Impact under Randomized Assignment
Treatment
Average (Y ) for the
comparison group = 80
Average (Y) for the
treatment group = 100
Comparison
Impact = ΔY = 20
Impact
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  Evaluating the Impact of HISP: Randomized Assignment
Let us now return to the example of the Health Insurance Subsidy 
Program (HISP) and check what randomized assignment means in this 
context. Recall that you are trying to estimate the impact of the program 
from a pilot that involves 100 treatment villages.
Having conducted two impact assessments using potentially biased 
estimators of the counterfactual in chapter 3 (with conﬂicting policy rec-
ommendations), you decide to go back to the drawing board to rethink 
how to obtain a more precise estimate of the counterfactual. After fur-
ther deliberations with your evaluation team, you are convinced that 
constructing a valid estimate of the counterfactual will require identify-
ing a group of villages that are as similar as possible to the 100 treatment 
villages in all respects, except that one group took part in HISP and the 
other did not. Because HISP was rolled out as a pilot, and the 100  treatment 
villages were selected randomly from among all of the rural villages in 
the country, you note that the treatment villages should, on average, 
have  the same characteristics as the untreated rural villages in the 
 country. The counterfactual can therefore be estimated in a valid way 
by  measuring the health expenditures of eligible households in rural 
 villages that did not take part in the program.
Luckily, at the time of the baseline and follow-up surveys, the survey 
ﬁrm collected data on an additional 100 rural villages that were not 
off ered the program. Those 100 villages were also randomly selected 
from the population of rural villages in the country. Thus the way that the 
two groups of villages were chosen ensures that they have statistically 
identical characteristics, except that the 100 treatment villages received 
HISP and the 100 comparison villages did not. Randomized assignment 
of the treatment has occurred.
Given randomized assignment of treatment, you are quite conﬁdent 
that no external factors other than HISP would explain any diff erences 
in outcomes between the treatment and comparison villages. To validate 
this assumption, you test whether eligible households in the treatment 
and comparison villages have similar characteristics at baseline, as shown 
in table 4.1.
You observe that the average characteristics of households in the 
treatment and comparison villages are in fact very similar. The only 
statistically signiﬁcant diff erences are for the number of years of edu-
cation of the head of household and distance to hospital, and those 
diff erences are small (only 0.16  years, or less than 6  percent of the 
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comparison group’s average years of education, and 2.91 kilometers, or 
less than 3  percent of the comparison group’s average distance to a 
 hospital). Even with a randomized experiment on a large sample, a 
small number of diff erences can be expected because of chance and 
Table 4.1 Evaluating HISP: Balance between Treatment 
and Comparison Villages at Baseline 
Household 
characteristics
Treatment 
villages 
(n = 2964)
Comparison 
villages 
(n = 2664) Difference t-stat
Health expenditures 
(US$ yearly per capita) 14.49 14.57 −0.08 −0.73
Head of household’s 
age (years) 41.66 42.29 −0.64 −1.69
Spouse’s age (years) 36.84 36.88 0.04 0.12
Head of household’s 
education (years) 2.97 2.81 0.16* 2.30
Spouse’s education 
(years) 2.70 2.67 0.03 0.43
Head of household is 
female = 1 0.07 0.08 −0.01 −0.58
Indigenous = 1 0.43 0.42 0.01 0.69
Number of household 
members 5.77 5.71 0.06 1.12
Has dirt fl oor = 1 0.72 0.73 −0.01 −1.09
Has bathroom = 1 0.57 0.56 0.01 1.04
Hectares of land 1.68 1.72 −0.04 −0.57
Distance to 
 hospital (km) 109.20 106.29 2.91* 2.57
Note: Signifi cance level: ** = 1 percent.
Table 4.2 Evaluating HISP: Randomized Assignment with 
Comparison of Means
Treatment 
villages
Comparison 
villages Difference t-stat
Household health expendi-
tures at baseline (US$) 14.49 14.57 −0.08 −0.73
Household health expendi-
tures at follow-up (US$) 7.84 17.98 −10.14** −49.15
Note: Signifi cance level: ** = 1 percent
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the properties of the statistical test. In fact, using standard signiﬁ cance 
levels of 5 percent we could expect diff erences in about 5 percent of 
characteristics to be statistically signiﬁ cant, though we would not 
expect the magnitude of these diff erences to be large.
With the validity of the comparison group established, you can now 
estimate the counterfactual as the average health expenditures of eligible 
households in the 100 comparison villages. Table 4.2 shows the average 
household health expenditures for eligible households in the treatment 
and comparison villages. You note that at baseline, the average household 
health expenditures in the treatment and comparison groups are not sta-
tistically diff erent, as should be expected under randomized assignment.
Given that you now have a valid comparison group, you can ﬁnd the 
impact of the HISP simply by taking the diff erence between the average 
out-of-pocket health expenditures of households in the treatment vil-
lages and randomly assigned comparison villages in the follow-up period. 
The impact is a reduction of US$10.14 over two years. Replicating this 
result through a linear regression analysis yields the same result, as 
shown in table 4.3. Finally, you run a multivariate regression analysis that 
controls for some other observable characteristics of the sample house-
holds, and you ﬁ nd that the program has reduced the expenditures of the 
enrolled households by US$10.01 over two years, which is nearly identi-
cal to the  linear regression result.
With randomized assignment, we can be conﬁdent that no factors 
are present that are systematically diff erent between the treatment 
and comparison groups that might also explain the diff erence in 
health expenditures. Both sets of villages started off  with very similar 
average characteristics and have been exposed to the same set of 
national policies and programs during the two  years of treatment. 
Thus the only plausible reason that poor households in treatment 
communities have lower expenditures than households in compari-
son villages is that the ﬁrst group received the health insurance 
 program and the other group did not.
Table 4.3 Evaluating HISP: Randomized Assignment with Regression 
Analysis
Linear regression Multivariate linear regression
Estimated impact on 
household health 
expenditures
−10.14**
(0.39)
−10.01**
(0.34)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signifi cance level: ** = 1 percent.
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Additional Resources
 • For accompanying material to this chapter and hyperlinks to additional 
 resources, please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (www 
. worldbank.org/ieinpractice).
 • For additional resources on randomized assignment impact evaluations, see 
the Inter-American Development Bank Evaluation Portal (www.iadb.org 
/ evaluationhub).
 • For a complete overview of randomized assignment impact evaluations, see 
the following book and accompanying website:
  – Glennerster, Rachel, and Kudzai Takavarasha. 2013. Running Randomized 
Evaluations: A Practical Guide. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
(http://runningres.com/).
 • For a detailed discussion on achieving balance between treatment and com-
parison groups through randomized assignment, see the following:
  – Bruhn, Miriam, and David McKenzie. 2009. “In Pursuit of Balance: 
 Randomization in Practice in Development Field Experiments.” American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1 (4): 200–32.
 • For a randomized assignment ceremony for an evaluation in Cameroon, see 
the World Bank Impact Evaluation Toolkit, Module 3 (www.worldbank.org 
/ health/impactevaluationtoolkit).
Notes
1. Randomized assignment of treatment is also commonly referred to as 
randomized control trials, randomized evaluations, experimental evaluations, 
and social experiments, among other terms. Strictly speaking, an experi-
ment need not identify impacts through randomized assignment, but 
evaluators typically use the term experiment only when the evaluation uses 
randomized assignment.
2. Note that this probability does not necessarily mean a 50-50 chance of winning 
the lottery. In practice, most randomized assignment evaluations will give each 
eligible unit a probability of selection that is determined so that the number of 
 HISP Question 3
A. Why is the impact estimate derived using a multivariate linear regres-
sion basically unchanged when controlling for other factors, com-
pared to the simple linear regression and comparison of means?
B. Based on the impact estimated with the randomized assignment 
method, should the HISP be scaled up nationally?
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winners (treatments) equals the total available number of beneﬁts. For example, 
if a program has enough funding to serve only 1,000 communities out of a 
population of 10,000 eligible communities, then each community will be given a 
1 in 10 chance of being selected for treatment. Statistical power (a concept 
discussed in more detail in chapter 15) will be maximized when the evaluation 
sample is divided equally between the treatment and comparison groups. In the 
example here, for a total sample size of 2,000 communities, statistical power 
will be maximized by sampling all 1,000 treatment communities and a 
 subsample of 1,000 comparison communities, rather than by taking a simple 
random sample of 20 percent of the original 10,000 eligible communities (which 
would produce an evaluation sample of roughly 200 treatment communities 
and 1,800 comparison communities).
3. For example, housing programs that provide subsidized homes routinely use 
lotteries to select program participants. Many charter schools in the United 
States use lotteries to select which applicants are granted admission.
4. In addition to creating groups that have similar average characteristics, 
randomized assignment also creates groups that have similar distributions.
5. Most software programs allow you to set a seed number to make the results of 
the randomized assignment fully transparent and replicable.
6. As mentioned, for statistical reasons, not all observed characteristics must be 
similar in the treatment and comparison groups for randomization to be 
successful. Even when the characteristics of the two groups are truly equal, one 
can expect that 5 percent of the characteristics will show up with a statistically 
signiﬁ cant diff erence when a 95 percent conﬁ dence level is used for the test. Of 
particular concern are variables where the diff erence between treatment and 
comparison groups is large.
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CHAPTER 5
Instrumental Variables
Evaluating Programs When Not Everyone 
Complies with Their Assignment
In the discussion of randomized assignment in chapter 4, we assumed 
that the program administrator has the power to assign units to treat-
ment and comparison groups, with those assigned to the treatment  taking 
the program and those assigned to the comparison group not taking the 
program. In other words, units that are assigned to the treatment and 
comparison groups comply with their assignment. Full compliance is 
more frequently attained in laboratory settings or medical trials, where 
the researcher can carefully make sure, ﬁrst, that all subjects in the treat-
ment group take a given treatment, and second, that none of the subjects 
in the comparison group take it.1 More generally in chapter 4, we assumed 
that programs are able to determine who the potential participants are, 
excluding some and ensuring that others participate.
However, in real-world social programs, it might be unrealistic to think 
that the program administrator will be able to ensure full compliance with 
the group assignment. Yet many programs allow potential participants to 
choose to enroll and thus are not able to exclude potential participants who 
want to enroll. In addition, some programs have a budget that is big enough 
to supply the program to the entire eligible population immediately, so 
that randomly assigning people to treatment and comparison groups and 
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excluding potential participants for the sake of an evaluation would not be 
ethical. We therefore need an alternative way to evaluate the impact of these 
kinds of programs.
A method called instrumental variables (IV) can help us evaluate pro-
grams with imperfect compliance, voluntary enrollment, or universal cov-
erage. Generally, to estimate impacts, the IV method relies on some external 
source of variation to determine treatment status. The method has wide-
ranging applications beyond impact evaluation. Intuitively, we can think of 
an IV as something outside the control of the individual that inﬂ uences her 
likelihood of participating in a program, but is otherwise not associated 
with her characteristics.
In this chapter, we discuss how this external variation, or IV, can be gen-
erated by the rules of program operation that are under the control of pro-
gram implementers or evaluation teams. To produce valid impact estimates, 
this external source of variation must satisfy a number of conditions, which 
we will discuss in detail in this chapter. It turns out that randomized assign-
ment of treatment, as discussed in chapter 4, is a very good instrument, sat-
isfying the necessary conditions. We will use the IV method in two common 
applications of impact evaluation. First, we will use it as an extension of the 
randomized assignment method when not all units comply with their group 
assignments. Second, we will use it to design randomized promotion of 
treatment, an evaluation method that can work for some programs that 
off er voluntary enrollment or universal coverage. Box 5.1 illustrates a cre-
ative use of the IV method.
Types of Impact Estimates
An impact evaluation always estimates the impact of a program by compar-
ing the outcomes for a treatment group with the estimate of the counterfac-
tual obtained from a comparison group. In chapter 4, we assumed full 
compliance with treatment: that is, all units to whom a program has been 
off ered actually enroll, and none of the comparison units receive the pro-
gram. In this scenario, we estimate the average treatment eff ect (ATE) for 
the population.
In the evaluation of real-world programs where potential participants 
can decide whether to enroll or not, full compliance is less common than in 
settings such as laboratory experiments. In practice, programs typically 
off er the opportunity of treatment to a particular group, and some units par-
ticipate while others do not. In this case, without full compliance, impact 
evaluations can estimate the eff ect of off ering a program or the eff ect of 
 participating in the program.
Key Concept
The instrumental 
variable method relies 
on some external 
source of variation to 
determine treatment 
status. An instrumen-
tal variable infl uences 
the likelihood of 
participating in a 
program, but is outside 
of the participant’s 
control and is 
unrelated to the 
participant’s 
characteristics.
Instrumental Variables 91
In the absence of full compliance in the treatment group, the estimated 
impact Δ is called the intention-to-treat (ITT) when comparing groups to 
which the program has randomly been off ered (in the treatment group) or 
not (in the comparison group)—regardless of whether or not those in the 
treatment group actually enroll in the program. The ITT is a weighted aver-
age of the outcomes of participants and nonparticipants in the treatment 
group compared with the average outcome of the comparison group. The 
ITT is important for those cases in which we are trying to determine the 
average impact of off ering a program, and enrollment in the treatment 
group is voluntary. By contrast, we might also be interested in knowing the 
impact of a program for the group of individuals who are off ered the pro-
gram and actually participate. This estimated impact is called the treatment-
on-the-treated (TOT). The ITT and TOT will be the same when there is full 
compliance. We will return to the diff erence between the ITT and TOT in 
future sections, but start with an example to illustrate these concepts.
Consider the Health Insurance Subsidy Program (HISP), discussed in 
previous chapters. Because of operational considerations and to minimize 
spillovers, the unit of treatment assignment chosen by the government is 
Key Concept
Intention-to-treat (ITT) 
estimates the difference 
in outcomes between 
the units assigned to the 
treatment group and the 
units assigned to the 
comparison group, 
irrespective of whether 
the units assigned to the 
treatment group actually 
receive the treatment.
Key Concept
Treatment-on-the-treated 
(TOT) estimates the 
difference in outcomes 
between the units that 
actually receive the 
treatment and the 
comparison group.
Box 5.1: Using Instrumental Variables to Evaluate the Impact of 
Sesame Street on School Readiness
The television show Sesame Street, a 
 program aimed at preparing preschool-aged 
children for primary school, quickly gained 
critical acclaim and popularity after fi rst air-
ing in 1969. It has since been watched by 
millions of children. In 2015, Kearney and 
Levine sought to evaluate the long-term im-
pacts of the program in a retrospective eval-
uation carried out in the United States. 
Taking advantage of limitations in television 
broadcasting technology in the early years of 
the show, the researchers used an instru-
mental variables approach.
In the fi rst few years the show was not 
accessible to all households. It was only broad-
cast on ultra-high frequency (UHF) channels. 
Only about two-thirds of the U.S. population 
lived in areas where the show was accessible. 
Thus, Kearney and Levine (2015) used house-
holds’ distance to the closest television tower 
that transmitted UHF as an instrument for par-
ticipation in the program. The researchers 
argue that since television towers were built in 
locations chosen by the government—all 
before Sesame Street was ever broadcast—
the variable would not be related to household 
characteristics or changes in the outcome.
The evaluation found positive results on 
school readiness for preschool-aged chil-
dren. In areas where there was UHF televi-
sion reception when the show began, 
children were more likely to advance through 
primary school at the appropriate age. This 
effect was notable for African-American and 
non-Hispanic children, boys, and children in 
economically disadvantaged areas.
Source: Kearney and Levine 2015.
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the village. Households in a treatment village (the villages where the health 
insurance program is being off ered) can sign up for a health insurance sub-
sidy voluntarily, while households in comparison communities cannot. 
Even though all households in treatment villages are eligible to enroll in the 
health insurance program, some fraction of households—say, 10 percent—
may decide not to do so (perhaps because they already have insurance 
through their jobs, because they are healthy and do not anticipate the need 
for health care, or because of any other myriad reasons).
In this scenario, 90 percent of households in the treatment village 
decide to enroll in the program and actually receive the services that the 
program provides. The ITT estimate would be obtained by comparing the 
average outcome for all households that were off ered the program—that is, 
for 100 percent of the households in treatment villages—with the average 
outcome in the comparison villages (where no households have enrolled). 
By contrast, the TOT can be thought of as the estimated impact for the 90 
percent of households in treatment villages that enrolled in the program. 
It is important to note that since individuals who participate in a program 
when off ered may diff er from individuals who are off ered the program but 
opt out, the TOT impact is not necessarily the same as the impact we 
would obtain for the 10 percent of households in the treatment villages 
that did not enroll, should they become enrolled. As such, local treatment 
eff ects cannot be extrapolated directly from one group to another.
Imperfect Compliance
As discussed, in real-world social programs, full compliance with a pro-
gram’s selection criteria (and hence adherence to treatment or comparison 
status) is desirable, and policy makers and evaluation teams alike usually 
strive to come as close to that ideal as possible. In practice, however, strict 
100 percent compliance to treatment and comparison assignments may not 
occur, despite the best eff orts of the program implementer and the evalua-
tion team. We will now work through the diff erent cases that can occur and 
discuss implications for the evaluation methods that can be used. We stress 
up front that the best solution to imperfect compliance is to avoid it in the 
ﬁ rst place. In this sense, program managers and policy makers should strive 
to keep compliance as high as possible in the treatment group and as low as 
possible in the comparison group.
Say you are trying to evaluate a teacher-training program, in which 2,000 
teachers are eligible to participate in a pilot training. The teachers have been 
randomly assigned to one of two groups: 1,000 teachers are assigned to the 
treatment group and 1,000 teachers are assigned to the comparison group. 
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When all teachers in the treatment group receive training, and none in the 
comparison group have, we estimate the ATE by taking the diff erence in 
mean outcomes (say student test scores) between the two groups. This ATE 
is the average impact of the treatment on the 1,000 teachers, given that all 
teachers assigned to the treatment group actually attend the course, while 
none of the teachers assigned to the comparison group attend.
The ﬁ rst case of imperfect compliance occurs when some units 
assigned to the treatment group choose not to enroll or are otherwise left 
untreated. In the teacher-training example, some teachers assigned to 
the treatment group do not actually show up on the ﬁrst day of the course. 
In this case, we cannot calculate the average treatment for the population 
of teachers because some teachers never enroll; therefore we can never 
calculate what their outcomes would have been with treatment. But we 
can estimate the average impact of the program on those teachers who 
actually take up or accept the treatment. We want to estimate the impact 
of the program on those teachers to whom treatment was assigned and 
who actually enrolled. This is the TOT estimate. In the teacher- training 
example, the TOT estimate provides the impact for teachers assigned to 
the treatment group who actually show up and receive the training.
The second case of imperfect compliance is when individuals assigned 
to the comparison group manage to participate in the program. Here the 
impacts cannot be directly estimated for the entire treatment group because 
some of their counterparts in the comparison group cannot be observed 
without treatment. The treated units in the comparison group were sup-
posed to generate an estimate of the counterfactual for some units in the 
treatment group, but they receive the treatment; therefore there is no way 
of knowing what the program’s impact would have been for this subset of 
individuals. In the teacher-training example, say that the most motivated 
teachers in the comparison group manage to attend the course somehow. In 
this case, the most motivated teachers in the treatment group would have 
no counterparts in the comparison group, and so it would not be possible to 
estimate the impact of the training for that segment of motivated teachers.
When there is noncompliance on either side, you should consider carefully 
what type of treatment eff ect you estimate and how to interpret them. A ﬁ rst 
option is to compute a straight comparison of the group originally assigned to 
treatment with the group originally assigned to comparison; this will yield the 
ITT estimate. The ITT compares those whom we intended to treat (those 
assigned to the treatment group) with those whom we intended not to treat 
(those assigned to the comparison group). If the noncompliance is only on the 
treatment side, this can be an interesting and relevant measure of impact 
because in any case most policy makers and program managers can only off er 
a program and cannot force the program on their target population.
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In the teacher-training example, the government may want to know the 
average impact of the program for all assigned teachers, even if some of the 
teachers do not attend the course. This is because even if the government 
expands the program, there are likely to be teachers who will never attend. 
However, if there is noncompliance on the comparison side, the intention-
to-treat estimate is not as insightful. In the case of the teacher training, since 
the comparison group of teachers includes teachers who are trained, the 
average outcome in the comparison group has been aff ected by  treatment. 
Let’s assume that the eff ect of teacher training on outcomes is positive. If 
the noncompliers in the comparison group are the most motivated teachers 
and they beneﬁ t the most from training, the average outcome for the com-
parison group will be biased upward (because the motivated teachers in the 
comparison group who got trained will increase the average outcome) and 
the ITT estimate will be biased downward (since it is the diff erence between 
the average outcomes in the treatment and comparison groups).
Under these circumstances of noncompliance, a second option is to 
 estimate what is known as the local average treatment eff ect (LATE). LATE 
needs to be interpreted carefully, as it represents program eff ects for only a 
speciﬁ c subgroup of the population. In particular, when there is noncompli-
ance in both the treatment group and in the comparison group, the LATE is 
the impact on the subgroup of compliers. In the teacher-training example, 
if there is noncompliance in both the treatment and comparison group, then 
the LATE estimate is valid only for teachers in the treatment group who 
enrolled in the program and who would have not enrolled had they been 
assigned to the comparison group. 
In the remainder of this section, we will explain how to estimate the 
LATE, and equally importantly, how to interpret the results. The LATE esti-
mation principles apply when there is noncompliance in the treatment 
group, comparison group, or both simultaneously. The TOT is simply a LATE 
in the more speciﬁ c case when there is noncompliance only in the treatment 
group. Therefore, the rest of this chapter focuses on how to estimate LATE.
Randomized Assignment of a Program and Final Take-Up
Imagine that you are evaluating the impact of a job-training program on 
individuals’ wages. The program is randomly assigned at the individual level. 
The treatment group is assigned to the program, while the comparison group 
is not. Most likely, you will ﬁnd three types of individuals in the population:
 • Enroll-if-assigned. These are the individuals who comply with their 
assignment. If they are assigned to the treatment group (assigned to the 
program), they take it up, or enroll. If they are assigned to the comparison 
group (not assigned to the program), they do not enroll.
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 • Never. These are the individuals who never enroll in or take up the pro-
gram, even if they are assigned to the treatment group. If assigned to the 
treatment group, these individuals will be noncompliers.
 • Always. These are the individuals who will ﬁnd a way to enroll in the 
program or take it up, even if they are assigned to the comparison 
group.  If  assigned to the comparison group, these individuals will be 
noncompliers.
In the context of the job-training program, the Never group might consist of 
unmotivated people who, even if assigned a place in the course, do not show 
up. Individuals in the Always group, in contrast, are so motivated that they 
ﬁnd a way to enter the program even if they were originally assigned to the 
comparison group. The Enroll-if-assigned group comprises those who enroll 
in the course if they are assigned to it, but who do not seek to enroll if they 
are assigned to the comparison group.
Figure 5.1 presents the randomized assignment of the program and the 
ﬁnal enrollment, or take-up, when Enroll-if-assigned, Never, and Always 
types are present. Say that the population comprises 80 percent Enroll-if-
assigned, 10 percent Never, and 10 percent Always. If we take a random 
sample of the population for the evaluation sample, then the evaluation 
sample will also have approximately 80 percent Enroll-if-assigned, 10 
percent Never, and 10 percent Always. Then if we randomly assign the 
Figure 5.1 Randomized Assignment with Imperfect Compliance
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evaluation sample to a treatment group and a comparison group, we 
should again have approximately 80 percent Enroll-if-assigned, 10 per-
cent Never, and 10 percent Always in both groups. In the group that is 
assigned treatment, the Enroll-if-assigned and Always individuals will 
enroll, and only the Never group will stay away. In the comparison group, 
the Always will enroll, while the Enroll-if-assigned and Never groups 
will stay out. It is important to remember that while we know that these 
three types of individuals exist in the population, we can not necessarily 
distinguish an individual’s type until we observe certain behaviors. In the 
treatment group, we will be able to identify the Never types when they 
fail to enroll, but we will not be able to distinguish the Enroll-if-assigned 
from the Always, since both types will enroll. In the comparison group, 
we will be able to identify the Always when they enroll, but we won’t be 
able to distinguish between the Enroll-if-assigned and the Never, since 
both these types remain unenrolled.
Estimating Impact under Randomized Assignment with 
Imperfect Compliance
Having established the diff erence between assigning a program and actual 
enrollment or take-up, we turn to estimating the LATE of the program. This 
estimation is done in two steps, which are illustrated in ﬁgure 5.2.2
To estimate program impacts under randomized assignment with imper-
fect compliance, we ﬁ rst estimate the ITT impact. Remember that this is 
just the straight diff erence in the outcome indicator (Y) for the group that 
we assigned to treatment and the same indicator for the group that we did 
not assign to treatment. For example, if the average wage (Y) for the treat-
ment group is US$110, and the average wage for the comparison group is 
US$70, then the intention-to-treat estimate of the impact would be US$40 
(US$110 minus US$70).
Second, we need to recover the LATE estimate for the Enroll- 
 if-assigned group from the ITT estimate. To do that, we will need to iden-
tify where the US$40 diff erence came from. Let us proceed by elimination. 
First, we know that the diff erence cannot be caused by any diff erences 
between the people who never enroll (the Nevers) in the treatment and 
comparison groups. That’s because the Nevers never enroll in the pro-
gram, so for them, it makes no diff erence whether they are in the treat-
ment group or in the comparison group. Second, we know that the US$40 
diff erence cannot be caused by  diff erences between the Always people in 
the treatment and comparison groups because the Always people always 
enroll in the program. For them, too, it makes no diff erence whether they 
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are in the treatment group or the comparison group. Thus the diff erence 
in outcomes between the two groups must necessarily come from the 
eff ect of the program on the only group aff ected by their assignment to 
treatment or comparison: that is, the Enroll-if-assigned group. So if we 
can identify the Enroll-if-assigned in both groups, it will be easy to esti-
mate the impact of the  program on them.
In reality, although we know that these three types of individuals 
exist in the population, we cannot separate out unique individuals by 
whether they are Enroll-if-assigned, Never, or Always. In the group that 
was assigned treatment, we can identify the Nevers (because they have 
not enrolled), but we cannot diff erentiate between the Always and the 
Enroll-if-assigned (because both are enrolled). In the group that was not 
assigned treatment, we can identify the Always group (because they 
enroll in the program), but we cannot diff erentiate between the Nevers 
and the Enroll-if-assigned.
Figure 5.2 Estimating the Local Average Treatment Effect under Randomized 
Assignment with Imperfect Compliance
Note: Δ = causal impact; Y = outcome. The intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate is obtained by comparing 
outcomes for those assigned to the treatment group with those assigned to the comparison group, 
irrespective of actual enrollment. The local average treatment effect (LATE) estimate provides the im-
pact of the program on those who enroll only if assigned to the program (Enroll-if-assigned). The LATE 
estimate does not provide the  impact of the program on those who never enroll (the Nevers) or on 
those who always enroll (the Always).
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However, once we observe that 90 percent of the units in the group that 
was assigned treatment do enroll, we can deduce that 10 percent of the units 
in our population must be Nevers (that is, the fraction of individuals in the 
group assigned treatment who did not enroll). In addition, if we observe 
that 10  percent of units in the group not assigned treatment enroll, we 
know  that 10 percent are Always (again, the fraction of individuals in 
our  group that was not assigned treatment who did enroll). This leaves 
80   percent of  the units in the Enroll-if-assigned group. We know that 
the entire impact of US$40 came from a diff erence in enrollment for the 
80   percent of the units in our sample who are Enroll-if-assigned. Now if 
80 percent of the units are responsible for an average impact of US$40 for 
the entire group assigned treatment, then the impact on those 80 percent of 
Enroll-if-assigned must be 40/0.8, or US$50. Put another way, the impact of 
the program for the Enroll-if-assigned is US$50, but when this impact is 
spread across the entire group assigned treatment, the average eff ect is 
watered down by the 20 percent that was noncompliant with the original 
randomized assignment.
Remember that one of the basic issues with self-selection into programs 
is that you cannot always know why some people choose to participate and 
others do not. When we conduct an evaluation where units are randomly 
assigned to the program, but actual participation is voluntary or a way 
exists for units in the comparison group to get into the program, then we 
have a similar problem: we will not always understand the behavioral pro-
cesses that determine whether an individual behaves like a Never, an 
Always, or an Enroll-if-assigned. However, provided that the noncompli-
ance is not too large, randomized assignment still provides a powerful tool 
for estimating impact. The downside of randomized assignment with 
imperfect compliance is that this impact estimate is no longer valid for the 
entire population. Instead, the estimate should be interpreted as a local 
estimate that applies only to a speciﬁc subgroup within our target popula-
tion, the Enroll-if-assigned.
Randomized assignment of a program has two important characteris-
tics that allow us to estimate impact when there is imperfect compliance 
(see box 5.2):
1. It can serve as a predictor of actual enrollment in the program if most 
people behave as Enroll-if-assigned, enrolling in the program when 
assigned treatment and not enrolling when not assigned treatment.
2. Since the two groups (assigned and not assigned treatment) are gener-
ated through a randomized process, the characteristics of individuals in 
the two groups are not correlated with anything else—such as ability or 
motivation—that may also aff ect the outcomes (Y).
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In statistical terms, the randomized assignment serves as an IV. It is a 
variable that predicts actual enrollment of units in a program, but is not cor-
related with other characteristics of the units that may be related to out-
comes. While some part of the decision of individuals to enroll in a program 
cannot be controlled by the program administrators, another part of the 
decision is under their control. In particular, the part of the decision that 
can be controlled is the assignment to the treatment and comparison groups. 
Insofar as assignment to the treatment and comparison groups predicts 
ﬁ nal enrollment in the program, the randomized assignment can be used as 
an instrument to predict ﬁ nal enrollment. Having this IV allows us to 
recover the estimates of the local average treatment eff ect from the esti-
mates of the intention-to-treat eff ect for the Enroll-if-assigned type of units.
Box 5.2: Using Instrumental Variables to Deal with 
Noncompliance in a School Voucher Program in Colombia
The Program for Extending the Coverage of 
Secondary School (Programa de Ampliación 
de Cobertura de la Educación Secundaria, or 
PACES), in Colombia, provided more than 
125,000 students with vouchers covering 
slightly more than half the cost of attending 
private secondary school. Because of the 
limited PACES budget, the vouchers were 
 allocated via a lottery. Angrist and others 
(2002) took advantage of this randomly as-
signed treatment to determine the effect of 
the voucher program on educational and so-
cial outcomes.
Angrist and others (2002) found that lot-
tery winners were 10 percent more likely to 
complete the 8th grade and scored, on aver-
age, 0.2 standard deviations higher on stan-
dardized tests three years after the initial 
lottery. They also found that the educational 
effects were greater for girls than boys. The 
researchers then looked at the impact of the 
program on several noneducational out-
comes and found that lottery winners were 
less likely to be married and worked about 
1.2 fewer hours per week.
There was some noncompliance with the 
randomized assignment. Only about 90 per-
cent of the lottery winners actually used the 
voucher or another form of scholarship, and 
24 percent of the lottery losers actually 
received scholarships. Using our earlier ter-
minology, the population must have con-
tained 10 percent Never, 24 percent Always, 
and 66 percent Enroll-if-assigned. Angrist 
and others (2002) therefore also used the 
original assignment, or a student’s lottery 
win or loss status, as an instrumental vari-
able for the treatment-on-the-treated, or 
actual receipt of a scholarship. Finally, the 
researchers were able to calculate a cost-
benefi t analysis to better understand the 
impact of the voucher program on both 
household and government expenditures. 
They concluded that the total social costs of 
the program are small and are outweighed 
by the expected returns to participants and 
their families, thus suggesting that demand-
side programs such as PACES can be a cost-
effective way to increase educational 
attainment.
Source: Angrist and others 2002.
100 Impact Evaluation in Practice
A valid IV must satisfy two basic conditions:
1. The IV should not be correlated with the characteristics of the treatment 
and comparison groups. This is achieved by  randomly assigning treatment 
among the units in the evaluation sample. This is known as exogeneity. It is 
important that the IV not directly aff ect the outcome of interest. Impacts 
must be caused only through the program we are interested in evaluating.
2. The IV must aff ect participation rates in the treatment and comparison 
groups diff erently. We typically think of increasing participation in the 
treatment group. This can be veriﬁed by checking that participation is 
higher in the treatment group compared with the  comparison group. 
This condition is known as relevance.
Interpreting the Estimate of the Local Average Treatment Effect
The diff erence between an estimate of an ATE and an estimate of a LATE 
is especially important when it comes to interpreting the results of an 
evaluation. Let’s think systematically about how to interpret a LATE esti-
mate. First, we must recognize that individuals who comply in a program 
(the Enroll-if-assigned type) are diff erent from individuals who do not 
comply (the Never and Always types). In particular, in the treatment group, 
noncompliers/nonparticipants (Never) may be those who expect to gain 
little from the intervention. In the comparison group, the noncompliers/
participants (Always) are likely the group of individuals who expect to 
beneﬁ t the most from participation. In our teacher-training example, 
teachers who are assigned to the training but decide not to participate (the 
Never type) may be those who feel they don’t need training, teachers with 
a higher opportunity cost of time (for example, because they hold a second 
job or have children to care for), or teachers with lax supervision who can 
get away with not attending. On the other hand, teachers who are assigned 
to the comparison group but enroll anyways (the Always type) may be 
those who feel they absolutely need training, teachers who don’t have 
children of their own to care for, or teachers with a strict principal who 
insists everyone needs to be trained.
Second, we know that the LATE estimate provides the impact for a 
 particular subgroup of the population: it takes into account only those sub-
groups that are not aff ected by either type of noncompliance. In other 
words, it takes into account only the Enroll-if-assigned type. Since the 
Enroll-if-assigned type is diff erent from Never and Always types, the impact 
we ﬁ nd through the LATE estimate does not apply to the Never or Always 
types. For example, if the ministry of education were to implement a second 
round of training and somehow force the Never teachers who did not get 
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trained in the ﬁ rst round to get trained, we don’t know if those teachers 
would have lower, equal, or higher eff ects compared with the teachers who 
participated in the ﬁ rst round. Similarly, if the most self- motivated teachers 
always ﬁ nd a way to take the teacher-training program despite being ran-
domly assigned to the comparison group, then the local average treatment 
eff ect for the compliers in both treatment and comparison groups does not 
give us information about the impact of the program for the highly moti-
vated teachers (the Always). The estimate of the local average treatment 
eff ect applies only to a speciﬁ c subset of the population: those types that 
are  not aff ected by noncompliance—that is, only the complier type—and 
should not be extrapolated to other subsets of the population.
Randomized Promotion as an Instrumental 
Variable
In the previous section, we saw how to estimate impact based on random-
ized assignment of treatment, even if compliance with the originally 
assigned treatment and comparison groups is imperfect. Next we propose 
a very similar approach that can be applied to evaluate programs that have 
universal eligibility or open enrollment or in which the program adminis-
trator can otherwise not control who participates and who does not.
This approach, called randomized promotion (also known as encourage-
ment design), provides an additional encouragement for a random set of 
units to enroll in the program. This randomized promotion serves as an IV. 
It serves as an external source of variation that aff ects the probability of 
receiving the treatment but is otherwise unrelated to the participants’ 
characteristics.
Voluntary enrollment programs typically allow individuals who are 
interested in the program to decide on their own to enroll and participate. 
Again consider the job-training program discussed earlier—but this time, 
randomized assignment is not possible, and any individual who wishes to 
enroll in the program is free to do so. Very much in line with our previous 
example, we will expect to encounter diff erent types of people: compliers, a 
Never group, and an Always group.
 • Always. These are the individuals who will always enroll in the program.
 • Never. These are the individuals who will never enroll.
 • Compliers or Enroll-if-promoted. In this context, any individual who 
would like to enroll in the program is free to do so. Yet some individuals 
may be interested in enrolling but for a variety of reasons, may not have 
suffi  cient information or the right incentive to enroll. The compliers here 
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are those who enroll-if-promoted: they are a group of individuals who 
enroll in the program only if given an additional incentive, stimulus, or 
promotion that motivates them to enroll. Without this additional stimu-
lus, the Enroll-if-promoted would simply remain out of the program.
Returning to the job-training example, if the agency that organizes the 
training is well funded and has suffi  cient capacity, it may have an “open-
door” policy, treating every unemployed person who wants to participate. It 
is unlikely, however, that every unemployed person will actually step for-
ward to participate or will even know that the program exists. Some unem-
ployed people may be reluctant to enroll because they know very little about 
the content of the training and ﬁnd it hard to obtain additional information. 
Now assume that the job-training agency hires a community outreach 
worker to go around town to encourage a randomly selected group of unem-
ployed persons to enroll into the job-training program. Carrying the list of 
randomly selected unemployed people, she knocks on their doors, describes 
the training program, and off ers to help the person to enroll in the program 
on the spot. The visit is a form of promotion, or encouragement, to partici-
pate in the program. Of course, she cannot force anyone to participate. In 
addition, the unemployed persons whom the outreach worker does not visit 
can also enroll, although they will have to go to the agency themselves to 
do  so. So we now have two groups of unemployed people: those who 
were   randomly assigned a visit by the outreach worker, and those who 
were  randomly not visited. If the outreach eff ort is eff ective, the enrollment 
rate among unemployed people who were visited should be higher than the 
rate among unemployed people who were not visited.
Now let us think about how we can evaluate this job-training program. 
We cannot just compare those unemployed people who enroll with those 
who do not enroll. That’s because the unemployed who enroll are probably 
very diff erent from those who do not enroll in both observed and unob-
served ways: they may be more or less educated (this can be observed  easily), 
and they are probably more motivated and eager to ﬁnd a job (this is hard to 
observe and measure).
However, there is some additional variation that we can exploit to ﬁnd a 
valid comparison group. Consider for a moment whether we can compare 
the group of people who were randomly assigned to receive a visit from the 
outreach worker with the group that was not visited. Because the promoted 
and nonpromoted groups were determined at random, both groups contain 
identical compositions of very motivated persons (Always) who will enroll 
whether or not the outreach worker knocks on their door. Both groups also 
contain unmotivated persons (Never) who will not enroll in the program, 
despite the eff orts of the outreach worker. Finally, if the outreach worker is 
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eff ective at motivating enrollment, some people (Enroll-if-promoted) will 
enroll in the training if the outreach worker visits them, but will not enroll if 
the worker does not.
Since the outreach worker visited a group of individuals assigned at 
 random, we can derive a LATE estimate, as discussed earlier. The only dif-
ference is that instead of randomly assigning the program, we are randomly 
promoting it. As long as Enroll-if-promoted people (who enroll when we 
reach out to them but do not enroll when we do not reach out to them) 
appear in suffi  cient numbers, we have variation between the group with the 
promotion and the group without the promotion that allows us to identify 
the impact of the training on the Enroll-if-promoted. Instead of complying 
with the assignment of the treatment, the Enroll-if-promoted are now com-
plying with the promotion.
For this strategy to work, we want the outreach or promotion to be eff ec-
tive in increasing enrollment substantially among the Enroll-if-promoted 
group. At the same time, we do not want the promotion activities themselves 
to inﬂuence the ﬁ nal outcomes of interest (such as earnings), since at the 
end of the day we are interested primarily in estimating the impact of the 
training program, and not the impact of the promotion strategy, on ﬁ nal out-
comes. For example, if the outreach workers off ered large amounts of money 
to unemployed people to get them to enroll, it would be hard to tell whether 
any later changes in income were caused by the training or by the outreach 
activity itself.
Randomized promotion is a creative strategy that generates the equiva-
lent of a comparison group for the purposes of impact evaluation. It can 
be used when a program has open enrollment and it is feasible to organize 
a  promotion campaign aimed at a random sample of the population of 
 interest. Randomized promotion is another example of an IV that allows us 
to estimate impact in an unbiased way. But again, as with randomized 
assignment with imperfect compliance, impact evaluations relying on ran-
domized promotion provide a LATE estimate: a local estimate of the eff ect 
on a speciﬁ c subgroup of the population, the Enroll-if-promoted group. As 
before, this LATE estimate cannot be directly extrapolated to the whole 
population, since the Always and Never groups are likely quite diff erent 
from the Enroll-if-promoted group.
You Said “Promotion”?
Randomized promotion seeks to increase the take-up of a voluntary 
 program in a randomly selected subsample of the population. The pro-
motion itself can take several forms. For instance, we may choose to initi-
ate an information campaign to reach those individuals who had not 
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enrolled because they did not know or fully understand the content of the 
program. Alternatively, we may choose to provide incentives to sign up, 
such as off ering small gifts or prizes or making transportation available.
As discussed for IV more generally, a number of conditions must be met 
for the randomized promotion approach to produce valid estimate of pro-
gram impact:
1. The promoted and nonpromoted groups must be similar. That is, the 
average characteristics of the two groups must be statistically equivalent. 
This is achieved by randomly assigning the outreach or promotion activi-
ties among the units in the evaluation sample.
2. The promotion itself should not directly aff ect the outcomes of interest. 
This is a critical requirement so that we can tell that changes in the 
 outcomes of interest are caused by the program itself and not by the 
promotion.
3. The promotion campaign must substantially change enrollment rates in 
the promoted group relative to the nonpromoted group. We typically 
think of increasing enrollment with promotion. This can be veriﬁed by 
checking that enrollment rates are higher in the group that receives the 
promotion than in the group that does not.
The Randomized Promotion Process
The process of randomized promotion is presented in ﬁgure 5.3. As in the 
previous methods, we begin with the population of eligible units for the 
 program. In contrast with randomized assignment, we can no longer ran-
domly choose who will receive the program and who will not receive the 
program because the program is fully voluntary. However, within the popu-
lation of eligible units, there will be three types of units:
 • Always. Those who will always want to enroll in the program.
 • Enroll-if-promoted. Those who will sign up for the program only when 
given additional promotion.
 • Never. Those who never want to sign up for the program, whether or not 
we off er them promotion.
Again, note that being an Always, an Enroll-if-promoted, or a Never is an 
intrinsic characteristic of units that cannot be easily measured by the pro-
gram evaluation team because it is related to factors such as motivation, 
intelligence, and information.
Once the eligible population is deﬁned, the next step is to randomly 
select a sample from the population to be part of the evaluation. These are 
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the units on whom we will collect data. In some cases—for example, when 
we have data for the entire population of eligible units—we may decide to 
include this entire population in the evaluation sample.
Once the evaluation sample is deﬁned, randomized promotion randomly 
assigns the evaluation sample into a promoted group and a nonpromoted 
group. Since we are randomly choosing the members of both the promoted 
group and the nonpromoted group, both groups will share the characteris-
tics of the overall evaluation sample, and those will be equivalent to the 
characteristics of the population of eligible units. Therefore, the promoted 
group and the nonpromoted group will have similar characteristics.
After the promotion campaign is over, we can observe the enrollment 
rates in both groups. In the nonpromoted group, only the Always will enroll. 
Although we know which units are Always in the nonpromoted group, we 
will not be able to distinguish between the Never and Enroll-if-promoted in 
that group. By contrast, in the promoted group, both the Enroll-if-promoted 
and the Always will enroll, whereas the Never will not enroll. So in the pro-
moted group we will be able to identify the Never group, but we will not be 
able to distinguish between the Enroll-if-promoted and the Always.
Estimating Impact under Randomized Promotion
Imagine that for a group of 10 individuals per group, the promotion cam-
paign raises enrollment from 30 percent in the nonpromoted  group 
(3 Always) to 80 percent in the promoted group (3 Always and 5 Enroll-if-
promoted). Assume that the average outcome for all individuals the 
Figure 5.3 Randomized Promotion
2. Select the evaluation
sample
No promotion
1. Define eligible units
Never Enroll-
if-
Promoted
Always External validity Internal validity
Promotion
3. Randomize promotion
of the program
4. Enrollment
106 Impact Evaluation in Practice
nonpromoted group (10 individuals) is 70, and that average outcome for all 
individuals in the promoted group (10 individuals) is 110 (ﬁ gure 5.4). Then 
what would be the impact of the program?
First, let’s compute the straight diff erence in outcomes between the 
 promoted and the nonpromoted groups, which is 40 (110 minus 70). We 
know that none of this diff erence of 40 comes from the Nevers because they 
do not enroll in either group. We also know that none of this diff erence of 
40 should come from the Always because they enroll in both groups. So all 
of this  diff erence of 40 should come from the Enroll-if-promoted.
The second step is to obtain the LATE estimate of the program on the 
Enroll-if-promoted. We know that the entire diff erence between the pro-
moted and nonpromoted groups of 40 can be attributed to the Enroll-if-
promoted, who make up only 50 percent of the population. To assess the 
average eff ect of the program on a complier, we divide 40 by the percentage 
of Enroll-if-promoted in the population. Although we cannot directly iden-
tify the Enroll-if-promoted, we are able to deduce what must be their 
 percentage of the population: it is the diff erence in the enrollment rates of 
the promoted and the nonpromoted groups (50 percent, or 0.5). Therefore, 
the estimate of the local average treatment eff ect of the program on the 
Enroll-if-promoted group is 40/0.5=80.
Given that the promotion is assigned randomly, the promoted and non-
promoted groups have equal characteristics. Thus the diff erences that we 
observe in average outcomes between the two groups must be caused by 
Figure 5.4 Estimating the Local Average Treatment Effect under 
Randomized Promotion
Note: Δ = causal impact; Y = outcome. Characters that appear against the shaded background are 
those who enroll.
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the fact that in the promoted group, the Enroll-if-promoted enroll, while in 
the nonpromoted group, they do not. Again, we should not directly extrap-
olate the estimated impacts for the Enroll-if-promoted to other groups, 
since they are likely quite diff erent from the groups that Never and Always 
enroll. Box 5.3 presents an example of randomized promotion for a project 
in Bolivia.
Box 5.3: Randomized Promotion of Education Infrastructure 
Investments in Bolivia
In 1991, Bolivia institutionalized and scaled 
up a successful Social Investment Fund (SIF), 
which provided fi nancing to rural communi-
ties to carry out small-scale investments in 
education, health, and water infrastructure. 
The World Bank, which was helping to fi -
nance SIF, built an impact evaluation into the 
program design.
As part of the impact evaluation of the 
education component, communities in the 
Chaco region were randomly selected for 
active promotion of the SIF intervention and 
received additional visits and encourage-
ment to apply from program staff. The pro-
gram was open to all eligible communities in 
the region and was demand-driven, in that 
communities had to apply for funds for a 
specifi c project. Not all communities took up 
the program, but take-up was higher among 
promoted communities.
Newman and others (2002) used the 
 randomized promotion as an instrumental 
variable. They found that the education 
investments succeeded in improving mea-
sures of school infrastructure quality such 
as electricity, sanitation facilities, textbooks 
per student, and student-teacher ratios. 
However, they detected little impact on edu-
cational outcomes, except for a decrease of 
about 2.5 percent in the dropout rate. As a 
result of these fi ndings, the ministry of edu-
cation and the SIF now focus more attention 
and resources on the “software” of educa-
tion, funding physical infrastructure improve-
ments only when they form part of an 
integrated intervention.
Source: Newman and others 2002.
  Evaluating the Impact of HISP: Randomized Promotion
Let us now try using the randomized promotion method to evaluate the 
impact of the Health Insurance Subsidy Program (HISP). Assume that 
the ministry of health makes an executive decision that the health insur-
ance subsidy should be made available immediately to any household 
that wants to enroll. You note that this is a diff erent scenario than the 
randomized assignment case we have considered so far. However, you 
know that realistically this national scale-up will be incremental over 
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time, so you reach an agreement to try and accelerate enrollment in a 
random subset of villages through a promotion campaign. In a random 
subsample of villages, you undertake an intensive promotion eff ort that 
includes communication and social marketing aimed at increasing 
awareness of HISP. The promotion activities are carefully designed to 
avoid content that may inadvertently encourage changes in other health-
related behaviors, since this would invalidate the promotion as an instru-
mental variable (IV). Instead, the promotion concentrates exclusively on 
boosting enrollment in HISP. After two years of  promotion and program 
implementation, you ﬁnd that 49.2 percent of households in villages that 
were randomly assigned to the promotion have enrolled in the program, 
while only 8.4 percent of households in nonpromoted villages have 
enrolled (table 5.1).
Because the promoted and nonpromoted villages were assigned at 
 random, you know that the average characteristics of the two groups should 
be the same in the absence of the promotion. You can verify that assump-
tion by comparing the baseline health expenditures (as well as any other 
characteristics) of the two populations. After two years of program imple-
mentation, you observe that the average health expenditure in the pro-
moted villages is US$14.97, compared with US$18.85 in nonpromoted areas 
(a diff erence of minus US$3.87). However, because the only diff erence 
between the promoted and nonpromoted villages is that enrollment in the 
program is higher in the promoted villages (thanks to the promotion), 
this diff erence of US$3.87 in health expenditures must be due to the addi-
tional 40.78 percent of households that enrolled in the promoted  villages 
because of the promotion. Therefore, we need to adjust the  diff erence in 
health expenditures to be able to ﬁnd the impact of the  program on the 
Enroll-if-promoted. To do this, we divide the  intention-to-treat  estimate—
that is, the straight diff erence between the promoted and  nonpromoted 
groups—by the percentage of Enroll-if-promoted: −3.87/0.4078 = −US$9.49. 
Table 5.1 Evaluating HISP: Randomized Promotion Comparison of Means 
Promoted 
villages
Nonpromoted 
villages Difference t-stat
Household health expendi-
tures at baseline (US$) 17.19 17.24 −0.05 −0.47
Household health expendi-
tures at follow-up (US$) 14.97 18.85 −3.87 −16.43
Enrollment rate in HISP 49.20% 8.42% 40.78% 49.85
Note: Signifi cance level: ** = 1 percent.
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Limitations of the Randomized Promotion Method
Randomized promotion is a useful strategy for evaluating the impact of 
 voluntary programs and programs with universal eligibility, particularly 
because it does not require the exclusion of any eligible units. Nevertheless, 
the approach has some noteworthy limitations compared with randomized 
assignment of treatment.
First, the promotion strategy must be eff ective. If the promotion cam-
paign does not increase enrollment, then no diff erence between the pro-
moted and the nonpromoted groups will appear, and there will be nothing 
to compare. It is thus crucial to carefully design and extensively pilot the 
promotion campaign to make sure that it will be eff ective. On the positive 
side, the design of the promotion campaign can help program managers by 
teaching them how to increase enrollment after the evaluation period is 
concluded.
Second, the randomized promotion method estimates the impact of 
the program for only a subset of the population of eligible units (a LATE). 
Your colleague, an econometrician who suggests using the randomized 
promotion as an IV, then estimates the impact of the program through a 
two-stage least-squares procedure (see  online technical companion at 
http://www.worldbank.org/ieinpractice for further details on the econo-
metric approach to estimating impacts with  IV). She ﬁnds the results 
shown in table 5.2. This estimated impact is valid for those households that 
enrolled in the program because of the promotion but who otherwise 
would not have done so: in other words, the Enroll-if-promoted.
 HISP Question 4
A. What are the key conditions required to accept the results from 
the randomized promotion evaluation of HISP?
B. Based on these results, should HISP be scaled up nationally?
Table 5.2 Evaluating HISP: Randomized Promotion with 
Regression Analysis
Linear regression Multivariate linear regression
Estimated impact on 
household health 
expenditures (US$)
−9.50**
(0.52)
−9.74**
(0.46)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signifi cance level: ** = 1 percent.
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Speciﬁcally, the program’s local average impact is estimated from the 
group of individuals who sign up for the program only when encouraged 
to do so. However, individuals in this group may have very diff erent 
characteristics than those individuals who always or never enroll. 
Therefore the average treatment eff ect for the entire population may be 
diff erent from the average treatment eff ect estimated for individuals 
who participate only when encouraged. A randomized promotion evalu-
ation will not estimate impacts for the group of individuals who enroll 
in the program without encouragement. In some contexts, this group 
(the Always) may be precisely the group the program is designed to 
 beneﬁ t. In this context, the randomized promotion design will shed 
light on impacts expected for new populations that would enroll from 
additional promotion, but not on impacts for the population that already 
enrolls on its own.
Checklist: Randomized Promotion as an 
Instrumental Variable
Randomized promotion leads to valid estimates of the counterfactual if the 
promotion campaign substantially increases take-up of the program with-
out directly aff ecting the outcomes of interest.
¸ Are the baseline characteristics balanced between the units that received 
the promotion campaign and those that did not? Compare the baseline 
characteristics of the two groups.
¸ Does the promotion campaign substantially aff ect the take-up of the pro-
gram? It should. Compare the program take-up rates in the promoted 
and the nonpromoted subsamples.
¸ Does the promotion campaign directly aff ect outcomes? It should not. 
This cannot usually be directly tested, so you need to rely on theory, com-
mon sense, and good knowledge of the setting of the impact evaluation 
for guidance.
Additional Resources
 • For accompanying material to the book and hyperlinks to additional 
 resources, please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (http://www 
. worldbank.org /ieinpractice).
 • For additional resources on IV, see the Inter-American Development Bank 
Evaluation Portal (http://www.iadb.org/evaluationhub).
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Notes
1. In the medical sciences, patients in the comparison group typically receive a 
placebo: that is, something like a sugar pill that should have no eff ect on the 
intended outcome. That is done to further control for the placebo eff ect, 
meaning the potential changes in behavior and outcomes that could occur 
simply from the act of receiving a treatment, even if the treatment itself is 
ineff ective.
2. These two steps correspond to the econometric technique of two-stage 
least-squares, which produces an estimate of the local average treatment eff ect.
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Regression Discontinuity 
Design
Evaluating Programs That Use an Eligibility Index
Social programs often use an index to decide who is eligible to enroll in the 
program and who is not. For example, antipoverty programs are typically 
targeted to poor households, which are identiﬁed by a poverty score or 
index. The poverty score can be based on a formula that measures a set of 
basic household assets as a proxy (or estimate) for means (such as income, 
consumption, or purchasing power).1 Households with low scores are 
classiﬁed as poor, and households with higher scores are considered rela-
tively better-off . Antipoverty programs typically determine a threshold or 
cutoff  score, below which households are deemed poor and are eligible for 
the program. Colombia’s system for selecting beneﬁciaries of social spend-
ing is one such example (see box 6.1). Test scores are another example (see 
box  6.3). College admission might be granted to the top performers on a 
standardized test, whose results are ranked from the lowest to the highest 
performer. If the number of slots is limited, then only students who score 
above a certain threshold score (such as the top 10 percent of students) will 
be granted admission. In both examples, there is a continuous eligibility 
index (poverty score and test score, respectively) that allows for ranking the 
population of interest, as well as a threshold or cutoff  score that determines 
who is eligible and who is not.
CHAPTER 6
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Box 6.1: Using Regression Discontinuity Design to Evaluate the 
Impact of Reducing School Fees on School Enrollment Rates in 
Colombia
Barrera-Osorio, Linden, and Urquiola (2007) 
used regression discontinuity design (RDD) 
to evaluate the impact of a school fee reduc-
tion program in Colombia (Gratuitad) on 
school enrollment rates in the city of  Bogota. 
The program is targeted based on an index 
called the SISBEN, which is a continuous pov-
erty index whose value is determined 
by household characteristics, such as loca-
tion, the building materials of the home, the 
services that are available there, demograph-
ics, health, education, income, and the 
 occupations of household members. The gov-
ernment established two cutoff scores along 
the SISBEN index: children of households 
with scores below cutoff score no. 1 are eli-
gible for free education from grades 1 to 11; 
children of households with scores between 
cutoff scores no. 1 and no. 2 are eligible for a 
50 percent subsidy on fees for grades 10 and 
11; and children from households with scores 
above cutoff score no. 2 are not eligible for 
free education or subsidies.
The authors used a RDD for four rea-
sons. First, household characteristics such 
as income or the education level of the 
household head are continuous along the 
SISBEN score at baseline; in other words, 
there are no “jumps” in characteristics along 
the SISBEN score. Second, households on 
both sides of the cutoff scores have similar 
characteristics, generating credible compari-
son groups. Third, a large sample of house-
holds was available. Finally, the government 
kept the formula used to calculate the 
SISBEN index secret, so that scores would 
be protected from manipulation.
Using the RDD method, the research-
ers found that the program had a signifi -
cant positive impact on school enrollment 
rates. Specifi cally, enrollment was 3 per-
centage points higher for primary school 
students from households below cutoff 
score no. 1, and 6 percentage points higher 
for high school students from households 
between cutoff scores no. 1 and no. 2. This 
study provides evidence on the benefi ts of 
reducing the direct costs of schooling, par-
ticularly for at-risk students. However, its 
authors also call for further research on 
price elasticities to better inform the design 
of subsidy programs such as this one.
Source: Barrera-Osorio, Linden, and Urquiola 2007.
Regression discontinuity design (RDD) is an impact evaluation method 
that can be used for programs that have a continuous eligibility index with a 
clearly deﬁned eligibility threshold (cutoff  score) to determine who is 
 eligible and who is not. To apply a regression discontinuity design, the 
 following main conditions must be met:
1. The index must rank people or units in a continuous or “smooth” way. 
Indexes like poverty scores, test scores, or age have many values that 
can be ordered from small to large, and therefore they can be considered 
smooth. By contrast, variables that have discrete or “bucket” categories 
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that have only a few possible values or cannot be ranked are not consid-
ered smooth. Examples of the latter include employment status 
(employed or unemployed), highest education level achieved (primary, 
secondary, university, or postgraduate), car ownership (yes or no), or 
country of birth.
2. The index must have a clearly deﬁned cutoff  score: that is, a point on 
the index above or below which the population is classiﬁed as eligible 
for the program. For example, households with a poverty index score of 
less than 50 out of 100 might be classiﬁed as poor, individuals age 67 
and older might be classiﬁed as eligible for a pension, and students with 
a test score of 90 or more out of 100 might be eligible for a scholarship. 
The cutoff  scores in these examples are 50, 67, and 90, respectively.
3. The cutoff  must be unique to the program of interest; that is, there 
should be no other programs, apart from the program to be evaluated, 
that uses the same cutoff  score. For example, if a poverty score below 
50 qualiﬁ es a household for a cash transfer, health insurance, and free 
public transportation, we would not be able to use the RDD method to 
estimate the impact of the cash transfer program by itself.
4. The score of a particular individual or unit cannot be manipulated by enu-
merators, potential beneﬁ ciaries, program administrators, or politicians.
The RDD estimates impact around the eligibility cutoff  as the diff erence 
between the average outcome for units on the treated side of the eligibility 
cutoff  and the average outcome of units on the untreated (comparison) side 
of the cutoff .
Consider an agriculture program that aims to improve total rice yields 
by subsidizing farmers’ purchase of fertilizer. The program targets small 
and medium-size farms, which it classiﬁes as farms with fewer than 50 
hectares of land. Before the program starts, we might expect smaller farms 
to have lower outputs than larger farms, as shown in ﬁ gure 6.1, which plots 
farm size and rice production. The eligibility score in this case is the num-
ber of hectares of the farm, and the cutoff  is 50 hectares. Program rules 
establish that farms below the 50-hectare cutoff  are eligible to receive fer-
tilizer subsidies, and farms with 50 or more hectares are not. In this case, 
we might expect to see a number of farms with 48, 49, or even 49.9 hectares 
that participate in the program. Another group of farms with 50, 50.1, and 
50.2 hectares will not participate in the program because they lie just to the 
ineligible side of the cutoff . The group of farms with 49.9 hectares is likely 
to be very similar to the group of farms with 50.1 hectares in all respects, 
except that one group received the fertilizer subsidy and the other group 
did not. As we move further away from the eligibility cutoff , eligible and 
Key Concept
Regression discontinuity 
design (RDD) is an 
impact evaluation 
method that is adequate 
for programs that use a 
continuous index to rank 
potential participants 
and that have a cutoff 
point along the index 
that determines whether 
or not potential 
participants are eligible 
to receive the program.
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Figure 6.1 Rice Yield, Smaller Farms versus Larger Farms (Baseline)
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ineligible farms may diff er more. But farm size is a good measure of how 
diff erent they are, allowing us to control for many of those diff erences.
Once the program rolls out and subsidizes the cost of fertilizer for small 
and medium farms, the impact evaluation could use an RDD to evaluate its 
impact (ﬁ gure 6.2). The RDD calculates impact as the diff erence in out-
comes, such as rice yields, between the units on both sides of the eligibility 
cutoff , which in our example is a farm size of 50 hectares. The farms that 
were just too large to enroll in the program constitute the comparison group 
and generate an estimate of the counterfactual outcome for those farms in 
the treatment group that were just small enough to enroll. Given that these 
two groups of farms were very similar at baseline and are exposed to the 
same set of external factors over time (such as weather, price shocks, and 
local and national agricultural policies), the only plausible reason for 
 diff erent outcomes must be the program itself.
Since the comparison group is made up of farms just above the eligibility 
threshold, the impact given by a RDD is valid only locally—that is, in the 
neighborhood around the eligibility cutoff  score. Thus we obtain an esti-
mate of a local average treatment eff ect (LATE) (see chapter 5). The impact 
of the fertilizer subsidy program is valid for the larger of the medium-size 
farms: that is, those with just under 50 hectares of land. The impact 
 evaluation will not necessarily be able to directly identify the impact of the 
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program on the smallest farms—say, those with 10 or 20 acres of land—
where the eff ects of a fertilizer subsidy may diff er in important ways from 
the medium-size farms with 48 or 49 hectares. One advantage of the RDD 
method is that once the program eligibility rules are applied, no eligible 
units need to be left untreated for the purposes of the impact evaluation. 
The trade-off  is that impacts for observations far away from the cutoff  will 
not be known. Box 6.2 presents an example of the use of RDD for evaluating 
a social safety net program in Jamaica.
Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design
Once we have veriﬁ ed that there is no evidence of manipulation in the 
 eligibility index, we may still face a challenge if units do not respect their 
assignment to the treatment or comparison groups. In other words, some 
units that qualify for the program on the basis of their eligibility index 
may opt not to participate, while other units that did not qualify for the 
program on the basis of their eligibility index may ﬁ nd a way to partici-
pate anyway. When all units comply with the assignment that corresponds 
to them on the basis of their eligibility index, we say that the RDD is 
“sharp,” while if there is noncompliance on either side of the cutoff , then 
Figure 6.2 Rice Yield, Smaller Farms versus Larger Farms (Follow-Up)
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we say that the RDD is “fuzzy” (ﬁ gure 6.3). If the RDD is fuzzy, we can use 
the instrumental variable approach to correct for the noncompliance (see 
chapter 5). Remember that in the case of randomized assignment with 
noncompliance, we used the randomized assignment as the instrumental 
variable that helped us correct for noncompliance. In the case of RDD, we 
can use the original assignment based on the eligibility index as the 
instrumental  variable. Doing so has a drawback, though: our instrumental 
RDD impact estimate will be further localized—in the sense that it is no 
longer valid to all observations close to the cutoff , but instead represents 
the impact for the subgroup of the population that is located close to the 
cutoff  point and that participates in the program only because of the eligi-
bility criteria.
Box 6.2: Social Safety Nets Based on a Poverty Index in Jamaica
The regression discontinuity design (RDD) 
method was used to evaluate the impact 
of a social safety net initiative in Jamaica. In 
2001, the government of Jamaica initiated 
the Programme of Advancement through 
Health and Education (PATH) to increase 
investments in human capital and improve 
the targeting of welfare benefi ts to the poor. 
The program provided health and education 
grants to children in eligible poor house-
holds, conditional on school attendance and 
regular health care visits. The average 
monthly benefi t for each child was about 
US$6.50, in addition to a government waiver 
of certain health and education fees.
With program eligibility determined by a 
scoring formula, Levy and Ohls (2010) were 
able to compare households just below the 
eligibility threshold with households just 
above (between 2 and 15 points from the 
cutoff). The researchers justify using the 
RDD method with baseline data showing 
that the treatment and comparison house-
holds had similar levels of poverty, mea-
sured by proxy means scores, and similar 
levels of motivation, in that all of the house-
holds in the sample had applied to the pro-
gram. The researchers also used the 
program eligibility score in the regression 
analysis to help control for any differences 
between the two groups.
Levy and Ohls (2010) found that the 
PATH program increased school atten-
dance for children ages 6 to 17 by an aver-
age of 0.5 days per month, which is 
signifi cant given an already fairly high 
attendance rate of 85 percent. Moreover, 
health care visits by children ages 0 to 6 
increased by approximately 38 percent. 
While the researchers were unable to fi nd 
any longer-term impacts on school achieve-
ment or health care status, they concluded 
that the magnitude of the impacts they did 
fi nd was broadly consistent with condi-
tional cash transfer programs implemented 
in other countries. A fi nal interesting 
aspect of this evaluation is that it gathered 
both quantitative and qualitative data, 
using information systems, interviews, 
focus groups, and household surveys.
Source: Levy and Ohls 2010.
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Checking the Validity of the Regression 
Discontinuity Design
For a RDD to yield an unbiased LATE estimate at the cutoff , it is impor-
tant that the eligibility index not be manipulated around the cutoff 
so that an individual can change treatment or control status.2 Manipulation 
of the eligibility criteria can take many forms. For example, the enumera-
tors who collect data that are used to compute the eligibility score could 
change one or two responses of respondents; or respondents may pur-
posefully lie to enumerators if they think that doing so would qualify 
them for the program. In addition, manipulation of the scores might get 
worse over time as enumerators, respondents, and politicians all start 
learning the “rules of the game.” In the fertilizer subsidy example, 
manipulation around the cutoff  would occur if farm owners could alter 
land titles or misreport the size of their farms. Or a farmer with 50.3 
hectares of land might ﬁ nd a way to sell off  a half hectare to qualify for 
the program, if the expected beneﬁ ts from the fertilizer subsidy were 
worth doing so.
One telltale sign of manipulation is illustrated in ﬁ gure 6.4. Panel a 
shows the distribution of households according to their baseline index 
when there is no manipulation. The density of households around the cut-
off  (50) is continuous (or smooth). Panel b shows a diff erent situation: a 
larger number of households seem to be “bunched” right below the cutoff , 
while relatively few households can be found right above the cutoff . Since 
there is no a priori reason to believe that there should be a large shift in the 
number of households right around the cutoff , the occurrence of that shift 
in the distribution around the cutoff  is evidence that somehow households 
Figure 6.3 Compliance with Assignment
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Figure 6.4 Manipulation of the Eligibility Index
a. No manipulation b. Manipulation
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Box 6.3: The Effect on School Performance of Grouping Students 
by Test Scores in Kenya
To test whether assigning  students to 
classes based on performance improves 
educational outcomes, Dufl o, Dupas, and 
Kremer (2011) conducted an experiment 
with 121 primary schools in western Kenya. 
In half the schools, fi rst-grade students were 
randomly split into two different class sec-
tions. In the other half of the schools, 
 students were assigned to either a high- 
performing or a low-performing section 
based on their initial test scores, using the 
test score as a cutoff point.
The regression discontinuity design 
(RDD) allowed researchers to test whether 
the composition of students in a class 
directly affected test scores. They compared 
endline test scores for students who were 
right around the cutoff to see if those 
assigned to the high-performing section did 
better than those assigned to the low- 
performing section.
On average, endline test scores in 
schools that assigned students to sections 
with similarly higher or lower performers 
were 0.14 standard deviations higher than in 
schools that did not use this method and 
instead used randomized assignment to cre-
ate equivalent groups of students. These 
results were not solely driven by students in 
the high-performing section, as students in 
the low-performing section also showed 
improvements in test scores. For students 
right around the cutoff score, the research-
ers found that there was no signifi cant dif-
ference in endline test scores. These 
fi ndings reject the hypothesis that students 
directly benefi t from having higher-achieving 
classmates.
Source: Dufl o, Dupas, and Kremer 2011.
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may be manipulating their scores to gain access to the program. A second 
test for manipulation plots the eligibility index against the outcome vari-
able at baseline and checks that there is no discontinuity or “jump” right 
around the cutoff  line.
  Evaluating the Impact of HISP: Regression 
Discontinuity Design
Now consider how the regression discontinuity design (RDD) method 
can be applied to our Health Insurance Subsidy Program (HISP). After 
doing some more investigation into the design of HISP, you ﬁnd that in 
addition to randomly selecting  treatment villages, the authorities tar-
geted the program to low-income households using the national poverty 
line. The poverty line is based on a poverty index that assigns each house-
hold in the country a score between 20 and 100 based on its assets, hous-
ing  conditions, and sociodemographic structure. The poverty line has 
been offi  cially set at 58. This means that all households with a score of 58 
or below are classiﬁed as poor, and all households with a score of more 
than 58 are considered to be nonpoor. Even in the treatment  villages, only 
poor households are  eligible to enroll in HISP. Your data set includes 
information on both poor and nonpoor households in the treatment 
villages.
Before carrying out the regression discontinuity design estimations, 
you decide to check whether there is any evidence of manipulation of 
the eligibility index. As a ﬁ rst step, you check whether the density of 
the eligibility index raises any concerns about manipulation of the 
index. You plot the percentage of households against the baseline 
 poverty index (ﬁ gure 6.5).3 The ﬁ gure does not indicate any “bunch-
ing” of households right below the cutoff  of 58.
Next, you check whether households respected their assignment to 
the treatment and comparison groups on the basis of their eligibility 
score. You plot participation in the program against the baseline poverty 
index (ﬁ gure 6.6) and ﬁ nd that two years after the start of the pilot, 
only households with a score of 58 or below (that is, to the left of the pov-
erty line) have been allowed to enroll in HISP. In addition, all of the 
 eligible households enrolled in HISP. In other words, you ﬁ nd full com-
pliance and have a “sharp” RDD.
You now proceed to apply the RDD method to compute the impact 
of the program. Using follow-up data, you again plot the relationship 
between the scores on the poverty index and predicted health 
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Figure 6.5 HISP: Density of Households, by Baseline Poverty Index
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Figure 6.6 Participation in HISP, by Baseline Poverty Index
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expenditures and ﬁnd the relation illustrated in ﬁgure 6.7. In the rela-
tionship between the poverty index and the predicted health expendi-
tures, you ﬁ nd a clear break, or discontinuity, at the poverty line (58).
The discontinuity reﬂects a decrease in health expenditures for 
those households eligible to receive the program. Given that house-
holds on both sides of the cutoff  score of 58 are very similar, the plausi-
ble explanation for the diff erent level of health expenditures is that one 
group of households was eligible to enroll in the program and the other 
was not. You estimate this diff erence through a regression with the 
ﬁndings shown in table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Evaluating HISP: Regression Discontinuity Design with 
Regression Analysis
Multivariate linear regression
Estimated impact on household health 
expenditures
−9.03**
(0.43)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signifi cance level: ** = 1 percent.
Figure 6.7 Poverty Index and Health Expenditures, HISP, Two Years Later
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Limitations and Interpretation of the Regression 
Discontinuity Design Method
Regression discontinuity design provides estimates of local average treat-
ment eff ects (LATE) around the eligibility cutoff  at the point where treat-
ment and comparison units are most similar. The closer to the cutoff  you 
get, the more similar the units on either side of the cutoff  will be. In fact, 
when you get extremely close to the cutoff  score, the units on either side of 
the cutoff  will be so similar that your comparison will be as good as if you 
had chosen the treatment and comparison groups using randomized 
assignment of the treatment.
Because the RDD method estimates the impact of the program around 
the cutoff  score, or locally, the estimate cannot necessarily be generalized to 
units whose scores are further away from the cutoff  score: that is, where 
eligible and ineligible individuals may not be as similar. The fact that the 
RDD method will not be able to provide an estimate of an average treatment 
eff ect for all program participants can be seen as both a strength and a limi-
tation of the method, depending on the evaluation question of interest. If 
the evaluation primarily seeks to answer the question, should the program 
exist or not?, then the average treatment eff ect for the entire eligible popula-
tion may be the most relevant parameter, and clearly the RDD will fall short 
of being perfect. However, if the policy question of interest is, should the 
program be cut or expanded at the margin?—that is, for (potential) beneﬁ -
ciaries right around the cutoff —then the RDD produces precisely the local 
estimate of interest to inform this important policy decision.
As mentioned, there can be an additional complication when compli-
ance on either side of the cutoff  is imperfect. This fuzzy RDD happens 
when units that are not eligible based on their index score nonetheless 
manage to gain access to the program, or when units that are eligible based 
on their index score choose not to participate in the program. In this case, 
 HISP Question 5
A. Is the result shown in table 6.1 valid for all eligible households?
B. Compared with the impact estimated with the randomized assign-
ment method, what does this result say about those households 
with a poverty index of just under 58?
C. Based on the RDD impact estimates, should HISP be scaled up 
nationally?
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we can use an instrumental variable methodology that is similar to the one 
outlined in chapter 5: the location of units above or below the cutoff  score 
will be used as an instrumental variable for the observed participation in 
the program. As was the case in the examples discussed in chapter 5, doing 
this has a drawback: we can estimate the impact for only those units that 
are sensitive to the eligibility criteria—the Enroll-if-eligible-score type, not 
the Always or Never types.
The fact that the RDD method estimates impact only around the cutoff  
score also raises challenges in terms of the statistical power of the analysis. 
Sometimes only a restricted set of observations that are located close to the 
cutoff  score are used in the analysis, thereby lowering the number of observa-
tions in the RDD analysis relative to methods that analyze all units in the treat-
ment and comparison groups. To obtain suffi  cient statistical power when 
applying RDD, you will need to choose a bandwidth around the cutoff  score 
that includes a suffi  cient number of observations. In practice, you should try 
to use as large a bandwidth as possible, while maintaining the balance in 
observed characteristics of the population above and below the cutoff  score. 
You can then run the estimation several times using diff erent bandwidths to 
check whether the estimates are sensitive to the chosen bandwidth.
An additional caveat when using the RDD method is that the speciﬁcation 
may be sensitive to the functional form used in modeling the relationship 
between the eligibility score and the outcome of interest. In the examples 
presented in this chapter, we assumed that the relation between the eligibil-
ity index and the outcome was linear. In reality, the relation could be more 
complex, including nonlinear relationships and interactions between vari-
ables. If you do not account for these complex relationships in the estima-
tion, they might be mistaken for a discontinuity, leading to an incorrect 
interpretation of the RDD estimated impact. In practice, you can estimate 
program impact using various functional forms (linear, quadratic, cubic, 
quartic, and the like) to assess whether, in fact, the impact estimates are sen-
sitive to functional form.
Finally, as discussed above, there are a few important conditions for the 
eligibility rule and cutoff . First, they must be unique to the program of 
interest. A poverty index ranking households or individuals, for example, 
may be used to target a variety of social programs to the poor. In this case, it 
will not be possible to isolate the impact of one particular antipoverty pro-
gram from all the other programs that use the same targeting criteria. 
Second, the eligibility rule and cutoff  should be resistant to manipulation by 
enumerators, potential beneﬁ ciaries, program administrators, or politi-
cians. Manipulation of the eligibility index creates a discontinuity in the 
index that undermines the basic condition for the method to work: namely, 
that the eligibility index should be continuous around the cutoff .
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Even with these limitations, RDD is a powerful impact evaluation method 
to generate unbiased estimates of a program’s impact in the vicinity of the 
eligibility cutoff . The RDD takes advantage of the program assignment rules, 
using continuous eligibility indexes, which are already common in many 
social programs. When index-based targeting rules are applied, it is not nec-
essary to exclude a group of eligible households or individuals from receiv-
ing the treatment for the sake of the evaluation because regression 
discontinuity design can be used instead.
Checklist: Regression Discontinuity Design
Regression discontinuity design requires that the eligibility index be con-
tinuous around the cutoff  score and that units be similar in the vicinity 
above and below the cutoff  score.
¸ Is the index continuous around the cutoff  score at the time of the 
baseline?
¸ Is there any evidence of noncompliance with the rule that determines 
eligibility for treatment? Test whether all eligible units and no ineligible 
units have received the treatment. If you ﬁ nd noncompliance, you will 
need to combine RDD with an instrumental variable approach to correct 
for this “fuzzy discontinuity.”4
¸ Is there any evidence that index scores may have been manipulated in 
order to inﬂ uence who qualiﬁ ed for the program? Test whether the 
 distribution of the index score is smooth at the cutoff  point. If you ﬁ nd 
 evidence of “bunching” of index scores either above or below the cutoff  
point, this might indicate manipulation.
¸ Is the cutoff  unique to the program being evaluated, or is the cutoff  used 
by other programs as well?
Additional Resources
 • For accompanying material to the book and hyperlinks to additional resources, 
please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (http://www.worldbank 
.org / ieinpractice).
 • For information about evaluating a cash transfer program using RDD, see 
the blog post on the World Bank Development Impact Blog (http://blogs 
. worldbank.org/impactevaluations/).
 • For a review of practical issues in implementing RDD, see Imbens, Guido, 
and Thomas Lemieux. 2008. “Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to 
Practice.” Journal of Econometrics 142 (2): 615–35.
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Notes
1. This is sometimes called a proxy-means test.
2. The continuous eligibility index is sometimes referred to as the forcing variable.
3. Technical note: Density was estimated using the univariate Epanechnikov 
kernel method.
4. In this case, you would use the location left or right of the cutoff  point as an 
instrumental variable for actual program take-up in the ﬁ rst stage of a two-stage 
least-squares estimation.
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Diff erence-in-Diff erences
Evaluating a Program When the Rule of 
Assignment Is Less Clear
The three impact evaluation methods discussed up to this point— 
randomized assignment, instrumental variables (IV), and regression dis-
continuity design (RDD)—all produce estimates of the counterfactual 
through explicit program assignment rules that the evaluation team knows 
and understands. We have discussed why these methods off er credible 
estimates of the counterfactual with relatively few assumptions and condi-
tions. The next two types of methods—diff erence-in-diff erences (DD) and 
matching methods—off er the evaluation team an additional set of tools 
that can be applied when the program assignment rules are less clear or 
when none of the three methods previously described is feasible. Both dif-
ference-in-diff erences and matching are commonly used in this case; how-
ever, both also typically require stronger assumptions than randomized 
assignment, IV, or RDD methods. Intuitively, if we do not know the pro-
gram assignment rule, we have an additional unknown in our evaluation, 
about which we need to make assumptions. Since the assumptions we 
make are not necessarily true, using diff erence-in-diff erences or matching 
may not always provide reliable estimates of program impacts.
CHAPTER 7
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The Difference-in-Differences Method
The diff erence-in-diff erences method compares the changes in outcomes 
over time between a population that is enrolled in a program (the treatment 
group) and a population that is not (the comparison group). Take, for exam-
ple, a road repair program that is carried out at the district level but cannot 
be randomly assigned between districts and is also not assigned based on an 
index with a clearly deﬁned cutoff  that would permit a regression disconti-
nuity design. District boards can decide to enroll or not enroll in the pro-
gram. One of the program’s objectives is to improve access of the population 
to labor markets, and one of the outcome indicators is the employment rate. 
As discussed in chapter 3, simply observing the before-and-after change in 
employment rates for districts that enroll in the program will not capture 
the program’s causal impact because many other factors are also likely to 
inﬂuence employment over time. At the same time, comparing districts that 
enrolled and did not enroll in the road repair program will be problematic if 
unobserved reasons exist for why some districts enrolled in the program 
and others did not (the selection bias problem discussed in the enrolled ver-
sus not-enrolled scenario).
However, what if we combined the two methods and compared the 
before-and-after changes in outcomes for a group that enrolled in the 
 program with the before-and-after changes for a group that did not enroll in 
the program? The diff erence in the before-and-after outcomes for the 
enrolled group—the ﬁrst diff erence—controls for factors that are constant 
over time in that group, since we are comparing the same group to itself. But 
we are still left with the factors that vary over time (time-varying factors) for 
this group. One way to capture those time-varying factors is to measure the 
before-and-after change in outcomes for a group that did not enroll in 
the program but was exposed to the same set of environmental conditions—
the second diff erence. If we “clean” the ﬁrst diff erence of other time-varying 
 factors that aff ect the outcome of interest by subtracting the second diff er-
ence, then we have eliminated a source of bias that worried us in the sim-
ple before-and-after comparisons. The diff erence-in-diff erences approach 
does what its name suggests. It combines the two counterfeit estimates 
of  the counterfactual (before-and-after comparisons, and comparisons 
between those who choose to enroll and those who choose not to enroll) to 
produce a better estimate of the counterfactual. In the example of the road 
repair program, the DD method might compare the changes in employment 
before and after the program is implemented for individuals living in dis-
tricts that enrolled in the  program with the changes in employment in dis-
tricts that did not enroll in the program.
Key Concept
Difference-in-
differences compares 
the changes in 
outcomes over time 
between units that are 
enrolled in a program 
(the treatment group) 
and units that are not 
(the comparison 
group). This allows us 
to correct for any 
differences between 
the treatment and 
comparison groups 
that are constant over 
time.
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It is important to note that what we are estimating here is the counter-
factual for the change in outcomes for the treatment group: our estimate 
of this counterfactual is the change in outcomes for the comparison 
group. The treatment and comparison groups do not necessarily need to 
have the same conditions before the intervention. But for DD to be valid, 
the comparison group must accurately represent the change in outcomes 
that would have been experienced by the treatment group in the absence 
of treatment. To apply diff erence-in-diff erences, it is necessary to mea-
sure outcomes in the group that receives the program (the treatment 
group) and the group that does not (the comparison group), both before 
and after the program. In box 7.1, we present an example where the 
DD  method was used to understand the impact of electoral incentives 
on  implementation of a cash transfer program in Brazil and on school 
 dropout rates.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the diff erence-in-diff erences method for the 
road repair example. Year 0 is the baseline year. In year 1, a treatment 
group of districts enrolls in the program, while a comparison group 
Box 7.1: Using Difference-in-Differences to Understand the Impact 
of Electoral Incentives on School Dropout Rates in Brazil
In an empirical study on local electoral incen-
tives, De Janvry, Finan, and Sadoulet (2011) 
examined the impacts of a conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) in Brazil. The Bolsa Escola 
 program gave mothers in poor households 
a monthly stipend conditional on their 
 children’s school attendance. The CCT was 
a  federal program similar to Mexico’s 
Oportunidades (see boxes 1.1 and 4.2), but it 
was decentralized to the municipal level. 
Municipal governments were responsible for 
identifying benefi ciaries and implementing 
the program.
Using the difference-in-differences method, 
De Janvry, Finan, and Sadoulet estimated the 
impact of the program on school dropout rates. 
They found notable variation in the  program’s 
performance across municipalities. To explore 
this variation, the researchers compared the 
improvement in school dropout rates in 
municipalities with fi rst-term versus second-
term mayors. Their hypothesis was that, since 
Brazil has a two-term limit for local politi-
cians, fi rst-term mayors are concerned about 
 reelection and therefore act differently than 
second-term mayors who do not have such 
concerns.
Overall, the program successfully reduced 
school dropout rates by an average of 8 per-
cent for benefi ciaries. The researchers found 
that the program’s impact was 36 percent 
larger in municipalities with fi rst-term may-
ors. Their conclusion was that reelection con-
cerns incentivized local politicians to increase 
their effort in implementing the Bolsa Escola 
program.
Source: De Janvry, Finan, and Sadoulet 2011.
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of  districts is not enrolled. The outcome level (employment rate) for 
the treatment group goes from A, before the program starts, to B after 
the program has started, while the outcome for the comparison 
group goes from C, before the program started, to D, after the program 
has started.
You will remember our two counterfeit estimates of the counterfactual: 
the diff erence in outcomes before and after the intervention for the treat-
ment group (B − A) and the diff erence in outcomes after the intervention 
between the treatment and comparison groups (B − D). In diff erence-in-
diff erences, the estimate of the counterfactual is obtained by computing the 
change in outcomes for the comparison group (D − C), and then subtracting 
this from the change in outcomes for the treatment group (B − A). Using the 
change in outcomes for the comparison group as the estimate of the coun-
terfactual for the change in outcomes for the treatment group is akin to 
assuming that, had the enrolled group not participated in the program, their 
outcome would have evolved over time along the same trend as the nonen-
rolled group: that is, the change in outcome for the enrolled group would 
have been from A to E, as shown in ﬁ gure 7.1.
In summary, the impact of the program is simply computed as the diff er-
ence between two diff erences:
DD impact = (B − A) − (D − C) = (0.74 − 0.60) − (0.81 − 0.78) = 0.11.
Figure 7.1 The Difference-in-Differences Method 
Note: All differences between points should be read as vertical differences in outcomes on the 
 vertical axis.
Outcome-
employment
rate
A = 0.60
Estimated impact = 0.11
E = 0.63
Comparison group trendTreatment
group
Year –2 Year –1 Year 0 Year 1
Time
B = 0.74
D = 0.81
Comparison
group
C = 0.78
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The relationships presented in ﬁgure 7.1 can also be presented in a 
simple table. Table 7.1 disentangles the components of the diff erence-in-
diff erences estimates. The ﬁrst row contains outcomes for the treatment 
group before the intervention (A) and after the intervention (B). The 
before-and-after comparison for the treatment group is the ﬁrst diff er-
ence (B − A). The second row contains outcomes for the comparison 
group before the intervention (C) and after the intervention (D), so the 
second diff erence is (D − C).
The diff erence-in-diff erences method computes the impact estimate as 
follows:
1. We calculate the diff erence in the outcome (Y) between the before and 
after situations for the treatment group (B − A).
2. We calculate the diff erence in the outcome (Y) between the before and 
after situations for the comparison group (D − C).
3. Then we calculate the diff erence between the diff erence in outcomes 
for the treatment group (B − A) and the diff erence for the comparison 
group (D − C), or diff erence-in-diff erences (DD) = (B − A) − (D − C). This 
 diff erence-in-diff erences is our impact estimate.
We could also compute the diff erence-in-diff erences the other way across: 
ﬁ rst calculating the diff erence in the outcome between the treatment and 
the comparison group in the after situation, then calculating the diff erence 
in the outcome between the treatment and the comparison group in the 
before situation, and ﬁ nally subtracting the latter from the former.
DD impact = (B − D) − (A − C) = (0.74 − 0.81) − (0.60 − 0.78) = 0.11.
Table 7.1 Calculating the Difference-in-Differences (DD) Method
After Before Difference
Treatment/enrolled B A B − A
Comparison/nonenrolled D C D − C
Difference B − D A − C DD = (B − A) − (D − C)
After Before Difference
Treatment/enrolled 0.74 0.60 0.14
Comparison/nonenrolled 0.81 0.78 0.03
Difference −0.07 −0.18 DD = 0.14 − 0.03 = 0.11
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Key Concept
Instead of comparing 
outcomes between the 
treatment and 
comparison groups 
after the intervention, 
the difference-in-
differences methods 
compares trends 
between the treatment 
and comparison 
groups.
How Is the Difference-in-Differences Method 
Helpful?
To understand how diff erence-in-diff erences is helpful, let us start with our 
second counterfeit estimate of the counterfactual discussed in chapter 3, 
which compared units that were enrolled in a program with those that were 
not enrolled in the program. Remember that the primary concern with this 
comparison was that the two sets of units may have had diff erent character-
istics and that it may be those characteristics—rather than the program—
that explain the diff erence in  outcomes between the two groups. The 
unobserved diff erences in  characteristics were particularly worrying: 
by deﬁnition, it is impossible for us to include unobserved characteristics 
in the analysis.
The diff erence-in-diff erences method helps resolve this problem to 
the extent that many characteristics of units or individuals can reason-
ably be assumed to be constant over time (or time-invariant). Think, for 
example, of observed characteristics, such as a person’s year of birth, a 
region’s location close to the ocean, a town’s climate, or a father’s level of 
education. Most of these types of variables, although plausibly related to 
outcomes, will probably not change over the course of an evaluation. 
Using the same reasoning, we might conclude that many unobserved 
characteristics of individuals are also more or less constant over time. 
Consider, for example, personality traits or family health history. It 
might be plausible that these intrinsic characteristics of a person would 
not change over time.
Instead of comparing outcomes between the treatment and compari-
son groups after the intervention, the diff erence-in-diff erences method 
compares trends between the treatment and comparison groups. The 
trend for an individual is the diff erence in outcome for that individual 
before and after the program. By subtracting the before outcome situation 
from the after situation, we cancel out the eff ect of all of the characteris-
tics that are unique to that individual and that do not change over time. 
Interestingly, we are canceling out (or controlling for) not only the eff ect 
of observed time-invariant characteristics, but also the eff ect of unob-
served time-invariant characteristics, such as those mentioned. Box  7.2 
describes a study that used the diff erence-in-diff erences method to esti-
mate the impact of increased police presence on incidences of car theft in 
Buenos Aires.
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The “Equal Trends” Assumption in 
Difference-in-Differences
Although diff erence-in-diff erences allows us to take care of diff erences 
between the treatment and comparison groups that are constant over time, 
it will not help us eliminate the diff erences between the treatment and com-
parison groups that change over time. In the example of the road repair pro-
gram, if treatment areas also beneﬁt from the construction of a new seaport 
at the same time as the road repair, we will not be able to separate out the 
eff ect from the road repair and from the seaport construction by using a 
diff erence-in-diff erences approach. For the method to provide a valid esti-
mate of the counterfactual, we must assume that no such time-varying dif-
ferences exist between the treatment and comparison groups.
Another way to think about this is that in the absence of the program, 
the diff erences in outcomes between the treatment and comparison 
Box 7.2: Using Difference-in-Differences to Study the Effects of 
Police Deployment on Crime in Argentina
DiTella and Schargrodsky (2005) examined 
whether an increase in police forces reduced 
crime in Argentina. In 1994, a terrorist attack 
on a large Jewish center in Buenos Aires 
prompted the Argentine government to 
increase police protection for Jewish-affi liated 
buildings in the country.
Seeking to understand the impact of 
police presence on the incidence of crime, 
DiTella and Schargrodsky collected data on 
the number of car thefts per block in three 
neighborhoods in Buenos Aires before and 
after the terrorist attack. They then com-
bined this information with geographic data 
on the location of Jewish-affi liated institu-
tions in the neighborhoods. This study pre-
sented a different approach from typical 
crime regressions. Studies on the impact of 
policing often face an endogeneity problem, 
as governments tend to increase police 
presence in areas with higher crime rates. 
By contrast, the increase in police force 
deployment in Argentina was not related at 
all to the incidence of car thefts, so the study 
does not suffer this issue of simultaneous 
causality. DiTella and Schargrodsky were 
able to use the difference-in- differences 
method to estimate the impact of increased 
police presence on the incidence of car 
theft.
The results revealed a positive deterrent 
effect of police presence on crime; however, 
this effect was localized. In the blocks with 
Jewish-affi liated buildings that received police 
protection, car thefts decreased signifi cantly 
compared with other blocks: by 75 percent. The 
researchers found no impacts on car thefts one 
or two blocks away from protected buildings.
Source: DiTella and Schargrodsky 2005.
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groups would need to move in tandem. That is, without treatment, 
 outcomes would need to increase or decrease at the same rate in 
both groups; we require that outcomes display equal trends in the absence 
of treatment.
Of course there is no way for us to prove that the diff erences between the 
treatment and comparison groups would have moved in tandem in the 
absence of the program. The reason is that we cannot observe what would 
have happened to the treatment group in the absence of the treatment—in 
other words, we cannot observe the counterfactual.
Thus when we use the diff erence-in-diff erences method, we must 
assume that, in the absence of the program, the outcome in the treatment 
group would have moved in tandem with the outcome in the comparison 
group. Figure 7.2 illustrates a violation of this fundamental assumption. If 
outcome trends are diff erent for the treatment and comparison groups, then 
the estimated treatment eff ect obtained by diff erence-in-diff erences meth-
ods would be invalid, or biased. That’s because the trend for the comparison 
group is not a valid estimate of the counterfactual trend that would have 
prevailed for the treatment group in the absence of the program. As shown 
in ﬁgure 7.2, if in reality outcomes for the comparison group grow more 
slowly than outcomes for the treatment group in the absence of the pro-
gram, using the trend for the comparison group as an estimate of the coun-
terfactual of the trend for the treatment group leads to a biased estimate of 
the program’s impact; more speciﬁ cally, we would overestimate the impact 
of the program.
Figure 7.2 Difference-in-Differences When Outcome Trends Differ
Outcome-
 employment
rate
A = 0.60
True impact <0.11
E = 0.63
Comparison group trendTreatment
group
Year –2 Year –1 Year 0 Year 1
Time
B = 0.74
D = 0.81
Comparison
group
True
counterfactual
C = 0.78
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Testing the Validity of the “Equal Trends” Assumption in 
Difference-in-Differences
Even though it cannot be proved, the validity of the underlying assumption 
of equal trends can be assessed. A ﬁ rst validity check is to compare changes 
in outcomes for the treatment and comparison groups repeatedly before the 
program is implemented. In the road repair program, this means that we 
would compare the change in employment rate between treatment and com-
parison groups before the program starts: that is, between year −2 and year 
−1, and between year −1 and year 0. If the outcomes moved in tandem before 
the program started, we gain conﬁdence that outcomes would have contin-
ued to move in tandem after the intervention. To check for equality of pre-
intervention trends, we need at least two serial observations on the  treatment 
and comparison groups before the start of the program. This means that the 
evaluation would require three serial observations: two pre-intervention 
observations to assess the preprogram trends, and at least one postinterven-
tion observation to assess impact with the diff erence- in- diff erences method.
A second way to test the assumption of equal trends would be to  perform 
what is known as a placebo test. For this test, you perform an additional 
 diff erence-in-diff erences estimation using a “fake” treatment group: that is, 
a group that you know was not aff ected by the program. Say, for example, 
that you estimate how additional tutoring for seventh-grade  students aff ects 
their probability of attending school, and you choose eighth-grade students 
as the comparison group. To test whether seventh and eighth graders have 
the same trends in terms of school attendance, you could test whether 
eighth graders and sixth graders have the same trends. You know that sixth 
graders are not aff ected by the program, so if you perform a diff erence-in-
diff erences estimation using eighth-grade students as the comparison group 
and sixth-grade students as the fake treatment group, you have to ﬁnd a zero 
impact. If you do not, then the impact that you ﬁnd must come from some 
underlying diff erence in trends between sixth graders and eighth graders. 
This, in turn, casts doubt on whether seventh graders and eighth graders 
can be assumed to have equal trends in the absence of the program.
A third way to test the assumption of equal trends would be to perform 
the placebo test not only with a fake treatment group, but also with a fake 
outcome. In the tutoring example, you may want to test the validity of 
using the eighth-grade students as a comparison group by estimating the 
impact of the tutoring on an outcome that you know is not aff ected by it, 
such as the number of siblings that the students have. If your diff erence- in-
diff erences estimation ﬁnds an impact of the tutoring on the number of 
siblings that the students have, then you know that your comparison group 
must be ﬂawed.
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A fourth way to test the assumption of equal trends would be to perform 
the diff erence-in-diff erences estimation using diff erent comparison groups. 
In the tutoring example, you would ﬁrst do the estimation using eighth-
grade  students as the comparison group, and then do a second estimation 
using sixth-grade students as the comparison group. If both groups are valid 
comparison groups, you would ﬁnd that the estimated impact is approxi-
mately the same in both calculations. In boxes 7.3 and 7.4, we present two 
examples of a diff erence-in-diff erences evaluation that used a combination 
of these methods to test the assumption of equal trends.
Box 7.3: Testing the Assumption of Equal Trends: Water 
Privatization and Infant Mortality in Argentina
Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) 
used the difference-in-differences method to 
address an important policy question: Does 
privatizing the provision of water services 
improve health outcomes and help alleviate 
poverty? During the 1990s, Argentina initiated 
one of the largest privatization campaigns 
ever, transferring local water companies to 
regulated private companies. The privatization 
process took place over a decade, with the 
largest number of privatizations occurring 
after 1995, and eventually reached about 30 
percent of the country’s municipalities and 60 
percent of the population.
The evaluation took advantage of that varia-
tion in ownership status over time to  determine 
the impact of privatization on under- age-fi ve 
mortality. Before 1995, the rates of child mor-
tality were declining at about the same pace 
throughout Argentina. After 1995, mortality 
rates declined faster in municipalities that had 
privatized their water services.
The researchers argued that, in this con-
text, the equal trends assumption behind 
 difference-in-differences is likely to hold true. 
In particular, they showed that no differences 
in child mortality trends are observed between 
the comparison and treatment municipalities 
before the privatization movement began. 
They also showed that the decision to priva-
tize was uncorrelated with economic shocks 
or historical levels of child mortality. They 
checked the strength of their fi ndings by car-
rying out a placebo test with a fake outcome: 
they distinguished those causes of child mor-
tality that are related water conditions, such 
as infectious and parasitic diseases, from 
those that are unrelated to water conditions, 
such as accidents and congenital diseases. 
They then tested the impact of privatization of 
water services separately for the two subsets 
of mortality causes. They found that privatiza-
tion of water services was correlated with 
reductions in deaths from infectious and para-
sitic diseases, but not correlated with reduc-
tions in deaths from causes such as accidents 
and congenital diseases.
In the end, the evaluation determined that 
child mortality fell about 8 percent in areas 
that privatized, and that the effect was largest, 
about 26 percent, in the poorest areas, where 
the expansion of the water network was the 
greatest. This study shed light on a number of 
important policy debates surrounding the 
(continued)
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Box 7.4: Testing the Assumption of Equal Trends: School 
Construction in Indonesia
Dufl o (2001) analyzed the medium- and long-
term impacts of a program to build schools in 
Indonesia on education and labor market out-
comes. In 1973, Indonesia embarked on a 
large-scale primary school construction pro-
gram and built more than 61,000 primary 
schools. To target students who had not 
 previously enrolled in school, the government 
allocated the number of schools to be con-
structed in each district in proportion to the 
number of unenrolled students in the district. 
Dufl o sought to evaluate the program’s 
impact on educational attainment and wages. 
Exposure to the treatment was measured 
by the number of schools in the region, and 
the treatment and comparison cohorts were 
identifi ed by the age when the program was 
launched. The treatment group was com-
posed of men born after 1962, as they would 
have been young enough to benefi t from the 
new primary schools that were constructed in 
1974. The comparison group was composed 
of men born before 1962 who would have 
been too old to benefi t from the program.
Dufl o used the difference-in-differences 
method to estimate the impact of the 
 program on average educational attainment 
and wages, comparing the differences in out-
comes among high- and low-exposure dis-
tricts. To show that this was a valid estimation 
method, she fi rst needed to test the assump-
tion of equal trends across districts. To test 
this, Dufl o used a placebo test with a fake 
treatment group. She compared the cohort 
ages 18–24 in 1974 with the cohort ages 
12–17. Since both of these cohorts were too 
old to benefi t from the new program, changes 
in their educational attainment should not be 
systematically different across districts. The 
estimate from this difference-in-differences 
regression was near zero. This result implied 
that educational attainment did not increase 
more rapidly before the program started in 
areas that would eventually become high- 
exposure districts than in low-exposure dis-
tricts. The placebo test also showed that the 
identifi cation strategy of relying on age at the 
time of school construction would work.
The evaluation found positive results on 
the educational attainment and wages of stu-
dents who had high exposure to the pro-
gram, meaning those who were under the 
age of eight when the schools were built. For 
these students, each new school constructed 
per 1,000 children was associated with a 
gain of 0.12 to 0.19 years in educational 
attainment and an increase of 3.0 percent to 
5.4 percent in wages. The program also 
increased the probability that a child would 
complete primary school by 12 percent.
Source: Dufl o 2001.
Box 7.3: Testing the Assumption of Equal Trends: Water Privatization and Infant Mortality 
in Argentina (continued)
privatization of public services. The research-
ers concluded that in Argentina, the regulated 
private sector proved more successful than 
the public sector in improving indicators of 
access, service, and most signifi cantly, child 
mortality.
Source: Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2005.
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  Evaluating the Impact of HISP: Using 
Difference-in-Differences
Diff erence-in-diff erences can be used to evaluate our Health Insurance 
Subsidy Program (HISP). In this scenario, you have two rounds of data 
on two groups of households: one group that enrolled in the program, 
and another that did not. Remembering the case of the enrolled and non-
enrolled groups, you realize that you cannot simply compare the average 
health expenditures of the two groups because of selection bias. Because 
you have data for two periods for each household in the sample, you can 
use those data to solve some of these challenges by comparing the change 
in health expenditures for the two groups, assuming that the change in 
the health expenditures of the nonenrolled group reﬂects what would 
have happened to the expenditures of the enrolled group in the absence 
of the program (see table 7.2). Note that it does not matter which way you 
calculate the double diff erence.
Next, you estimate the eff ect using regression analysis (table 7.3). 
Using a simple linear regression to compute the simple diff erence-in-
diff erences estimate, you ﬁnd that the program reduced household 
health expenditures by US$8.16. You then reﬁne your analysis by adding 
additional control variables. In other words, you use a multivariate linear 
regression that takes into account a host of other factors, and you ﬁnd the 
same reduction in household health expenditures.
Table 7.2 Evaluating HISP: Difference-in-Differences Comparison of Means
After 
(follow-up)
Before 
(baseline) Difference
Enrolled 7.84 14.49 −6.65
Nonenrolled 22.30 20.79 1.51
Difference DD = −6.65 − 1.51 = −8.16
Note: The table presents mean household health expenditures (in dollars) for enrolled and 
 nonenrolled households, before and after the introduction of HISP.
Table 7.3 Evaluating HISP: Difference-in-Differences with Regression Analysis
Linear regression Multivariate linear regression
Estimated impact on 
household health 
expenditures
−8.16**
(0.32)
−8.16**
(0.32)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signifi cance level: ** = 1 percent.
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 HISP Question 6
A. What are the basic assumptions required to accept this result from 
diff erence-in-diff erences?
B. Based on the result from diff erence-in-diff erences, should HISP be 
scaled up nationally?
Limitations of the Difference-in-Differences 
Method
Even when trends are equal before the start of the intervention, bias in the 
diff erence-in-diff erences estimation may still appear and go undetected. 
That’s because DD attributes to the intervention any diff erences in trends 
between the treatment and comparison groups that occur from the time 
intervention begins. If any other factors are present that aff ect the  diff erence 
in trends between the two groups and they are not accounted for in multi-
variate regression, the estimation will be invalid or biased.
Let us say that you are trying to estimate the impact on rice production of 
subsidizing fertilizer and are doing this by measuring the rice production of 
subsidized (treatment) farmers and unsubsidized (comparison) farmers 
before and after the distribution of the subsidies. If in year 1 there is 
a  drought that aff ects only subsidized farmers, then the diff erence-in- 
diff erences estimate will produce an invalid estimate of the impact of 
 subsidizing fertilizer. In general, any factor that disproportionately aff ects 
one of the two groups, and does so at the same time that the treatment group 
receives the treatment—and is not taken into account in the regression—has 
the potential to invalidate or bias the estimate of the impact of the program. 
Diff erence-in-diff erences assumes that no such factor is present.
Checklist: Difference-in-Differences
Diff erence-in-diff erences assumes that outcome trends are similar in the 
comparison and treatment groups before the intervention and that the only 
factors explaining diff erences in outcomes between the two groups are con-
stant over time, apart from the program itself.
¸ Would outcomes have moved in tandem in the treatment and compari-
son groups in the absence of the program? This can be assessed by using 
several falsiﬁ cation tests, such as the following: (1) Are the outcomes in 
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the treatment and comparison groups moving in tandem before the 
intervention? If two rounds of data are available before the start of 
the program, test to see if any diff erence in trends appears between the 
two groups. (2) How about fake outcomes that should not be aff ected 
by the program? Are they moving in tandem before and after the start of 
the intervention in the treatment and comparison groups?
¸ Perform the diff erence-in-diff erences analysis using several plausible 
comparison groups. You should obtain similar estimates of the impact of 
the program.
¸ Perform the diff erence-in-diff erences analysis using your chosen treat-
ment and comparison groups and a fake outcome that should not be 
aff ected by the program. You should ﬁ nd zero impact of the program on 
that outcome.
¸ Perform the diff erence-in-diff erences analysis using your chosen out-
come variable with two groups that you know were not aff ected by the 
program. You should ﬁ nd zero impact of the program.
Additional Resources
 • For accompanying material to the book and hyperlinks to additional  resources, 
please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (http://www. worldbank 
.org / ieinpractice).
 • For more on the unspoken assumptions behind diff erence-in-diff erences, 
see the World Bank Development Impact Blog (http://blogs .worldbank.org 
/ impactevaluations).
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Matching
Constructing an Artifi cial Comparison Group
The method described in this chapter consists of a set of statistical tech-
niques that we will refer to collectively as matching. Matching methods 
can be applied in the context of almost any program assignment rules, as 
long as a group exists that has not participated in the program. Matching 
essentially uses statistical techniques to construct an artiﬁcial comparison 
group. For every possible unit under treatment, it attempts to ﬁ nd a non-
treatment unit (or set of nontreatment units) that has the most similar 
 characteristics possible. Consider a case in which you are attempting to 
evaluate the impact of a job training program on income and have a data set, 
such as income and tax records, that contains both individuals that enrolled 
in the program and individuals that did not enroll. The program that you are 
trying to evaluate does not have any clear assignment rules (such as ran-
domized assignment or an eligibility index) that explain why some individ-
uals enrolled in the program and others did not. In such a context, matching 
methods will enable you to identify the set of nonenrolled individuals that 
look most similar to the treated individuals, based on the characteristics 
that you have available in your data set. These matched nonenrolled indi-
viduals then become the comparison group that you use to estimate the 
counterfactual.
Finding a good match for each program participant requires approximat-
ing as closely as possible the characteristics that explain that individual’s 
Key Concept
Matching uses large 
data sets and 
statistical techniques 
to construct the best 
possible comparison 
group based on 
observed 
characteristics.
CHAPTER 8
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decision to enroll in the program. Unfortunately, this is easier said than 
done. If the list of relevant observed characteristics is very large, or if each 
characteristic takes on many values, it may be hard to identify a match for 
each of the units in the treatment group. As you increase the number of 
characteristics or dimensions against which you want to match units that 
enrolled in the program, you may run into what is called the curse of 
 dimensionality. For example, if you use only three important characteristics 
to identify the matched comparison group, such as age, gender, and whether 
the individual has a secondary school diploma, you will probably ﬁnd 
matches for all participants enrolled in the program in the pool of those who 
are not enrolled (the nonenrolled), but you run the risk of leaving out other 
potentially important characteristics. However, if you increase the list of 
characteristics—say, to include number of children, number of years of edu-
cation, number of months unemployed, number of years of experience, and 
so forth—your database may not contain a good match for most of the pro-
gram participants who are enrolled, unless it contains a very large number 
of observations. Figure 8.1 illustrates matching based on four characteris-
tics: age, gender, months unemployed, and secondary school diploma.
Propensity Score Matching
Fortunately, the curse of dimensionality can be quite easily solved using a 
method called propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). In 
this approach, we no longer need to try to match each enrolled unit to a 
Figure 8.1 Exact Matching on Four Characteristics
Treated units
Age
19 1 3 0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
12
17
6
21
4
8
3
12
2
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
35
41
23
55
27
24
46
33
40
Gender Months
unemployed
Secondary
diploma
Untreated units
Age
24
38
58
21
34
41
46
41
19
27
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
8
1
7
2
20
17
9
11
3
4
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
Gender Months
unemployed
Secondary
diploma
Matching 145
nonenrolled unit that has exactly the same value for all observed control 
characteristics. Instead, for each unit in the treatment group and in the pool 
of nonenrolled, we compute the probability that this unit will enroll in the 
program (the so-called propensity score) based on the observed values of 
its characteristics (the explanatory variables). This score is a real number 
between 0 and 1 that summarizes the inﬂ uence of all of the observed char-
acteristics on the likelihood of enrolling in the program. We should use only 
baseline observed characteristics to calculate the propensity score. This is 
because posttreatment characteristics might have been aff ected by the pro-
gram itself, and using such characteristics to identify the matched compari-
son group would bias the results. When the treatment aff ects individual 
characteristics and we use those to match, we choose a comparison group 
that looks similar to the treated group because of the treatment itself. 
Without the treatment, those characteristics would look more diff erent. 
This violates the basic requirement for a good estimate of the counterfac-
tual: the comparison group must be similar in all aspects, except for the fact 
that the treatment group receives the treatment and the comparison group 
does not.
Once the propensity score has been computed for all units, then units 
in the treatment group can be matched with units in the pool of nonen-
rolled that have the closest propensity score.1 These closest units become 
the comparison group and are used to produce an estimate of the 
 counterfactual. The propensity score–matching method tries to mimic 
the randomized assignment to treatment and comparison groups by 
choosing for the comparison group those units that have similar propensi-
ties to the units in the treatment group. Since propensity score matching 
is not a randomized assignment method but tries to imitate one, it belongs 
to the category of quasi-experimental methods.
The average diff erence in outcomes between the treatment or enrolled 
units and their matched comparison units produces the estimated impact of 
the program. In summary, the program’s impact is estimated by comparing 
the average outcomes of a treatment or enrolled group and the average out-
comes among a statistically matched subgroup of units, the match being 
based on observed characteristics available in the data at hand.
For propensity score matching to produce estimates of a program’s 
impact for all treated observations, each treatment or enrolled unit 
needs to be successfully matched to a nonenrolled unit.2 In practice, 
however, it may be the case that for some enrolled units, no units in the 
pool of nonenrolled have similar propensity scores. In technical terms, 
there may be a lack of common support, or lack of overlap, between the 
propensity scores of the treatment or enrolled group and those of the 
pool of nonenrolled.
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Figure 8.2 provides an example of lack of common support. First, we 
 estimate the likelihood that each unit in the sample enrolls in the program 
based on the observed characteristics of that unit: that is, the propensity 
score. The ﬁgure shows the distribution of propensity scores separately for 
enrolled and nonenrolled. The issue is that these distributions do not over-
lap perfectly. In the middle of the distribution, matches are relatively easy to 
ﬁnd because there are both the enrolled and nonenrolled with these levels 
of propensity scores. However, enrollees with propensity scores close to 1 
cannot be matched to any nonenrolled because there are no nonenrolled 
with such high propensity scores. Intuitively, units that are highly likely to 
enroll in the program are so dissimilar to nonenrolling units that we cannot 
ﬁnd a good match for them. Similarly, nonenrolled with propensity scores 
close to 0 cannot be matched to any enrollees because there are no enrollees 
with such low propensity scores. A lack of common support thus appears at 
the extremes, or tails, of the distribution of propensity scores. In this case, 
the matching procedure estimates the local average treatment eff ect (LATE) 
for observations on the common support.
The steps to be taken when applying propensity score matching are sum-
marized in Jalan and Ravallion (2003).3 First, you will need representative 
and highly comparable surveys in which it is possible to identify the units 
that enrolled in the program and those that did not. Second, you pool the 
two samples and estimate the probability that each individual enrolls in 
Figure 8.2 Propensity Score Matching and Common Support
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the  program, based on individual characteristics observed in the survey. 
This step yields the propensity score. Third, you restrict the sample to units 
for which common support appears in the propensity score distribution. 
Fourth, for each enrolled unit, you locate a subgroup of nonenrolled units 
that have similar propensity scores. Fifth, you compare the outcomes for the 
treatment or enrolled units and their matched comparison or nonenrolled 
units. The diff erence in average outcomes for these two subgroups is the 
measure of the impact that can be attributed to the program for that particu-
lar treated observation. Sixth, the mean of these individual impacts yields 
an estimate of the local average treatment eff ect. In practice, commonly 
used statistical programs include preprogrammed commands that run 
steps 2 through 6 automatically.
Overall, it is important to remember three crucial issues about matching. 
First, matching methods can use only observed characteristics to construct 
a comparison group, since unobserved characteristics cannot be taken into 
account. If there are any unobserved characteristics that aff ect whether a 
unit enrolls  in the program and also aff ect the outcome, then the impact 
estimates obtained with the matched comparison group would be biased. 
For a matching result to be unbiased, it requires the strong assumption that 
there are no unobserved diff erences in the treatment and comparison 
groups that are also associated with the outcomes of interest.
Second, matching must be done using only characteristics that are not 
aff ected by the program. Most characteristics that are measured after 
the start of the program would not fall into that category. If baseline (pre-
intervention) data are not available and the only data are from after the 
intervention has started, the only characteristics we will be able to use to 
construct a matched sample are those (usually few) characteristics that 
are unaff ected by a program, such as age and gender. Even though we 
would like to match on a much richer set of characteristics, including 
the outcomes of interest, we cannot do so because those are potentially 
aff ected by the intervention. Matching solely based on postintervention 
characteristics is not recommended. If baseline data are available, we can 
match based on a richer set of characteristics, including the outcomes of 
interest. Given that the data are collected before the intervention, those 
preintervention variables cannot have been aff ected by the program. 
However, if baseline data on outcomes are available, you should not use 
the matching method by itself. You should combine it with diff erence-
in-diff erences to reduce the risk of bias. This procedure is discussed in 
the next section.
Third, the matching method’s estimation results are only as good as 
the characteristics that are used for matching. While it is important to be 
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able to match using a large number of characteristics, even more impor-
tant is to be  able to match on the basis of characteristics that deter-
mine enrollment. The more we understand about the criteria used for 
participant selection, the better we will be able to construct the matched 
comparison group.
Combining Matching with Other Methods
Although the matching technique requires a signiﬁcant amount of data and 
carries a signiﬁ cant risk of bias, it has been used to evaluate development 
programs in a wide array of settings. The most convincing uses of matching 
are those that combine matching with other methods and those that use the 
synthetic control method. In this section, we will discuss matched diff er-
ence-in-diff erences and the synthetic control method.
Matched Difference-in-Differences
When baseline data on outcomes are available, matching can be combined 
with diff erence-in-diff erences to reduce the risk of bias in the estimation. 
As discussed, simple propensity score matching cannot account for unob-
served characteristics that might explain why a group chooses to enroll in a 
program and that might also aff ect outcomes. Matching combined with 
diff erence-in-diff erences at least takes care of any unobserved characteris-
tics that are constant across time between the two groups. It is implemented 
as follows:
1. Perform matching based on observed baseline characteristics (as 
discussed).
2. For each enrolled unit, compute the change in outcomes between the 
before and after periods (ﬁ rst diff erence).
3. For each enrolled unit, compute the change in outcomes between the 
before and after periods for this unit’s matched comparison (second 
diff erence).
4. Subtract the second diff erence from the ﬁ rst diff erence; that is, apply the 
diff erence-in-diff erences method.
5. Finally, average out those double diff erences.
Boxes 8.1 and 8.2 provide examples of evaluations that used the matched 
diff erence-in-diff erences method in practice.
Matching 149
Box 8.1: Matched Difference-in-Differences: Rural Roads and 
Local Market Development in Vietnam
Mu and Van de Walle (2011) used propen-
sity score matching in combination with 
 difference-in-differences to estimate the 
impact of a rural road program on local 
 market development at the commune level. 
From 1997 to 2001, the Vietnamese govern-
ment rehabilitated 5,000 kilometers of rural 
roads. The roads were selected according to 
cost and population density criteria.
Since the communes that benefi ted from 
the rehabilitated roads were not randomly 
selected, the researchers used propensity 
score matching to construct a comparison 
group. Using data from a baseline survey, the 
researchers found a variety of factors at the 
commune level that infl uenced whether a 
road in the commune was selected for the 
program, such as population size, share of 
ethnic minorities, living standards, density of 
existing roads, and presence of passenger 
transport. They estimated propensity scores 
based on these characteristics and limited the 
sample size to the area of common support. 
This yielded 94 treatment and 95 compari-
son communes. To further limit the poten-
tial selection bias, the researchers used 
 difference-in-differences to estimate the 
change in local market conditions.
Two years after the program, the results 
indicated that the road rehabilitation led to 
signifi cant positive impacts on the presence 
and frequency of local markets and the avail-
ability of services. New markets developed 
in 10 percent more treatment communes 
than comparison communes. In treatment 
communes, it was more common for house-
holds to switch from agricultural to more 
service-related activities such as tailoring 
and hairdressing. However, the results var-
ied substantially across communes. In 
poorer communes, the impacts tended to 
be higher due to lower levels of initial market 
development. The researchers concluded 
that small road improvement projects can 
have larger impacts if targeted at areas with 
an initially low market development.
Source: Mu and Van de Walle 2011.
Box 8.2: Matched Difference-in-Differences: Cement Floors, 
Child Health, and Maternal Happiness in Mexico
The Piso Firme program in Mexico offers 
households with dirt fl oors up to 50 square 
meters of concrete fl ooring (see box 2.1). 
Piso Firme began as a local program in the 
state of Coahuila, but was adopted nation-
ally. Cattaneo and others (2009) took advan-
tage of the geographic variation to evaluate 
the impact of this large-scale housing 
improvement effort on health and welfare 
outcomes.
The researchers used the difference-
in-differences method in conjunction with 
matching to compare households in Coahuila 
with similar families in the neighboring state 
(continued)
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The Synthetic Control Method
The synthetic control method allows for impact estimation in settings 
where a single unit (such as a country, a ﬁ rm, or a hospital) receives an inter-
vention or is exposed to an event. Instead of comparing this treated unit to 
a group of untreated units, the method uses information about the charac-
teristics of the treated unit and the untreated units to construct a “syn-
thetic,” or artiﬁ cial, comparison unit by weighting each untreated unit in 
such a way that the synthetic comparison unit most closely resembles the 
of Durango, which at the time of the survey 
had not yet implemented the program. To 
improve comparability between the treat-
ment and comparison groups, the research-
ers limited their sample to households in 
the neighboring cities that lie just on 
either side of the border between the two 
states. Within this sample, they used match-
ing techniques to select treatment and com-
parison blocks that were the most similar. 
The pretreatment characteristics they used 
were the proportion of households with dirt 
fl oors, number of young children, and num-
ber of households within each block.
In addition to matching, the researchers 
used instrumental variables to recover the 
local average treatment effect from the intent-
to-treat effect. With the offer of a cement 
fl oor as an instrumental variable for actually 
having cement fl oors, they found that the pro-
gram led to an 18.2 percent reduction in the 
presence of parasites, a 12.4 percent reduc-
tion in the prevalence of diarrhea, and a 19.4 
percent reduction in the prevalence of ane-
mia. Furthermore, they were able to use vari-
ability in the amount of total fl oor space 
actually covered by cement to predict that a 
complete replacement of dirt fl oors with 
cement fl oors in a household would lead to a 
78 percent reduction in parasitic infestations, 
a 49 percent reduction in diarrhea, an 81 per-
cent reduction in anemia, and a 36 percent to 
96 percent improvement in child cognitive 
development. The authors also collected data 
on adult welfare and found that cement fl oors 
make mothers happier, with a 59 percent 
increase in self-reported satisfaction with 
housing, a 69 percent increase in self-
reported satisfaction with quality of life, a 52 
percent reduction on a depression assess-
ment scale, and a 45 percent reduction on a 
perceived stress assessment scale.
Cattaneo and others (2009) concluded 
by illustrating that Piso Firme has a larger 
absolute impact on child cognitive develop-
ment at a lower cost than Mexico’s large-
scale conditional cash transfer program, 
Oportunidades/Progresa, as well as 
 comparable programs in nutritional supple-
mentation and early childhood cognitive 
stimulation. The cement fl oors also pre-
vented more parasitic infections than the 
common deworming treatment. The authors 
state that programs to replace dirt fl oors 
with cement fl oors are likely to improve child 
health cost-effectively in similar contexts.
Source: Cattaneo and others 2009.
Box 8.2: Matched Difference-in-Differences: Cement Floors, Child Health, and Maternal Happiness 
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treated unit. This requires a long series of observations over time of the 
characteristics of both the treated unit and the untreated units. This combi-
nation of comparison units into a synthetic unit provides a better compari-
son for the treated unit than any untreated unit individually. Box 8.3 provides 
an example of an evaluation that used the synthetic control method.
Box 8.3: The Synthetic Control Method: The Economic Effects of 
a Terrorist Confl ict in Spain
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) used the syn-
thetic control method to investigate the eco-
nomic effects of the terrorist confl ict in the 
Basque Country. In the early 1970s, the 
Basque Country was one of the richest 
regions in Spain; however, by the late 1990s, 
after 30 years of confl ict, it had dropped to 
the sixth position in per capita gross domes-
tic product (GDP). At the onset of terrorism in 
the early 1970s, the Basque Country differed 
from other Spanish regions in characteristics 
that are thought to be related to potential for 
economic growth. Therefore a comparison of 
GDP growth between the Basque economy 
and the rest of Spain would refl ect both the 
effect of  terrorism and the effect of these dif-
ferences in economic growth determinants 
before the onset of terrorism. In other words, 
the  difference-in-differences approach would 
yield biased results of the impact of terrorism 
on economic growth in the Basque Country. 
To deal with this situation, the authors used a 
combination of other Spanish regions to con-
struct a “synthetic” comparison region.
Source: Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003.
 Evaluating the Impact of HISP: Using Matching Techniques
Having learned about matching techniques, you may wonder whether you 
could use them to estimate the impact of the Health Insurance Subsidy 
Program (HISP). You decide to use some matching techniques to select a 
group of nonenrolled households that look similar to the enrolled house-
holds based on baseline observed characteristics. To do this, you use your 
statistical software’s matching package. First, it estimates the probability 
that a household will enroll in the program based on the observed values 
of characteristics (the explanatory variables), such as the age of the house-
hold head and of the spouse, their level of education, whether the head of 
the household is a female, whether the household is indigenous, and so on.
We will carry out matching using two scenarios. In the ﬁ rst scenario, 
there is a large set of variables to predict enrollment, including socioeco-
nomic household characteristics. In the second scenario, there is little 
information to predict enrollment (only education and age of the 
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household head). As shown in table 8.1, the likelihood that a household is 
enrolled in the program is smaller if the household is older, more edu-
cated, headed by a female, has a bathroom, or owns larger amounts of 
land. By contrast, being indigenous, having more household members, 
having a dirt ﬂoor, and being located further from a hospital all increase 
the likelihood that a household is enrolled in the program. So overall, it 
seems that poorer and less-educated households are more likely to be 
enrolled, which is good news for a program that targets poor people.
Now that the software has estimated the probability that each house-
hold is enrolled in the program (the propensity score), you check the dis-
tribution of the propensity score for the enrolled and matched comparison 
households. Figure 8.3 shows that common support (when using the full 
set of explanatory variables) extends across the whole distribution of the 
propensity score. In fact, none of the enrolled households fall outside the 
area of common support. In other words, we are able to ﬁ nd a matched 
comparison household for each of the enrolled households.
Table 8.1 Estimating the Propensity Score Based on Baseline Observed 
Characteristics
Dependent variable: Enrolled = 1
Full set of 
explanatory 
variables
Limited set of 
explanatory 
variables
Explanatory variables: Baseline 
observed characteristics Coeffi cient Coeffi cient
Head of household’s age (years) −0.013** −0.021**
Spouse’s age (years) −0.008** −0.041**
Head of household’s education (years) −0.022**
Spouse’s education (years) −0.016*
Head of household is female =1 −0.020
Indigenous = 1 0.161**
Number of household members 0.119**
Dirt fl oor = 1 0.376**
Bathroom = 1 −0.124**
Hectares of land −0.028**
Distance to hospital (km) 0.002**
Constant −0.497** 0.554**
Note: Probit regression. The dependent variable is 1 if the household enrolled in HISP, and 
0  otherwise. The coeffi cients represent the contribution of each listed explanatory variable to 
the probability that a household enrolled in HISP.
Signifi cance level: * = 5 percent, ** = 1 percent.
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You decide to use nearest neighbor matching; that is, you tell the soft-
ware to locate, for each enrolled household, the nonenrolled household 
that has the closest propensity score to the enrolled household. The soft-
ware now restricts the sample to those households in the enrolled and 
nonenrolled groups for which it can ﬁnd a match in the other group.
To obtain the estimated impact using the matching method, you ﬁrst 
compute the impact for each enrolled household individually (using each 
household’s matched comparison household), and then average those indi-
vidual impacts. Table 8.2 shows that the impact estimated from applying 
this procedure is a reduction of US$9.95 in household health expenditures.
Finally, the software also allows you to compute the standard error on 
the estimated impact using linear regression (table 8.3).4
You realize that you also have information on baseline outcomes in 
your survey data, so you decide to carry out matched diff erence-in- 
diff erences in addition to using the full set of explanatory variables. That 
is, you compute the diff erence in household health expenditures at fol-
low-up between enrolled and matched comparison households; you 
compute the diff erence in household health expenditures at baseline 
between enrolled and matched comparison households; and then you 
compute the diff erence between these two diff erences. Table 8.4 shows 
the result of this matched diff erence-in-diff erences approach.
Figure 8.3 Matching for HISP: Common Support
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Table 8.2 Evaluating HISP: Matching on Baseline Characteristics and 
Comparison of Means
Enrolled Matched comparison Difference
Household health 
expenditures (US$)
7.84 17.79 
(using full set of 
explanatory variables)
−9.95
19.9 
(using limited set of 
explanatory variables)
−11.35
Note: This table compares mean household health expenditures for enrolled households and 
matched comparison households.
Table 8.3 Evaluating HISP: Matching on Baseline Characteristics and 
Regression Analysis
Linear regression 
(Matching on full set of 
explanatory variables)
Linear regression 
(Matching on limited set 
of explanatory variables)
Estimated impact on 
household health 
expenditures (US$)
−9.95**
(0.24)
−11.35**
(0.22)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signifi cance level: ** = 1 percent.
Table 8.4 Evaluating HISP: Difference-in-Differences Combined with 
Matching on Baseline Characteristics
Enrolled
Matched 
comparison 
using full set 
of explanatory 
variables Difference
Household health 
expenditures 
(US$)
Follow-up 7.84 17.79 −9.95
Baseline 14.49 15.03 0.54
Matched 
difference-in-
differences = 
−9.41**
(0.19)
Note: Standard error is in parentheses and was calculated using linear regression. Signifi cance 
level: ** = 1 percent.
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Limitations of the Matching Method
Although matching procedures can be applied in many settings, regardless 
of a program’s assignment rules, they have several serious shortcomings. 
First, they require extensive data sets on large samples of units, and even 
when those are available, there may be a lack of common support between 
the treatment or enrolled group and the pool of nonparticipants. Second, 
matching can only be performed based on observed characteristics; by 
deﬁnition, we cannot incorporate unobserved characteristics in the calcula-
tion of the propensity score. So for the matching procedure to identify a 
valid comparison group, we must be sure that no systematic diff erences in 
unobserved characteristics between the treatment units and the matched 
comparison units exist5 that could inﬂuence the outcome (Y). Since we 
 cannot prove that there are no such unobserved characteristics that aff ect 
both participation and outcomes, we must assume that none exist. This is 
usually a very strong assumption. Although matching helps control for 
observed background characteristics, we can never rule out bias that stems 
from unobserved characteristics. In summary, the assumption that no selec-
tion bias has occurred stemming from unobserved characteristics is very 
strong, and most problematically, it cannot be tested.
Matching alone is generally less robust than the other evaluation meth-
ods we have discussed, since it requires the strong assumption that there are 
no unobserved characteristics that simultaneously aff ect program partici-
pation and outcomes. Randomized assignment, instrumental variable, 
and  regression discontinuity design, on the other hand, do not require 
the  untestable assumption that there are no such unobserved variables. 
 HISP Question 7
A. What are the basic assumptions required to accept these results based 
on the matching method?
B. Why are the results from the matching method diff erent if you use the 
full versus the limited set of explanatory variables?
C. What happens when you compare the result from the matching 
method with the result from randomized assignment? Why do you 
think the results are so diff erent for matching on a limited set of 
explanatory variables? Why is the result more similar when matching 
on a full set of explanatory variables?
D. Based on the result from the matching method, should HISP be scaled 
up nationally?
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They  also do not require such large samples or as extensive background 
characteristics as propensity score matching.
In practice, matching methods are typically used when randomized 
assignment, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity design 
options are not possible. So-called ex post matching is very risky when no 
baseline data are available on the outcome of interest or on background 
characteristics. If an evaluation uses survey data that were collected after 
the start of the program (that is, ex post) to infer what people’s background 
characteristics were at baseline, and then matches the treated group to a 
comparison group using those inferred characteristics, it may inadvertently 
match based on characteristics that were also aff ected by the program; in 
that case, the estimation result would be invalid or biased.
By contrast, when baseline data are available, matching based on baseline 
background characteristics can be very useful when it is combined with other 
techniques, such as diff erence-in-diff erences, which allows us to correct for 
diff erences between the groups that are ﬁ xed over time. Matching is also 
more reliable when the program assignment rule and underlying variables 
are known, in which case matching can be performed on those variables.
By now, it is probably clear that impact evaluations are best designed before 
a program begins to be implemented. Once the program has started, if one has 
no way to inﬂuence how it is allocated and no baseline data have been col-
lected, few, if any, rigorous options for the impact evaluation will be available.
Checklist: Matching
Matching relies on the assumption that enrolled and nonenrolled units are 
similar in terms of any unobserved variables that could aff ect both the prob-
ability of participating in the program and the outcome.
¸ Is program participation determined by variables that cannot be 
observed? This cannot be directly tested, so you will need to rely on the-
ory, common sense, and good knowledge of the setting of the impact 
evaluation for guidance.
¸ Are the observed characteristics well balanced between matched sub-
groups? Compare the observed characteristics of each treatment and its 
matched comparison group of units at baseline.
¸ Can a matched comparison unit be found for each treatment unit? Check 
whether suffi  cient common support exists in the distribution of the pro-
pensity scores. Small areas of common support indicate that enrolled and 
nonenrolled persons are very diff erent, and that casts doubt as to whether 
matching is a credible method.
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Additional Resources
 • For accompanying material for this book and hyperlinks to additional resources, 
please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (http://www.worldbank 
.org / ieinpractice).
 • For more information on matching, see Rosenbaum, Paul. 2002. Observational 
Studies, second edition. Springer Series in Statistics. New York: Springer-Verlag.
 • For more on implementing propensity score matching, see Heinrich,  Carolyn, 
Alessandro Maffi  oli, and Gonzalo Vásquez. 2010. “A Primer for Applying 
Propensity-Score Matching. Impact-Evaluation Guidelines.” Technical Note 
IDB-TN-161, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC.
Notes
1. Technical note: In practice, many deﬁnitions of what constitutes the closest or 
nearest unit are used to perform matching. The nearest comparison units can be 
deﬁned based on a stratiﬁcation of the propensity score—the identiﬁcation of 
the treatment unit’s nearest neighbors, based on distance, within a given 
radius—or using kernel techniques. It is considered good practice to check 
the robustness of matching results by using various matching algorithms. See 
Rosenbaum (2002) for more details.
2. The discussion on matching in this book focuses on one-to-one matching. 
Various other types of matching, such as one-to-many matching or replacement/
nonreplacement matching, will not be discussed. In all cases, however, the 
conceptual framework described here would still apply.
3. A detailed review of matching can be found in Rosenbaum (2002).
4. Technical note: When the enrolled units’ propensity scores are not fully covered 
by the area of common support, standard errors should be estimated using 
bootstrapping rather than linear regression.
5. For readers with a background in econometrics, this means that participation is 
independent of outcomes, given the background characteristics used to do the 
matching.
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Addressing Methodological 
Challenges
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
We have seen that most impact evaluation methods produce valid estimates 
of the counterfactual only under speciﬁc assumptions. The main risk in 
applying any given method is that its underlying assumptions do not hold 
true, resulting in biased estimates of the program’s impact. But there are 
also a number of other risks that are common to most of the methodologies 
that we have discussed. We will discuss the key ones in this chapter.
One type of risk arises if you are estimating a program’s impact on an 
entire group, and your results mask some diff erences in responses to the 
treatment among diff erent recipients, that is, heterogeneous treatment 
eff ects. Most impact evaluation methods assume that a program aff ects out-
comes in a simple, linear way for all the units in the population. 
If you think that diff erent subpopulations may have experienced the 
impact of a program very diff erently, then you may want to consider hav-
ing stratiﬁ ed samples by each subpopulation. Say, for example, that you 
are interested in knowing the impact of a school meal program on girls, 
but only 10 percent of the students are girls. In that case, even a large ran-
dom sample of students may not contain a suffi  cient number of girls to 
allow you to estimate the impact of the program on girls. For your 
CHAPTER 9
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evaluation’s sample design, you would want to stratify the sample on the 
basis of gender and include a suffi  ciently large number of girls to allow 
you to detect a given eff ect size.
Unintended Behavioral Effects
When conducting an impact evaluation, you may also induce unintended 
behavioral responses from the population that you are studying, as follows:
 • The Hawthorne eff ect occurs when the mere fact that you are observing 
units makes them behave diff erently (see box 9.1).
 • The John Henry eff ect happens when comparison units work harder to 
compensate for not being off ered a treatment (see box 9.1).
 • Anticipation can lead to another type of unintended behavioral eff ect. In 
a randomized rollout, units in the comparison group may expect to 
receive the program in the future and begin changing their behavior 
before the program actually reaches them.
Box 9.1: Folk Tales of Impact Evaluation: The Hawthorne Effect 
and the John Henry Effect
The term Hawthorne effect refers to experi-
ments that were carried out from 1924 to 
1932 at the Hawthorne Works, an electric 
equipment factory in the U.S. state of Illinois. 
The experiments tested the impact of chang-
ing working conditions (such as increasing or 
decreasing the intensity of light) on workers’ 
productivity, and they found that any changes 
in working conditions (more or less light, 
more or fewer breaks, and the like) led to an 
increase in productivity. This was interpreted 
as an observation effect: workers who were 
part of the experiment saw themselves as 
special, and their productivity increased 
because of this and not because of the 
change in working conditions. While the 
original experiments later became the sub-
ject of controversy and were somewhat dis-
credited, the term Hawthorne effect stuck.
The term John Henry effect was coined 
by Gary Saretsky in 1972 to refer to legend-
ary American folk hero John Henry, a “steel-
driving man” tasked with driving a steel drill 
into rock to make holes for explosives during 
construction of a railroad tunnel. According 
to legend, when he learned that he was 
being compared to a steam drill, he worked 
much harder so as to outperform the 
machine. Alas, he died as a result. But the 
term lives on to denote how comparison 
units sometimes work harder to compen-
sate for not being offered a treatment.
Sources: Landsberger 1958; Levitt and List 2009; Saretsky 1972.
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 • Substitution bias is another behavioral eff ect that aff ects the comparison 
group: units that were not selected to receive the program may be able to 
ﬁ nd good substitutes through their own initiative.
Behavioral responses that disproportionately aff ect the comparison group 
are an issue because they may undermine the internal validity of the evalu-
ation results, even if you use randomized assignment as the evaluation 
method. A comparison group that works harder to compensate for not being 
off ered a treatment, or that changes behavior anticipating the program, is 
not a good representation of the counterfactual.
If you have reason to believe that these unintended behavioral responses 
may be present, then building in additional comparison groups that are 
completely unaff ected by the intervention is sometimes an option—one that 
allows you to explicitly test for such responses. It might also be a good idea 
to gather qualitative data in order to better understand behavioral responses.
Imperfect Compliance
Imperfect compliance is a discrepancy between assigned treatment status and 
actual treatment status. Imperfect compliance happens when some units 
assigned to the treatment group do not receive treatment, and when some 
units assigned to the comparison group receive treatment. In chapter 5, we 
discussed imperfect compliance in reference to randomized assignment, but 
imperfect compliance can also occur in regression discontinuity design (as 
discussed in chapter 6) and in diff erence-in-diff erences (chapter 7). Before 
you can interpret the impact estimates produced by any method, you need to 
know whether imperfect compliance has occurred in the program.
Imperfect compliance can occur in a variety of ways:
 • Not all intended program participants actually participate in the 
 program.  Sometimes units that are assigned to a program choose not 
to participate.
 • Some intended participants are excluded from the program because of 
administrative or implementation errors.
 • Some units of the comparison group are mistakenly off ered the program 
and enroll in it.
 • Some units of the comparison group manage to participate in the 
 program, even though it is not off ered to them.
 • The program is assigned based on a continuous eligibility index, but the 
eligibility cutoff  is not strictly enforced.
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 • Selective migration takes place based on treatment status. For example, 
the evaluation may compare outcomes for treated and nontreated munic-
ipalities, but individuals may choose to move to another municipality if 
they do not like the treatment status of their municipality.
In general, in the presence of imperfect compliance, standard impact evalu-
ation methods produce intention-to-treat estimates. However, the local 
average treatment eff ect can be recovered from the intention-to-treat esti-
mates using the instrumental variable approach.
In chapter 5, we presented the intuition for dealing with imperfect 
compliance in the context of randomized assignment. Using an adjust-
ment for the percentage of compliers in the evaluation sample, we were 
able to recover the local average treatment eff ect for the compliers from 
the intention-to-treat estimate. This “ﬁx” can be extended to other meth-
ods through application of the more general instrumental variable 
approach. The instrumental variable contains an external source of varia-
tion that helps you clear up, or correct, the bias that may stem from imper-
fect compliance. In the case of randomized  assignment with imperfect 
compliance, we used a 0/1 variable (a so-called dummy variable) that takes 
the value 1 if the unit was originally assigned to the treatment group, and 
0 if the unit was originally assigned to the comparison group. During the 
analysis stage, the instrumental variable is used in the context of a two-
stage regression that allows you to identify the impact of the treatment on 
the compliers.
The logic of the instrumental variable approach can be extended in the 
context of other evaluation methods:
 • In the context of regression discontinuity design, the instrumental 
 variable you would use is a 0/1 variable that indicates whether a unit 
is located on the ineligible side or the eligible side of the cutoff  score.
 • In the context of selective migration, a possible instrumental variable for 
the location of the individual after the start of the program would be the 
location of the individual before the announcement of the program.
Despite the possibility of addressing imperfect compliance using instru-
mental variables, three points are important to remember:
1. From a technical point of view, it is not desirable to have a large portion 
of the comparison group enroll in the program. As the portion of the 
comparison group that enrolls in the program increases, the fraction of 
compliers in the population will decrease, and the local  average treat-
ment eff ect estimated with the instrumental variable method will be 
valid only for a shrinking fraction of the population of interest. If this 
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continues too long, the results may lose all policy signiﬁ cance, since they 
would no longer be applicable to a suffi  cient portion of the population of 
interest.
2. Conversely, it is not desirable to have a large portion of the treatment 
group remain unenrolled. Again, as the portion of the treatment group 
that enrolls in the program decreases, the fraction of compliers in the 
population decreases. The local average treatment eff ect estimated with 
the instrumental variable method will be valid only for a shrinking frac-
tion of the population of interest.
3. As discussed in chapter 5, the instrumental variable method is valid only 
under certain circumstances; it is deﬁnitely not a universal solution.
Spillovers
Spillovers (or spillover eff ects) are another common issue that may aff ect 
evaluations, whether they use the randomized assignment, regression dis-
continuity design, or diff erence-in-diff erences method. A spillover happens 
when an intervention aff ects a nonparticipant, and it might be positive or 
negative. There are four types of spillover eff ects, according to Angelucci 
and Di Maro (2015):
 • Externalities. These are eff ects that go from treated subjects to untreated 
subjects. For example, vaccinating the children in a village against inﬂ u-
enza decreases the probability that nonvaccinated inhabitants of the same 
village will catch this disease. This is an example of a positive externality. 
Externalities may also be negative. For example, a farmer’s crop could be 
partially destroyed when his neighbor applies an herbicide on his own 
plot and some of the herbicide blows to the other side of the property line.
 • Social interactions. Spillovers might result from social and economic 
interactions between treated and nontreated populations, leading to 
indirect impacts on the nontreated. For example, a student who receives 
a tablet as part of a learning enhancement program shares the tablet with 
another student who does not participate in the program.
 • Context equilibrium eff ects. These eff ects happen when an intervention 
aff ects the behavioral or social norms within the given context, such as a 
treated locality. For example, increasing the amount of resources that 
treated health centers receive so they can extend their range of services 
might aff ect the expectations from the population about what should be 
the range of services off ered at all health centers.
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 • General equilibrium eff ects. These eff ects happen when interventions 
aff ect the supply and demand for good or services, and thereby change 
the market price for those services. For example, a program that gives 
poor women vouchers to use private facilities for childbirth might sud-
denly increase the demand for services at private facilities, thereby 
increasing the price of the service for everyone else. Box 9.2 presents an 
example of negative spillovers due to general equilibrium eff ects in the 
context of a job training program.
If the nonparticipant who experiences the spillover is a member of the 
comparison group, then the spillover violates the basic requirement that the 
outcome of one unit should be unaff ected by the particular assignment of 
treatments to other units. This stable unit treatment value assumption 
(SUTVA) is necessary to ensure that randomized assignment yields unbiased 
estimates of impact. Intuitively, if the comparison group is indirectly aff ected 
by the treatment received by the treatment group (for example, comparison 
students borrow tablets from treated students), then the comparison does 
Box 9.2: Negative Spillovers Due to General Equilibrium Effects: 
Job Placement Assistance and Labor Market Outcomes in France
Job placement assistance programs are 
popular in many industrialized countries. 
Governments contract with a third-party 
entity to assist unemployed workers in their 
job search. Many studies fi nd that these 
counseling programs have a signifi cant and 
positive impact on job seekers.
Crépon and others (2013) investigated 
whether giving job assistance to young, edu-
cated job seekers in France might have nega-
tive effects on other job seekers who were 
not supported by the program. They hypoth-
esized that a spillover mechanism might be 
at work: when the labor market is not grow-
ing much, helping one job seeker to fi nd a job 
might come at the detriment of another job 
seeker who might otherwise have gotten the 
job that the counseled job seeker obtained. 
To investigate this hypothesis, they carried 
out a randomized experiment that included 
235 labor markets (such as cities) in France. 
These labor markets were randomly allo-
cated to one of fi ve groups, which varied in 
terms of the proportion of job seekers to be 
assigned to counseling treatment (0  percent, 
25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent, and 100 
percent). Within each labor market, eligible 
job seekers were randomly assigned to the 
treatment following this proportion. After 
eight months, the researchers found that 
unemployed youths who were assigned to 
the program were signifi cantly more likely to 
have found a stable job than those who were 
not. But these gains appear to have come 
partly at the expense of eligible workers who 
did not benefi t from the program.
Source: Crépon and others 2013.
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not accurately represent what would have happened to the treatment group 
in absence of the treatment (the counterfactual).
If the nonparticipant who experiences the spillover is not a member of 
the comparison group, then the SUTVA assumption would hold, and the 
comparison group would still provide a good estimate of the counterfactual. 
However, we still would want to measure the spillover because it represents 
a real impact of the program. In other words, comparing the outcomes of 
the treatment and comparison groups would yield unbiased estimates of the 
impact of the treatment on the treated group, but this would not take into 
account the impact of the program on other groups.
A classic example of spillovers due to externalities is presented by Kremer 
and Miguel (2004), who examined the impact of administering deworming 
medicine to children in Kenyan schools (box 9.3). Intestinal worms are para-
sites that can be transmitted from one person to another through contact 
with contaminated fecal matter. When a child receives deworming medi-
cine, her worm load will decrease, but so will the worm load of people living 
in the same environment, as they will no longer come in contact with the 
child’s worms. Thus in the Kenya example, when the medicine was admin-
istered to the children in one school, it beneﬁted not only those children 
(a direct beneﬁt) but also those in neighboring schools (an indirect beneﬁt).
As depicted in ﬁgure 9.1, deworming children in group A schools also 
diminishes the number of worms that aff ect children who don’t attend 
group A schools. In particular, it may diminish the number of worms that 
aff ect children who attend group B comparison schools, which are located 
close to group A schools. However, comparison schools farther away from 
group A schools—the so-called group C schools—do not experience such 
spillover eff ects because the medicine administered in group A does not kill 
any of the worms that aff ect children attending group C schools. The evalu-
ation and its results are discussed in more detail in box 9.3.
Designing an Impact Evaluation That Accounts for Spillovers
Say that you are designing an impact evaluation for a program where you 
think it’s likely that spillovers will occur. How should you approach this? 
The ﬁ rst thing to do is to realize that the objective of your evaluation needs 
to be expanded. While a standard evaluation aims to estimate the impact (or 
causal eff ect) of a program on an outcome of interest for units receiving the 
treatment, an evaluation with spillovers will have to answer two questions:
1. The standard evaluation question for the direct impact. What is the impact 
(or causal eff ect) of a program on an outcome of interest for units receiv-
ing the treatment? This is the direct impact that the program has on 
treated groups.
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2. An additional evaluation question for the indirect impact. What is the 
impact (or causal eff ect) of a program on an outcome of interest for units 
not receiving the treatment? This is the indirect impact that the program 
has on nontreated groups.
To estimate the direct impact on treated groups, you will need to choose 
the comparison group in such a way that it is not aff ected by spillovers. 
For example, you might require that the treatment and comparison villages, 
Box 9.3: Working with Spillovers: Deworming, Externalities, and 
Education in Kenya
The Primary School Deworming Project in 
Busia, Kenya, was designed to test a variety 
of aspects of worm treatment and preven-
tion. It was carried out by the Dutch  nonprofi t 
International Child Support Africa, in coop-
eration with the ministry of health. The proj-
ect involved 75 schools with a total 
enrollment of more than 30,000 students 
between the ages of 6 and 18. The students 
were treated with worm medication in 
accordance with World Health Organization 
recommendations and also received worm 
prevention education in the form of health 
lectures, wall charts, and teacher training.
Due to administrative and fi nancial con-
straints, the rollout was phased according to 
the alphabetical order of the school’s name, 
with the fi rst group of 25 schools starting 
in 1998, the second group in 1999, and the 
third group in 2001. By randomizing at the 
level of school, Kremer and Miguel (2004) 
were able both to estimate the impact of 
deworming on a school and to identify spill-
overs across schools using exogenous varia-
tion in the closeness of comparison schools 
to treatment schools. Although compliance 
with the randomized design was relatively 
high (with 75 percent of students assigned 
to the treatment receiving worm medication, 
and only a small percentage of the compari-
son group units receiving treatment), the 
researchers were also able to take advantage 
of noncompliance to determine within-
school health externalities, or spillovers.
The direct effect of the interventions was 
to reduce moderate-to-heavy worm infec-
tions by 26 percentage points for students 
who took the worm medication. Meanwhile, 
moderate-to-heavy infections among stu-
dents who attended treatment schools but 
did not take the medication fell by 12 per-
centage points through an indirect spillover 
effect. There were also externalities between 
schools.
Because the cost of worm treatment is 
so low and the health and education effects 
relatively high, the researchers concluded 
that deworming is a relatively cost-effi cient 
way to improve participation rates in schools. 
The study also illustrates that tropical dis-
eases such as worms may play a signifi cant 
role in educational outcomes and strength-
ens claims that Africa’s high disease burden 
may be contributing to its low income. Thus 
Kremer and Miguel argue that the study 
makes a strong case for public subsidies for 
disease treatments with similar spillover 
benefi ts in developing countries.
Source: Kremer and Miguel 2004.
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clinics, or households be located suffi  ciently far from one another that 
 spillovers are unlikely.
To estimate the indirect impact on nontreated groups, you should iden-
tify an additional comparison group for each nontreated group that may 
be  aff ected by spillovers. For instance, community health workers may 
undertake household visits to provide information to parents about the ben-
eﬁ ts of improved dietary diversity for their children. Let us assume that the 
community health workers visit only some households in any given village. 
You may be interested in spillover eff ects on children in nonvisited house-
holds, in which case you would need to ﬁ nd a comparison group for these 
children. At the same time, it may be possible that the intervention also 
aff ects adults’ dietary diversity. If such an indirect eff ect is of interest to the 
evaluation, a comparison group would also be needed among adults. As the 
number of potential spillover channels increases, the design can quickly 
become rather complicated.
Figure 9.1 A Classic Example of Spillovers: Positive Externalities from 
Deworming School Children
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Evaluations with spillovers pose some speciﬁ c challenges. First, when 
spillover eff ects are likely, it is important to understand the mechanism of 
spillover: biological, social, environmental, or the like. If we don’t know 
what the spillover mechanism is, we will be unable to accurately choose 
comparison groups that are and are not aff ected by spillovers. Second, an 
evaluation with spillovers requires more extensive data collection than one 
where this is not a concern: there is an additional comparison group (in the 
preceding example, nearby villages). You may also need to collect data on 
additional units (in the preceding example, adults in households targeted by 
nutrition visits for children). Box 9.4 examines how researchers handled 
spillovers in an evaluation of a conditional cash transfer program in Mexico.
Box 9.4: Evaluating Spillover Effects: Conditional Cash Transfers 
and Spillovers in Mexico
Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) examined 
spillovers in Mexico’s Progresa program, 
which provided conditional cash transfers 
to households (see boxes 1.1 and 4.2). The 
researchers sought to explore whether there 
was risk sharing within villages. If households 
shared risk, then eligible households could be 
transferring part of the cash transfer to ineli-
gible households through loans or gifts.
The Progresa program was phased in 
over two years, with 320 villages randomly 
selected to receive the cash transfers in 1998, 
and 186 in 1999. So between 1998 and 1999 
there were 320 treatment villages and 186 
comparison villages. Within the treatment vil-
lages, a household’s eligibility for Progresa 
transfers was determined based on poverty 
status, and census data were collected for 
both groups. This created four subgroups 
within the sample: eligible and ineligible pop-
ulations within both treatment and compari-
son villages. Assuming that the program did 
not indirectly affect comparison villages, the 
ineligible households in the comparison 
villages provided a valid counterfactual for the 
ineligible households in the treatment vil-
lages, for the purpose of estimating within-
village spillovers to ineligible households.
The researchers found evidence of posi-
tive spillovers on consumption. Adult food 
consumption increased about 10 percent per 
month in ineligible households in treatment 
villages. This was about half the average 
increase in food consumption among eligi-
ble households. The results also supported 
the hypothesis of risk-sharing in villages. 
Ineligible households in treatment villages 
received more loans and transfers from fam-
ily and friends than did ineligible households 
in comparison villages. This implies that the 
spillover effect operated through local insur-
ance and credit markets.
Based on these results, Angelucci and De 
Giorgi concluded that previous evaluations of 
Progresa underestimated the impact of the 
program by 12 percent because they did not 
account for indirect effects on ineligible 
households within treatment villages.
Source: Angelucci and De Giorgi 2009.
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Attrition
Attrition bias is another common issue that may aff ect evaluations, 
whether they use the randomized assignment, regression discontinuity 
design, or diff erence-in-diff erences methods. Attrition occurs when parts 
of the sample disappear over time, and researchers are not able to ﬁ nd all 
initial members of the treatment and comparison groups in follow-up sur-
veys or data. For example, of the 2,500 households surveyed in the base-
line, researchers are able to ﬁ nd only 2,300 in a follow-up survey two years 
later. If researchers go back and attempt to resurvey the same group, say, 
10 years later, they might be able to ﬁ nd even fewer original households.
Attrition might happen for various reasons. For example, members of 
households or even entire households might move to another village, city, 
region, or even country. In a recent example of a long-term follow-up of an 
early childhood development intervention in Jamaica, at the 22-year follow-
up survey, 18 percent of the sample had migrated abroad (see box 9.5). In 
other cases, respondents might no longer be willing to respond to an addi-
tional survey. Or conﬂ icts and lack of security in the area might prevent the 
research team from carrying out a survey in some locations that were 
included in the baseline.
Attrition can be problematic for two reasons. First, the follow-up sample 
might no longer accurately represent the population of interest. Remember 
that when we choose the sample at the time of the randomized assignment, 
we choose it so that it accurately represents the population of interest. In 
other words, we choose a sample that has external validity for our popula-
tion of interest. If the follow-up survey or data collection is marred by sub-
stantial attrition, we would be concerned that the follow-up sample might 
represent only a speciﬁ c subset of the population of interest. For example, 
if  the most educated people in the original sample are also the ones who 
migrate, our follow-up survey would miss those educated people and no 
longer accurately represent the population of interest, which included those 
educated people.
Second, the follow-up sample might no longer be balanced between 
the treatment and comparison group. Say you are trying to evaluate a pro-
gram that tries to boost girls’ education, and that educated girls are more 
likely to move to the city to look for work. Then your follow-up survey might 
show disproportionately high attrition in the treatment group, compared 
with  the comparison group. This could aff ect the internal validity of the 
 program: by comparing the treatment and comparison units that you ﬁ nd 
at follow-up, you will no longer be able to accurately estimate the impact of 
the program.
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If you ﬁ nd attrition during a follow-up survey, the following two tests can 
help you assess the extent of the problem. First, check whether the baseline 
characteristics of the units that dropped out of the sample are statisti-
cally  equal to baseline characteristics of the units that were successfully 
resurveyed. As long as the baseline characteristics of both groups are not 
Box 9.5: Attrition in Studies with Long-Term Follow-Up: Early 
Childhood Development and Migration in Jamaica
Attrition can be especially problematic 
where many years have passed between 
the baseline and follow-up surveys. In 
1986, a team at the University of the West 
Indies began a study to measure long-term 
outcomes from an early childhood interven-
tion in Jamaica. In 2008, a follow-up was 
conducted when the original participants 
were 22 years old. It was challenging to 
track down all of the original study 
participants.
The intervention was a two-year 
 program that provided psychosocial stimu-
lation and food supplementation to growth-
stunted toddlers in Kingston, Jamaica. A 
total of 129 children were randomly 
assigned to one of three treatment arms or 
a comparison group. The researchers also 
surveyed 84 nonstunted children for a sec-
ond  comparison group. In the follow-up, 
the researchers were able to resurvey 
about 80 percent of the participants. There 
was no evidence of selective attrition in the 
whole sample, meaning that there were no 
signifi cant differences in the baseline char-
acteristics of those who could be surveyed 
at 22 years, compared with those who 
could not be surveyed. However, when 
considering the subgroup of children who 
had become migrant workers, there were 
signs of selective attrition. Out of 23 
migrant workers, nine had dropped out of 
the sample, and a signifi cantly larger share 
of these belonged to the treatment group. 
This implied that the treatment was associ-
ated with migration. Since migrant workers 
typically earned more than those who 
remained in Jamaica, this made it diffi cult 
to estimate impacts.
To address the potential bias from attri-
tion among migrant workers, the research-
ers used econometric techniques. They 
predicted earnings for the migrant work-
ers that had dropped out of the sample 
through an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression using treatment status, gen-
der, and migration as determinants. Using 
these predictions in the impact estima-
tion, the researchers found that the pro-
gram had impressive results. The early 
childhood intervention increased earnings 
by 25 percent for the treatment group. 
This effect was large enough for the 
stunted treatment group to catch up to the 
nonstunted comparison group 20 years 
later.
Source: Gertler and others 2014; Grantham-McGregor and others 1991.
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statistically diff erent, your new sample should continue to represent the 
population of interest.
Second, check whether the attrition rate in the treatment group is 
 similar to the attrition rate in the comparison group. If the attrition rates 
are  signiﬁ cantly diff erent, then there is a concern that your sample is no 
longer valid and you may need to use various statistical techniques to try to 
correct this. One common method is inverse probability weighting, a method 
that statistically reweights the data (in this case, the follow-up data) so as to 
correct for the fact that a portion of the original respondents is missing. The 
method reweighs the follow-up sample so it looks similar to the baseline 
sample.1
Timing and Persistence of Effects
The likely channels of transmission between inputs, activities, outputs, and 
outcomes might happen immediately, soon, or with a substantial time lag, 
and are usually closely related to changes in human behavior. Chapter 2 
emphasized how important it is to think about these channels and plan 
before the intervention starts, and to develop a clear causal chain for the 
program being evaluated. For the sake of simplicity, we have been abstract-
ing from timing issues. But it is important to consider aspects related to tim-
ing when designing an evaluation.
First, programs do not necessarily become fully eff ective immediately 
after they start (King and Behrman 2009). Program administrators may 
need time to get a program running, beneﬁ ciaries may not immediately 
beneﬁ t because behavioral changes take time, and institutions may not 
immediately adjust their behavior either. On the other hand, once insti-
tutions and beneﬁ ciaries change certain behaviors, it might be the case 
that they continue even if the program is discontinued. For example, a 
program that incentivizes households to sort and recycle garbage and 
save energy might continue to be eff ective after incentives are removed, 
if it manages to change household norms about how to handle garbage 
and energy. When designing an evaluation, you need to be very careful 
(and realistic) in assessing how long it might take for a program to reach 
full eff ectiveness. It  might be necessary to carry out several follow-up 
surveys to gauge the impact of the program over time, or even after 
the  program is discontinued. Box 9.6 illustrates an evaluation where 
some  eff ects only became apparent after the initial intervention was 
discontinued.
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Additional Resources
 • For accompanying material to the book and hyperlinks to additional resources, 
please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (http://www.worldbank 
.org / ieinpractice).
Note
1. A more advanced statistical method would be to estimate “sharp bounds” on 
treatment eff ects (see Lee 2009).
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Evaluating Multifaceted 
Programs
Evaluating Programs That Combine Several 
Treatment Options
Up to now, we have discussed programs that include only one kind of treat-
ment. In reality, many highly relevant policy questions arise in the context 
of multifaceted programs: that is, programs that combine several treatment 
options.1 Policy makers may be interested in knowing not only whether or 
not a program works, but also whether the program works better than 
another or at lower cost. For example, if we want to increase school atten-
dance, is it more eff ective to implement demand-side interventions (such as 
cash transfers to families) or supply-side interventions (such as greater 
incentives for teachers)? If we introduce the two interventions together, do 
they work better than each of them alone? In other words, are they comple-
mentary? Alternatively, if program cost-eff ectiveness is a priority, you may 
well want to determine the optimal level of services that the program should 
deliver. For instance, what is the optimal duration of a vocational training 
program? Does a six-month program have a greater eff ect on trainees’ 
ﬁnding jobs than a three-month program? If so, is the diff erence large 
enough to justify the additional resources needed for a six-month program? 
Finally, policy makers may be interested in how to alter an existing program 
CHAPTER 10
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to make it more eff ective, and they might want to test a variety of mecha-
nisms in order to ﬁ nd which one(s) work best.
Beyond simply estimating the impact of an intervention on an outcome 
of interest, impact evaluations can help to answer broader questions such as 
these:
 • What is the impact of one treatment compared with the impact of 
another  treatment? For example, what is the impact on children’s 
 cognitive development of a program providing parenting training as 
opposed to a nutrition intervention?
 • Is the joint impact of a ﬁrst treatment and a second treatment larger 
than  the sum of the two individual impacts? For example, is the total 
impact of the parenting intervention and the nutrition intervention 
greater than, less than, or equal to the sum of the eff ects of the two 
 individual interventions?
 • What is the additional impact of a higher-intensity treatment compared 
with a lower-intensity treatment? For example, what is the eff ect on the 
cognitive development of stunted children if a social worker visits them 
at home every two weeks, as compared with visiting them only once a 
month?
This chapter provides examples of how to design impact evaluations for 
two types of multifaceted programs: ones with multiple levels of the same 
treatment, and ones with multiple treatments. First, we discuss how to 
design an impact evaluation for a program with multiple treatment levels. 
Then we turn to how to disentangle the various kinds of impact of a pro-
gram with multiple treatments. The discussion assumes that we are using 
the randomized assignment method, but it can be generalized to other 
methods.
Evaluating Programs with Varying 
Treatment Levels
It is relatively easy to design an impact evaluation for a program with vary-
ing treatment levels. Imagine that you are trying to evaluate the impact of a 
program that has two levels of treatment: high (for example, biweekly visits) 
and low (say, monthly visits). You want to evaluate the impact of both 
options, and you also want to know how much the additional visits aff ect 
outcomes. To do this, you can run a lottery to decide who receives the high 
level of treatment, who receives the low level of treatment, and who is 
assigned to the comparison group. Figure 10.1 illustrates this process.
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As in standard randomized assignment, step 1 is to deﬁne the population 
of eligible units for your program. Step 2 is to select a random sample of 
units to be included in the evaluation, the evaluation sample. Once you have 
the evaluation sample, in step 3 you then randomly assign units to the group 
receiving high-level treatment, the group receiving low-level treatment, or 
the comparison group. As a result of randomized assignment to multiple 
treatment levels, you will have created three distinct groups:
 • Group A constitutes the comparison group.
 • Group B receives the low level of treatment.
 • Group C receives the high level of treatment.
When correctly implemented, randomized assignment ensures that the 
three groups are similar. Therefore, you can estimate the impact of the high 
level of treatment by comparing the average outcome for group C with the 
average outcome for group A. You can also estimate the impact of the low 
level of treatment by comparing the average outcome for group B with that 
for group A. Finally, you can assess whether the high-level treatment has a 
larger impact than the low-level treatment by comparing the average out-
comes for groups B and C.
Estimating the impact of a program with more than two treatment levels 
will follow the same logic. If there are three levels of treatment, the random-
ized assignment process will create three diff erent treatment groups, plus a 
comparison group. In general, with n diff erent treatment levels, there will 
be n treatment groups, plus a comparison group. Box 10.1 and 10.2 provide 
examples of impact evaluations that test modalities of diff erent intensity or 
multiple treatment options.
Key Concept
When evaluating 
programs with n 
different treatment 
levels, there should be 
n treatment groups, 
plus a comparison 
group.
Figure 10.1 Steps in Randomized Assignment of Two Levels of Treatment
1. Define eligible units 2. Select the evaluation
sample
Ineligible Eligible
3. Randomize assignment to
high and low levels of treatment
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Box 10.1: Testing Program Intensity for Improving Adherence to 
Antiretroviral Treatment
Pop-Eleches and others (2011) used a multi-
level cross-cutting design to evaluate the 
impact of using short message service 
(SMS) reminders on HIV/AIDS patients’ 
adherence to antiretroviral therapy at a rural 
clinic in Kenya. The study varied the intensity 
of the treatment along two dimensions: how 
often the messages were sent to patients 
(daily or weekly), and the length of the 
 messages (short or long). Short messages 
included only a reminder (“This is your 
reminder.”), while long messages included a 
reminder as well as a word of encourage-
ment (“This is your reminder. Be strong and 
courageous, we care about you.”). A total of 
531 patients were assigned to one of four 
treatment groups or the comparison group. 
The treatment groups were short weekly 
messages, long weekly messages, short 
daily messages, or long daily messages.
One-third of the sample was allocated to 
the control group, and the remaining two-
thirds of the sample were allocated evenly 
to each of the four intervention groups. 
A sequence of random numbers between 0 
and 1 was generated. Four equal intervals 
between 0 and 2/3 corresponded to the four 
intervention groups, while the value interval 
from 2/3 to 1 corresponded to the control 
group.
The investigators found that weekly mes-
sages increased the percentage of patients 
achieving 90 percent adherence to antiretro-
viral therapy by approximately 13–16 per-
cent, compared with no messages. These 
weekly messages were also effective at 
reducing the frequency of treatment inter-
ruptions, which have been shown to be an 
important cause of treatment-resistant fail-
ure in resource-limited settings. Contrary to 
expectations, adding words of encourage-
ment in the longer messages was not more 
effective than either a short message or no 
message.
The investigators also found that while 
weekly messages improved adherence, 
daily messages did not, but they were not 
able to distinguish as to why the weekly 
messages were most effective. It is possi-
ble that habituation, or the diminishing of a 
response to a frequently repeated stimulus, 
may explain this fi nding, or patients may 
simply have found the daily messages to be 
intrusive.
Source: Pop-Eleches and others 2011.
Table B10.1.1 Summary of Program Design
Group Type of message
Frequency of 
message
Number of 
patients
1 Reminder only Weekly 73
2 Reminder + encouragement Weekly 74
3 Reminder only Daily 70
4 Reminder + encouragement Daily 72
5 None (comparison group) None 139
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Evaluating Multiple Interventions
In addition to comparing various levels of treatment, you may want to 
 compare entirely diff erent treatment options. In fact, policy makers usually 
prefer comparing the relative merits of diff erent interventions, rather than 
simply knowing the impact of only a single intervention.
Imagine that you want to evaluate the impact on school attendance of a 
program with two diff erent interventions: cash transfers to the students’ 
families that are conditional on school enrollment and free bus transporta-
tion to school. First, you may want to know the impact of each intervention 
separately. This case is virtually identical to the one where you test diff erent 
levels of treatment of one intervention: instead of randomly assigning units 
to high and low levels of treatments and the comparison group, you could 
randomly assign them to a cash transfers group, a free bus transportation 
group, and the comparison group. In general, with n diff erent interventions, 
there will be n treatment groups plus a comparison group.
Apart from wanting to know the impact of each intervention separately, 
you may also want to know whether the combination of the two is better 
Box 10.2: Testing Program Alternatives for Monitoring Corruption 
in Indonesia
In Indonesia, Olken (2007) used a cross- 
cutting design to test different methods for 
controlling corruption, from a top-down 
enforcement approach to more grassroots 
community monitoring. He used a random-
ized assignment methodology in more than 
600 villages that were building roads as part 
of a nationwide infrastructure improvement 
project.
One of the multiple treatments included 
randomly selecting some villages to be 
informed that their construction project 
would be audited by a government agent. 
Then, to test community participation in 
monitoring, the researchers implemented 
two interventions. They passed out invita-
tions to community accountability meetings, 
and they provided comment forms that could 
be submitted anonymously. To measure the 
levels of corruption, an independent team of 
engineers and surveyors took core samples 
of the new roads, estimated the cost of the 
materials used, and then compared their cal-
culations to the reported budgets.
Olken found that increasing government 
audits (from about a 4 percent chance of 
being audited to a 100 percent chance) 
reduced missing expenditures by about 
8 percentage points (from 24 percent). 
Increasing community participation in moni-
toring had an impact on missing labor but 
not on missing expenditures. The comment 
forms were effective only when they were 
distributed to children at school to give to 
their families and not when handed out by 
the village leaders.
Source: Olken 2007.
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than just the sum of the individual eff ects. Seen from the participants’ point 
of view, the program is available in three diff erent forms: conditional cash 
transfers only, free bus transportation only, or a combination of conditional 
cash transfers and free bus transportation.
Randomized assignment for a program with two interventions is very 
much like the process for a program with a single intervention. The main 
diff erence is the need to conduct several independent lotteries instead of 
one. This produces a crossover design, sometimes called a cross-cutting 
design. Figure 10.2 illustrates this process. As before, step 1 is to deﬁne the 
population of units eligible for the program. Step 2 is to select a random 
sample of eligible units from the population to form the evaluation sample. 
Once you obtain the evaluation sample, step 3 is to randomly assign units 
from the evaluation sample to a treatment group and a comparison group. In 
step 4, you use a second lottery to randomly assign a subset of the treatment 
group to receive the second intervention. Finally, in step 5, you conduct 
another lottery to assign a subset of the initial comparison group to receive 
the second intervention, while the other subset will remain as a pure com-
parison.2 As a result of the randomized assignment to the two treatments, 
you will have created four groups, as illustrated in ﬁgure 10.3.
 • Group A receives both interventions (cash transfers and bus 
transportation).
 • Group B receives intervention 1 but not intervention 2 (cash transfers 
only).
 • Group C does not receive intervention 2 but receives intervention 1 (bus 
transportation only).
 • Group D receives neither intervention 1 nor intervention 2 and consti-
tutes the pure comparison group.
When correctly implemented, randomized assignment ensures that the 
four groups are similar. You can therefore estimate the impact of the ﬁrst 
intervention by comparing the outcome (such as school attendance rate) for 
group B with the outcome for the pure comparison group, group D. You can 
also estimate the impact of the second intervention by comparing the out-
come for group C to the outcome for the pure comparison group, group D. 
In addition, this design also makes it possible to compare the incremental 
impact of receiving the second intervention when a unit already receives 
the ﬁrst one. Comparing the outcomes of group A and group B will yield the 
impact of the second intervention for those units that have already received 
the ﬁrst intervention. Comparing the outcomes of group A and group C will 
yield the impact of the ﬁrst intervention for those units that have already 
received the second intervention.
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Figure 10.2 Steps in Randomized Assignment of Two Interventions
1. Define eligible
units
4. and 5. Randomize
assignment to
2nd treatment
EligibleIneligible
3. Randomize
assignment to
1st treatment
2. Select the
evaluation sample
Figure 10.3 Crossover Design for a Program with Two Interventions
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The foregoing description has used the example of randomized assign-
ment to explain how an impact evaluation can be designed for a program with 
two diff erent interventions. When a program comprises more than two inter-
ventions, the number of lotteries can be increased, and the evaluation can be 
further subdivided to construct groups that receive the various combinations 
of interventions. Designs with multiple treatments and multiple treatment 
levels can also be implemented. Even if the number of groups increases, the 
basic theory behind the design remains the same, as described earlier.
However, evaluating more than one or two interventions will create prac-
tical challenges both for the evaluation and for program operation, as the 
complexity of the design will increase exponentially with the number of 
treatment arms. To evaluate one intervention, only two groups are needed: 
one treatment group and one comparison group. To evaluate two interven-
tions, four groups are needed: three treatment groups and one comparison 
group. If you were to evaluate three interventions, including all possible 
combinations among the three interventions, you would need 2 × 2 × 2 = 8 
groups in the evaluation. In general, for an evaluation that is to include all 
possible combinations among n interventions, 2n groups would be needed. In 
addition, to be able to distinguish diff erences in outcomes among the diff er-
ent groups, each group must contain a suffi  cient number of units of observa-
tion to ensure suffi  cient statistical power. In practice, detecting diff erences 
between diff erent intervention arms may require larger samples than when 
comparing a treatment to a pure comparison. If the two treatment arms are 
successful in causing changes in the desired outcomes, larger samples will be 
required to detect the potentially minor diff erences between the two groups.3
Finally, crossover designs can also be put in place in evaluation designs 
that combine various evaluation methods. The operational rules that guide 
the assignment of each treatment will determine which combination of 
methods has to be used. For instance, it may be that the ﬁrst treatment is 
allocated based on an eligibility score, but the second one is allocated in a 
randomized fashion. In that case, the design can use a regression disconti-
nuity design for the ﬁrst intervention and a randomized assignment method 
for the second intervention.
Additional Resources
 • For accompanying material to the book and hyperlinks to additional resources, 
please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (http://www.worldbank 
.org / ieinpractice).
 • For more information on impact evaluation design with multiple treatment 
options, see Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duﬂo. 2009. “The  Experimental 
 Approach to Development Economics.” Annual Review of  Economics 1: 151–78.
Key Concept
For an evaluation to 
evaluate the impact of 
all possible 
combinations among n 
different interventions, 
you will need a total of 
2n treatment and 
comparison groups.
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Notes
1. See Banerjee and Duﬂo (2009) for a longer discussion.
2. Note that in practice, it is possible to combine the three separate lotteries into 
one and still achieve the same result.
3. Testing the impact of multiple interventions also has a more subtle implication: 
as we increase the number of interventions or levels of treatment that we test 
against one another, we increase the likelihood that we will ﬁ nd an impact in 
at least one of the tests, even if there is no impact. In other words, we are more 
likely to ﬁ nd a false positive result. To prevent this, statistical tests must be 
adjusted to account for multiple hypothesis testing. False positives are also 
referred to as type II errors. See chapter 15 for more information on type II 
errors and references on multiple hypothesis testing.
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Part 3 of this book focuses on how to implement an impact evaluation: how to 
select an impact evaluation method compatible with a program’s operational 
rules; how to manage an impact evaluation, including ensuring a strong partner-
ship between the research and policy teams and managing the time and budget 
for an evaluation; how to ensure that an evaluation is both ethical and credible, 
following principles for working with human subjects and open  science; and 
how to use impact evaluation to inform policy.
Chapter 11 outlines how to use the rules of program operation—namely, a 
program’s available resources, criteria for selecting benefi ciaries, and timing 
for implementation—as the basis for selecting an impact evaluation method. 
A simple framework is set out to determine which of the impact evaluation 
HOW TO IMPLEMENT 
AN IMPACT 
EVALUATION
Part 3
methodologies presented in part 2 is most suitable for a given program, depend-
ing on its operational rules. The chapter further discusses how the preferred 
method is the one that requires the weakest assumptions and has the fewest 
data requirements within the context of the operational rules.
Chapter 12 discusses the relationship between the research and policy teams 
and their respective roles. It reviews the distinction between independence and 
unbiasedness, and highlights areas that may prove to be sensitive in carrying 
out an impact evaluation. The chapter provides guidance on how to manage 
stakeholders’ expectations and highlights some of the common risks involved in 
conducting impact evaluations, as well as suggestions on how to manage those 
risks. The chapter concludes with an overview of how to manage impact evalu-
ation activities, including setting up the evaluation team, timing the evaluation, 
budgeting, and fundraising.
Chapter 13 provides an overview of the ethics and science of impact evaluation, 
including the importance of not denying benefi ts to eligible benefi ciaries for the 
sake of the evaluation; how to apply core principles of ethical research involving 
human subjects; the role of institutional review boards that approve and monitor 
research involving human subjects; and the importance of practicing open sci-
ence, including registering evaluations and making data publically available for 
further research and for replicating results.
Chapter 14 provides insights into how to use impact evaluations to inform pol-
icy, including tips on how to make the results relevant, a discussion of the kinds 
of products that impact evaluations can and should deliver, and guidance on 
how to produce and disseminate fi ndings to maximize policy impact.
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Choosing an Impact Evaluation 
Method
CHAPTER 11
Determining Which Method to Use for a 
Given Program
The key to identifying the causal impact of a program is ﬁnding a valid 
 comparison group to estimate the counterfactual and answer the policy 
question of interest. In part 2, we discussed a number of methods, including 
randomized assignment, instrumental variables, regression discontinuity 
design, diff erence-in-diff erences, and matching. In this chapter, we con-
sider the question of which method to choose for a given program that you 
would like to evaluate.
First, we show that the program’s operational rules provide clear guid-
ance on how to ﬁ nd comparison groups, and thus on which method is 
most appropriate for your policy context. An overarching principle is that, 
if the operational rules of a program are well deﬁ ned, then they can help 
to determine which method is best suited to evaluate that particular 
program. 
Second, the methods introduced in part 2 have diff erent data require-
ments and rely on diff erent underlying assumptions. Some methods require 
stronger assumptions than others to precisely estimate the changes in out-
comes caused by the intervention. In general, we prefer the method that 
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requires the weakest assumptions and has the fewest data requirements 
within the context of the operational rules.
Finally, we discuss how to choose the unit of intervention. For example, 
will the program be assigned at the individual level or at a higher level, such 
as communities or districts? In general, we prefer choosing the smallest unit 
of intervention feasible within operational constraints.
How a Program’s Rules of Operation Can Help 
Choose an Impact Evaluation Method
One of the main messages of this book is that we can use a program’s opera-
tional rules to ﬁ nd valid comparison groups, to the extent that the program 
operational rules are well deﬁ ned. In fact, the rules of program operation 
provide a guide to which method is best suited to evaluate that particular 
program. It is the program rules of operations that can and should drive the 
evaluation method—not vice versa. The evaluation should not drastically 
change key elements of well-deﬁ ned program assignment rules for the sake 
of a cleaner evaluation design.
The operational rules most relevant for the evaluation design are those 
that identify who is eligible for the program and how they are selected for 
participation. Comparison groups come from those that are eligible but 
 cannot be incorporated at a given moment (for example, when there are 
resource constraints and excess demand exists), or those near an eligibility 
threshold for participation in the program.
Principles for Well-Defi ned Program Assignment Rules
When designing prospective impact evaluations, we can almost always ﬁnd 
valid comparison groups if the operational rules for selecting beneﬁciaries 
are equitable, transparent, and accountable:
• Equitable program assignment rules rank or prioritize eligibility based on 
a commonly agreed indicator of need, or stipulate that everyone is off ered 
program beneﬁts or at least has an equal chance of being off ered beneﬁts.
• Transparent program assignment rules are made public, so that outside 
parties can implicitly agree to them and can monitor that they are actually 
followed. Transparent rules should be quantitative and easily observable.
• Accountable rules are the responsibility of program offi  cials, and their 
implementation is the basis of the job performance or rewards of those 
offi  cials.
Key Concept
The operational rules 
of a program 
determine which 
impact evaluation 
method is best suited 
to evaluate that 
program—not vice 
versa.
Key Concept
When designing 
prospective impact 
evaluations, we can 
almost always fi nd 
valid comparison 
groups if the 
operational rules for 
selecting benefi ciaries 
are equitable, 
transparent, and 
accountable.
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The operational rules of eligibility are transparent and accountable 
when programs use quantiﬁable criteria that can be veriﬁed by outside 
parties and when they make those criteria public. Equity, transparency, 
and accountability ensure that eligibility criteria are quantitatively 
veriﬁable and are actually implemented as designed. As such, these prin-
ciples of good governance improve the likelihood that the program will 
actually beneﬁt the target population, and they are also the key to a suc-
cessful evaluation. If the rules are not quantiﬁable and veriﬁable, then the 
evaluation team will have diffi  culty making sure that assignment to treat-
ment and comparison groups happens as designed or, at minimum, docu-
menting how it actually happened. If members of the evaluation team 
cannot actually verify assignment, then they cannot correctly analyze the 
data to calculate impacts. Understanding the program assignment rules is 
critical to selecting a proper impact evaluation method.
When the operational rules violate any of these three principles of good 
governance, we face challenges both in creating a well-designed program 
and in conducting the evaluation. It is diffi  cult to ﬁnd valid comparison 
groups if the rules that determine beneﬁciaries’ eligibility and selection are 
not equitable, transparent, and accountable. In this case, the design of an 
impact evaluation may require clariﬁ cations and adjustments in the way the 
program operates. If the rules are well deﬁ ned, however, the impact evalua-
tion method can be chosen based on the existing program assignment rules, 
as we now discuss in more detail.
Key Operational Rules
Rules of operation typically govern what the program beneﬁts are, how 
those beneﬁ ts are ﬁnanced and distributed, and how the program selects 
beneﬁciaries. The rules governing programs and the selection of beneﬁciaries 
are key to ﬁnding valid comparison groups. The rules governing beneﬁ ciary 
selection cover eligibility, allocation rules in the case of limited resources, 
and the phasing in of beneﬁciaries over time. More speciﬁcally, the key rules 
that generate a road map to ﬁ nd comparison groups answer three funda-
mental operational questions relating to a program’s available resources, 
eligibility criteria, and timing for implementation:
1. Available resources. Does the program have suffi  cient resources to achieve 
scale and reach full coverage of all eligible beneﬁciaries? Governments 
and nongovernmental organizations do not always have suffi  cient 
resources to provide program services to everyone who is  eligible and 
applies for beneﬁts. In that case, the government must decide which 
of  the eligible applicants will receive program beneﬁts and which will 
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not be included. Many times, programs are limited to speciﬁc geographic 
regions, or to a limited number of communities, even though there may 
be eligible beneﬁciaries in other regions or communities.
2. Eligibility criteria. Who is eligible for program beneﬁts? Is the program 
assignment based on an eligibility cutoff , or is it available to everyone? 
Public school and primary health care are usually off ered universally. 
Many programs use operational eligibility rules that rely on a continuous 
ranking with a cutoff  point. For example, pension programs set an age 
limit above which elderly individuals become eligible. Cash transfer pro-
grams often rank households based on their estimated poverty status, 
and households below a predetermined cutoff  are deemed eligible.
3. Timing for implementation. Are potential beneﬁciaries enrolled in the 
program all at once, or in phases over time? Often, administrative and 
resource constraints prevent governments and nongovernmental organi-
zations from immediately providing beneﬁts to the entire eligible popu-
lation. They must roll out their programs over time, and thus must decide 
who gets the beneﬁts ﬁrst and who is incorporated later. A common 
approach is to phase in a program geographically, over time, incorporat-
ing all eligible beneﬁciaries in one village or region before moving to 
the next.
Deriving Comparison Groups from Operational Rules
When designing prospective impact evaluations, answering the three oper-
ational questions largely determines the impact evaluation method that is 
suitable for a given program. Table 11.1 maps the possible comparison groups 
to speciﬁ c program operational rules and the three fundamental operational 
questions related to available resources, eligibility rules, and timing for 
implementation. The columns are split as to whether or not the program 
has suffi  cient resources to cover all potentially eligible beneﬁciaries eventu-
ally (available resources), and are further subdivided into programs that 
have a continuous eligibility ranking and cutoff  and those that do not 
 (eligibility criteria). The rows are divided into phased versus immediate 
implementation of the program (timing for implementation). Each cell lists 
the potential sources of valid comparison groups, along with the related 
chapter in which they were discussed in part 2. Each cell is labeled with an 
index: the initial letter indicates the row in the table (A, B), and the number 
that follows indicates the column (1–4). For example, cell A1 refers to the 
cell in the ﬁrst row and ﬁrst column of the table. For instance, cell A1 
identiﬁes the evaluation methods that are most adequate for programs that 
have limited resources, have eligibility criteria, and are phased in over time.
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Most programs need to be phased in over time because of either ﬁnancing 
constraints or logistical and administrative limitations. This group or cate-
gory covers the ﬁrst row of the chart (cells A1, A2, A3, and A4). In this case, 
the equitable, transparent, and accountable operational rule is to give every 
eligible unit an equal chance of getting the program ﬁrst, second, third, and 
so on, implying randomized rollout of the program over time.
In the cases in which resources are limited—that is, in which there will 
never be enough resources to achieve full scale-up (cells A1 and A2, and B1 
and B2)—excess demand for those resources may emerge very quickly. Then 
a lottery to decide who gets into the program may be a viable approach to 
assign beneﬁ ts among equally eligible units. In this case, each eligible unit 
gets an equal chance to beneﬁt from the program. A lottery is an example 
Table 11.1 Relationship between a Program’s Operational Rules and Impact Evaluation Methods
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Excess demand for program 
(limited resources)
No excess demand for program 
(fully resourced)
Eligibility 
criteria
(1)
Continuous 
eligibility 
ranking and 
cutoff
(2)
No continuous 
eligibility ranking and 
cutoff
(3)
Continuous 
eligibility ranking 
and cutoff
(4)
No continuous 
eligibility ranking and 
cutoff
(A)
Phased 
implemen-
tation over 
time 
Cell A1
Randomized 
assignment 
(chapter 4)
RDD (chapter 6)
Cell A2
Randomized assign-
ment (chapter 4)
Instrumental variables 
(randomized promo-
tion) (chapter 5)
DD (chapter 7)
DD with matching 
(chapter 8)
Cell A3
Randomized 
assignment to 
phases (chapter 4)
RDD (chapter 6)
Cell A4
Randomized assign-
ment to phases 
(chapter 4)
Instrumental variables 
(randomized promo-
tion to early take-up) 
(chapter 5)
DD (chapter 7)
DD with matching 
(chapter 8)
(B)
Immediate 
implemen-
tation 
Cell B1
Randomized 
assignment 
(chapter 4)
RDD (chapter 6)
Cell B2
Randomized assign-
ment (chapter 4)
Instrumental variables 
(randomized promo-
tion) (chapter 5)
DD (chapter 7)
DD with matching 
(chapter 8)
Cell B3
RDD (chapter 6)
Cell B4
If less than full 
take-up:
Instrumental variables 
(randomized promo-
tion) (chapter 5)
DD (chapter 7)
DD with matching 
(chapter 8)
Note: DD = difference-in-differences; RDD = regression discontinuity design.
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of  an equitable, transparent, and accountable operational rule to allocate 
program beneﬁts among eligible units.
Another class of programs comprises those that are phased in over time 
and for which administrators can rank the potential beneﬁciaries by need 
(cells A1 and A3). If the criteria used to prioritize the beneﬁciaries are quan-
titative and available and have a cutoff  for eligibility, the program can use a 
regression discontinuity design.
The other broad category consists of programs that have the administra-
tive capability to be implemented immediately: that is, the cells in the bot-
tom row of the chart. When the program has limited resources and is not 
able to rank beneﬁciaries (cell B2), then randomized assignment based 
on excess demand could be used. If the program has suffi  cient resources to 
achieve scale and no eligibility criteria (cell B4), then the only solution is to 
use instrumental variables (randomized promotion), under the assumption 
of less than full take-up of the program. If the program can rank beneﬁciaries 
and relies on eligibility criteria, regression discontinuity design can be used.
Prioritizing Benefi ciaries
All three key operational questions relate to the critical issue of how 
beneﬁciaries are selected, which is crucial to ﬁ nd valid comparison groups. 
Comparison groups are sometimes found among the ineligible populations, 
and more frequently among the populations that are eligible but are incor-
porated into the program later. How beneﬁciaries are prioritized depends in 
part on the objectives of the program. Is it a pension program for the elderly, 
a poverty alleviation program targeted to the poor, or an immunization pro-
gram available to everyone?
To prioritize beneﬁciaries based on need, the program must ﬁ nd an 
 indicator that is both quantiﬁable and veriﬁable. In practice, feasibility of 
prioritization depends largely on the ability of the government to measure 
and rank need. If the government can accurately rank beneﬁciaries based on 
relative need, it may feel ethically obligated to roll out the program in order 
of need. However, ranking based on need requires not only a quantiﬁable 
measure, but also the ability and resources to measure that indicator for 
each unit that could participate in the program.
Some programs use selection criteria that could in principle be used to 
rank relative need and determine eligibility. For example, many programs 
seek to reach poor individuals. However, accurate poverty indicators that 
reliably rank households are often hard to measure and costly to collect. 
Collecting income or consumption data on all potential beneﬁciaries to rank 
them by poverty level is a complex and costly process, which would also be 
hard to verify. Instead, many programs use some sort of proxy means test 
Choosing an Impact Evaluation Method 193
to estimate poverty levels. These are indexes of simple observable measures 
such as assets and sociodemographic characteristics (Grosh and others 
2008). Proxy means tests can help determine reasonably well whether a 
household is above or below some gross cutoff , but they may be less precise 
in providing a detailed ranking of socioeconomic status or need. 
Rather than confront the cost and complexity of ranking potential indi-
vidual beneﬁ ciaries, many programs choose to rank at a higher level of 
aggregation, such as at the community level. Determining program assign-
ment at an aggregate level has obvious operational beneﬁts, but it is often 
diffi  cult to ﬁ nd indicators to achieve a ranking of needs at a more aggre-
gate level. 
In cases when a program cannot reliably assign beneﬁ ts based on need, 
because a quantiﬁ able and veriﬁ able ranking indicator either is not avail-
able or is too costly and prone to error, other criteria need to be used to 
decide how to sequence program rollout. One criterion that is consistent 
with good governance is equity. An equitable rule would be to give every-
one who is eligible an equal chance of going ﬁrst, and as such to randomly 
assign a place in the sequence to potential beneﬁ ciaries. In practice, given 
the  challenges in ranking need, randomized assignment of program bene-
ﬁ ts is a commonly used program assignment rule. It is a fair and equitable 
 allocation rule. It also produces a randomized evaluation design that can 
provide good internal validity if implemented well, and it can rely on 
weaker assumptions compared with the other methods, as discussed in the 
next section.
A Comparison of Impact Evaluation Methods
After assessing which impact evaluation method is suitable for speciﬁ c pro-
gram operational rules, the evaluation team can choose the method that has 
the weakest assumption and fewest data requirements. Table 11.2 provides a 
comparison of the alternative impact evaluation methods in terms of the 
data requirements to implement them, and the underlying assumptions 
necessary to interpret their results as causal impacts of the intervention. 
Each row represents a separate method. The ﬁ rst two columns describe the 
methods and the units that are in the comparison group. The last two col-
umns report the assumptions needed to interpret the results as causal and 
the data needed to implement the methods.
All methods require assumptions; that is, to be able to interpret results as 
causal, we must believe facts to be true that we cannot always fully verify 
empirically. In particular, for each method, one key assumption is that the 
mean of the comparison group on which the method relies is a valid 
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estimate of the counterfactual. In each of the chapters on methods in part 2, 
we discussed some considerations of how to test whether a method is valid 
in a particular context. Some methods rely on stronger assumptions than 
others.
All other things equal, the method that best ﬁ ts the operational context, 
and that requires the weakest assumptions and the least data, is the pre-
ferred method. These criteria explain why researchers settle on random-
ized assignment as the gold standard, and why it is often the preferred 
method. Randomized assignment ﬁ ts many operational contexts, and it 
tends  to generate internally valid impact estimates under the weakest 
assumptions. When properly implemented, it generates comparability 
between the  treatment and comparison groups in observed and unob-
served characteristics. In addition, randomized assignment tends to 
require smaller samples than the samples needed to implement quasi-
experimental methods (see discussion in chapter 15). Because randomized 
assignment is fairly intuitive, the method also makes it straightforward to 
communicate results to policy makers.
Quasi-experimental methods may be more suitable in some operational 
contexts, but they require more assumptions in order for the compari-
son  group to provide a valid estimate of the counterfactual. For example, 
 diff erence-in-diff erences relies on the assumption that changes in outcomes 
in the comparison group provide a valid estimate of the counterfactual 
changes in outcomes for the treatment group. This assumption that the out-
comes in the treatment and comparison groups grow in parallel over time is 
not always possible to test without multiple waves of data before the interven-
tion. Regression discontinuity relies on comparability of units just below and 
just above the eligibility threshold. Matching has the strongest assumptions of 
all methods, as it essentially assumes away any unobserved characteristics 
between program participants and nonparticipants. Overall, the stronger the 
assumptions, the higher the risk for them not to hold in practice.
A Backup Plan for Your Evaluation
Sometimes things do not go exactly as planned, even with the best impact 
evaluation design and the best intentions. In one job training program, for 
example, the implementation agency planned to randomly select partici-
pants from the pool of applicants, based on the expected oversubscription to 
the program. Because unemployment among the target population was 
high, it was anticipated that the pool of applicants for the job training pro-
gram would be much larger than the number of places available. 
Unfortunately, advertisement for the program was not as eff ective as 
expected, and in the end, the number of applicants was just below the 
Key Concept
The preferred impact 
evaluation method is 
the one that best fi ts 
the operational 
context, requires the 
weakest assumptions, 
and has the fewest 
data requirements.
Choosing an Impact Evaluation Method 197
number of training slots available. Without oversubscription from which to 
draw a comparison group, and with no backup plan in place, the initial 
attempt to evaluate the program had to be dropped entirely. This kind of 
situation is common, as are unanticipated changes in the operational or 
political context of a program. Therefore, it is useful to have a backup plan 
in case the ﬁrst choice of methodology does not work out.
Planning to use several impact evaluation methods is also good prac-
tice from a methodological point of view. If you have doubts about 
whether one of your methods may have remaining bias, you will be able 
to check the results against the other method. When a program is imple-
mented in a randomized rollout, the comparison group will eventually 
be incorporated into the program. That limits the time during which 
the comparison group is available for the evaluation. If, however, in addi-
tion to the randomized assignment design, a randomized promotion 
design is also implemented, then a comparison group will be available 
for the entire duration of the program. Before the ﬁnal group of the roll-
out is incorporated, two alternative comparison groups will exist (from 
the randomized assignment and the randomized promotion), though in 
the longer term only the randomized promotion comparison group will 
remain.
Finding the Smallest Feasible Unit of 
Intervention
In general, the rules of operation also determine the level at which an inter-
vention is assigned, which relates to the way the program is implemented. 
For example, if a health program is implemented at the district level, then all 
villages in the district would either receive the program (as a group) or not 
receive it. Some programs can be effi  ciently implemented at the individual 
or household level, whereas others need to be implemented at a community 
or higher administrative level. Even if a program can be assigned and imple-
mented at the individual level, the evaluation research team may prefer a 
higher level of aggregation in order to mitigate potential spillovers, that is, 
indirect eff ects from participating to nonparticipating units (see discussion 
in chapter 9).
Implementing an intervention at a higher level can be problematic for 
the evaluation for two main reasons. First, evaluations of interventions 
assigned and implemented at higher levels, such as the community or 
administrative district, require larger sample sizes and will be more costly 
compared with evaluations of interventions at a lower level, such as at the 
individual or household level. The level of intervention is important because 
198 Impact Evaluation in Practice
it deﬁnes the unit of assignment to the treatment and comparison groups, 
and that has implications for the size of the evaluation sample and its cost. 
For interventions implemented at higher levels, a larger sample is needed to 
be able to detect the program’s true impact. The intuition behind this will be 
discussed in  chapter 15, which reviews how to determine the sample size 
required for an evaluation and discusses how implementation at higher lev-
els creates clusters that increase the required sample size.
Second, at higher levels of intervention, it is harder to ﬁnd a suffi  cient 
number of units to include in the evaluation. Yet randomized assignment 
only generates comparable treatment and comparison groups if it is per-
formed among a suffi  cient number of units. For example, if the level of 
aggregation is at the province level and the country has only six provinces, 
then randomization is unlikely to achieve balance between the treatment 
and comparison groups. In this case, say that the evaluation design allocates 
three states to the treatment group and three to the comparison group. It is 
very unlikely that the states in the treatment group would be similar to the 
comparison group, even if the number of households within each state is 
large. This is because the key to balancing the treatment and comparison 
groups is the number of units assigned to the treatment and comparison 
groups, not the number of individuals or households in the sample. 
Therefore, performing randomized assignment at high levels of implemen-
tation creates risks for internal validity if the number of units is not 
suffi  cient.
To avoid the risks associated with implementing an intervention at a high 
geographical or administrative level, the evaluation team and program man-
agers need to work together to ﬁnd the smallest unit of intervention that is 
operationally feasible. Various factors determine the smallest feasible unit 
of intervention:
• Economies of scale and administrative complexity in the delivery of the 
program
• Administrative ability to assign beneﬁts at the individual or household 
level
• Potential concerns about possible tensions
• Potential concerns about spillovers and contamination of the compari-
son group.
The smallest feasible unit of intervention typically depends on economies 
of scale and the administrative complexity of delivering the program. 
For  example, a health insurance program may require a local offi  ce for 
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beneﬁciaries to submit claims and to pay providers. The ﬁxed costs of the 
offi  ce need to be spread over a large number of beneﬁciaries, so it might be 
ineffi  cient to roll out the program at the individual level and more effi  cient 
to do so at the community level. However, in situations with new and 
untested types of interventions, it may be worth absorbing short-run inef-
ﬁ ciencies and rolling out the program within administrative districts, so as 
to better ensure credibility of the evaluation and lower the costs of data 
collection.
Some program managers argue that locally administered programs, such 
as health insurance programs, do not have the administrative capabilities to 
implement programs at the individual level. They worry that it would be a 
burden to set up systems to deliver diff erent beneﬁts to diff erent beneﬁciaries 
within local administrative units, and that it may be challenging to guaran-
tee that the assignment of treatment and comparison groups will be imple-
mented as designed. The latter issue is a serious threat for an impact 
evaluation, as program managers may not be able to implement the pro-
gram consistently with an evaluation design. In this case, implementation 
at a higher level or simpliﬁ cation of the impact evaluation design may be 
necessary.
Sometimes governments prefer to implement programs at more aggre-
gate levels, such as the community, because they worry about potential ten-
sions when members of the comparison group observe neighbors in the 
treatment group getting beneﬁts. Many programs have been successfully 
implemented at the individual or household level within communities with-
out generating tensions, in particular when beneﬁts have been assigned in an 
equitable, transparent, and accountable way. Still, the risk that tensions may 
arise needs to be considered in the context of a speciﬁ c impact evaluation.
Finally, when a program is assigned and implemented at a very low level, 
such as the household or individual level, contamination of the comparison 
group may compromise the internal validity of the evaluation. For example, 
say that you are evaluating the eff ect of providing tap water on households’ 
health. If you install the taps for a household but not for its neighbor, the 
treatment household may well share the use of the tap with a comparison 
neighbor; the neighboring household then would not be a true comparison, 
since it would beneﬁt from a spillover eff ect.
Box 11.1 illustrates the implications of the choice of implementation level 
of intervention in the context of cash transfer programs. In practice, pro-
gram managers therefore need to choose the smallest feasible unit of 
 intervention that (1) allows a large enough number of units for the evalua-
tion, (2) mitigates the risks to internal validity, and (3) ﬁts the operational 
context.
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Additional Resources
• For accompanying material to the book and hyperlinks to additional resources, 
please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (http://www.worldbank 
.org / ieinpractice).
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Box 11.1: Cash Transfer Programs and the Minimum Level of 
Intervention
The majority of conditional cash transfers 
use communities as the unit or level of 
 intervention, for administrative and program 
design reasons, as well as out of concern 
about spillovers and potential tensions in the 
community if treatment were to be assigned 
at a lower level.
For example, the evaluation of Mexico’s 
conditional cash transfer program, Progresa/
Oportunidades, relied on the rollout of the 
program at the community level in rural 
areas to randomly assign communities to 
the treatment and comparison groups. All 
eligible households in the treatment com-
munities were offered the opportunity to 
enroll in the program in spring 1998, and 
all eligible households in the comparison 
communities were offered the same oppor-
tunity 18 months later, in winter 1999. 
However, the evaluation team found sub-
stantial correlation in outcomes between 
households within communities. Therefore, 
to generate suffi cient statistical power for 
the evaluation, they needed more house-
holds in the sample than would have been 
needed if they had been able to assign indi-
vidual households to the treatment and 
comparison groups. The impossibility of 
implementing the program at the household 
level therefore led to larger sample size 
requirements and increased the cost of 
the evaluation. Similar constraints apply to 
many programs in the human development 
sector.
Sources: Behrman and Hoddinott 2001; Skoufi as and McClafferty 2001.
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CHAPTER 12
Managing an Evaluation’s Team, Time, and 
Budget
An evaluation is a partnership between a policy team and a research 
team. Each group depends on the other for the success of the evaluation. 
Together, they constitute the evaluation team. The partnership is based 
on an understanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of the 
two teams, a joint commitment to the evaluation, and a recognition of 
what motivates people’s work on the evaluation. An eff ective partner-
ship is critical to ensuring the technical credibility and policy impact of 
an evaluation.
This chapter outlines elements of an eff ective partnership, including 
the roles and responsibilities of each team. It explores how the partnership 
works at diff erent stages of the evaluation process and reviews alternative 
models for collaboration. The chapter also addresses practical questions of 
timing and budgeting.
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Roles and Responsibilities of the Research and 
Policy Teams
The Research Team: Research Function and Data Function
The research team is responsible for the technical quality and scientiﬁ c 
integrity of the evaluation work. Its responsibilities encompass research 
design, data quality, and analysis. Research teams typically comprise the 
 following people:
 • The principal investigator works with policy makers and program 
 implementers to establish the key objectives, policy questions, indica-
tors, and information needs of the evaluation (often using a theory of 
change as depicted by a results chain); determine the impact evaluation 
methodology; develop the evaluation plan; identify the research team; 
register the impact evaluation; obtain approvals from the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB); prepare an evaluation plan, including a more 
detailed preanalysis plan; lead the analysis of results; and engage with 
the policy team to disseminate results. The principal investigator needs 
to be able to work eff ectively with the full evaluation team, including the 
organization in charge of data collection, other members of the research 
team, and policy makers or program implementers who use the data and 
the results of the evaluation. A number of researchers may work with the 
principal investigator or as co-principal investigators to lead or support 
speciﬁ c analytical work on elements, such as sampling, qualitative assess-
ment, or cost-eff ectiveness analysis.
 • An evaluation manager or ﬁ eld coordinator works directly with the prin-
cipal investigator on the day-to-day implementation of the evaluation. 
This includes working with program implementers and policy makers on 
the policy team and overseeing ﬁ eldwork when primary data are being 
collected. This person is particularly important in cases where the prin-
cipal investigator is not based locally, where a prospective evaluation is 
being applied that needs to be closely coordinated with program imple-
mentation, or where primary data are being collected.
 • A sampling expert guides work on power calculations and sampling. 
For the type of quantitative impact evaluation covered in this book, the 
sampling expert should be able to carry out power calculations to deter-
mine the appropriate sample sizes for the indicators established; select 
the sample; review the results of the actual sample versus the designed 
sample; and provide advice on implications for the analysis in line with 
the preanalysis plan. The principal investigator often performs these 
functions directly or together with the sampling expert.
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 • A data collection team is responsible for developing data collection 
 instruments and accompanying manuals and codebooks; collecting, 
 digitizing, and cleaning the data; and delivering a clean and documented 
data set, when primary data collection is required. Chapter 16 discusses 
data sources and various aspects of data collection.
The Policy Team: Policy Function and Program Management 
Function
The policy team consists of policy makers and program implementers:
 • Policy makers set the research agenda, identify the core study question to 
be addressed, ensure adequate resources are available for the work, and 
apply the results to policy. At the outset of the evaluation, they need to 
clearly articulate the objectives of both the program and the evaluation, 
as well as the theory of change and the main indicators of interest, includ-
ing the minimum policy-relevant eff ect size for the outcome indicators of 
interest, as outlined in chapter 2. The policy team has the knowledge of 
the policy dialogue and contacts with key stakeholders to ensure that the 
evaluation is designed to be as policy-relevant as possible, and to ensure 
that the appropriate stakeholders and decision makers are engaged at 
key points in the evaluation process.
 • Program implementers work hand in hand with the research team to 
align the evaluation design and program implementation. This includes 
verifying that the evaluation design is based on accurate information 
about the program’s operation, and committing to implement the pro-
gram as planned, in the case of prospective evaluations. Program imple-
menters on the policy team also typically manage the evaluation budget 
and are often engaged in helping the research team supervise ﬁ eldwork 
for data collection.
Who Cares about the Evaluation and Why?
From the perspective of the policy team, the primary interest is usually to 
know whether or not the program or reform is eff ective, and at what cost the 
results were achieved, thereby allowing the team to make policy decisions on 
the basis of the evidence produced. The local program implementers will be 
interested in ensuring that their eff orts are valued and that they get credit 
and visibility for their work, which often reaches beyond the boundaries of 
their day-to-day responsibilities. A good way to value these contributions is 
to ensure that local teams are actively engaged in the broader range of evalu-
ation activities. This can be done by holding joint workshops, as well as by 
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issuing joint publications, ensuring training and capacity building, and engag-
ing local researchers who are well placed to contribute substantively and can 
serve as an important conduit between the research and policy teams.
Evaluations have value in terms of a public good when they inform a 
question of interest beyond the immediate interest of the policy team. This 
aspect is often of primary interest to researchers exploring fundamental 
questions pertaining to a theory of change. For example, results concerning 
how people behave under certain circumstances or how transmission chan-
nels function, allowing impacts to be achieved, can allow more general les-
sons to be drawn and applied in diff erent settings. Impact evaluations are 
rapidly contributing to a global evidence base on the performance of a range 
of program and policy reforms, constituting repositories of knowledge 
highly relevant to program and policy design. Donors and policy institutes 
are often interested in this broader public good value and are increasingly 
providing ﬁ nancial support to conduct evaluations that contribute to this 
evidence base.
Researchers will also be very committed to the use of a robust, defensible 
evaluation methodology and will want to ensure that they are engaged in 
the design of the impact evaluation, in the analysis of the data, and in the 
generation of primary research that meets scientiﬁ c standards for publica-
tion in academic journals. Interdisciplinary research teams have an added 
challenge of ensuring that there is a common understanding among team 
 members. Diff erent disciplines, such as medicine and economics, may have 
diff erent approaches to registering trials, engaging subjects, reporting 
results, or disseminating results, for example. These diff erent expectations 
are best clariﬁ ed and understood at the outset of an evaluation. Regardless 
of diff erent protocols, research teams are expected to follow generally 
accepted scientiﬁ c norms and ethical principles, discussed in chapter 13.
The diff erent interests of the policy team and the research team can 
 create tensions that need to be understood and managed. Researchers tend 
to value technical rigor in the evaluation design over the operational feasi-
bility of program implementation. The teams may also be interested 
in somewhat diff erent evaluation questions. Finally, neither team may be 
interested in publishing nuanced or negative results, as this may reﬂ ect 
poorly on the program performance for the policy team and may be of less 
academic interest to the research team. The policy team may also be inter-
ested in being selective about which results are released, whereas the 
research team will value highly the ability to publish the full range of results.
For the evaluation team as a whole, fostering a culture of transparency 
and respect for evidence is critical. Policy makers and program managers 
should be rewarded for their commitments to evidence-based policy mak-
ing. Even when results are not favorable, these actors should be credited for 
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having championed transparency. Likewise, the research team should be 
encouraged to report on and publish results, regardless of the ﬁ ndings.
The Research and Policy Team Partnership during the Evaluation
The technical quality and policy impact of the evaluation depend on an 
active partnership between the research team and the policy team at each 
stage in the evaluation: design, implementation, analysis, and dissemina-
tion. Box 12.1 summarizes some guiding principles.
Design stage. First, the policy makers need to clearly structure and con-
vey the core research questions, the accompanying theory of change, and 
the core indicators of interest, and ensure that the research team has a good 
understanding of and respect for these elements. To ensure policy relevance, 
the policy team also needs to take the lead in structuring an engagement 
strategy that will ensure that the necessary stakeholders are consulted and 
informed about the design, implementation, and results of the evaluation. 
For their part, researchers need to clarify for the policy team the necessary 
conditions for good impact evaluations. In the case of prospective evalua-
tions, this will ﬁ rst involve verifying with the program implementers and 
policy makers in the policy team that program operations are well enough 
established to ensure that the program being evaluated will not change a 
great deal during the evaluation—and thus will not render the results irrel-
evant for policy purposes. The “sweet spot” for conducting an impact evalu-
ation is often the point at which the program has been ﬁ eld tested enough to 
establish that it is operating in the manner intended—which can be informed 
Box 12.1: Guiding Principles for Engagement between the Policy 
and Evaluation Teams
• Engage early to maximize evaluation design options and ensure an effective partnership 
between the policy and evaluation teams.
• Have a clear impact evaluation plan at the outset.
• Understand roles, responsibilities, and motivations of the various stakeholders and give 
them a stake in the evaluation.
• Stay engaged throughout the evaluation to ensure the proper alignment between the 
evaluation and the intervention being evaluated.
• Acknowledge and manage risks and benefi ts, being clear about what impact evaluations 
can and cannot do.
• Value transparency and ensure objectivity and be prepared to respect the results, good 
or bad.
206 Impact Evaluation in Practice
by a good process evaluation—but has not been expanded, thereby leaving 
more options to construct appropriate counterfactuals.
Second, the research team needs to clearly understand the program’s 
rules of operation: namely, its available resources, eligibility criteria for 
selecting beneﬁ ciaries, and timing for implementation. The policy team 
should clearly convey these three rules of operation to the research team, as 
these are fundamental to informing the methodological options available in 
the evaluation, as detailed in chapter 11.
Third, the research team should prepare an impact evaluation plan that 
contains both operational and research aspects, and share this with policy 
makers to ensure that the evaluation is focused on the questions of inter-
est; that elements of collaboration with the policy team are outlined; and 
that the evaluation team is clear and straightforward about the  questions 
being asked and the nature and timing of the results (see box 12.2). It is 
also useful to consider risks and proposed mitigation strategies. Finally, 
the research team should obtain ethical approval from an institutional 
review board and register the evaluation in a trial registry (see chapter 13).
This dialogue during the design stage should result in a clear, shared 
commitment to an evaluation plan, with realistic expectations and mutually 
agreed upon responsibilities for members of the policy and research teams. 
This dialogue provides an opportunity for the research team to clarify both 
the value of an impact evaluation—notably the establishment of causality 
and the generalizability of the ﬁ ndings—and its limitations, such as not 
 providing insights into why certain results are obtained, trade-off s with 
sample sizes and power calculations, or the time involved in generating cer-
tain results. This dialogue also provides the opportunity for the policy team 
to specify priority questions and to ensure that the evaluation is well aligned 
with policy questions of interest.
Implementation stage. The policy and research teams need to work together 
to ensure that implementation proceeds smoothly and to troubleshoot. 
For example, in a randomized controlled trial, the teams need to agree on the 
best way to randomize in practice. In addition, during this stage, coordination 
is especially important to ensure ﬁ delity between the evaluation design and 
program implementation.
Analysis stage. The analysis that is carried out should correspond to 
what is outlined in the evaluation plan and in the more detailed pre- 
analysis plan. The research team should provide and discuss results with 
the policy team at key junctures. As early as the baseline, this should 
include a review of the quality of the data collected and adherence to the 
evaluation plan. This will help ensure that the evaluation plan envisioned 
in the design stage remains feasible and allow any necessary adjustments 
to be made. This is also an excellent opportunity to review which products 
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will be delivered at which stage of the analysis and to see whether the 
 production of those results is on track with respect to the policy team’s 
decision-making needs. Once the evaluation team has concluded the 
impact analysis, the initial results should be presented and shared with 
the policy team to ensure that any questions are answered and to prepare 
the dissemination stage.
Dissemination stage. In this stage, the policy team needs to ensure that 
the evaluation results reach the right people at the right time in an appropri-
ate format. This is also the stage to ensure that all the data from the evalua-
tion are appropriately documented. Often teams will engage multiple 
strategies and vehicles to disseminate results, keeping in mind the diff erent 
target audiences, as discussed in chapter 14.
Box 12.2: General Outline of an Impact Evaluation Plan
 1. Introduction
 2. Description of the intervention
 3. Objectives of the evaluation
 3.1 Hypotheses, theory of change, results chain
 3.2 Policy questions
 3.3 Key outcome indicators
 3.4 Risks
 4. Evaluation design
 5. Sampling and data
 5.1 Sampling strategy
 5.2 Power calculations
 6. Preanalysis plan overview
 7. Data collection plan
 7.1 Baseline survey
 7.2 Follow-up survey(s)
 8. Products to be delivered
 8.1 Baseline report
 8.2 Impact evaluation report
 8.3 Policy brief
 8.4 Fully documented data sets, design and analysis protocols
 9. Dissemination plan
10. Ethical protocols on protection of human subjects
 10.1 Ensuring informed consent
 10.2 Obtaining approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
11. Time line
12. Budget and funding
13. Composition and roles of evaluation team
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Establishing Collaboration
How to Set Up a Partnership
An evaluation is a balance between the technical expertise and indepen-
dence contributed by the research team and the policy relevance, strategic 
guidance, and operational coordination contributed by the policy makers 
and program implementers on the policy team. A range of models can be 
used to set up and implement this partnership between the research and 
policy teams.
The choice of modality will depend on the context and objectives of 
the impact evaluation, as well as on the consideration of a range of risks. 
On the one  hand, a fully independent research team with limited col-
laboration with the policy team may deliver an impact evaluation that is 
disconnected from the policy questions of interest or that uses a meth-
odology constrained by  insuffi  cient interactions with program imple-
menters. On the other hand, a  research team fully integrated with the 
policy team may create risks of conﬂ icts of interest or lead to the censor-
ship of some results if open science  principles are not applied (see 
 chapter 13). In addition, evaluations can often have multiple goals, 
including building evaluation capacity within government agencies and 
sensitizing program operators to the realities of their projects as they are 
carried out in the ﬁeld. These broader goals may also partly determine 
the model to be chosen.
Overall, what matters most for the quality of the impact evaluation 
is  whether the partnership approach will produce unbiased estimates of 
program impacts. As long as principles of research ethics and open science 
are respected, unbiasedness and objectivity tend to be more critical to the 
quality of the impact evaluation than the functional independence of 
the research and policy teams. In practice, close collaboration between the 
research and policy teams is often needed to ensure that the highest-quality 
impact evaluation strategy is put in place.
The Outsourcing Model
For busy program implementers managing complex operations, vesting an 
outside team with the responsibility of designing and implementing 
the impact evaluation is often appealing. Outsourcing models can take dif-
ferent forms. Program managers sometimes outsource the design of the 
impact evaluation, as well as the implementation of the various  surveys 
(typically, a baseline and follow-up survey), to a single entity in a wide-rang-
ing contract. In other cases, program managers ﬁ rst outsource the design, 
and follow with contracts for various phases of data collection and analysis.
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Outsourcing creates separation between the design and implementation 
of the impact evaluation, which can make the impact evaluation more inde-
pendent. However, fully outsourcing the impact evaluation can come with 
substantial risks. The establishment of this kind of contractual relationship 
can limit the collaboration between the program implementation and con-
tracted research teams.
In some cases, the contracted team is given a set of previously deﬁ ned 
program parameters, with little margin to discuss design and implementa-
tion plans or the scope for shaping the research. In other cases, the program 
rules and implementation modalities needed to design a good impact evalu-
ation may not be deﬁ ned. In such cases, the contracted team in charge of 
the impact evaluation has limited inﬂ uence in ensuring that these elements 
are deﬁ ned.
In still other cases, the program may already have been designed or 
implementation may have begun, which can severely constrain method-
ological options for the evaluation. The contracted team is often asked to 
adjust to changes in program implementation ex post, without being closely 
involved or informed during implementation. These situations can lead to 
suboptimal evaluation designs or to challenges during implementation, as 
the contracted team may have diff erent motivations from the researchers 
and policy makers who have led the design of the evaluation.
Lastly, the selection and oversight of the contracted team can be chal-
lenging for the program implementation unit. Procurement rules must be 
carefully considered up front to ensure that the outsourcing is effi  cient and 
does not present conﬂ icts of interest. Certain rules may limit the possibility 
that a team contracted to contribute to the design of the impact evaluation 
can later bid on its implementation.
To mitigate these risks, it is generally preferable for the policy team to 
already have an impact evaluation design in place, including an identiﬁ ca-
tion strategy, core outcome indicators, initial power calculations, and 
approximate sample sizes. This will help guide the procurement and con-
tracting, since these elements strongly aff ect evaluation budgets. The policy 
team should also establish mechanisms to ensure strong technical oversight 
of the design and implementation of the impact evaluation. This could be 
through an oversight committee or through regular technical and scientiﬁ c 
review of impact evaluation products. Taken together, these mitigation mea-
sures suggest that the most eff ective model is usually not a full outsourcing 
model.
The Partnership Model
The collaboration between the research and policy teams is not necessarily 
built solely on contractual relationships. Mutually beneﬁ cial partnerships 
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can be put in place when researchers are interested in conducting research 
on a policy question and when policy makers and program implementers 
are  seeking to ensure that a good-quality impact evaluation is set up in their 
project. Researchers have incentives to address new questions that will add 
to the global evidence base, and to push the envelope of the impact evalua-
tion and contribute to its broader visibility. The research team may be able 
to leverage some coﬁ nancing for the impact evaluation if the objectives of 
funders are closely aligned with the research focus of the evaluation.
Another type of integrated model that is becoming more prominent, 
especially in larger institutions, including the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank, uses in-house impact evaluation research 
capacity to support policy and program teams.
The partnership approach presents certain risks. At times, researchers 
may seek to incorporate novel research elements in the impact evaluation 
that may not be fully aligned to the immediate policy objectives at the local 
level, although they can add value more globally. For their part, policy mak-
ers and program implementers may not always appreciate the scientiﬁ c 
rigor needed to undertake rigorous impact evaluations, and they may have a 
higher tolerance than the research team with respect to potential risks to 
the impact evaluation.
To mitigate those risks the objectives of the research team and policy 
teams need to be closely aligned. For instance, the research and policy 
teams can work together up front on a thorough evaluation plan outlining a 
detailed strategy as well as the respective teams’ roles and responsibilities 
(see box 12.2). The impact evaluation plan is also a place to highlight key 
operational rules, as well as potential operational risks to the implementa-
tion of the impact evaluation.
A mutual commitment to an impact evaluation as embodied in a clear 
evaluation plan is essential for the partnership to work smoothly, even if a 
contractual relationship is not put in place. It is good practice for this mutual 
commitment to take the form of a written agreement—for instance, in the 
form of terms of reference or a memorandum of understanding—to estab-
lish the roles, responsibilities, and products of the impact evaluation. Such 
aspects can also be included in the impact evaluation plan.
The Fully Integrated Model
Some impact evaluations are implemented in a fully integrated model where 
the research and program implementation teams are one and the same. 
This approach is sometimes taken in effi  cacy trials, where new interven-
tions are being tested for the proof of concept. In this case, researchers 
 generally prefer to maintain control over implementation to ensure that 
the  program is implemented as closely as possible to its original design. 
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While such impact evaluations are best able to test underlying theories and 
to establish whether a given intervention can work in ideal circumstances, 
the risk is that the results may have limited external validity.
Box 12.3 presents some examples of diff erent models that research and 
policy teams can use to collaborate.
Box 12.3: Examples of Research–Policy Team Models
Outsourcing Evaluations at the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation
The Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC), a U.S. aid agency, was established in 
2004 with a strong emphasis on accountabil-
ity and results. It requires each of its devel-
opment programs to have a comprehensive 
monitoring and evaluation plan, with a focus 
on unbiased and independent evaluations. 
This focus led MCC to develop a model 
where both the design and implementation 
of evaluations are fully outsourced to exter-
nal researchers. In the early years of MCC’s 
operations, the separation between the pro-
gram staff and the external researchers con-
tracted for the evaluation sometimes created 
issues. For example, in Honduras, research-
ers designed a randomized controlled trial of 
a farmer training program. However, as the 
implementation contract was performance 
based, the implementer had a strong incen-
tive to fi nd high-performing farmers for the 
program. Eligible farmers were not randomly 
assigned into the program, invalidating the 
evaluation design. With the release of the 
fi rst fi ve evaluations of farmer training pro-
grams, MCC refl ected on experiences like 
these and concluded that collaboration 
between implementers and evaluators is 
critical throughout design and implementa-
tion. The organization adapted its model to 
be more selective when applying impact 
evaluations in order to strike a balance 
between accountability and learning.
Integration at Innovations for Poverty 
Action
At Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), a U.S.- 
based nonprofi t organization, the researcher 
and policy teams work hand in hand from 
the very start of the evaluation design, and 
often from the time the program originates. 
IPA’s model relies on an extensive network of 
fi eld offi ces, many of which have existing 
relationships with government agencies 
and other implementing partners. From the 
time an evaluation is fi rst conceived, IPA-
affi liated researchers from a global network 
of universities work with country directors at 
relevant fi eld offi ces to create an  evaluation 
design and implementation plan. Country 
directors are responsible for leading partner 
relationships and matching principal investi-
gators on the research team with program 
partners on the policy team to develop a pro-
posal for an evaluation. Once a proposal has 
been approved, they hire project manage-
ment staff to lead the data  collection on the 
ground, all housed at the IPA fi eld offi ce. 
Coordination between the researchers and 
the program implementers is generally close, 
and in some cases, IPA offi ces are also 
responsible for implementing the interven-
tion being evaluated.
Partnership Models at the World Bank
In the past decade, the World Bank has 
 rapidly scaled up the use of prospective 
impact evaluations to assess the impacts 
(continued)
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of some of the development projects it 
fi nances. Several groups—including DIME 
(Development Impact Evaluation), SIEF 
(Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund), and GIL 
(Gender Innovation Lab)—provide funding 
and technical support to impact evaluations. 
When a particularly innovative or high-stakes 
project is put in place, impact evaluation 
activities are set up, either embedded in the 
project and managed by counterpart govern-
ments, or as independent activities managed 
by the World Bank. Either way, an evaluation 
team is put in place, consisting of a research 
team, including a mix of technical experts 
and academics, and a policy team, typically 
including policy makers, program implement-
ers, and project operational team leaders.
For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, a joint initia-
tive between the World Bank, the Abdul Latif 
Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), and the 
government evaluated a Youth Employment 
and Skills Development Project. An evaluation 
team was put together, including a research 
team composed of a World Bank team leader, 
international academics, and local experts, 
and a policy team including specialists from 
the project implementing unit, the affi liated 
ministry, and World Bank staff. The evaluation 
team identifi ed priority areas for impact evalu-
ation. A prospective randomized controlled 
trial was put in place. The government shaped 
key questions and fi nanced data collection, 
which was in part contracted out to the 
National School of Statistics (ENSEA) and 
partly conducted in-house by a dedicated data 
collection team. The World Bank fi nanced 
technical oversight and research activities, as 
well as led the evaluation team. J-PAL contrib-
uted through affi liated academics. This model 
has proved effective in ensuring scientifi c 
rigor and global relevance, as well as align-
ment with policy makers’ priorities. It requires 
careful management of partnerships and 
effective coordination across the various 
stakeholders in the evaluation team.
Sources: Bertrand and others 2016; IPA 2014; Sturdy, Aquino, and Molyneaux 2014.
Box 12.3: Examples of Research–Policy Team Models (continued)
Choosing a Research Team Partner
Policy makers and program implementers need to decide with whom to 
partner for the evaluation. Key questions are whether the research 
team—or parts of it—can be a local team, and what kind of outside assis-
tance will be needed. Research capacity varies greatly from country to 
country. International ﬁ rms are often contracted when particular skills 
are needed, and they can also partner with local ﬁ rms. Data collection 
 functions are generally implemented by local ﬁ rms, given their deep 
knowledge of the local context and environment. There is also a strong 
global push to ensure the full participation of local researchers in impact 
evaluation.
As evaluation capacity increases, it is becoming more common for 
 governments, private ﬁ rms, and multilateral institutions to implement 
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impact evaluations in partnership with local research teams. Involving local 
researchers can bring signiﬁ cant value to the impact evaluation, given their 
knowledge of the local context. In some countries, research authorization is 
provided only to teams that include local researchers. Overall, it is up to the 
evaluation manager to assess local capacity and determine who will be 
responsible for what aspects of the evaluation eff ort. International impact 
evaluation networks of academics (such as J-PAL or IPA), private research 
ﬁ rms, or impact evaluation groups in international institutions (such as 
DIME and SIEF at the World Bank, or SPD or RES at the Inter-American 
Development Bank) can help policy teams connect to international 
researchers with the technical expertise to collaborate on the impact 
evaluation.1
Another question is whether to work with a private ﬁrm or a public 
agency. Private ﬁrms or research institutions can be more dependable in 
providing timely results, but private ﬁrms often are understandably less 
amenable to incorporating elements into the evaluation that will make the 
eff ort costlier once a contract has been signed. The research team can also 
draw on research institutions and universities. Their reputation and techni-
cal expertise can ensure that evaluation results are widely accepted by 
stakeholders. However, those institutions sometimes lack the operational 
experience or the ability to perform some aspects of the evaluation, such 
as data collection. Such aspects may need to be subcontracted to another 
partner. Capacity building in the public sector may also be a goal and can be 
included as part of the terms of reference for the impact evaluation. 
Whatever combination of counterparts is ﬁnally crafted, a sound review of 
potential collaborators’ past evaluation activities is essential to making an 
informed choice.
Particularly when working with a public agency with multiple respon-
sibilities, the capacity and availability of an in-house research team to 
undertake the impact evaluation activities need to be assessed in light 
of  other activities for which they are accountable. Awareness of the 
workload is important for assessing not only how it will aff ect the quality 
of the evaluation being conducted but also the opportunity cost of the 
evaluation with respect to other eff orts for which the public agency is 
responsible.
How to Time the Evaluation
Part 1 discussed the advantages of prospective evaluations, designed during 
program preparation. Advance planning allows for a broader choice in gen-
erating comparison groups, facilitates the collection of baseline data, and 
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helps stakeholders reach consensus about program objectives and ques-
tions of interest.
Though it is important to plan evaluations early in the project design 
phase, carrying them out should be timed in the previously mentioned 
“sweet spot” once the program is mature enough to be stable, but before 
it is expanded. Pilot projects or nascent reforms are often prone to revi-
sion, both of their content and with respect to how, when, where, and by 
whom they will be implemented. Program providers may  need time to 
learn and consistently apply new operational rules. Because evaluations 
require clear rules of program operation to generate appropriate counter-
factuals, it is important to apply evaluations to programs after they are 
well established.
Another key issue concerns how much time is needed before results can 
be measured. The right balance is context-speciﬁc: “If one evaluates too 
early, there is a risk of ﬁnding only partial or no impact; too late, and there is 
a risk that the program might lose donor and public support or that a badly 
designed program might be expanded” (King and Behrman 2009, 56).2 A 
range of factors needs to be weighted to determine when to collect follow-
up data:
The program cycle, including program duration, time of implementa-
tion, and potential delays. The impact evaluation needs to be ﬁtted to the 
program implementation cycle; the evaluation cannot drive the program 
being evaluated. By their very nature, evaluations are subject to the pro-
gram time frame; they must be aligned to the expected duration of the 
program. They also must be adapted to potential implementation lags 
when programs are slow to assign beneﬁts or are delayed by external fac-
tors.3 In general, although evaluation timing should be built into the 
project from the outset, evaluators should be prepared to be ﬂexible and 
to make modiﬁcations as the project is implemented. In addition, provi-
sion should be made for tracking the interventions, using a strong moni-
toring system so that the evaluation eff ort is informed by the actual pace 
of the intervention.
The expected time needed for the program to aff ect outcomes, as well as the 
nature of outcomes of interest. The timing of follow-up data collection must 
take into account how much time is needed after the program is imple-
mented for results to become apparent. The program results chain helps 
identify outcome indicators and the appropriate time to measure them. 
Some programs (such as income support programs) aim to provide short-
term beneﬁts, whereas others (such as basic education programs) aim for 
longer-term gains. Moreover, certain results by their nature take longer to 
appear (such as changes in life expectancy or fertility from a health reform) 
than others (such as earnings from a training program).
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For example, in the evaluation of the Bolivian Social Investment Fund, 
which relied on baseline data collected in 1993, follow-up data were not 
collected until 1998 because of the time required to carry out the inter-
ventions (water and sanitation projects, health clinics, and schools) and 
for eff ects on the beneﬁciary population’s health and education to 
emerge (Newman and others 2002). A similar period of time was 
required for the evaluation of a primary education project in Pakistan 
that used an experimental design with baseline and follow-up surveys to 
assess the impact of community schools on student outcomes, including 
academic achievement (King, Orazem, and Paterno 2008). However, fol-
low-up data are often collected earlier than would be recommended, 
given pressures for timely results or budget and project cycle constraints 
(McEwan 2014).
When to collect follow-up data will therefore depend on the program 
under study, as well as on the outcome indicators of interest. 
Follow-up data can be collected more than once, so that short-term and 
medium-term results can be considered and contrasted while the treatment 
group is still receiving the intervention. Follow-up data may not capture the 
full impact of the program if indicators are measured too early. Still, it is very 
useful to document short-term impacts, which can provide information 
about expected longer-term outcomes to produce early impact evaluation 
results that can invigorate dialogue between the research and policy teams 
and maintain contact with the evaluation sample to reduce sample attrition 
over time.
Follow-up surveys that measure long-term outcomes after the program 
has been implemented often produce the most convincing evidence regard-
ing program eff ectiveness. For instance, the positive results from long-term 
impact evaluations of early childhood programs in the United States (Currie 
2001; Currie and Thomas 1995, 2000) and Jamaica (Grantham-McGregor 
and others 1994; Gertler and others 2014) have been inﬂuential in making 
the case for investing in early childhood interventions.
Long-term impacts sometimes are explicit program objectives, but even 
a strong impact evaluation design may not withstand the test of time. For 
example, units in the control group may begin to beneﬁt from spillover 
eff ects from program beneﬁciaries.
Teams can collect follow-up data more than once, so that short-, medium-, 
and long-term results can be considered and contrasted.
Policy-making cycles. The timing of an evaluation must also take into 
account when certain information is needed to inform policy decisions and 
must synchronize evaluation and data collection activities to key decision-
making points. The production of results should be timed to inform bud-
gets, program expansion, or other policy decisions.
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How to Budget for an Evaluation
Budgeting constitutes one of the last steps to operationalize the evaluation 
design. In this section, we review some existing impact evaluation cost data, 
discuss how to budget for an evaluation, and suggest some options for 
funding.
Review of Cost Data
Tables 12.1 and 12.2 provide useful benchmarks on the costs associated with 
conducting rigorous impact evaluations. They contain cost data on impact 
evaluations of a number of projects supported by the Strategic Impact 
Evaluation Fund (SIEF) administered by the World Bank. The sample in 
table 12.1 comes from a comprehensive review of programs supported by 
the Early Childhood Development and Education research clusters within 
SIEF. The sample in table 12.2 was selected based on the availability of cur-
rent budget statistics from the set of impact evaluations ﬁnanced by SIEF.4
The direct costs of the evaluation activities reviewed in the samples 
included in tables 12.1 and 12.2 range between US$130,000 and US$2.78 mil-
lion, with an average cost of about US$1 million. Although those costs vary 
widely and may seem high in absolute terms, impact evaluations generally 
constitute only a small percentage of overall program budgets. In addition, 
the cost of conducting an impact evaluation must be compared with the 
opportunity costs of not conducting a rigorous evaluation and thus poten-
tially running an ineff ective program. Evaluations allow researchers and 
policy makers to identify which programs or program features work, which 
do not, and which strategies may be the most eff ective and effi  cient in achiev-
ing program goals. In this sense, the resources needed to implement an 
impact evaluation constitute a relatively small but signiﬁcant investment.
Table 12.2 disaggregates the costs of the sample of impact evaluations 
supported by SIEF. The total costs of an evaluation include World Bank staff  
time, national and international consultants, travel, data collection, and dis-
semination activities.5 As is the case in almost all evaluations for which 
existing data cannot be used, the highest cost in the evaluation is new data 
collection, accounting for 63 percent of the total evaluation cost, on average, 
as shown in the table.
These numbers reﬂect diff erent sizes and types of evaluations. The rela-
tive cost of evaluating a pilot program is generally higher than the relative 
cost of evaluating a nationwide or universal program. In addition, some 
evaluations require only one follow-up survey or may be able to use existing 
data sources, whereas others may need to carry out multiple rounds of data 
collection. Costs of data collection depend largely on the salaries of the local 
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team, the cost of accessing populations in the evaluation sample, and the 
length of time in the ﬁeld. To learn more about how to estimate the cost of a 
survey in a particular context, it is recommended that the evaluation team 
ﬁrst contact the national statistical agency and look for information from 
teams who have done survey work in the country.
Table 12.1 Cost of Impact Evaluations of a Selection of World Bank–Supported Projects 
Impact evaluation (IE) Country
Total cost 
of impact 
evaluation 
(US$)
Total cost 
of programa 
(US$)
IE costs as a 
percentage of 
total program 
costs
Safety net project Burkina Faso 750,000 38,800,000 1.9
Migrant Skills Development and 
Employment
China 220,000 50,000,000 0.4
Social Safety Net Project Colombia 130,000 86,400,000 0.2
Integrated Nutrition/Workfare 
Social Safety Net (Pilot)
Djibouti 480,000 5,000,000 8.8
Social Sectors Investment 
Program
Dominican 
Republic
600,000 19,400,000 3.1
Performance-Based Incentives for 
Teachers
Guinea 2,055,000 39,670,000 4.9
Social Protection Jamaica 800,000 40,000,000 2.0
Addressing Chronic Malnutrition Madagascar 651,000 10,000,000 6.1
Community-Based Childcare 
Centers (pilot)
Malawi 955,000 1,500,000 38.9
Information and Unconditional 
Cash Transfer
Nepal 984,000 40,000,000 2.4
Social Safety Net Technical 
Assistance
Pakistan 2,000,000 60,000,000 3.3
Social Protection Project Panama 1,000,000 24,000,000 4.2
1st Community Living Standards Rwanda 1,000,000 11,000,000 9.1
Information-for-accountability and 
teacher incentive interventions
Tanzania 712,000 416,000,000 0.2
Class-size and teacher quality 
interventions
Uganda 639,000 100,000,000 0.6
Social Fund for Development 3 Yemen, Rep. 2,000,000 15,000,000 13.3
Average 936,000 59,798,000 6.2
Source: A sample of impact evaluations supported by the Early Childhood Development and Education research clusters of the 
World Bank’s Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund.
Note: IE = impact evaluation.
a. Total cost of program does not include costs associated with the impact evaluation.
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Budgeting for an Impact Evaluation
Many resources are required to implement a rigorous impact evaluation, 
especially when primary data are being collected. Budget items include staff  
fees for at least one principal investigator/researcher, a ﬁeld coordinator, a 
sampling expert, and a data collection team. Time from project staff  on the 
policy team is also needed to provide guidance and support throughout the 
evaluation. These human resources may consist of researchers and techni-
cal experts from international organizations, international or local consul-
tants, and local program staff . The costs of travel and subsistence must 
also be budgeted. Resources for dissemination, often in the form of work-
shops, reports, and academic papers, should be considered in the evaluation 
planning.
As noted, the largest costs in an evaluation are usually those of data col-
lection (including creating and pilot testing the survey), data collection 
materials and equipment, training for the enumerators, daily wages for the 
enumerators, vehicles and fuel, and data entry operations. Calculating the 
costs of all these inputs requires making some assumptions about, for exam-
ple, how long the questionnaire will take to complete and travel times 
between sites.
The costs of an impact evaluation may be spread out over several years. 
A sample budget in table 12.3 shows how the expenditures at each stage of 
an evaluation can be disaggregated by year for accounting and reporting 
purposes. Again, budget demands will likely be higher during the years 
when the data are collected.
Options for Funding Evaluations
Financing for an evaluation can come from many sources, including project 
resources, direct program budgets, research grants, or donor funding. Often, 
evaluation teams look to a combination of sources to generate the needed 
funds. Although funding for evaluations used to come primarily from 
research budgets, a growing emphasis on evidence-based policy making has 
increased funding from other sources. In cases where an evaluation is likely 
to ﬁll a substantial knowledge gap that is of interest to the development 
community more broadly, and where a credible, robust evaluation can be 
applied, policy makers should be encouraged to look for outside funding, 
given the public good the evaluation results will provide. Sources of funding 
include the government, development banks, multilateral organizations, 
United Nations agencies, foundations, philanthropists, and research and 
evaluation organizations such as the International Initiative for Impact 
Evaluation.
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Additional Resources
 • For accompanying material to this chapter and hyperlinks to additional 
 resources, please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (http://www 
. worldbank.org/ieinpractice).
 • To access several tools to help plan and implement an evaluation, see 
the Inter-American Development Bank Evaluation portal (http://www.iadb 
.org / evaluationhub), including the following:
  – Design section: Gantt charts to assist in the scheduling of impact 
evaluation activities, a budget template tool to estimate the costs of an 
impact evaluation, and a checklist of core activities to be carried out.
  – Implementation section: Sample terms of reference (TORs) for 
principal investigators, data collection ﬁ rms, and technical support and 
 supervision.
 • For guidelines and tools to help plan and implement an evaluation, see the 
World Bank Impact Evaluation Toolkit (Vermeersch, Rothenbühler, and 
Sturdy 2012), including the following:
  – Module 2: Team Building: Sample terms of reference for principal 
investigators,  evaluation coordinators, data analysts, local researchers, 
power calculation experts, data quality experts, ﬁ eld workers, and others.
  – Field manuals and training programs for household and health facilities.
  – Module 3: Design: Guidelines on how to align the timing, team 
composition, and budget of your impact evaluation; and a budget 
template.
  – Module 4: Data Collection Preparation: Information on scheduling data 
collection activities and reaching agreements with stakeholders on data 
ownership; Gantt chart; sample data collection budget.
Notes
1. J-PAL is the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. SPD is the Inter-American 
Development Bank’s (IDB) Offi  ce of Strategic Planning and Development 
Eff ectiveness. RES is IDB’s Research Department.
2. For a detailed discussion of timing issues in relation to the evaluation of social 
programs, see King and Behrman (2009).
3. “There are several reasons why implementation is neither immediate nor 
perfect, why the duration of exposure to a treatment diff ers not only across 
program areas but also across ultimate beneﬁciaries, and why varying lengths 
of exposure might lead to diff erent estimates of program impact” (King and 
Behrman 2009, 56).
4. While tables 12.1 and 12.2 provide useful benchmarks, they are not representative 
of all evaluations undertaken by the SIEF program or the World Bank.
5. In this case, cost is calculated as a percentage of the portion of the project cost 
ﬁnanced by the World Bank.
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The Ethics and Science of 
Impact Evaluation
Managing Ethical and Credible Evaluations
The ethics of evaluation center on protecting the individuals, or human 
 subjects, who participate in the evaluation, while transparency of methods 
helps ensure that the results of the evaluation are unbiased, reliable, and 
credible, and contribute to a wider body of knowledge.
Policy makers and researchers have a joint interest and responsibility 
to ensure that the evaluation is ethical and that its results are unbiased, 
reliable, and credible. Failure to do so can invalidate the evaluation and 
lead to problems beyond the scope of the evaluation. Imagine an impact 
evaluation that endangers a group of people by releasing personal data, 
or an evaluation that uses a program assignment mechanism that is 
unfair by excluding the neediest families. Imagine an evaluation that 
shows that a program is highly successful, but doesn’t make any data 
available to support the claim. Any of these cases could lead to public 
outcry; to complaints in the media, in courts, or elsewhere; and to embar-
rassment for policy makers and researchers alike. Criticism of the evalu-
ation might spill over to the program itself and even undermine its 
implementation. Reliability and completeness of evaluation results 
are  also very important: when evaluations produce biased or partial 
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estimates of the impact of programs, policy makers will be restricted in 
their ability to make a fully informed decision.
While impact evaluations are linked to public programs and projects, 
they are also a research activity and thus are conducted in the realm of social 
science. Accordingly, the evaluation team must abide by a number of social 
science principles and rules to make sure the evaluation is ethical and trans-
parent in its methods and results.
The Ethics of Running Impact Evaluations
When an impact evaluation assigns subjects to treatment and comparison 
groups and collects and analyzes data about them, the evaluation team has a 
responsibility to minimize to the greatest extent possible any risks that indi-
viduals might be harmed and to ensure that those individuals who partici-
pate in the evaluation are doing so through informed consent.
The Ethics of Assignment to Treatment and Comparison Groups
As with the Hippocratic Oath in the medical profession, a ﬁ rst principle of 
evaluation ethics should be to do no harm. The foremost concern is that 
the  program intervention to be evaluated might harm individuals, either 
directly or indirectly. For example, a road rehabilitation project might dis-
place households living along some sections of the roads. Or a literacy proj-
ect that does not take into account the use of native languages might harm 
indigenous communities. Many governments and international donors that 
ﬁ nance development projects use a safeguards framework to prevent and 
mitigate these types of risks. While the program implementers have the 
 primary responsibility to apply project safeguard measures, the evaluation 
team should be vigilant to verify that the project is complying with these 
required frameworks.
There is another concern about harm that may arise from withholding an 
intervention from potential beneﬁ ciaries. A fundamental principle is that 
groups should not be excluded from an intervention that is known to be 
beneﬁ cial solely for the purpose of conducting an evaluation. Evaluations 
should only be done in cases where the evaluation team does not know 
whether an intervention is beneﬁ cial in the particular context where it is 
being evaluated. Additionally, if an evaluation shows that a program is cost-
eff ective, the funders of the program—whether governments, donors, or 
nongovernmental organizations—should make reasonable eff orts to expand 
the program to include the comparison groups once the impact evaluation 
has been completed.
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A related principle that we advocate in this book is that evaluations should 
not dictate how programs are assigned; instead, evaluations should be ﬁ tted 
to program assignment rules to the extent that those are clear and fair. The 
evaluation can also help (re)deﬁ ne rules when they don’t exist or when they 
are not fair. Following this procedure will help ensure that ethical concerns 
will not stem so much from the impact evaluation itself but rather from the 
ethics of the rules used to choose the beneﬁ ciaries of the program. 
Nonetheless, the assignment into treatment and comparison groups can raise 
concerns about the ethics of denying program beneﬁ ts to eligible beneﬁ cia-
ries. This is particularly the case with randomized assignment of program 
beneﬁ ts. In part 2 and in chapter 11, we have emphasized that randomized 
assignment is a method that can be applied in speciﬁ c operational contexts. 
In particular, the fact that most programs operate with limited ﬁ nancial and 
administrative resources makes it impossible to reach all eligible beneﬁ cia-
ries at once. This addresses the ethical concerns, since the program itself 
must develop allocation rules and impose some form of rationing, even with-
out the existence of an impact evaluation. From an ethical standpoint, there 
is a good case to be made for all of those who are equally eligible to  participate 
in a program to have the same chance of receiving the program. Randomized 
assignment fulﬁ lls this requirement. In other operational contexts where a 
program will be phased in over time, rollout can be based on randomly select-
ing the order in which equally deserving beneﬁ ciaries or groups of beneﬁ cia-
ries will receive the program. Again, this will give each eligible beneﬁ ciary 
the same chance to be the ﬁ rst to receive the program. In these cases, beneﬁ -
ciaries who enter the program later can be used as a comparison group for 
earlier beneﬁ ciaries, generating a solid evaluation design, as well as a trans-
parent and fair method for allocating scarce resources.
Finally, there can also be an ethical concern about not pursuing an evalu-
ation when programs invest substantial resources in interventions whose 
eff ectiveness is unknown. In this context, the lack of evaluation could itself 
be seen as unethical because it might perpetuate wasteful programs that do 
not beneﬁ t the population, while the funds might be better spent on more 
eff ective interventions. The information about program eff ectiveness that 
impact evaluations yield can lead to more eff ective and ethical investment of 
public resources.
Protecting Human Subjects during Data Collection, Processing, 
and Storage
A second point at which subjects might be harmed is during data collection, 
processing, and storage. The households, teachers, doctors, administrators, 
and others who respond to questionnaires or provide data through other 
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means are subject to harm if the information they provide is made publicly 
available without suffi  cient safeguards to protect their anonymity. The harm 
might aff ect the individuals themselves or an organization to which they 
belong. Here are a few examples:
• While a survey is being administered, a woman shares information about 
her family planning practices, and her husband (who does not favor 
 family planning) overhears her conversation with the enumerator.
• The privacy of households is violated (and their safety is jeopardized) 
when an individual manages to use survey data that were posted on the 
Internet to identify the income and assets of speciﬁ c families.
• A study uses inappropriately qualiﬁ ed enumerators to administer bio-
metric tests, such as drawing blood.
• A survey respondent asks to withdraw from a study halfway through the 
interview but is instructed by the enumerator to ﬁ nish answering the 
survey questions.
• Survey data are used to identify community organizations that oppose 
certain government policies, and to retaliate against them.
Given risks like these, it is the responsibility of the principal investigators 
and others on the research team to safeguard the rights and welfare of human 
subjects involved in the impact evaluation in accordance with the appropri-
ate national code of ethics or legislation and with international  guidines.1 
The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends the  following basic 
criteria for assessing the research projects involving human subjects:
• The rights and welfare of the subjects involved in the impact evaluation 
should be adequately protected.
• The researchers should obtain freely given, informed consent from the 
participants.
• The balance between risk and potential beneﬁ ts involved should be 
assessed and deemed acceptable by a panel of independent experts.
• Any special national requirements should be met.
The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Research (National Commission 1978) identiﬁ es three 
principles that form the foundation for the ethical conduct of research 
involving human subjects:
• Respect for persons. How will the researchers obtain informed consent 
from their research subjects?
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• Beneﬁ cence. How will the researchers ensure that the research (1) does not 
harm and (2) maximizes potential beneﬁ ts and minimizes potential harm?
• Justice. How will the researchers ensure that the beneﬁ ts and burdens of 
research are fairly and equitably shared?
As a key element of his or her duty to protect human subjects, the princi-
pal investigator(s) should submit the research and data collection protocols 
for review and clearance to an institutional review board (IRB), also known 
as an independent ethics committee (IEC) or ethical review board (ERB). 
The IRB is a committee that has been formally designated to review, 
approve, and monitor biomedical and behavioral research involving human 
subjects. Both before the study starts and during its implementation, the 
IRB reviews the research protocols and related materials in order to assess 
the ethics of the research and its methods. In the context of impact evalua-
tions, IRB review is particularly important when the study requires the 
 collection of household and individual data. In particular, the IRB review 
checks whether the participants are capable of making the choice to partici-
pate in the data collection activities and whether their choice will be fully 
informed and voluntary. Finally, the IRB reviews whether there is any rea-
son to believe that the safety of participants could be at risk.
The principal investigator is responsible for identifying all the institu-
tions that should review and clear the study. Many countries have a national 
ethical review board, and most universities have an institutional review 
board. Typically, the team will be required to obtain ethical clearance from 
the respective country’s national ethical review board and from the institu-
tional review board of any university with which the investigators are affi  li-
ated. There may be particular instances where impact evaluations are 
carried out in countries that do not have a national ethical review board, or 
with researchers whose institutions do not have an institutional review 
board. In those cases, the principal investigator should contract a third-
party (possibly commercial) institutional review board. The review and 
clearance process can take two to three months, though the time varies 
depending on how often the IRB committee meets. The policy and research 
team should coordinate submissions to the IRB and data collection activi-
ties so that they can obtain all required clearances before initiating data 
 collection that involves human subjects.
Review by an IRB is a necessary but insuffi  cient condition to ensure 
human subjects’ protection. IRBs can vary widely in their capacity and 
experience with social science experiments, as well as in the focus of their 
review. IRBs, especially if their location is far away from where the evalua-
tion is taking place, may be insuffi  ciently aware of local circumstances to 
be  able to identify contextual threats to human subjects. They may put 
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excessive emphasis on the wording of questionnaires and consent forms. Or 
they may have experience in a more focused subject area, such as medical 
experiments, whose norms are quite diff erent from social experiments in 
terms of risks to human subjects. Thinking about human subject protection 
doesn’t stop once IRB approval is obtained; rather, it should be seen as a 
starting point for ensuring that the evaluation is ethical.
Institutional review boards commonly require the following information 
to be submitted for review:
Evidence of training. Many IRBs (as well as many national ethical guide-
lines) require that the research team be trained in the protection of human 
subjects, though modalities vary by country. We list several options for 
training in the additional resources section at the end of this chapter.
The research protocol. The research protocol includes core elements 
 usually outlined in the evaluation plan—notably the purpose of the study and 
objectives of the evaluation, core policy questions, and proposed evaluation 
methodology—as well as description of how the research team will ensure 
that human subjects are protected. As such, it is an important document in 
an evaluation’s documentation. The research protocol normally includes the 
following elements with respect to the treatment of human subjects: the cri-
teria for selecting study participants (subjects), the methodology and proto-
cols applied for protecting vulnerable subjects, procedures used to ensure 
that subjects are aware of the risks and beneﬁ ts of participation in the study, 
and procedures used to ensure anonymity. The research protocol should be 
used by the survey ﬁ rm to guide ﬁ eldwork procedures. More information on 
the content of the research protocol can be found on the  World Health 
Organization (WHO) website and in the Impact Evaluation Toolkit.2
Procedures for requesting and documenting informed consent. Informed 
consent is one of the cornerstones of protecting the rights of human subjects 
in any study. It requires that respondents have a clear understanding of the 
purpose, procedures, risks, and beneﬁ ts of the data collection in which they 
are asked to participate. By default, informed consent by an adult respon-
dent requires a written document that includes a section on the methods 
used to protect respondent conﬁ dentiality, a section on the respondent’s 
right to refuse or cease participation at any point in time, an explanation of 
potential risks and beneﬁ ts, contact information in the event the respondent 
wishes to contact the data collection team, and space for respondents to 
record their formal written consent to participate in the data  collection with 
a signature. Sometimes, study participants are not capable of  making the 
choice to participate. For example, children are usually deemed to be inca-
pable of making this choice. Therefore, in contrast to able adults, minors 
cannot consent to participate in a survey; they may assent to participate after 
written permission by their parent or guardian. While the steps described 
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are the default informed procedures, many impact evaluations request one 
or more waivers from their IRB from the requirement to obtain formal writ-
ten consent from respondents. For example, when dealing with an illiterate 
population, formal written consent among eligible, potential adult respon-
dents is often waived and replaced with documented verbal consent.3
Procedures for protecting respondent conﬁ dentiality. Protection of respon-
dent conﬁ dentiality is critical when storing data and making data publically 
available. All information provided during the course of data collection 
should be anonymized to protect the identity of the respondents. Although 
results of the study may be published, the report should be written in such a 
way that it is not possible to identify an individual or household. With respect 
to ensuring conﬁ dentiality in the data, each subject of the survey should be 
assigned a unique encrypted identiﬁ cation number (ID), and all names and 
identiﬁ ers should be deleted from the database that is made publicly avail-
able. Identiﬁ ers include any variables allowing identiﬁ cation of individuals 
or households (such as address), or any combination of variables that does 
the same (such as a combination of date of birth, place of birth, gender, and 
years of education). In case the research team anticipates that it would need 
the identiﬁ ers in order to follow up on respondents in a subsequent survey, it 
can keep a separate and securely kept database that links the encrypted IDs 
with the respondents’ identifying information.4 In addition to encrypting 
individual IDs, it may also be necessary to encrypt locations and institutions. 
For example, if households and individuals are coded with encrypted IDs but 
villages are identiﬁ ed, it might still be possible to identify households through 
the characteristics that are included in the survey. For example, a particular 
village may include only one household that owns a motorcycle, seven cows, 
and a barber shop. Anyone with access to the data might be able to locate the 
household, and this violates the household’s conﬁ dentiality.
Ensuring Reliable and Credible Evaluations 
through Open Science
One of the fundamental objectives of impact evaluation is to estimate the 
impact of a program on a range of outcomes of interest. Part 2 discussed a 
series of methods to ensure that the estimated impacts are robust. A well-
designed and well-implemented impact evaluation should ensure that 
results are unbiased, reliable, and credible, and that they contribute to a 
wider body of knowledge. When evaluations are unbiased, reliable, and 
 credible, and can be interpreted within a relevant body of related knowledge, 
they can contribute to good policy decisions and to improving people’s 
lives. In reality, however, several issues can impede the attainment of this ideal. 
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In this section, we will discuss how a number of scientiﬁ c issues in impact 
evaluation can translate into diffi  cult issues for policy makers, and we will 
discuss potential measures to prevent or mitigate these issues. These mea-
sures are commonly grouped under the term open science, because they 
aim to make research methods transparent.5 Most of these issues need to be 
handled by the research team, but the policy team overseeing an impact eval-
uation needs to be aware of them while managing impact evaluations. Issues, 
policy implications, and possible solutions are summarized in table 13.1.
Table 13.1 Ensuring Reliable and Credible Information for Policy through Open Science
Research issue Policy implications
Prevention and 
mitigation solutions 
through open science
Publication bias. Only positive results 
are published. Evaluations showing 
limited or no impacts are not widely 
disseminated.
Policy decisions are based on a 
distorted body of knowledge. 
Policy makers have little informa-
tion on what doesn’t work and 
continue to try out/adopt policies 
that have no impact.
Trial registries
Data mining. Data are sliced and diced 
until a positive regression result 
appears, or the hypothesis is retrofi tted 
to the results.
Policy decisions to adopt 
interventions may be based on 
unwarranted positive estimates 
of impacts.
Preanalysis plans
Multiple hypothesis testing, subgroup 
analysis. Researchers slice and dice the 
data until they fi nd a positive result for 
some group. In particular, (1) multiple 
testing leads to a conclusion that some 
impacts exist when they do not, or (2) 
only the impacts that are signifi cant are 
reported.
Policy decisions to adopt 
interventions may be based on 
unwarranted positive estimates 
of impacts.
Preanalysis plans and 
specialized statistical 
adjustment techniques 
such as index tests, 
family-wise error rate, 
and false discovery rate 
controla
Lack of replication. Results cannot be 
replicated because the research 
protocol, data, and analysis methods 
are not suffi ciently documented.
Mistakes and manipulations may go 
undetected.
Researchers are not interested in 
replicating studies, and journals are not 
interested in “me-too” results.
Interventions cannot be replicated 
because the intervention protocol is 
not suffi ciently documented.
Policy may be based on manipu-
lated (positive or negative) 
results, as results may be due to 
mistakes in calculations.
Results between different studies 
cannot be compared.
Validity of results in another 
context cannot be tested.
Policy makers may be unable to 
replicate the intervention in a 
different context.
Data documentation and 
registration, including 
project protocols, 
organizing codes, 
publication of codes, and 
publication of data
Changes in journal 
policies and funding 
policies to require data 
documentation and 
encourage replication
a. For a basic introduction to the multiple comparisons problem and potential statistical corrections, please see https://en 
. wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_comparisons_problem.
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Publication Bias and Trial Registries
Researchers who work on impact evaluations normally have an interest in 
making sure that the results of their evaluations are published in peer-
reviewed journals because this helps their own careers. However, most of 
the results published in journals show positive impacts. This then begs the 
question of what happens to evaluations that show negative results or that 
fail to show any signiﬁ cant results. Researchers have almost no incentive to 
write up nonsigniﬁ cant results or submit them for publication to peer-
reviewed journals because they perceive that there is little interest in the 
results and that the journals will reject their papers (Franco, Malhotra, and 
Simonovits 2014). This publication bias is commonly referred to as the “ﬁ le 
drawer problem” because results stay in the ﬁ le drawer and are not 
 disseminated or published. Similar publication bias issues may arise for 
impact evaluations of speciﬁ c programs. Policy teams, ﬁ nancers, and 
 governments are more likely to publicize and advertise positive results from 
a program’s evaluation than negative or nonresults. Because of these ten-
dencies, it is diffi  cult to have a clear picture of those interventions that do 
not work, since the results tend not to be available, and the available body of 
evidence is rather distorted. Policy makers who try to base their policies on 
available evidence may not have access to the nonpublished nonresults; as a 
result, they may continue trying out policies that have been unsuccessful 
elsewhere.
A partial solution to publication bias is trial registration. Impact evalua-
tion teams should be encouraged to register their trials, and the policy team 
has an important role to play in ensuring that the research team registers 
the impact evaluation. Trial registration is very common (and often required) 
in the medical sciences, but it is just starting to gain ground in the social 
 sciences, including for impact evaluations. Registration implies that the 
researchers publicly declare their intent to carry out an evaluation before 
actually doing so, by recording key information about the evaluation in a 
registry (see box 13.1). As a result, it should be possible to have a complete 
list of impact evaluations that were carried out, whether the results were 
positive or not.
Registries are a big step forward in ensuring that the available body of 
knowledge becomes less distorted. However, many challenges remain. For 
example, even if it is clear from a registry that an evaluation was carried out, 
it may not be so easy to obtain information about the results of the evalua-
tion. Impact evaluations may be stopped or may not be well carried out. And 
even if nonresults from an evaluation are available, these often trigger an 
additional set of questions that make it diffi  cult to interpret the results: Did 
the researchers ﬁ nd no results because the evaluation was poorly designed 
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and carried out, because the program was not well implemented, or because 
the program truly did not have an impact? As chapter 16 discusses, collect-
ing complementary data through program monitoring or from alternative 
data sources can help ensure that the results are well interpreted.
Data Mining, Multiple Hypothesis Testing, and Subgroup Analysis
Another potential issue with impact evaluation is data mining, the practice 
of manipulating the data in search of positive results. Data mining can mani-
fest itself in diff erent ways. For example, when data are available, there 
might be a temptation to run regressions on the data until something posi-
tive comes up, and then to retroﬁ t an attractive hypothesis to that result. 
This is an issue for the following reason: when we run statistical tests for 
signiﬁ cance of impacts, we need to use a level of signiﬁ cance, say 5 percent. 
Statistically, 1 in 20 impact tests will come out signiﬁ cant at the 5 percent 
level, even if the underlying distribution does not warrant an impact 
(see chapter 15 for a discussion of type I errors). With data mining, one can 
no longer be sure that an impact result is a genuine result, or whether it 
comes purely from the statistical properties of the test. This issue is related 
to the issue of multiple hypothesis testing: when a piece of research includes 
many diff erent hypotheses, there is a high likelihood that at least one of 
them will be conﬁ rmed with a positive test purely by chance (because of the 
statistical properties of the test), and not because of real impact. A similar 
Box 13.1: Trial Registries for the Social Sciences
Impact evaluations of public policies should 
normally be registered with social science 
registries rather than with medical regis-
tries, due to the nature of the research. Here 
are a few examples:
• The American Economic Association’s 
registry for randomized controlled tri-
als can be accessed at http://www 
. socialscienceregistry .org. As of July 
2015, it listed 417 studies in 71 countries.
• The International Initiative for Impact 
Evaluation (3ie) manages the Registry 
for International Development Impact 
Evaluations (RIDIE), which focuses on 
impact evaluations related to development 
in low- and middle-income countries. It 
had registered approximately 64 evalua-
tions as of July 2015.
• The Center for Open Science manages the 
Open Science Framework (OSF), which 
has a slightly different focus, but it can 
also serve as a registry (https://osf.io/). The 
OSF is a cloud-based management sys-
tem for research projects, which allows 
snapshots of research to be created at 
any point in time, with a persistent URL 
and time stamp. Researchers can upload 
their protocol, research hypotheses, data, 
and code to the OSF and share the result-
ing web link as a proof of registration.
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situation arises for subgroup analysis: when the sample is suffi  ciently large, 
researchers could try to subdivide it until they ﬁ nd an impact for some 
 subgroup. Again, one can no longer be sure that an impact result for that 
subgroup is a genuine result, or whether it comes purely from the statistical 
properties of the test.
Another example of data mining is when the decision to continue or 
stop collecting data is made dependent on an intermediate result: say, a 
household survey was planned for a sample size of 2,000 households and 
ﬁ eldwork has progressed up to 1,000 households. If this reduced sample 
produces a positive impact evaluation result and a decision is made to stop 
the data collection to avoid the risk that additional data might change the 
results, then this would be data mining. Other examples are excluding 
 certain inconvenient observations or groups, or selectively hiding results 
that do not ﬁ t. While there is no reason to believe that these practices are 
widespread, just a few high-proﬁ le, egregious cases have the potential of 
undermining impact evaluation as a science. In addition, even lesser cases 
of data mining have the potential to distort the body of evidence used 
by  policy makers to decide what interventions to start, continue, or 
discontinue.
A common recommendation to avoid data mining is to use a preanalysis 
plan. Such a plan outlines the analysis methods before the impact evaluation 
analysis is carried out, thereby clarifying the focus of the evaluation and 
reducing the potential to alter the methods once the analysis has started. 
The preanalysis plan should specify the outcomes to be measured, the vari-
ables to be constructed and used, the subgroups for which analysis will be 
conducted, and the basic analytical approaches to be used in estimating 
impacts. Preanalysis plans should also include the researchers’ proposed 
corrections for multiple hypothesis testing and subgroup testing, if required. 
For example, testing the impact of an education intervention on six diff erent 
test scores (math, English, geography, history, science, French) for ﬁ ve dif-
ferent school groups (grades 1 through 5) and two genders (male and female) 
would yield 60 diff erent hypotheses, one or several of which are bound to 
have a signiﬁ cant test just by chance. Instead, the researcher could propose 
to compute one or more indexes that group the indicators together, so as to 
reduce the number of hypotheses and subgroups.6
While a preanalysis plan might help alleviate the concern of data 
 mining, there is also a concern that it might remove some needed ﬂ exibil-
ity in the kind of analysis carried out by researchers. For example, the pre-
analysis plan may specify the anticipated channels of impact of an 
intervention throughout the results chain. However, once the intervention 
is actually implemented, a whole host of additional, unanticipated fac-
tors  may suddenly appear. For example, if a government is thinking of 
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implementing a new way of paying health care providers, one might be 
able to come up with the possible channels of impact. However, it would 
be very diffi  cult to anticipate every possible eff ect that this could have. In 
some cases, qualitative interviews with providers would be needed to 
understand exactly how they adapt to the changes and how this is aff ecting 
performance. It would be very diffi  cult to incorporate all these possibili-
ties into the preanalysis plan in advance. In that case, researchers would 
have to work outside of the original preanalysis plan—and should not be 
penalized for this. In other words, a preanalysis plan can lend additional 
credibility to evaluations by turning them into conﬁ rmations of a hypoth-
esis, rather than just exploratory research; but researchers should be able 
to continue to explore new options that can be turned into conﬁ rmatory 
research in subsequent evaluations.
Lack of Replication
There are two kinds of replication that are important for impact  evaluation. 
First, for a given study, researchers other than the original research team 
should be able to produce the same (or at least very similar) results as the 
original researchers when using the same data and analysis. Replications 
of a given impact evaluation result are a way to check their internal validity 
and unbiasedness. When studies or results cannot be replicated because of 
lack of availability of information about coding or data, there is a risk that 
mistakes and manipulations in the analysis may go undetected, and that 
inaccurate results may continue to inﬂ uence policy. Fortunately, substan-
tial advances are being made in terms of making data, coding, and proto-
cols available. An increasing number of social science journals are starting 
to require that data and coding be made available along with publication of 
results. Guidelines such as the Transparency and Openness Promotion 
Guidelines developed by the Center for Open Science are slowly changing 
practices and incentives. To ensure that replication can take place, impact 
evaluation teams need to make data publicly available and ensure that all 
 protocols (including the randomization protocol), data sets, and analysis 
codes of the impact evaluation are documented, safely stored, and suffi  -
ciently detailed.
Second, once an evaluation is completed, it should be possible for other 
policy makers and researchers to take the original intervention and evalu-
ation protocols and apply them in a diff erent context or at a diff erent time 
to see if the results hold under diff erent circumstances. Lack of replica-
tion of evaluation results is a serious issue for policy makers. Say an evalu-
ation shows that introducing computers in schools has highly beneﬁ cial 
results, but this is the only study that produced such results, and other 
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researchers are unable to get the same positive results in subsequent 
 evaluations of similar programs. What is a policy maker to do in such 
cases? Lack of replication of results can have many causes. First, it can be 
diffi  cult to carry out evaluations that just try to replicate results that were 
obtained in a previous study: neither researchers nor ﬁ nancers might be 
interested in “me-too” studies. Second, even when there are willingness 
and funds to replicate studies, replication is not always possible because 
the protocols (including the randomization protocol), data, and analysis 
code of the original study might not be available or suffi  ciently detailed. 
There is a growing eff ort among organizations that support impact 
 evaluations to encourage replications across settings, for instance, by 
developing clusters of studies on similar topics or fostering multisite 
impact evaluations.
Checklist: An Ethical and Credible Impact 
Evaluation
Policy makers have an important role to play in ensuring that the right stage 
is set for an ethical and credible impact evaluation. In particular, policy 
makers bear the primary responsibility for ensuring that the program 
assignment rules are fair, and they should hold the research team account-
able for the transparency of the research methods. We suggest the following 
checklist of questions to ask:
¸ Is assignment to the treatment and comparison groups fair? Are there 
any groups with particularly high need that should receive the program 
in any case? Who will be excluded from the impact evaluation?
¸ Has the research team identiﬁ ed the relevant Institutional Review Board 
or National Ethics Review Committee?
¸ Does the impact evaluation schedule allow suffi  cient time to prepare and 
submit the research protocol to the IRB and obtain consent before data 
collection from human subjects begins?
¸ Did the research team submit the research protocol and preanalysis plan 
to a social science trial registry?
¸ Is a procedure in place to ensure that the key elements of the interven-
tion are documented as they happen, and not only as they are planned?
¸ Do policy makers understand that evaluation results might show that the 
intervention was not eff ective, and do they agree that such results will be 
published and not held back?
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¸ Has the evaluation team identiﬁ ed the way in which evaluation data and 
results will be made available, even if the research team does not manage 
to publish the results in a peer-reviewed journal?
The principles, issues, and checklist identiﬁ ed in this chapter can help 
ensure that your impact evaluation is both credible and ethical.
Additional Resources
• For accompanying material to the book and hyperlinks to additional  resources, 
please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (http://www.worldbank 
.org / ieinpractice).
• Human Subjects training from the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH)
  – The NIH off ers an online training that—while focused on medical sciences 
and the United States—is still very informative and takes only about one 
hour to complete. See http://phrp.nihtraining.com/users/login.php and 
http://www.ohsr.od.nih.gov.
• Human Subjects training through the Collaborative Institutional Training 
Initiative at the University of Miami (CITI)
  – CITI off ers international courses in several languages to both organiza-
tions and individuals, though the program has a fee (starting at US$100 per 
person). See http://www.citiprogram.com.
• International compilation of human research standards
  – Every year, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services publishes 
a compilation of laws, regulations, and guidelines that govern research 
 involving human subjects. The 2015 edition includes 113 countries, as well 
as the standards from a number of international and regional organizations. 
The document identiﬁ es national and international institutional review 
boards (http://www.hhs.gov / ohrp/international).
• Procedures for Protection of Human Subjects in Research Supported by  USAID 
(U.S. Agency for International Development) (http://www.usaid.gov/ policy /ads 
/200/humansub.pdf ).
• Manual of Best Practices in Transparent Social Science Research, by  Garret 
Christensen with assistance from Courtney Soderberg (Center for Open 
 Science) (https://github.com/garretchristensen/BestPracticesManual).
  – This is a working guide to the latest best practices for transparent quantita-
tive social science research. The manual is regularly updated.
• The Transparency and Openness Promotion (TOP) Guidelines (http:// centerfor 
openscience.org/top/).
  – The guidelines can be found on the website of the Center for Open Science.
• For links to recognized independent review boards and independent IRB 
services, see the Inter-American Development Bank Evaluation Portal (http://
www .iadb.org/evaluationhub).
• For more on data collection, see the Inter-American Development Bank 
Evaluation Portal (http://www.iadb.org/evaluationhub).
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  – See the data collection section under Protection of Human Subjects.
  – Note the link to the Association for the Accreditation of Human Research 
Protection Programs (AAHRPP). AAHRPP provides training and certiﬁ ca-
tion for IRBs. A list of accredited organizations can be found on their website.
• For guidelines for protecting human research participants, see the World 
Bank Impact Evaluation Toolkit, Module 4 (http://www.worldbank.org/health 
/ impactevaluationtoolkit).
Notes
1. In the absence of national ethical guidelines, the investigator and team should 
be guided by the Helsinki Declaration adopted by the Twenty-Ninth World 
Medical Assembly in Tokyo (October 1975) and Article 7 of the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on December 16, 1966. Additional guidance is provided by the World 
Health Organization and by the Belmont Report on Ethical Principles and 
Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects (1974) (http://www.hhs.gov 
/ ohrp/policy/belmont.html). An international compilation of human research 
standards can be found at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/international.
2. The World Health Organization’s guidelines on how to write a protocol for 
research involving human participation can be found at http://www.who.int 
/ rpc/research_ethics/guide_rp/en/index.html.
3. More information on consent procedures during data collection can be found in 
the World Bank’s Impact Evaluation Toolkit.
4. More information on the assignment of IDs can be found in the World Bank’s 
Impact Evaluation Toolkit.
5. For more information on open science recommendations in the context of 
impact evaluation, please see Miguel and others (2014).
6. Other techniques are available. See, for example, Anderson (2008).
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Disseminating Results and 
Achieving Policy Impact
CHAPTER 14
A Solid Evidence Base for Policy
You have ﬁ nally completed the arduous task of evaluating your program 
from start to ﬁ nish, a multiyear eff ort that involved signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial 
and human resources. The ﬁ nal evaluation products, including a 200-page 
report, complete with multiple annexes, have been delivered. Mission 
accomplished?
Actually, now a new phase begins to ensure that all this eff ort pays off  in 
the form of policy impact. Impact evaluations fundamentally aim to provide 
accountability for past investments and guide policy decisions in the future 
toward more cost-eff ective development so that scarce resources yield the 
 highest social returns possible. Those policy decisions will be inﬂ uenced by 
a range of factors, from the political economy to ideological positions. 
But impact evaluations can and should inﬂ uence policy by providing a solid 
evidence base that guides resources toward eff ective, proven interventions. 
From the earliest stages of a new program, even while it is being conceived, 
 evidence from available relevant impact evaluations should play a central 
role in informing the program’s design and guiding the next set of evalua-
tion questions.
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Typically, however, the process of inﬂ uencing policy does not happen 
spontaneously through the generation of evidence alone. Impact evalua-
tions must ﬁ rst and foremost answer relevant policy questions in a rigorous 
manner, bringing actionable evidence to key stakeholders in a timely 
 manner. But policy makers and program managers may not have the time 
and energy to delve into the details of a 200-page report, trying to distill the 
key ﬁ ndings and recommendations. Information generated through impact 
evaluations needs to be packaged and disseminated in a way that decision 
makers can easily access and use.
In this chapter, we discuss ways your impact evaluation can inﬂ uence 
policy, key constituencies you may want to reach, and strategies for com-
municating and disseminating information to target audiences so that the 
evaluation achieves policy impact.
The starting point for inﬂ uencing policy is the selection of relevant 
 evaluation questions that will be useful for making policy decisions, as dis-
cussed in part 1 of this book. During the very earliest stages of designing an 
impact evaluation, policy makers and evaluators will likely start with a 
wish list of questions. These questions should be vetted with the key group 
of stakeholders and decision makers who will ultimately use the impact 
evaluation to formulate decisions. The wish list will typically be adjusted 
and improved over time to include a more limited number of well- formulated 
questions that are both policy relevant and amenable to being answered 
through an impact evaluation, using the methods discussed in part 2 of this 
book. Simultaneously engaging policy makers to identify the important 
questions and the evaluation team to gauge the technical feasibility of 
answering those questions is a critical ﬁ rst step to inﬂ uencing policy.
Once the program is up and running, the impact evaluation will probably 
produce important analytical inputs that can serve to inform policy well 
before the program and impact evaluation have come to fruition. One com-
mon example is the ﬁ ndings of a baseline survey or an analysis of short-term 
results. Baseline surveys often produce the ﬁ rst comprehensive and popula-
tion-speciﬁ c data for a program, providing descriptive statistics that can be 
fed into the program design and policy dialogue. While a program may have 
a general description of its target population through national surveys or 
diagnostic studies, the baseline survey may provide the ﬁ rst detailed infor-
mation for speciﬁ c subpopulations or geographic areas where the program 
will operate. For example, a program designed to improve child nutrition 
through nutritional supplementation may have statistics on rates of stunting 
and wasting at a national level from existing surveys, but the baseline survey 
might provide the ﬁ rst measures of nutritional status and eating habits for 
the group of children that the program will actually serve. This type of 
information can be valuable for tailoring the intervention design and must 
Key Concept
Impact evaluations 
must answer relevant 
policy questions in a 
rigorous manner, bring 
actionable evidence to 
key stakeholders in a 
timely manner, and 
disseminate evidence 
in a form that decision 
makers can easily 
access and use.
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be made available to the policy team in a timely manner (ideally before the 
intervention is rolled out) in order to inﬂ uence the program’s design. 
Box 14.1 presents an example from Mozambique.
Some impact evaluations, particularly those that rely on administrative 
data sources or routine surveys, can produce intermediate results that feed 
back to the program while the program is being implemented. These results 
provide valuable information and recommendations on how indicators 
along the causal pathway are changing over time, allowing both the imple-
mentation of the program and timing of evaluation activities to be adjusted 
accordingly. For example, if half way through a program, it is clear that there 
are no eff ects on short-term outcomes, the program may be advised to 
implement an operational evaluation to detect bottlenecks and undertake 
corrective actions. The evaluation timeline could be adjusted to avoid 
 conducting a costly endline survey before the results of the intervention 
have had a chance to kick in. In the child nutrition example, if the analysis 
of administrative data on the distribution of nutritional supplements shows 
that supplements are not reaching the intended beneﬁ ciaries, then the 
Box 14.1: The Policy Impact of an Innovative Preschool Model 
in Mozambique
(continued from chapter 1)
Recall that in chapter 1 (box 1.2), an evalua-
tion of Save the Children’s community-based 
preschool program in Mozambique was 
an important input for the country’s 
national early childhood development policy. 
However, even before the program ended, 
the evaluation generated new and revealing 
information for the country’s policy debate in 
this area. The evaluation’s baseline survey 
generated the fi rst population-based mea-
surements of child development outcomes, 
using specialized tests of child development 
adapted to the Mozambican context, and 
 collected by specialized surveyors. Even 
though data were from a select group of 
communities in one province of Mozambique, 
the baseline statistics provided a fi rst snap-
shot of child development outcomes in the 
 country, showing that many children lagged 
behind in a number of dimensions, from 
 language and communication to cognitive 
and socioemotional development.
The baseline survey was presented 
by the evaluation team in seminars and 
 workshops, where results were discussed 
with high-level policy makers, international 
donors, and key stakeholders from the early 
childhood development community. The data 
generated through the impact evaluation fur-
ther bolstered the need for investing in this 
area, and played a catalytic role in mobilizing 
support for the early childhood agenda in the 
country. The completed evaluation was even-
tually disseminated through various outlets, 
including policy notes, videos, and blogs, a 
number of which have been compiled on the 
website of the International Initiative for 
Impact Evaluation (3ie).
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policy team can be alerted that a review of its supply chain is in order. The 
costly follow-up survey for measuring child height and weight could be 
postponed until some months after the program is operating eff ectively, 
since there is no good reason to believe that the nutritional program will 
generate impacts any sooner if it was not reaching its participants.
Impact evaluations tend to produce large volumes of information, from 
the technical underpinnings of the evaluation design, to descriptive statis-
tics and impact analyses complete with data sets, statistical code, and 
reports. It is critical that the evaluation team make an eff ort to document all 
 information throughout the evaluation cycle, and to the extent possible, put 
 relevant (nonconﬁ dential) technical documentation in the public domain: 
for example, through a dedicated website. Ultimately, the credibility of the 
evaluation results will hinge on the methodology and rigor with which the 
evaluation was implemented. Full transparency strengthens the trustwor-
thiness of the evaluation and its potential for inﬂ uencing policy.
While completeness and transparency are critical, most consumers of 
the information will not delve into the details. It will be up to the evaluation 
team to distill a manageable set of key messages summarizing the most 
policy- relevant results and recommendations, and to communicate these 
messages consistently across audiences. The sequencing of dissemination 
activities is also critical for policy impact. Unless otherwise agreed on by the 
policy team, the initial round of presentations and consultations of an evalu-
ation’s results should be conducted internally, with program staff , manag-
ers, and policy makers. A premature result, leaked to the public domain, can 
hurt a program’s reputation, with lasting harm for the evaluation’s policy 
impact.
Tailoring a Communication Strategy to 
Different Audiences
There are at least three primary audiences for impact evaluation ﬁ nd-
ings:  program staff  and managers involved in the speciﬁ c program being 
 evaluated; high-level policy makers who will use the evaluation to inform 
funding and policy design decisions; and the community of practice, broadly 
encompassing the academic community, development practitioners, civil 
society (including the media), and program participants. Each of these audi-
ences will have diff erent interests in the evaluation results and will require 
 tailored communication strategies in order to accomplish the objective of 
informing and inﬂ uencing policy (table 14.1).
Technicians and managers. The ﬁ rst key audience includes technical 
and  operational staff , and managers who designed and implemented the 
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program, as well as individuals from institutions (such as a ministry or fund-
ing institution) closely associated with the project. This group of individuals 
will typically be the ﬁ rst to see the evaluation results and provide comments 
on the evaluation’s interpretations and recommendations.
Since this is the ﬁ rst time results usually see the light of day, timing 
the release of information to this key constituency is critical. On the one 
hand, it is important to share the results early on, so program decision 
 makers can incorporate changes and make policy decisions, such as scaling 
the intervention up (or down) or adjusting program components to 
improve the use of resources and achieve greater impact. On the other hand, 
we caution against sharing very preliminary results based on partial or 
Table 14.1 Engaging Key Constituencies for Policy Impact: Why, When, and How
Program staff and 
managers High-level policy makers
Development academics 
and civil society groups
Why? They can become 
champions of impact 
evaluation and the use 
of evidence.
They need to understand why the 
issue is important, how impact 
evaluation can help them make 
better decisions, and ultimately, 
what the evidence tells them about 
where their energies (and available 
fi nancing) should be directed.
They need evidence about 
the impact of development 
programs in order to make 
decisions, design new 
programs, replicate 
successful programs in 
other countries, and carry 
out research that can help 
improve lives.
When? Early on, even before 
the program is rolled 
out, and with continued 
and frequent interac-
tions throughout. 
Baseline data can be 
used to tailor the 
intervention. They are 
the fi rst to comment on 
evaluation results.
Early on, when defi ning the 
evaluation questions and before 
the evaluation begins, and again 
when results have been fi nalized. 
It’s important that senior policy 
makers understand why an impact 
evaluation is being conducted and 
how the results can help them.
Depending on the program 
being evaluated, civil 
society groups and 
development experts can 
be important local champi-
ons. Information should be 
disseminated once results 
are fi nalized and have been 
vetted by program staff and 
policy makers.
How? Introduce the role of 
evidence in policy 
making in a workshop 
to engage program 
managers in the 
evaluation design. Follow 
up with meetings at key 
points: immediately after 
collection of baseline 
data, after collection of 
intermediate results, and 
at the endline.
Present at national workshops and 
seek direct meetings with senior-
level staff to explain the work. 
Encourage program managers, 
technical staff, and mid-level policy 
makers to keep ministries informed 
about the impact evaluation. When 
the evidence is fi nalized, present 
to senior policy makers. When 
possible, include cost-benefi t or 
cost-effectiveness analysis and 
suggestions for next steps. 
Public events and forums—
including seminars and 
conferences, working 
papers, journal articles, 
media coverage, and 
web-based materials—are 
all avenues for reaching 
these audiences.
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incomplete analysis. These results could be subject to change. Their release 
could set expectations with program staff  and prompt premature policy 
decisions that could be costly to reverse in the future. Thus an appropriate 
balance of timeliness and completeness should be sought for the initial 
 dissemination of results with the project team. This typically happens when 
the evaluation team has conducted a thorough analysis and robustness 
checks, but before the ﬁ nal results, interpretation, and recommendations 
are formulated.
The program staff  and managers will usually be interested in both the 
technical details of the evaluation methodology and analysis and the par-
ticulars of the initial ﬁ ndings and recommendations. The initial discussions 
of results with this group may be well suited for workshop-style meetings, 
with presentations by the evaluation team and ample time for clarifying 
questions and comments from all sides. These initial discussions will typi-
cally enrich the ﬁ nal analysis, inform the interpretation of results, and 
help tailor the ﬁ nal recommendations so they are best suited to guide the 
program’s policy objectives. The initial discussions with program staff  and 
managers will be a good opportunity to discuss unexpected or potentially 
controversial results, and to propose policy recommendations and responses 
in anticipation of public disclosure of the impact evaluation.
Negative results (including ﬁ nding no impact) or unexpected results can 
be disappointing for program staff  and managers who have invested signiﬁ -
cant time and energy into a program, but they also serve the critical function 
of prompting policy to be reformulated. For example, if the program is found 
to have failed to achieve its primary objective because of implementation 
challenges, measures can be taken to address those areas and an improved 
program can be reevaluated later. If the program does not produce impacts 
in the short term or only produces impacts in a subset of the results chain, 
and there is reason to believe that additional time is required to reach ﬁ nal 
outcomes, then the evaluation can present and defend the initial results, and 
additional measurements can be planned at a future date. Finally, if it is clear 
that the intervention is failing to generate its intended beneﬁ ts or is unex-
pectedly causing harm, then the program managers can take immediate 
steps to stop the intervention or reformulate its design. In this way, when 
the evaluation results are made public, policy makers in charge of the pro-
gram can announce corrective measures and formulate responses ahead of 
time, in anticipation of tough questions in policy debates or the media.
High-level policy makers. The second key constituency is high-level  policy 
makers who will make policy decisions based on the results of the impact 
evaluation, such as whether to expand, maintain, or decrease funding for 
an  intervention. These may include the national legislature, presidents 
and prime ministers, ministers and principal secretaries, board of directors, 
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or donors. This group of stakeholders will typically be provided with the 
evaluation results once they are ﬁ nalized and have been reviewed by pro-
gram staff  and managers and vetted by external technical experts. At this 
stage, the evaluation team will need to focus on communicating the key 
results and recommendations in an accessible manner; technical details of 
the evaluation may be of secondary importance. High-level policy makers 
will be interested in the translation of impacts into economically meaning-
ful values through cost-beneﬁ t analysis, or comparison with alternative 
interventions through cost-eff ectiveness analysis. These parameters will 
help inform decision makers as to whether the program is a worthwhile way 
to invest limited resources to further an important development objective. 
High-level policy makers may also be interested in using the results to fur-
ther their political agenda, such as lobbying for (or against) a given public 
policy that the evaluation does (or does not) support. The evaluation team 
can collaborate with communication experts to ensure that the results and 
related recommendations are correctly interpreted and that messages in the 
communications strategy remain aligned with the evaluation ﬁ ndings.
The community of practice. The third key constituency for achieving a 
policy impact broadly encompasses the consumers of evaluation outside the 
direct realm of the program or country context. This heterogeneous group 
encompasses the community of practice in sectors germane to the evalua-
tion, including development practitioners, academia, civil society, and 
 policy makers in other countries. Development practitioners beyond the 
speciﬁ c program may be interested in using the results of the evaluation to 
inform the design of new or existing programs. These practitioners will be 
interested both in details of the evaluation (methods, results, recommenda-
tions) and in operational lessons and recommendations that can help 
 implement their own projects more eff ectively. The academic community, 
on the other hand, may be more interested in the evaluation’s methodology, 
data, and empirical ﬁ ndings.
Within civil society at large, two key constituencies stand out: the media 
and program participants. Informing the public of the results of an evalua-
tion through the media can play a key role in achieving accountability for 
public spending, building public support for the evaluation recommenda-
tions, and sustaining eff ective policies. This is particularly true of new and 
innovative policies where the outcome was initially uncertain or the subject 
of controversy in the policy debate. If the evaluation sheds empirical light 
on what had been to date a largely theoretical or ideological debate, it can be 
a powerful instrument for policy change.
Finally, program participants should be included in the dissemination 
eff orts. Participants have invested their time and energy in the program and 
may have spent considerable time providing information for purposes of 
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the  evaluation. Ensuring that program participants have access to and 
remain informed about the evaluation results is a small but signiﬁ cant 
 gesture that can contribute to their continued interest in the program and 
willingness to participate in future evaluations.
Disseminating Results
Next, we discuss a variety of strategies that can be considered to inform 
these key constituencies and achieve policy impact. Ideally, the early stages 
of the evaluation planning will include a dissemination or policy impact 
strategy. This strategy should be agreed to up front, clearly spelling out the 
evaluation policy objective (for example, expansion of a more cost-eff ective 
intervention model), the key audiences that the evaluation intends to reach, 
the communication strategies to be used, and a budget for conducting dis-
semination activities. While the format and content of the dissemination 
activities and products will vary on a case-by-case basis, we provide some 
tips and general guidelines in the remainder of this chapter. Box 14.2 lists 
some outreach and dissemination tools.
Reports are typically the ﬁ rst outlet for the complete set of evaluation 
results. We recommend keeping reports to a moderate length, in the range 
of 30 to 50 pages, including an abstract of 1 page or less, and a 2 to 4-page 
executive summary with the principal results and recommendations. 
Technical details, associated documentation, and supporting analysis 
such  as robustness and falsiﬁ cation tests can be presented in annexes or 
appendixes.
Box 14.2: Outreach and Dissemination Tools
Here are some examples of outlets for disseminating impact evaluations:
• Slide shows about the program and evaluation results
• Videos that feature benefi ciaries giving their view of the program and how it affects 
their lives
• Short policy notes explaining the evaluation and summarizing policy recommendations
• Blogs by researchers and policy makers that explain the importance of the evaluation
• Full reports after fi nal results have come in, with strong executive summaries to ensure 
that readers can quickly understand the main fi ndings
• Media invitations that let journalists see the program in action and report results.
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Publishing the impact evaluation as an academic working paper or arti-
cle in a peer-reviewed scientiﬁ c journal can be a laborious but very worth-
while ﬁ nal step in writing up the evaluation results. The rigorous peer 
reviews required for the publication process will provide valuable feedback 
for improving the analysis and interpretation of results, and publication can 
provide a strong signal to policy makers as to the quality and credibility of an 
evaluation’s results.
Based on the agreed dissemination strategy, reports and papers can 
be  published through various outlets, including on the program website; 
through the evaluating institution’s website; and as part of working paper 
series, peer-reviewed academic journals, and books.
While evaluation reports and academic papers serve as the foundation 
for the dissemination strategy, their reach to a broader audience outside the 
community of practice and academia may be limited by their length and 
technical language. The evaluation team, perhaps in collaboration with 
communication experts, might ﬁ nd it useful to produce short articles writ-
ten in a storytelling or journalistic fashion, with clear and simple language 
for dissemination to broader audiences. Short articles can be published in 
the form of policy briefs, newsletters, bulletins, and infographics. For 
these publications it will be particularly helpful to eliminate technical jar-
gon and translate results into visually appealing representations, including 
pictures, charts, and graphs (box 14.3).
Box 14.3: Disseminating Impact Evaluations Effectively
Various publications showcase the results of impact evaluations in an accessible and user-
friendly format. These include two updates with a regional focus:
• Impact evaluation results from programs throughout Latin America and the Caribbean are 
featured in the Development Effectiveness Overview, published yearly by the Offi ce of 
Strategic Planning and Development Effectiveness at the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB). Results are summarized in short, easy-to-read articles, which include one-
page infographic summaries that distill the key impact evaluation question, methods, 
results, and policy recommendations using fi gures, graphics, and icons that allow 
 readers to grasp the key messages very quickly and intuitively. The 2014 Development 
Effectiveness Overview includes results from impact evaluations of programs as diverse 
as tourism in Argentina, job training in the Dominican Republic, agricultural productivity 
in Bolivia, and youth orchestras in Peru.
• The World Bank’s Africa Impact Evaluation Update brings together the latest evidence 
from the region. It focused on gender in 2013 and on agriculture and land in 2014.
Sources: http://deo.iadb.org and http://www.worldbank.org.
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Evaluation teams can generate a set of presentations that accompany 
written reports and short articles. Presentations should be tailored to the 
speciﬁ c audience. A good starting point is to produce a technical presenta-
tion for project staff  and academic audiences, and another shorter and less 
technical presentation for policy makers and civil society. While the key 
ﬁ ndings and policy recommendations will be the same, the structure and 
content of these two types of presentation will have important variations. 
The technical presentation should focus on building credibility for the 
results through presentation of the evaluation methods, data, and analysis 
before reaching results and recommendations. A presentation targeted to 
policy makers should emphasize the development problem that the inter-
vention is meant to address and the practical implications of ﬁ ndings, while 
skimming over technical details.
To take advantage of expanding access to the Internet in developing 
countries and low-cost alternatives for producing multimedia, evaluation 
teams can also consider a range of media to disseminate evaluation ﬁ ndings, 
from websites to audio and video pieces. Short video clips can be a powerful 
way to transmit complex ideas through images and sound, allowing the 
evaluation story to unfold in a way that is more quickly and fully compre-
hensible than typical print media (box 14.4).
Finally, armed with a variety of dissemination products, the evaluation 
team must be proactive about disseminating these products to consumers 
within the program, government, and broader community of practice so 
they reach the intended users and can be assimilated into the decision- 
making process and policy debate. The process of dissemination happens 
Box 14.4: Disseminating Impact Evaluations Online
Here are some noteworthy examples of online dissemination of impact evaluation results:
• The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) organizes evidence from impact 
evaluations by sector, including policy briefs, systematic reviews, and evidence gap 
maps.
• The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) disseminates evidence from impact 
evaluations conducted by affi liated researchers, including policy briefs, cost- effectiveness 
analysis and links to academic papers.
• The World Bank’s Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) presents briefs, newsletters, 
and reports highlighting results from impact evaluations of World Bank projects.
• The World Bank’s Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund (SIEF) includes videos, briefs, and 
interviews.
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through face-to-face meetings between the evaluation team and program 
manager, lobbying with high-level policy makers, presentations in seminars 
and conferences where academics and members of the community of prac-
tice gather to learn about the latest developments in development research 
and evaluation, interviews and news programs on radio and television, and 
increasingly through the Internet. Blogs and social media in particular can 
be cost-eff ective ways to reach large numbers of potential users and to cap-
ture traffi  c and guide readers toward the array of products available from a 
given evaluation (box 14.5). While the particular strategies will vary on a 
case-by-case basis, we again recommend planning and budgeting the dis-
semination outlets and activities early on, so that the results of the evalua-
tion can reach their intended audiences quickly and eff ectively, thus 
maximizing the policy impact.
Additional Resources
 • For accompanying material to the book and hyperlinks to additional resources, 
please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (http://www.worldbank 
.org / ieinpractice).
 • The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) and the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) have developed an online Policy Impact Toolkit 
to help disseminate and use evidence from impact evaluations for decision 
making.
Box 14.5: Impact Evaluation Blogs
Here are a few examples of blogs that regularly feature the results of impact evaluations:
• World Bank Development Impact Blog
• Inter-American Bank Development Effectiveness Blog
• Innovations for Poverty Action Blog.

The fourth part of the book provides guidance on how to get data for an impact 
evaluation, including choosing the sample and fi nding adequate sources of data.
Chapter 15 discusses how to draw a sample from a population of interest, and 
how to conduct power calculations to determine the appropriate size of the 
impact evaluation sample. The chapter focuses on describing the main intu-
ition behind sampling and power calculations. It also highlights the elements 
that the policy team needs to provide to the research team or technical expert 
responsible for undertaking sampling and power calculations.
Chapter 16 reviews the various sources of data that impact evaluations 
can use. It highlights when existing sources of data can be used, including 
administrative data. Since many evaluations require the collection of new data, 
HOW TO GET DATA FOR 
AN IMPACT  EVALUATION
Part 4
the chapter discusses the steps in collecting new survey data: determining who 
will collect the data, developing and piloting data collection instruments, con-
ducting fi eldwork and quality control, and processing and storing data.
Chapter 17 provides a conclusion to the overall book. It briefl y reviews the core 
elements of a well-designed impact evaluation, as well as some tips to mitigate 
common risks in conducting an impact evaluation. It also provides some per-
spectives on recent growth in the use of impact evaluation and related institu-
tionalization efforts.
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Choosing a Sample
CHAPTER 15
Sampling and Power Calculations
Once you have chosen a method to select a comparison group and estimate 
the counterfactual, one of the next steps in undertaking an impact evalua-
tion is to determine what data you will need and the sample required to 
precisely estimate diff erences in outcomes between the treatment group 
and the comparison group. In this chapter, we discuss how you can draw a 
sample from a population of interest (sampling) and how you can determine 
how large the sample needs to be to provide precise estimates of program 
impact (power calculations). Sampling and power calculations require 
 speciﬁ c technical skills and are often commissioned to a dedicated expert. 
In this chapter, we describe the basics of performing sampling and power 
calculations, and we highlight the elements that the policy team needs to be 
able to provide to technical experts.
Drawing a Sample
Sampling is the process of drawing units from a population of interest to 
 estimate the characteristics of that population. Sampling is often necessary, 
as typically it is not possible to directly observe and measure outcomes for the 
entire population of interest. For instance, if you are interested in knowing 
the average height of children below age two in a country, it would be very 
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hard, costly, and time consuming to directly visit and measure all children in 
the population. Instead, a sample of children drawn from the population can 
be used to infer the average characteristics in the population (ﬁ gure 15.1).
The process by which a sample is drawn from the population of interest 
is crucial. The principles of sampling provide guidance to draw representa-
tive samples. In practice, there are three main steps to draw a sample:
1. Determine the population of interest.
2. Identify a sampling frame.
3. Draw as many units from the sampling frame as required by power 
calculations.
First, the population of interest needs to be clearly deﬁned. This requires 
accurately specifying the unit within the population of interest for which 
outcomes will be measured, and clearly deﬁ ning the geographic coverage 
or any other relevant attributes that characterize the population of interest. 
For example, if you are managing an early childhood development pro-
gram, you may be interested in measuring the impact of the program on 
cognitive outcomes for young children between ages three and six in the 
entire country, only for children in rural areas, or only for children enrolled 
in preschool.
Second, once the population of interest has been deﬁned, a sampling 
frame must be established. The sampling frame is the most comprehensive 
list that can be obtained of units in the population of interest. Ideally, the 
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Figure 15.1 Using a Sample to Infer Average Characteristics of the 
Population of Interest
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sampling frame should exactly coincide with the population of interest. 
A  full  and totally up-to-date census of the population of interest would 
 constitute an ideal sampling frame. In practice, existing lists, such as popula-
tion censuses, facility censuses, or enrollment listings, are often used as 
 sampling frames.
An adequate sampling frame is required to ensure that the conclusions 
reached from analyzing a sample can be generalized to the entire popula-
tion. Indeed, a sampling frame that does not exactly coincide with the popu-
lation of interest creates a coverage bias, as illustrated in ﬁgure 15.2. If 
coverage bias occurs, results from the sample do not have external validity 
for the entire population of interest, but only for the population included in 
the sampling frame. The degree to which statistics computed from the sam-
ple can be generalized to the population of interest as a whole depends on 
the magnitude of the coverage bias, in other words, the lack of overlap 
between the sampling frame and the population of interest.
Coverage biases constitute a risk, and the construction of sampling 
frames requires careful eff ort. For instance, census data may contain the list 
of all units in a population. However, if much time has elapsed between the 
census and the time the sample data are collected, the sampling frame may 
no longer be fully up to date. Moreover, census data may not contain suffi  -
cient information on speciﬁc attributes to build a sampling frame. If the 
population of interest consists of children attending preschool, and the cen-
sus does not contain data on preschool enrollment, complementary enroll-
ment data or facility listings would be needed.
Figure 15.2 A Valid Sampling Frame Covers the Entire Population of Interest
Valid
sampling frame
Invalid
sampling frame
Population
of interest
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Once you have identiﬁed the population of interest and a sampling frame, 
you must choose a method to draw the sample. Various alternative proce-
dures can be used.
Probabilistic sampling methods are the most rigorous, as they assign a 
well-deﬁned probability for each unit to be drawn. The three main probabi-
listic sampling methods are the following:
 • Random sampling. Every unit in the population has exactly the same 
probability of being drawn.1
 • Stratiﬁed random sampling. The population is divided into groups (for 
example, male and female), and random sampling is performed within 
each group. As a result, every unit in each group (or stratum) has the 
same probability of being drawn. Provided that each group is large 
enough, stratiﬁed sampling makes it possible to draw inferences about 
outcomes not only at the level of the population but also within each 
group. Stratiﬁ ed sampling is useful when you would like to oversample 
subgroups in the population that are small (like minorities) in order to 
study them more carefully. Stratiﬁcation is essential for evaluations that 
aim to compare program impacts between such subgroups.
 • Cluster sampling. Units are grouped in clusters, and a random sample of 
clusters is drawn. Thereafter, either all units in those clusters constitute 
the sample or a number of units within the cluster are randomly drawn. 
This means that each cluster has a well-deﬁned probability of being 
selected, and units within a selected cluster also have a well-deﬁned 
probability of being drawn.
In the context of an impact evaluation, the procedure for drawing a 
 sample is often determined by the eligibility rules of the program under 
evaluation. As will be described in the discussion on sample size, if the 
smallest viable unit of implementation is larger than the unit of observation, 
randomized assignment of beneﬁts will create clusters. For this reason, 
cluster sampling often arises in impact evaluation studies.
Nonprobabilistic sampling can create serious sampling errors. For 
instance, suppose that a national survey is undertaken by asking a group of 
interviewers to collect household data from the dwelling closest to the 
school in each village. When such a nonprobabilistic sampling procedure is 
used, it is likely that the sample will not be representative of the population 
of interest as a whole. In particular, a coverage bias will arise, as remote 
dwellings will not be surveyed.
It is necessary to pay careful attention to the sampling frame and the 
sampling procedure to determine whether results obtained from a given 
sample can be generalized to the entire population of interest. Even if the 
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sampling frame has perfect coverage and a probabilistic sampling procedure 
is used, nonsampling errors can also aff ect the internal and external validity 
of the impact evaluation. Nonsampling errors are discussed in chapter 16. 
Lastly, there is sometimes confusion between random sampling and 
 randomized assignment. Box 15.1 makes clear that random sampling is very 
diff erent from randomized assignment.
Box 15.1: Random Sampling Is Not Suffi cient for Impact Evaluation
Confusion sometimes arises between ran-
dom sampling and randomized assignment. 
What if someone proudly tells you that they 
are implementing an impact evaluation by 
interviewing a random sample of partici-
pants and nonparticipants? Assume that you 
observe a group of individuals participating 
in an employment program, and a group 
of  individuals not participating in the pro-
gram. What if you were to take a random 
sample of each of these two groups? 
The fi rst fi gure illustrates that you would 
obtain a random sample of participants 
and a random sample of nonparticipants. 
Figure B15.1.1 Random Sampling among Noncomparable Groups of 
Participants and Nonparticipants
Participants in a program Non Participants
(continued)
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If participants and nonparticipants have dif-
ferent characteristics, so will the sample of 
participants and nonparticipants. Random 
sampling does not make two noncompara-
ble groups comparable, and thus does not 
provide internal validity for the impact evalu-
ation. This is why random sampling is not 
suffi cient for impact evaluation.
As should be clear from the discussion in 
part 2, randomized assignment of program 
benefi ts is different from random sampling. 
The randomized assignment process starts 
from an eligible population of interest and 
uses a randomization procedure to assign 
units (usually consisting of people or groups 
of people, such as children in a school) from 
the eligible population to a treatment group 
that will receive an intervention and a com-
parison group that will not. The randomization 
process of a program in the second fi gure is 
different than the random sampling process 
described in the fi rst fi gure. As discussed in 
part 2, when randomized assignment is well 
implemented, it contributes to the internal 
validity of the impact evaluation. Random 
sampling can be useful to ensure external 
validity, to the extent that the sample is ran-
domly drawn from the population of interest.
Box 15.1: Random Sampling Is Not Suffi cient for Impact Evaluation (continued)
Figure B15.1.2 Randomized Assignment of Program Benefi ts between a Treatment 
Group and a Comparison Group
Eligible Population 
Comparison Group 
(Non participants in the program) 
Treatment Group 
(Participants in the program) 
Comparison
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In the rest of this chapter, we discuss how the size of the sample matters 
for the precision of the impact evaluation. As will become clear, relatively 
larger samples are needed to obtain precise estimates of the population 
characteristics. Larger samples are also needed to be able to obtain more 
precise estimates of diff erences between treatment groups and comparison 
groups, that is, to estimate the impact of a program.
Deciding on the Size of a Sample for Impact 
Evaluation: Power Calculations
As discussed, sampling describes the process of drawing a sample of 
units from a population of interest to estimate the characteristics of that 
population. Larger samples give more precise estimates of the popula-
tion characteristics. Exactly how large do samples need to be for impact 
evaluation? The calculations to determine how large the sample must be 
are called power calculations. We discuss the basic intuition behind 
power calculations by focusing on the simplest case: an evaluation con-
ducted using a randomized assignment method, testing the eff ectiveness 
of a program against a comparison group that does not receive an inter-
vention, and assuming that noncompliance is not an issue.2 We brieﬂ y 
discuss additional considerations beyond this simple case at the end of 
the chapter.
The Rationale for Power Calculations
Power calculations indicate the minimum sample size needed to conduct 
an  impact evaluation and to convincingly answer the policy question of 
interest. In particular, power calculations can be used to
 • Assess whether existing data sets are large enough to conduct an impact 
evaluation.
 • Avoid collecting too little data. If the sample is too small, you may not be 
able to detect positive impact—even if it existed—and may thus conclude 
that the program had no eff ect. That could lead to a policy decision to 
eliminate the program, and that would be detrimental.
 • Help make decisions about adequate sample size. Larger sample sizes 
provide more accurate estimates of program impacts, but collecting 
information can be very costly. Power calculations provide key inputs to 
assess trade-off s between costs required to collect additional data and 
gains from greater precision within the impact evaluation.
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Power calculations provide an indication of the smallest sample (and 
lowest budget) with which it is possible to measure the impact of a program, 
that is, the smallest sample that will allow meaningful diff erences in out-
comes between the treatment and comparison groups to be detected. Power 
calculations are thus crucial for determining which programs are successful 
and which are not.
As discussed in chapter 1, the basic evaluation question tackled by impact 
evaluations is, what is the impact or causal eff ect of a program on an out-
come of interest? The simple hypothesis embedded in that question can be 
restated as follows: Is the program impact diff erent from zero? In the case of 
randomized assignment, answering this question requires two steps:
1. Estimate the average outcomes for the treatment and comparison groups.
2. Assess whether a diff erence exists between the average outcome for the 
treatment group and the average outcome for the comparison group.
We now discuss how to estimate average outcomes for each group, and 
then how to test for a diff erence between groups.
Estimating Average Outcomes for the Treatment and 
Comparison Groups
Assume that you are interested in estimating the impact of a nutrition pro-
gram on the weight of children at age two, and that 200,000 children are 
eligible for the program. From all eligible children, 100,000 were randomly 
assigned to participate in the program. The 100,000 eligible children who 
were not randomly assigned to the program serve as the comparison group. 
As a ﬁrst step, you will need to estimate the average weight of the children 
who participated and the average weight of those who did not.
To determine the average weight of participating children, one could 
weigh every one of the 100,000 participating children and then average the 
weights. Of course, doing that would be extremely costly. Luckily, it is not 
necessary to measure every child. The average can be estimated using the 
average weight of a sample drawn from the population of participating 
 children.3 The more children in the sample, the closer the sample average 
will be to the true average. When a sample is small, the average weight con-
stitutes a very imprecise estimate of the average in the population. For 
example, a sample of two children will not give a precise estimate. In con-
trast, a sample of 10,000 children will produce a more precise estimate that 
is much closer to the true average weight. In general, the more observations 
in the sample, the more precise the statistics obtained from the sample will 
be (ﬁ gure 15.3).4
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So now we know that with a larger sample we provide a more precise 
and accurate image of the population of participating children. The same 
will be true for nonparticipating children: as the sample of nonparticipating 
children gets larger, we will know more precisely what that population 
looks like. But why should we care? If we are able to estimate the average 
outcome (weight) of participating and nonparticipating children more pre-
cisely, we will also be able to tell more precisely the diff erence in weight 
between the two groups—and that is the estimate of the impact of the pro-
gram. To put it another way, if you have only a vague idea of the average 
weight of children in the participating (treatment) and nonparticipating 
(comparison) groups, then how can you have a precise idea of the diff erence 
in the weight of the two groups? That’s right; you can’t. In the following sec-
tion, we will explore this idea in a slightly more formal way.
Comparing the Average Outcomes between the Treatment and 
Comparison Groups
Once you have estimated the average outcome (weight) for the treatment 
group (participating children selected by randomized assignment) and the 
comparison group (nonparticipating children selected by randomized 
assignment), you can proceed to determine whether the two outcomes 
Figure 15.3 A Large Sample Is More Likely to Resemble the Population of 
Interest
Population of interest
A large
sample
A small
sample
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are diff erent. This part is clear: you subtract the averages and check what 
the diff erence is. In statistical terms, the impact evaluation tests the null 
(or default) hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis.
The null hypothesis is the hypothesis that the program does not have an 
impact. It is expressed as:
H0 : Impact or diff erence between outcomes in treatment and comparison 
groups = 0.
Ha : Impact or diff erence between outcomes in treatment and comparison 
groups ≠ 0.
Imagine that in the nutrition program example, you start with a sample 
of two treated children and two comparison children. With such a small 
sample, your estimate of the average weight of treated and comparison chil-
dren, and thus your estimate of the diff erence between the two groups, will 
not be very reliable. You can check this by drawing diff erent samples of two 
treated and two comparison children. What you will ﬁnd is that the esti-
mated impact of the program bounces around a lot.
By contrast, let us say that you start with a sample of 1,000 treated chil-
dren and 1,000 comparison children. As discussed, your estimates of the 
average weight of both groups will be much more precise. Therefore, your 
estimate of the diff erence between the two groups will also be more precise.
For example, say that you ﬁnd that the average weight in the sample of 
treatment (participating) children is 12.2 kilograms (kg), and the average in 
the sample of comparison (nonparticipating) children is 12.0 kg. The diff er-
ence between the two groups is 0.2 kg. If these numbers came from samples 
of two observations each, you would not be very conﬁdent that the impact of 
the program is truly positive because the entire 0.2 kg could be due to the 
lack of precision in your estimates. However, if these numbers come from 
samples of 1,000 observations each, you would be more conﬁdent that you 
are quite close to the true program impact, which in this case would be 
positive.
The key question then becomes, Exactly how large must the sample be to 
allow you to know that a positive estimated impact is due to true program 
impact, rather than to lack of precision in your estimates?
Two Potential Errors in Impact Evaluations
When testing whether a program has an impact, two types of error can 
be made. A type I error is made when an evaluation concludes that a pro-
gram has had an impact, when in reality it had no impact. In the case of the 
hypothetical nutrition intervention, this would happen if you, as a member 
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of the evaluation team, were to conclude that the average weight of the 
 children in the treated sample is higher than that of the children in the 
 comparison sample, even though the average weight of the children in 
the two populations is in fact equal and observed diff erences were purely 
 coincidental. In this case, the positive impact you saw came purely from the 
lack of precision of your estimates.
A type II error is the opposite kind of error. A type II error occurs when 
an evaluation concludes that the program has had no impact, when in fact it 
has had an impact. In the case of the nutrition intervention, this would hap-
pen if you were to conclude that the average weight of the children in the 
two samples is the same, even though the average weight of the children 
in  the treatment population is in fact higher than that of the children in 
the  comparison population. Again, the impact should have been positive, 
but because of lack of precision in your estimates, you concluded that the 
program had zero impact.
When testing the hypothesis that a program has had an impact, statisti-
cians can limit the size of type I errors. The likelihood of a type I error can 
be set by a parameter called the signiﬁ cance level. The signiﬁ cance level is 
often ﬁxed at 5 percent—meaning that you can be 95 percent conﬁdent in 
concluding that the program has had an impact. If you are very concerned 
about committing a type I error, you can conservatively set a lower signiﬁ -
cance level—for example, 1 percent, so that you are 99 percent conﬁdent in 
concluding that the program has had an impact.
However, type II errors are also worrying for policy makers. Many factors 
aff ect the likelihood of committing a type II error, but the sample size is cru-
cial. If the average weight of 50,000 treated children is the same as the aver-
age weight of 50,000 comparison children, then you probably can conﬁdently 
conclude that the program has had no impact. By contrast, if a sample of two 
treatment children weigh on average the same as a sample of two comparison 
children, it is harder to reach a reliable conclusion. Is the average weight sim-
ilar because the intervention has had no impact or because the data are not 
suffi  cient to test the hypothesis in such a small sample? Drawing large sam-
ples makes it less likely that you will observe only children who weigh the 
same simply by (bad) luck. In large samples, the diff erence in mean between 
the treated sample and comparison sample provides a better estimate of the 
true diff erence in mean between all treated and all comparison units.
The power (or statistical power) of an impact evaluation is the probability 
that it will detect a diff erence between the treatment and comparison 
groups, when in fact one exists. An impact evaluation has a high power 
if there is a low risk of not detecting real program impacts: that is, of com-
mitting a type II error. The previous examples show that the size of the 
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sample is a crucial determinant of the power of an impact evaluation. The 
following sections will further illustrate this point.
Why Power Calculations Matter for Policy
The purpose of power calculations is to determine how large a sample is 
required to avoid concluding that a program has had no impact, when it has 
in fact had one (a type II error). The power of a test is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of a type II error.
An impact evaluation has high power if a type II error is unlikely to 
 happen—meaning that you are unlikely to be disappointed by results 
 showing that the program being evaluated has had no impact, when in 
 reality it did have an impact.
From a policy perspective, underpowered impact evaluations with a 
high  probability of type II errors are not only unhelpful but can also be 
very costly. A high probability of type II error jeopardizes the potential for an 
impact evaluation to identify statistically signiﬁ cant results. Putting resources 
into underpowered impact evaluations is therefore a risky investment.
Underpowered impact evaluations can also have serious practical conse-
quences. For example, in the hypothetical nutrition intervention previously 
mentioned, if you were to conclude that the program was not eff ective, even 
though it was, policy makers might close down a program that, in fact, 
beneﬁts children. It is therefore crucial to minimize the probability of type 
II errors by using large enough samples in impact evaluations. That is why 
carrying out power calculations is so crucial and relevant.
Power Calculations Step by Step
We now turn to the basic principles of power calculations, focusing on the 
simple case of a randomly assigned program. Carrying out power calcula-
tions requires examining the following ﬁ ve main questions:
1. Does the program operate through clusters?
2. What is/are the outcome indicator(s)?
3. What is the minimum level of impact that would justify the investment 
that has been made in the intervention?
4. What is the mean of the outcome for the population of interest? What is 
the underlying variance of the outcome indicator?
5. What are reasonable levels of statistical power and statistical signiﬁ cance 
for the evaluation being conducted?
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Each of these questions applies to the speciﬁc policy context in which 
you have decided to conduct an impact evaluation.
The ﬁrst step in power calculations is to determine whether the program 
that you want to evaluate creates any clusters through its implementation. 
An intervention whose level of intervention (often places) is diff erent from 
the level at which you would like to measure outcomes (often people) cre-
ates clusters around the location of the intervention. For example, it may be 
necessary to implement a program at the hospital, school, or village level (in 
other words, through clusters), but you measure its impact on patients, 
 students, or villagers (see table 15.1).5 When an impact evaluation involves 
clusters, it is the number of clusters that largely determines the useful sam-
ple size. By contrast, the number of individuals within clusters matters less. 
We discuss this further below.
The nature of any sample data built from programs that are clustered is a 
bit diff erent from that of samples obtained from programs that are not. As a 
result, power calculations will involve slightly diff erent steps, depending 
on whether a program randomly assigns beneﬁts among clusters or simply 
assigns beneﬁts randomly among all units in a population. We will discuss 
each situation in turn. We start with the principles of power calculations 
when there are no clusters: that is, when the treatment is assigned at the 
level at which outcomes are observed. We then go on to discuss power cal-
culations when clusters are present.
Power Calculations without Clusters
Assume that you have solved the ﬁrst question by establishing that the 
 program’s beneﬁts are not assigned by clusters. In other words, the program 
to be evaluated randomly assigns beneﬁts among all units in an eligible 
population.
In the second step, you must identify the most important outcome indica-
tors that the program was designed to improve. These indicators derive 
from the program objective, theory of change, and the fundamental evalua-
tion research question, as discussed in part 1. Power calculations will also 
yield insights into the type of indicators for which impact evaluations can 
Table 15.1 Examples of Clusters
Benefi t
Level at which benefi ts are 
assigned (cluster)
Unit at which outcome 
is measured
Cash transfers Village Households 
Malaria treatment School Individuals
Training program Neighborhood Individuals
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identify impacts. Indeed, as we will further discuss, samples of varying sizes 
may be required to measure impacts on diff erent indicators.
Third, you must determine the minimum impact that would justify the 
investment that has been made in the intervention. This is fundamentally a 
policy question, rather than a technical one. Is a cash transfer program a 
worthwhile investment if it reduces poverty by 5 percent, 10 percent, or 
15  percent? Is an active labor market program worth implementing if it 
increases earnings by 5 percent, 10 percent, or 15 percent? The answer is 
highly speciﬁ c to the context, but in all contexts it is necessary to determine 
the change in the outcome indicators that would justify the investment made 
in the program. Put another way, what is the level of impact below which an 
intervention should be considered unsuccessful? The answer to that ques-
tion provides you with the minimum detectable eff ect that the impact evalua-
tion needs to be able to identify. Answering this question will depend not only 
on the cost of the program and the type of beneﬁts that it provides, but also on 
the opportunity cost of not investing funds in an alternative intervention.
While minimum detectable eff ects can be based on policy objectives, other 
approaches can be used to establish them. It can be useful to benchmark min-
imum detectable eff ects against results from studies on similar programs to 
shed light on the magnitude of impacts that can be expected. For instance, 
education interventions often measure gains in terms of  standardized test 
scores. Existing studies show that an increase in 0.1 standard deviation is 
relatively small, while an increase of 0.5 standard deviation is relatively large. 
Alternatively, ex ante simulations can be  performed to assess the range of 
impacts that are realistic under various hypotheses. Examples of ex ante sim-
ulations were provided in chapter 1 for conditional cash transfer programs. 
Lastly, ex ante economic analysis can shed light on the size of the impacts 
that would be needed for the rate of return on a given investment to be suffi  -
ciently high. For instance, the annualized earnings gains triggered by a job 
training program would need to be above a prevailing market interest rate.
Intuitively, it is easier to identify a large diff erence between two groups 
than it is to identify a small diff erence between two groups. For an impact 
evaluation to identify a small diff erence between the treatment and com-
parison groups, a very precise estimate of the diff erence in mean outcomes 
between the two groups will be needed. This requires a large sample. 
Alternatively, for interventions that are judged to be worthwhile only if they 
lead to large changes in outcome indicators, the samples needed to conduct 
an impact evaluation will be smaller. Nevertheless, the minimum detectable 
eff ect should be set conservatively, since any impact smaller than the mini-
mum desired eff ect is less likely to be detected.
Fourth, to conduct power calculations, you must ask an expert to esti-
mate some basic parameters, such as a baseline mean and variance of the 
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outcome indicators. These benchmark values should preferably be obtained 
from existing data collected in a setting similar to the one where the pro-
gram under study will be implemented, or from a pilot survey in the popula-
tion of interest.6 It is very important to note that the more variable the 
outcomes of interest prove to be, the larger the sample that will be needed to 
estimate a precise treatment eff ect. In the example of the hypothetical 
nutrition intervention, children’s weight is the outcome of interest. If all 
individuals weigh the same at the baseline, it will be feasible to estimate the 
impact of the nutrition intervention in a small sample. By contrast, if base-
line weights among children are very variable, then a larger sample will be 
required to estimate the program’s impact.
Fifth, the evaluation team needs to determine a reasonable power level 
and signiﬁ cance level for the planned impact evaluation. As stated earlier, 
the power of a test is equal to 1 minus the probability of any type II error. 
Therefore, the power ranges from 0 to 1, with a high value indicating less 
risk of failing to identify an existing impact. A power of 0.8 is a widely used 
benchmark for power calculations. It means that you will ﬁnd an impact in 
80 percent of the cases where one has occurred. A higher level of power of 
0.9 (or 90 percent) often provides a useful benchmark but is more conserva-
tive, increasing the required sample sizes.
The signiﬁ cance level is the probability of committing a type I error. It is 
usually set at 5 percent, so that you can be 95 percent conﬁdent in conclud-
ing that the program has had an impact if you do ﬁ nd a signiﬁ cant impact. 
Other common signiﬁ cance levels are 1 percent and 10 percent. The smaller 
your signiﬁ cance level, the more conﬁ dent you can be that the estimated 
impact is real.
Once these ﬁ ve questions have been addressed, the power calculations 
expert can calculate the required sample size using standard statistical 
 software.7 The power calculation will indicate the required sample size, 
depending on the parameters established in steps 1 to 5. The computations 
themselves are straightforward, once policy-relevant parameters have been 
determined (particularly in steps 2 and 3).8 If you are interested in the 
implementation of power calculations, the technical companion available 
on the book website provides examples of power calculations using Stata 
and Optimal Design.
When seeking advice from statistical experts, the evaluation team should 
ask for an analysis of the sensitivity of the power calculation to changes in 
the assumptions. That is, it is important to understand how much the 
required sample size will have to increase under more conservative assump-
tions (such as lower expected impact, higher variance in the outcome indi-
cator, or a higher level of power). It is also good practice to commission 
power calculations for various outcome indicators, as the required sample 
276 Impact Evaluation in Practice
sizes can vary substantially if some outcome indicators are much more 
 variable than others. Finally, the power calculations can also indicate the 
sample size needed to make comparison of program impacts across 
 speciﬁ c  subgroups (for example, men or women, or other subgroups of 
the population of interest). Each subgroup would need to have the required 
sample size.
  Evaluating the Impact of HISP: Deciding How Big a 
Sample Is Needed to Evaluate an Expanded HISP
Returning to our example in part 2, let us say that the ministry of health 
was pleased with the quality and results of the evaluation of the Health 
Insurance Subsidy Program (HISP). However, before scaling up the pro-
gram, the ministry decides to pilot an expanded version of the program, 
which they call HISP+. The original HISP pays for part of the cost of 
health insurance for poor rural households, covering costs of primary 
care and drugs, but it does not cover hospitalization. The minister of 
health wonders whether an expanded HISP+ that also covers hospital-
ization would further lower out-of-pocket health expenditures of poor 
households. The ministry asks you to design an impact evaluation to 
assess whether HISP+ would decrease health expenditures for poor 
rural households.
In this case, choosing an impact evaluation design is not a challenge 
for you: HISP+ has limited resources and cannot be implemented univer-
sally immediately. As a result, you have concluded that randomized 
assignment would be the most viable and robust impact evaluation 
method. The minister of health understands how well the randomized 
assignment method can work and is supportive.
To ﬁnalize the design of the impact evaluation, you have hired a statis-
tician who will help you establish how big a sample is needed. Before he 
starts working, the statistician asks you for some key inputs. He uses a 
checklist of ﬁ ve questions.
1. Will the HISP+ program generate clusters? At this point, you are not 
totally sure. You believe that it might be possible to randomize the 
expanded beneﬁt package at the household level among all poor rural 
households that already beneﬁt from HISP. However, you are aware 
that the minister of health may prefer to assign the expanded program 
at the village level, and that would create clusters. The statistician sug-
gests conducting power calculations for a benchmark case without 
clusters, and then considering how results would change with clusters.
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2. What is the outcome indicator? You explain that the government 
is  interested in a well-deﬁned indicator: out-of-pocket health 
 expenditures of poor households. The statistician looks for the most 
up-to-date source to obtain benchmark values for this indicator and 
suggests using the follow-up survey from the HISP evaluation. He 
notes that among households that received HISP, the per capita yearly 
out-of-pocket health expenditures have averaged US$7.84.
3. What is the minimum level of impact that would justify the investment 
in the intervention? In other words, what decrease in out-of-pocket health 
expenditures below the average of US$7.84 would make this interven-
tion worthwhile? The statistician stresses that this is not only a techni-
cal consideration, but truly a policy question; that is why a policy maker 
like you must set the minimum eff ect that the evaluation should be able 
to detect. You remember that based on ex ante economic analysis, the 
HISP+ program would be considered eff ective if it reduced household 
out-of-pocket health expenditures by US$2. Still, you know that for the 
purpose of the evaluation, it may be better to be conservative in deter-
mining the minimum detectable impact, since any smaller impact is 
unlikely to be captured. To understand how the required sample size 
varies based on the minimum detectable eff ect, you  suggest that the 
statistician perform calculations for a minimum reduction of out-of-
pocket health expenditures of US$1, US$2, and US$3.
4. What is the variance of the outcome indicator in the population of 
interest? The statistician goes back to the data set of treated HISP 
households, pointing out that the standard deviation of out-of-pocket 
health expenditures is US$8.
5. What would be a reasonable level of power for the evaluation being 
conducted? The statistician adds that power calculations are usually 
conducted for a power between 0.8 and 0.9. He recommends 0.9, 
but off ers to perform robustness checks later for a less conservative 
level of 0.8.
Equipped with all this information, the statistician undertakes the 
power calculations. As agreed, he starts with the more conservative case 
of a power of 0.9. He produces the results shown in table 15.2.
The statistician concludes that to detect a US$2 decrease in out-of-pocket 
health expenditures with a power of 0.9, the sample needs to contain at 
least 672 units (336 treated units and 336 comparison units, with no 
 clustering). He notes that if you were satisﬁed to detect a US$3 decrease in 
out-of-pocket health expenditures, a smaller sample of at least 300 units 
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(150 units in each group) would be suffi  cient. By contrast, a much larger 
sample of at least 2,688 units (1,344 in each group) would be needed to 
detect a US$1 decrease in out-of-pocket health expenditures.
The statistician then produces another table for a power level of 0.8. 
Table 15.3 shows that the required sample sizes are smaller for a power 
of 0.8 than for a power of 0.9. To detect a US$2 reduction in household 
 out-of-pocket health expenditures, a total sample of at least 502 units 
would be suffi  cient. To detect a US$3 reduction, at least 224 units are 
needed. However, to detect a US$1 reduction, at least 2,008 units would 
be needed in the sample. The statistician stresses that the following 
results are typical of power calculations:
 • The higher (more conservative) the level of power, the larger the 
required sample size.
 • The smaller the impact to be detected, the larger the required sample 
size.
Table 15.2 Evaluating HISP+: Sample Size Required to Detect Various 
Minimum Detectable Effects, Power = 0.9
Minimum 
detectable effect
Treatment 
group
Comparison 
group
Total 
sample
US$1 1,344 1,344 2,688
US$2 336 336 672
US$3 150 150 300
Note: The minimum detectable effect describes the minimum reduction of household out-of- pocket 
health expenditures that can be detected by the impact evaluation. Power = 0.9, no clustering.
Table 15.3 Evaluating HISP+: Sample Size Required to Detect Various 
Minimum Detectable Effects, Power = 0.8
Minimum 
detectable effect
Treatment 
group
Comparison 
group
Total 
sample
US$1 1,004 1,004 2,008
US$2 251 251 502
US$3 112 112 224
Note: The minimum detectable effect describes the minimum reduction of household out-of-pocket 
health expenditures that can be detected by the impact evaluation. Power = 0.8, no clustering.
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The statistician asks whether you would like to conduct power calcu-
lations for other outcomes of interest. You suggest also considering the 
sample size required to detect whether HISP+ aff ects the hospitalization 
rate. In the sample of treated HISP villages, a household member visits 
the hospital in a given year in 5 percent of households; this provides a 
benchmark rate. The statistician produces a new table, which shows that 
relatively large samples would be needed to detect changes in the hospi-
talization rate (table 15.4) of 1, 2, or 3 percentage points from the baseline 
rate of 5 percent.
Table 15.4 shows that sample size requirements are larger for this out-
come (the hospitalization rate) than for out-of-pocket health expendi-
tures. The statistician concludes that if you are interested in detecting 
impacts on both outcomes, you should use the larger sample sizes implied 
by the power calculations performed on the hospitalization rates. If sam-
ple sizes from the power calculations performed for out-of-pocket health 
expenditures are used, the statistician suggests letting the minister of 
health know that the evaluation will not have suffi  cient power to detect 
policy-relevant eff ects on hospitalization rates.
 HISP Question 8
A. Which sample size would you recommend to estimate the impact of 
HISP+ on out-of-pocket health expenditures?
B. Would that sample size be suffi  cient to detect changes in the hospital-
ization rate?
Table 15.4 Evaluating HISP+: Sample Size Required to Detect Various 
Minimum Desired Effects (Increase in Hospitalization Rate)
Power = 0.8, no clustering
Minimum 
detectable effect 
(percentage point)
Treatment 
group
Comparison 
group
Total 
sample
1 7,257 7,257 14,514
2 1,815 1,815 3,630
3 807 807 1,614
Note: The minimum desired effect describes the minimum change in the hospital utilization rate 
(expressed in percentage points) that can be detected by the impact evaluation.
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Power Calculations with Clusters
The previous discussion introduced the principles of carrying out power 
calculations for programs that do not create clusters. However, as discussed 
in part 2, some programs assign beneﬁts at the cluster level. We now brieﬂy 
describe how the basic principles of power calculations need to be adapted 
for clustered samples.
In the presence of clustering, an important guiding principle is that the 
number of clusters typically matters much more than the number of indi-
viduals within the clusters. A suffi  cient number of clusters is required to 
test convincingly whether a program has had an impact by comparing out-
comes in samples of treatment and comparison units. It is the number of 
clusters that largely determines the useful or eff ective sample size. If you 
randomly assign treatment among a small number of clusters, the treatment 
and comparison clusters are unlikely to be identical. Randomized assign-
ment between two districts, two schools, or two hospitals will not guarantee 
that the two clusters are similar. By contrast, randomly assigning an inter-
vention among 100 districts, 100 schools, or 100 hospitals is more likely to 
ensure that the treatment and comparison groups are similar. In short, a 
suffi  cient number of clusters is necessary to ensure that balance is achieved. 
Moreover, the number of clusters also matters for the precision of the 
 estimated treatment eff ects. A suffi  cient number of clusters is required to 
test the hypothesis that a program has an impact with suffi  cient power. 
When implementing an impact evaluation based on randomized assign-
ment, it is therefore very important to ensure that the number of clusters is 
large enough.
You can establish the number of clusters required for precise hypothe-
sis testing by conducting power calculations. Carrying out power calcula-
tions for cluster samples requires asking the same ﬁ ve questions listed 
above plus an additional one: How variable is the outcome indicator within 
clusters?
At the extreme, all outcomes within a cluster are perfectly correlated. For 
instance, it may be that household income is not especially variable within 
villages but that signiﬁcant inequalities in income occur between villages. 
In this case, if you consider adding an individual to your evaluation sample, 
adding an individual from a new village will provide much more additional 
power than adding an individual from a village that is already represented. 
Since outcomes are fully correlated within a cluster, adding a new individ-
ual from the existing cluster will not add any new information. Indeed, in 
this case, the second villager is likely to look very similar to the original 
 villager already included. In general, higher intra-cluster correlation in out-
comes (that is, higher correlation in outcomes or characteristics between 
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units that belong to the same cluster) increases the number of clusters 
required to achieve a given power level.
In clustered samples, power calculations highlight the trade-off s between 
adding clusters and adding observations within clusters. The relative 
increase in power from adding a unit to a new cluster is almost always larger 
than that from adding a unit to an existing cluster. Although the gain in 
power from adding a new cluster can be dramatic, adding clusters may also 
have operational implications and increase the cost of program implemen-
tation or data collection. Later in this chapter, we show how to conduct 
power  calculations with clusters in the case of HISP+ and discuss some of 
the trade-off s involved.
In many cases, at least 40 to 50 clusters in each treatment and compari-
son group are required to obtain suffi  cient power and guarantee balance 
of  baseline characteristics when using randomized assignment methods. 
However, the number may vary depending on the various parameters 
already discussed, as well as the intra-cluster correlation. In addition, 
as  will  be discussed further below, the number will likely increase when 
using methods other than randomized assignment (assuming all else is 
constant).
  Evaluating the Impact of HISP: Deciding How Big a 
Sample Is Needed to Evaluate an Expanded HISP with 
Clusters
After your ﬁrst discussion with the statistician about power calcula-
tions for HISP+, you decided to talk brieﬂy to the minister of health 
about the implications of randomly assigning the expanded HISP+ 
beneﬁts among all individuals in the population who receive the basic 
HISP plan. The consultation revealed that such a procedure would not 
be politically feasible: in that context, it would be hard to explain why 
one person would receive the expanded beneﬁts, while her neighbor 
would not.
Instead of randomization at the individual level, you therefore suggest 
randomly selecting a number of HISP villages to pilot HISP+. All villag-
ers in the selected village would then become eligible. This procedure 
will create clusters and thus require new power calculations. You now 
want to determine how large a sample is required to evaluate the impact 
of HISP+ when it is randomly assigned by cluster.
You consult with your statistician again. He reassures you: only a 
 little  more work is needed. On his checklist, only one question is left 
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unanswered. He needs to know how variable the outcome indicator is 
within clusters. Luckily, this is also a question he can answer using the 
HISP data. He ﬁnds that the within-village correlation of out-of-pocket 
health expenditures is equal to 0.04.
He also asks whether an upper limit has been placed on the number of 
villages in which it would be feasible to implement the new pilot. Since 
the program now has 100 HISP villages, you explain that you could have, 
at most, 50 treatment villages and 50 comparison villages for HISP+. 
With that information, the statistician produces the power calculations 
shown in table 15.5 for a power of 0.8.
The statistician concludes that to detect a US$2 decrease in out- 
 of-pocket health expenditures, the sample must include at least 630 
units: that is, 7 units per cluster in 90 clusters (45 clusters in the treat-
ment group and 45 clusters in the comparison group). He notes that 
this number is higher than in the sample under randomized assign-
ment at the household level, which required only a total of 502 units 
(251 in the treatment group and 251 in the comparison group; see table 
15.3). To detect a US$3 decrease in out-of-pocket health expenditures, 
the sample would need to include at least 246 units, or 3 units in each 
of 82 clusters (41 clusters in the treatment group and 41 clusters in the 
comparison group).
The statistician then shows you how the total number of observations 
required in the sample varies with the total number of clusters. He 
decides to repeat the calculations for a minimum detectable eff ect of 
US$2 and a power of 0.8. The size of the total sample required to estimate 
such an eff ect increases strongly when the number of clusters diminishes 
Table 15.5 Evaluating HISP+: Sample Size Required to Detect Various 
Minimum Detectable Effects (Decrease in Household Health Expenditures)
Power = 0.8, maximum of 100 clusters
Minimum 
detectable 
effect
Number of 
clusters
Units per 
cluster
Total sample 
with clusters
Total sample 
without 
clusters
US$1 100 102 10,200 2,008
US$2 90 7 630 502
US$3 82 3 246 224
Note: The minimum detectable effect describes the minimum reduction of household out-of-pocket 
health expenditures that can be detected by the impact evaluation. The number of clusters is the 
total number of clusters, half of which will be the number of clusters in the comparison group, and 
the other half the number of clusters in the treatment group.
Choosing a Sample 283
Moving Beyond the Benchmark Case
In this chapter, we have focused on the benchmark case of an impact evalu-
ation implemented using the randomized assignment method with full 
compliance. This is the simplest scenario, and therefore the most suitable to 
convey the intuition behind power calculations. Still, many practical aspects 
of power calculations have not been discussed, and deviations from the 
basic cases discussed here need to be considered carefully. Some of these 
deviations are discussed below.
Using quasi-experimental methods. All else being equal, quasi- experimental 
impact evaluation methods such as regression discontinuity, matching, or 
diff erence-in-diff erences tend to require larger samples than the  randomized 
assignment benchmark. For instance, when using regression discontinuity 
(table 15.6). With 120 clusters, a sample of 600 observations would be 
needed. If only 30 clusters were available, the total sample would need to 
contain 1,500 observations. By contrast, if 90 clusters were available, only 
630 observations would be needed.
 HISP Question 9
A. Which total sample size would you recommend to estimate the impact 
of HISP+ on out-of-pocket health expenditures?
B. In how many villages would you advise the minister of health to roll 
out HISP+?
Table 15.6 Evaluating HISP+: Sample Size Required to Detect a US$2 
Minimum Impact for Various Numbers of Clusters
Power = 0.8
Minimum 
detectable effect
Number of 
clusters
Units per 
cluster
Total sample 
with clusters
US$2 30 50 1,500
US$2 58 13 754
US$2 81 8 648
US$2 90 7 630
US$2 120 5 600
Note: The number of clusters is the total number of clusters, half of which will be the number of 
clusters in the comparison group and the other half the number of clusters in the treatment group. 
If the design did not have any clusters, 251 units in each group would be needed to identify a 
minimum detectable effect of US$2 (see table 15.3).
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design, chapter 6 highlighted that only observations around the eligibility 
threshold can be used. A suffi  ciently large sample is required around that 
threshold. Power calculations are needed to estimate the required sample to 
make meaningful comparisons around the threshold.
On the other hand, the availability of several rounds of data can help 
increase the power of an impact evaluation for a given sample size. For 
instance, baseline data on outcomes and other characteristics can help make 
the estimation of the treatment eff ects more precise. The availability of 
repeated measures of outcomes after the start of the treatment can also help.
Examining diff erent program modalities or design innovations. In the 
examples presented in this chapter, the total sample size was divided equally 
between treatment and comparison groups. In some cases, the main policy 
question of the evaluation may entail comparing program impacts between 
program modalities or design innovations. If this is the case, the expected 
impact may be relatively smaller than if a treatment group receiving a pro-
gram were to be compared with a comparison group receiving no beneﬁ ts at 
all. As such, the minimum desired eff ect between two treatment groups may 
be smaller than the minimum desired eff ect between a treatment and com-
parison group. The optimal distribution of the sample may lead to treatment 
groups that are relatively larger than the comparison group.9 In impact eval-
uations with multiple treatment arms, power calculations may need to be 
implemented to separately estimate the size of each treatment and compari-
son group, depending on the main policy questions of interest.
Comparing subgroups. In other cases, some of the impact evaluation 
questions may focus on assessing whether program impacts vary between 
diff erent subgroups, such as gender, age, or income categories. If this is the 
case, then sample size requirements will be larger, and power calculations 
will need to be adjusted accordingly. For instance, it may be that a key policy 
question is whether an education program has a larger impact on female 
students than on male students. Intuitively, you will need a suffi  cient num-
ber of students of each gender in the treatment group and in the comparison 
group to detect an impact for each subgroup. Setting out to compare pro-
gram impacts between two subgroups can double the required sample size. 
Considering heterogeneity between more groups (for example, by age) can 
also substantially increase the size of the sample required. If such compari-
sons across groups are to be made in the context of an impact evaluation 
relying on randomized assignment, it is preferable to also take this into 
account when implementing the randomization, and in particular to per-
form randomization within blocks or strata (that is, within each of the sub-
groups to be compared). In practice, even if no comparison across subgroups 
is to be made, stratiﬁ ed or block randomization can help further maximize 
power for a given sample size.
Choosing a Sample 285
Analyzing multiple outcomes. Particular care is needed when undertak-
ing power calculations in cases where an impact evaluation will seek to 
test whether a program leads to changes in multiple outcomes. If many 
diff erent outcomes are considered, there will be a relatively higher prob-
ability that the impact evaluation will ﬁ nd impacts on one of the outcomes 
just by chance. To address this, the impact evaluation team will need to 
consider testing for the joint statistical signiﬁ cance of changes in various 
outcomes. Alternatively, some indexes for families of outcomes can be 
 constructed. These approaches to tackle multiple hypothesis testing have 
implications for power calculations and sample size, and as such need to 
be considered when determining the sample needed for the impact 
evaluation.10
Dealing with imperfect compliance or attrition. Power calculations 
often provide the minimum required sample size. In practice, imple-
mentation issues often imply that the actual sample size is smaller than 
the planned sample size. For instance, imperfect compliance may imply 
that only a share of the beneﬁ ciaries off ered the program take it up. 
Sample size requirements increase when imperfect compliance arises. 
In addition, even if all individuals take up the program, some attrition 
may occur at the follow-up survey if not all individuals can be tracked. 
Even if such noncompliance or attrition is random and does not aff ect 
the consistency of the impact estimates, these aspects would aff ect the 
power of the impact evaluation. It is generally advisable to add a margin 
to the sample size predicted by power calculations to account for such 
factors. Similarly, data of lower quality will have more measurement 
error and make the outcomes of interest more variable, also requiring 
larger sample sizes.
The more advanced considerations mentioned in this section are beyond 
the scope of this book, but the additional resources listed at the end of this 
chapter can help. In practice, evaluation teams need to include or contract 
an expert who can perform power calculations, and the expert should be 
able to provide advice on more advanced issues.
Additional Resources
 • For accompanying material to this chapter and hyperlinks to additional 
 resources, please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (http://www 
. worldbank.org/ieinpractice).
 • For examples of how to undertake power calculations in the Stata and Optimal 
Design software programs for the speciﬁ c HISP case that  illustrates this chap-
ter, see the online technical companion available on the book website (http://
www.worldbank.org/ieinpractice). The technical companion includes 
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additional technical material for readers with a background in statistics and 
econometrics.
 • For detailed discussions of sampling (including other methods such as 
 systematic sampling or multistage sampling) beyond the basic concepts 
 discussed here, see the following resources:
  – Cochran, William G. 1977. Sampling Techniques, third edition. New York: 
John Wiley.
  – Kish, Leslie. 1995. Survey Sampling. New York: John Wiley.
  – Lohr, Sharon. 1999. Sampling: Design and Analysis. Paciﬁc Grove, CA: 
Brooks Cole.
  – Thompson, Steven K. 2002. Sampling, second edition. New York: John Wiley.
  – Or, at a more basic level, Kalton, Graham. 1983. Introduction to Survey 
 Sampling. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
 • Practical guidance for sampling can be found in the following:
  – Grosh, Margaret, and Juan Muñoz. 1996. “A Manual for Planning and 
Implementing the Living Standards Measurement Study Survey.” LSMS 
Working Paper 126, World Bank, Washington, DC.
  – UN (United Nations). 2005. Household Sample Surveys in Developing and 
Transition Countries. New York: United Nations.
  – Iarossi, Giuseppe. 2006. The Power of Survey Design: A User’s Guide for 
Managing Surveys, Interpreting Results, and Inﬂuencing Respondents. 
 Washington, DC: World Bank.
  – Fink, Arlene G. 2008. How to Conduct Surveys: A Step by Step Guide, fourth 
edition. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
 • For a power calculation spreadsheet that will calculate the power for a given 
sample size after certain characteristics are inputted, see the Inter-American 
Development Bank Evaluation hub, in the Design section under Tools (www 
.iadb.org/evaluationhub).
 • For more on power calculations and sample size, see the World Bank Impact 
Evaluation Toolkit, Module 3 on Design (Vermeersch, Rothenbühler, and 
Sturdy 2012). This module also includes a guide for doing ex ante power 
calculations, a paper about power calculations with binary variables, and a 
collection of useful references for further information on power calculations. 
(http://www.worldbank.org/health/impactevaluationtoolkit)
 • For several blog posts about power calculations, see the World Bank 
Development Impact blog (http://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/).
 • For a discussion of some considerations for power calculations in designs 
more complex than the benchmark case of randomized assignment in 
 presence of perfect compliance, see the following:
  – Spybrook, Jessaca, Stephen Raudenbush, Xiaofeng Liu, Richard Congdon, 
and Andrés Martinez. 2008. Optimal Design for Longitudinal and Multilevel 
Research: Documentation for the “Optimal Design” Software. New York: 
William T. Grant Foundation.
  – Rosenbaum, Paul. 2009. “The Power of Sensitivity Analysis and Its 
Limit.” Chapter 14 in Design of Observational Studies, by Paul Rosenbaum. 
New York: Springer Series in Statistics.
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 • On the topic of multiple hypothesis testing, see the following:
  – Duﬂ o, E., R. Glennerster, M. Kremer, T. P. Schultz, and A. S. John. 2007. 
“Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit.” 
Chapter 61 in Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 4, 3895–962. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
  – Schochet, P. Z. 2008. Guidelines for Multiple Testing in Impact Evaluations 
of Educational Interventions. Prepared by Mathematica Policy Research 
Inc., for the Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education, 
Washington, DC.
 • A number of tools are available for those interested in exploring sample 
design further. For example, the W. T. Grant Foundation developed the freely 
available Optimal Design Software for Multi-Level and Longitudinal Research, 
which is useful for statistical power analysis in the presence of clusters. The 
Optimal Design software and manual can be downloaded at http://hlmsoft 
.net/od.
Notes
1. Strictly speaking, samples are drawn from sampling frames. In our discussion, 
we assume that the sampling frame perfectly overlaps with the population.
2. As discussed in part 2, compliance assumes that all the units assigned to the 
treatment group are treated and all the units assigned to the comparison group 
are not treated.
3. In this context, the term population does not refer to the population of the 
country, but rather to the entire group of children that we are interested in: the 
population of interest.
4. This intuition is formalized by a theorem called the central limit theorem. 
Formally, for an outcome y, the central limit theorem states that the sample 
mean y¯  on average constitutes a valid estimate of the population mean. In 
addition, for a sample of size n and for a population variance s 2, the 
variance of the sample mean is inversely proportional to the size of the 
sample:
=
svar y
n
( )
2
 As the size of the sample n increases, the variance of sample estimates tends 
to 0. In other words, the mean is more precisely estimated in large samples than 
in small samples.
5. The allocation of beneﬁts by cluster is often made necessary by social or 
political considerations that make randomization within clusters impossible. 
In the context of an impact evaluation, clustering often becomes necessary 
because of likely spillovers, or contagion of program beneﬁts between individu-
als within clusters. See discussion in chapter 11.
6. When computing power from a baseline, the correlation between outcomes 
over time should also be taken into account in power calculations.
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7. For instance, Spybrook and others (2008) introduced Optimal Design, user-
friendly software to conduct power calculations.
8. Having treatment and comparison groups of equal size is generally desirable. 
Indeed, for a given number of observations in a sample, power is maximized by 
assigning half the observations to the treatment group and half to the compari-
son group. However, treatment and comparison groups do not always have to 
be of equal size. See discussion at the end of the chapter.
9. The costs of the treatment can also be taken into consideration and lead to 
treatment and comparison group that are not of equal size. See, for instance, 
Duﬂ o and others (2007).
10. See, for instance, Duﬂ o and others (2007) or Schochet (2008).
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CHAPTER 16
Finding Adequate Sources 
of Data
Kinds of Data That Are Needed
In this chapter, we discuss the various sources of data that impact evalua-
tions can use. We ﬁ rst discuss sources of existing data, particularly adminis-
trative data, and provide some examples of impact evaluations that have 
leveraged existing data. Since many evaluations require the collection of 
new data, we then discuss the steps in collecting new survey data. A clear 
understanding of these steps will help ensure that your impact evaluation is 
based on quality data that do not compromise the evaluation design. As a 
ﬁrst step, you will need to commission the development of an appropriate 
questionnaire. In parallel, you will need to get help from a ﬁrm or govern-
ment agency that specializes in data collection. The data collection entity 
will recruit and train ﬁeld staff  and pilot test the questionnaire. After mak-
ing the necessary adjustments, the ﬁrm or agency will be able to proceed 
with ﬁeldwork, collect the data, and digitize and process them, before they 
can be delivered, stored, and analyzed by the evaluation team.
Good quality data are required to assess the impact of the intervention on 
the outcomes of interest. The results chain discussed in chapter 2 provides 
a basis to deﬁne which indicators should be measured and when. Indicators 
are needed across the results chain.
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Data about outcomes. The ﬁrst and foremost need is data on outcome 
indicators directly aff ected by the program. Outcome indicators relate to 
the objectives the program seeks to achieve. As discussed in chapter 2, 
 outcome indicators should preferably be selected so that they are SMART: 
speciﬁc, measurable, attributable, realistic, and targeted. The impact evalu-
ation should not measure only those outcomes for which the program is 
directly accountable, however. Data on outcome indicators that the pro-
gram indirectly aff ects, or indicators that capture unintended program 
eff ects, will maximize the value of the information that the impact evalua-
tion generates, as well as the understanding of the program’s overall 
eff ectiveness.
Data about intermediate outcomes. In addition, data on intermediary 
 outcomes are useful to help understand the channels through which the 
program evaluated has impacted—or has not impacted—the ﬁ nal out-
comes of interest. Impact evaluations are typically conducted over sev-
eral time periods, and you must determine when to measure the outcome 
indicators. Following the results chain, you can establish a hierarchy of 
outcome indicators, ranging from short-term indicators that can be 
measured while  participants are still in the program, such as school 
attendance collected in a short-term follow-up survey in the context of 
an education program, to longer-term ones, such as student achieve-
ment or labor market outcomes that can be measured in a longer-term 
follow-up survey after participants have exited the program. To measure 
impact convincingly over time, data are needed starting at a base-
line before the program or innovation being evaluated is implemented. 
The  section in chapter 12 on the timing of evaluations sheds light on 
when to collect data.
As we discussed in chapter 15 in the context of power calculations, 
some indicators may not be amenable to impact evaluation in small 
samples. Detecting impacts for outcome indicators that are extremely 
variable, that are rare events, or that are likely to be only marginally 
aff ected by an intervention may require prohibitively large samples. For 
instance, identifying the impact of an intervention on maternal mortal-
ity rates will be feasible only in a sample that contains tens of thousands 
of pregnant women, since mortality is (thankfully) a rare event. In such 
a case, it may be necessary to refocus the impact evaluation on more 
intermediate indicators, related to the ﬁ nal outcomes, but for which 
there is suffi  cient power to detect eff ects. In the case of an intervention 
meant to reduce maternal mortality, an intermediate indicator may be 
related to health service utilization during pregnancy and institutional 
delivery, which are associated with mortality. The power calculations 
Key Concept
Indicators are needed 
across the results 
chain to measure fi nal 
outcomes, intermedi-
ate outcomes, as well 
as program benefi ts 
and quality of 
implementation.
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discussed in chapter 15 can help shed light on the indicators on which 
impacts can be detected, and those on which impacts may be harder to 
detect without very large samples.
Data about program activities and outputs. Indicators are also required 
for the part of the results chain that describes program activities and 
 outputs. In particular, program monitoring data can provide essential 
information about the delivery of the intervention, including who the ben-
eﬁ ciaries are and which program beneﬁ ts or outputs they may have 
received. At minimum, monitoring data are needed to know when a pro-
gram starts and who receives beneﬁts, as well as to provide a measure of 
the intensity or quality of the intervention. This is particularly important 
in cases when the program may not be delivered to all beneﬁciaries with 
the same content, quality, or duration. A good understanding of the extent 
to which the intervention has been delivered as designed is essential to 
interpret the impact evaluation results, including whether they highlight 
the eff ectiveness of the program implemented as designed or with some 
ﬂ aws in implementation.
Additional data. Other data required by the impact evaluation can depend 
on the methodology used. Data on other factors that may aff ect the outcome 
of interest may be needed to control for outside inﬂuences. This aspect is 
particularly important when using evaluation methods that rely on more 
assumptions than randomized methods do. Sometimes it is also necessary 
to have data on outcomes and other factors over time to calculate trends, as 
is the case with the diff erence-in-diff erences method. Accounting for other 
factors and past trends also helps increase statistical power. Even with 
 randomized assignment, data on other characteristics can make it possible 
to estimate treatment eff ects more precisely. They can be used to include 
additional controls or analyze the heterogeneity of the program’s eff ects 
along relevant characteristics.
The design selected for the impact evaluation will also aff ect the data 
requirements. For example, if either the matching or the diff erence-in- 
diff erences method is chosen, it will be necessary to collect data on a broad 
array of characteristics for both treatment and comparison groups, making 
it possible to carry out a range of robustness tests, as described in part 2 or 
chapter 11 (see table 11.2).
For each evaluation, it is useful to develop a matrix that lists the question 
of interest, the outcome indicators for each question, the other types of indi-
cators needed, and the source of data, as outlined in ﬁgure 2.1 on the results 
chain in chapter 2. The preparation of an impact evaluation plan and pre-
analysis plan are other important opportunities to deﬁ ne a precise list of key 
indicators required for the impact evaluation.
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Using Existing Quantitative Data
One of the ﬁ rst questions to consider when designing the impact evaluation 
is what sources of data it will use. A fundamental consideration is whether 
the impact evaluation will rely on existing data or require the collection of 
new data.
Some existing data are almost always needed at the outset of an impact 
evaluation to estimate benchmark values of indicators or to conduct power 
calculations, as discussed in chapter 15. Beyond the planning stages, the 
availability of existing data can substantially diminish the cost of conduct-
ing an impact evaluation. While existing data, and in particular administra-
tive data, are probably underused in impact evaluation in general, the 
feasibility of using existing data for impact evaluation needs to be carefully 
assessed.
Indeed, as discussed in chapter 12, data collection is often the largest cost 
when implementing an impact evaluation. However, to determine whether 
existing data can be used in a given impact evaluation, a range of questions 
must be considered:
 • Sampling. Are existing data available for both the treatment and compari-
son groups? Are existing samples drawn from a sampling frame that 
coincides with the population of interest? Were units drawn from the 
sampling frame based on a probabilistic sampling procedure?
 • Sample size. Are existing data sets large enough to detect changes in the 
outcome indicators with suffi  cient power? The answer to this question 
depends on the choice of the outcome indicators, as well as on the results 
of the power calculations discussed in chapter 15.
 • Availability of baseline data. Are the existing data available for both the 
treatment and comparison groups prior to the rollout of the program or 
innovation to be evaluated? The availability of baseline data is important 
to document balance in preprogram characteristics between treatment 
and comparison groups when randomized methods are used, and critical 
for the implementation of quasi-experimental designs.
 • Frequency. Are the existing data collected frequently enough? Are they 
available for all units in the sample over time, including for the times 
when the outcome indicators need to be measured according to the 
results chain and the logic of the intervention?
 • Scope. Do existing data contain all the indicators needed to answer the 
policy questions of interest, including the main outcome indicators and 
the intermediary outcomes of interest?
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 • Linkages to program monitoring information. Can existing data be linked 
to monitoring data on program implementation, including to observe 
which units are in the treatment and comparison groups, and whether all 
units assigned to the treatment group received the same beneﬁ ts?
 • Unique identiﬁ ers. Do unique identiﬁ ers exist to link across data sources?
As the questions above highlight, the requirements for existing data are 
quite signiﬁ cant, and it is not common for existing data to be suffi  cient for 
impact evaluations. Still, with the rapid growth in the scope and coverage of 
information systems, as well as the overall evolution toward a world where 
digital data from a broad range of sources are routinely stored, an increasing 
number of impact evaluations can consider the use of existing data. A range 
of potential sources of existing data can be used for impact evaluation, 
including census data, national surveys, or administrative data.
Population census data can provide comprehensive data for the complete 
population. They can be used in impact evaluations when they are available 
at a  suffi  ciently disaggregated level and include details to know which units 
are in a treatment or comparison group, such as geographic or personal 
identiﬁ ers. Census data are ﬁ elded infrequently and usually include only a 
small set of key indicators. However, census data are sometimes collected to 
feed into information systems or registries that provide the basis to target 
public programs, including unique identiﬁ ers that can support linkages 
with other existing data sets.
Nationally representative surveys such as household surveys, living stan-
dards measurement surveys, labor force surveys, demographic and health 
surveys, enterprise surveys, or facility surveys can also be considered. They 
may contain a comprehensive set of outcome variables, but they rarely con-
tain enough observations from both the treatment and comparison groups 
to conduct an impact evaluation. Assume, for example, that you are inter-
ested in evaluating a large national program that reaches 10 percent of the 
households in a given country. If a nationally representative survey is car-
ried out on 5,000 households every year, it may contain roughly 500 house-
holds that receive the program in question. Is this sample large enough to 
conduct an impact evaluation? Power calculations can answer this question, 
but in many cases the answer is no.
In addition to exploring whether you can use existing surveys, you should 
also ﬁnd out if any new national data collection eff orts are being planned. If 
a survey is planned that will cover the population of interest, you may also 
be able to introduce a question or series of questions as part of that survey. 
If a survey measuring the required indicators is already planned, there 
might be opportunities to oversample a particular population to ensure 
appropriate coverage of the treatment and comparison groups and 
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accommodate the impact evaluation. For instance, the evaluation of the 
Nicaraguan Social Fund complemented a national Living Standards 
Measurement Study with an extra sample of beneﬁciaries (Pradhan and 
Rawlings 2002).
Administrative data are typically collected by public or private agencies 
as part of their regular operations, usually relatively frequently, and often 
to monitor the services delivered or record interactions with users. In 
some cases, administrative data contain outcome indicators needed for 
impact evaluation. For instance, education systems gather school records 
on students’ enrollment, attendance, or test scores, and can also compile 
information on school inputs and teachers. Similarly, health systems can 
collect data on the characteristics and location of health centers, the sup-
ply of health services, and the allocation of resources. They can also 
 consolidate data  collected in health centers on patients’ medical records, 
anthropometrics, and vaccination histories, and more broadly, data on the 
 incidence of diseases and vital statistics. Public utility agencies collect data 
on water or electricity use. Tax agencies may collect data on income and 
taxes. Transport systems collect data on passengers and travel times. 
Financial system agencies  collect data on customers’ transactions or credit 
history. All these sources of existing data can potentially be used for impact 
evaluations. They sometimes include long time series that can help track 
units over time.
An assessment of data availability and quality is critical when consid-
ering whether to rely on administrative data. In some cases, data from 
administrative sources may be more reliable than survey data. For 
instance, a study in Malawi found that respondents overstated school 
attendance and enrollment in self-reported data from a household survey 
compared with administrative records obtained in schools; thus impact 
evaluation results were more reliable if based on the administrative data 
(Baird and Özler 2012). At the same time, in many contexts, administra-
tive data are collected by a large number of providers and can be of 
unequal quality. Thus their reliability needs to be fully assessed before a 
decision is made to rely on administrative data for the impact evaluation. 
One critical aspect is to ensure that single identiﬁ ers exist to connect 
administrative data with other data sources, including program monitor-
ing data documenting which units have received program beneﬁ ts. When 
such identiﬁ ers exist—such as national identiﬁ cation numbers used 
 consistently—a large amount of work to prepare and clean data may be 
avoided. In all cases, the protection of conﬁ dentiality is an important part 
of the data preparation and data management protocol. The ethical prin-
ciples to protect human subjects (see discussion in chapter 13) also apply 
to the use of existing data.
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Some inﬂuential retrospective evaluations have relied on administrative 
records (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky [2005] on water policy in 
Argentina; Ferraz and Finan [2008] on audits and politicians’ perfor-
mance; and Chetty, Friedman, and Saez [2013] on tax credits in the United 
States). Box  16.1 provides an example of a health impact evaluation in 
Argentina. Box 16.2 illustrates the use of administrative data in the impact 
evaluation of a cash transfer program in Honduras.
In some cases, the data required for impact evaluation can be collected 
by rolling out new information or administrative data systems. Such 
 roll-out can be coordinated with the implementation of an evaluation 
design, so that outcome indicators are collected for a treatment and a 
comparison group at multiple times. The setup of information systems 
may need to be established before new interventions are launched, so that 
Box 16.1: Constructing a Data Set in the Evaluation of Argentina’s 
Plan Nacer
When evaluating Argentina’s results-based 
health-fi nancing program, Plan Nacer, 
Gertler, Giovagnoli, and Martinez (2014) 
combined administrative data from several 
sources to form a large and comprehensive 
database for analysis. After several previous 
evaluation strategies were unsuccessful, 
the researchers turned to an instrumental 
variables approach. This required a substan-
tial amount of data from the universe of 
all birth records in the seven provinces 
studied.
The researchers needed data on prenatal 
care and birth outcomes, which could be 
found in birth registries at public hospitals. 
Then they needed to determine whether 
the mother was a benefi ciary of Plan Nacer 
and whether the clinic she visited was 
 incorporated into the program at the time of 
the visit. To construct a database with all this 
information, the evaluation team linked fi ve 
different data sources, including public 
maternity  hospital databases, Plan Nacer 
program implementation data, pharmaceuti-
cal records, the 2001 population census, and 
geographic information for health facilities. 
Obtaining medical records on individual births 
at maternity hospitals was among the most 
challenging tasks. Each maternity hospital 
 collected prenatal care and birth outcome 
data, but only about half the records were 
digitized. The rest were on paper, requiring the 
evaluation team to merge the paper records 
into the computerized system.
Overall, the team was able to compile a 
comprehensive database for 78 percent of 
births occurring during the evaluation period. 
This yielded a large data set that allowed 
them to examine the impact of Plan Nacer 
on relatively rare events, such as neonatal 
mortality. This is typically not possible in 
evaluations with smaller samples collected 
through surveys. The evaluation found that 
benefi ciaries of Plan Nacer had a 74 percent 
lower chance of in-hospital neonatal mortal-
ity than nonbenefi ciaries.
Source: Gertler, Giovagnoli, and Martinez 2014.
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administrative centers in the comparison group use the new information 
system before receiving the intervention to be evaluated. Because the 
quality of administrative data can vary, auditing and external veriﬁcation 
are required to guarantee the reliability of the evaluation. Collecting 
impact evaluation data through administrative sources instead of through 
surveys can dramatically reduce the cost of an evaluation, but it may not 
always be feasible.
Even if existing data are not suffi  cient for an entire impact evaluation, 
they can sometimes be used for parts of the impact evaluation. For exam-
ple,  in some cases, programs collect detailed targeting data on potential 
 beneﬁ ciaries to establish who is eligible. Or census data may be avail-
able  shortly before a program is rolled out. In such cases, the existing 
data can sometimes be used to document baseline balance in preprogram 
Box 16.2: Using Census Data to Reevaluate the PRAF 
in Honduras
Honduras’s Programa de Asignación Familiar 
(PRAF) aimed at improving educational and 
health outcomes for young children living in 
poverty. It provided cash transfers to eligible 
households conditional on regular school 
attendance and health center visits. The pro-
gram began in 1990. An evaluation compo-
nent was included in the second phase of 
the PRAF in 1998. Glewwe and Olinto (2004) 
and Morris and others (2004) reported posi-
tive impacts on education and health 
outcomes.
Several years later, Galiani and McEwan 
(2013) reevaluated the impact of the pro-
gram using a different source of data. While 
the original impact evaluation collected sur-
vey data from 70 out of 298 municipalities, 
Galiani and McEwan used data from the 
2001 Honduran census. They merged indi-
vidual and household-level data from 
the census with municipal-level data on the 
treatment communities. This provided the 
researchers with a larger sample size that 
allowed them to test the robustness of the 
fi ndings, in addition to spillover effects. 
Moreover, since the researchers had census 
data from all the municipalities, they were 
able to apply two different regression dis-
continuity designs (RDDs) using alternate 
comparison groups. For the fi rst RDD, the 
researchers used the eligibility cutoff; for the 
second, they used municipal borders.
Like the previous impact evaluations, 
Galiani and McEwan found positive and sta-
tistically signifi cant impacts from the pro-
gram. However, their estimates implied that 
the PRAF had a much larger impact than the 
impact found in the original evaluation. They 
found that the PRAF increased school enroll-
ment for eligible children by 12 percent more 
than those in the comparison group. The 
results from the alternate regression discon-
tinuity designs generally confi rmed the 
robustness of the fi ndings.
Source: Galiani and McEwan 2013.
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characteristics in the treatment and comparison groups, even though addi-
tional follow-up data would still need to be collected to measure a broader 
set of outcome indicators.
Collecting New Survey Data
Only in relatively rare cases are existing data suffi  cient for an entire impact 
evaluation. If administrative data are not suffi  cient for your evaluation, you 
will likely have to rely on survey data. As a result, you will most likely have 
to budget for the collection of new data. Although data collection is often 
the major cost for an impact evaluation, it can also be a high-return invest-
ment upon which the quality of the evaluation often depends. The collec-
tion of new data provides the ﬂ exibility to ensure that all the necessary 
indicators are measured for a comprehensive assessment of program 
performance.
Most impact evaluations require survey data to be collected, including 
at least a baseline survey before the intervention or innovation to be evalu-
ated, and a follow-up survey after it has been implemented. Survey data 
may be of various types, depending on the program to be evaluated and the 
unit of analysis. For instance, enterprise surveys use ﬁ rms as the main unit 
of observation, facility surveys use health centers or schools as the main 
unit of observation, and household surveys use households as the main 
unit of observation. Most evaluations rely on individual or household sur-
veys as a primary data source. In this section, we review some general 
principles of collecting survey data. Even though they primarily relate to 
household  surveys, the same principles also apply to most other types of 
survey data.
The ﬁrst step in deciding whether to use existing data or collect new 
 survey data will be to determine the sampling approach, as well as the size 
of the sample that is needed (as discussed in chapter 15). Once you decide to 
collect survey data for the evaluation, you will need to
 • Determine who will collect the data,
 • Develop and pilot the data collection instrument,
 • Conduct ﬁeldwork and undertake quality control, and
 • Process and store the data.
The implementation of those various steps is usually commissioned, but 
understanding their scope and key components is essential to managing a 
quality impact evaluation eff ectively.
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Determining Who Will Collect the Data
You will need to designate the agency in charge of collecting data early on. 
Some important trade-off s must be considered when you are deciding who 
should collect impact evaluation data. Potential candidates for the job 
include
 • The institution in charge of implementing the program,
 • Another government institution with experience collecting data (such as 
a national statistical agency), or
 • An independent ﬁrm or think tank that specializes in data collection.
The data collection entity always needs to coordinate closely with the 
agency implementing the program. Close coordination is required to ensure 
that no program operations are implemented before baseline data have been 
collected. When baseline data are needed for the program’s operation (for 
instance, data for an eligibility index, in the context of an evaluation based 
on a regression discontinuity design), the entity in charge of data collection 
must be able to process the data quickly and transfer the data to the institu-
tion in charge of program operations. Close coordination is also required in 
timing the collection of follow-up survey data. For instance, if you have cho-
sen a randomized rollout, the follow-up survey must be implemented before 
the program is rolled out to the comparison group, to avoid contamination.
An extremely important factor in deciding who should collect data is that 
the same data collection procedures should be used for both the comparison 
and treatment groups. The implementing agency often has contact only with 
the treatment group and so is not in a good position to collect data for the 
comparison groups. But using diff erent data collection agencies for the treat-
ment and comparison groups is very risky, as it can create diff erences in the 
outcomes measured in the two groups simply because the data collection 
procedures diff er. If the implementing agency cannot collect data eff ectively 
for both the treatment and comparison groups, the possibility of engaging an 
external institution or agency to do so should be strongly considered.
In some contexts, it may also be advisable to commission an independent 
agency to collect data to ensure that the data are considered objective. 
Concerns that the program-implementing agency does not collect objective 
data may not be warranted, but an independent data collection body that 
has no stake in the evaluation results can add credibility to the overall 
impact evaluation eff ort. It may also ensure that respondents do not per-
ceive the survey to be part of the program and thus may minimize the risk 
that respondents will give strategic responses in an attempt to increase their 
perceived chances to participate in a program.
Key Concept
The same data 
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Because data collection involves a complex sequence of operations, it is 
recommended that a specialized and experienced entity be responsible for 
it. Few program-implementing agencies have suffi  cient experience to col-
lect the large-scale, high-quality data necessary for an impact evaluation. In 
most cases, you will have to consider commissioning a local institution, such 
as a national statistical agency or a specialized ﬁrm or think tank.
Commissioning a local institution such as a national statistical agency 
can give the institution exposure to impact evaluation studies and help build 
its capacity—which may in itself be a side beneﬁ t of the impact evaluation. 
However, national statistical agencies may not always have the logistical 
capacity to take on extra mandates in addition to their regular activities. 
They may also lack the necessary experience in ﬁelding surveys for impact 
evaluations, such as experience in successfully tracking individuals over 
time or in implementing nontraditional survey instruments. If such con-
straints appear, contracting an independent ﬁrm or think tank specialized 
in data collection may be more practical.
You do not necessarily have to use the same entity to collect information 
at baseline and in follow-up surveys, which may vary in scope. For instance, 
for an impact evaluation of a training program, for which the population of 
interest comprises the individuals who signed up for the course, the institu-
tion in charge of the course could collect the baseline data when individuals 
enroll. It is unlikely, however, that the same agency will also be the best 
choice to collect follow-up information for both the treatment and com-
parison groups. In this context, contracting rounds of data collection sepa-
rately has its advantages, but eff orts should be made not to lose any 
information between rounds that will be useful in tracking households or 
individuals, as well as to ensure that baseline and follow-up data are mea-
sured consistently.
To determine the best institution for collecting impact evaluation data, 
all these factors—experience in data collection, ability to coordinate with 
the program’s implementing agency, independence, opportunities for 
capacity building, adaptability to the impact evaluation context—must 
be weighed, together with the expected cost and likely quality of the data 
 collected in each case. One eff ective way to identify the organization best 
placed to collect quality data is to write clear terms of reference and ask 
organizations to submit technical and ﬁnancial proposals.
Because the prompt delivery and the quality of the data are often crucial 
for the reliability of the impact evaluation, the contract for the agency in 
charge of data collection must be structured carefully. The scope of the 
expected work and deliverables must be made extremely clear. In addition, 
it is often advisable to introduce incentives into contracts and link those 
incentives to clear indicators of data quality. For instance, the nonresponse 
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rate is a key indicator of data quality. To create incentives for data collection 
agencies to minimize nonresponse, the contract can stipulate one unit cost 
for the ﬁrst 80 percent of the sample, a higher unit cost for the units between 
80 percent and 90 percent, and again a higher unit cost for units between 
90 percent and 100 percent. Alternatively, a separate contract can be writ-
ten for the survey ﬁrm to track nonrespondents. In addition, the data collec-
tion contract may include incentives or conditions related to veriﬁ cation of 
data quality, such as through back-checks or quality audits among a sub-
sample of the impact evaluation survey.
Developing and Piloting the Data Collection Instrument
When commissioning data collection, the evaluation team has an important 
role to play in providing speciﬁc guidance on the content of the data collec-
tion instruments or questionnaires. Data collection instruments must elicit 
all the information required to answer the policy question set out by the 
impact evaluation. As we have discussed, indicators must be measured 
throughout the results chain, including indicators for ﬁ nal outcomes, 
 intermediate outcomes, and measures of program beneﬁ ts and quality of 
implementation.
It is important to be selective about which indicators to measure. Being 
selective helps limit data collection costs, simpliﬁes the task of the data 
 collection agency, and improves the quality of the data collected by mini-
mizing demands on the enumerators and the respondents’ time. Collecting 
information that is either irrelevant or unlikely to be used has a very high 
cost. Additional data require more time for preparing, training, collecting, 
and processing. With limited availability and attention spans, respondents 
may provide decreasing quality information as the survey drags on, and 
interviewers will have added incentives to cut corners to meet their survey 
targets. Thus extraneous questions are not “free.” Having clear objectives 
for the impact evaluation that are aligned with well-deﬁ ned program objec-
tives can help you prioritize necessary information. A preanalysis plan writ-
ten in advance (see discussion in chapters 12 and 13) will help ensure that 
the survey collects the data required for the impact analysis and avoids the 
inclusion of extraneous (and costly) additional information.
It is preferable to collect data on outcome indicators and control charac-
teristics consistently at baseline and at follow-up. Having baseline data is 
highly desirable. Even if you are using randomized assignment or a regres-
sion discontinuity design, where simple postintervention diff erences can 
in  principle be used to estimate a program’s impact, baseline data are essen-
tial for testing whether the design of the impact evaluation is adequate 
(see discussion in part 2). Having baseline data can give you an insurance 
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policy when randomization does not work, in which case the diff erence-in- 
diff erences method can be used instead. Baseline data are also useful during 
the impact analysis stage, since baseline control variables can help increase 
statistical power and allow you to analyze impacts on diff erent subpopula-
tions. Finally, baseline data can be used to enhance the design of the pro-
gram. For instance, baseline data sometimes make it possible to analyze 
targeting effi  ciency or to provide additional information about beneﬁciaries 
to the agency implementing the program. In some cases, the follow-up 
 survey may include a broader set of indicators than the baseline survey.
Once you have deﬁned the core data that need to be collected, the next 
step is to determine exactly how to measure those indicators. Measurement 
is an art in itself and is best handled by specialists, including the impact 
evaluation research team, the agency hired to collect data, survey experts, 
and experts in the measurement of speciﬁ c complex indicators. Outcome 
indicators should be as consistent as possible with local and international 
best practice. It is always useful to consider how indicators of interest have 
been measured in similar surveys both locally and internationally. Using 
the same indicators (including the same survey modules or questions) 
ensures comparability between the preexisting data and the data collected 
for the impact evaluation. Choosing an indicator that is not fully compa-
rable or not well measured may limit the usefulness of the evaluation 
results. In some cases, it may make sense to invest the resources to collect 
the new innovative outcome indicator, as well as a more established 
alternative.
Particular attention should be paid to ensuring that all the indicators 
can be measured in exactly the same way for all units in both the treat-
ment group and the comparison group. Using diff erent data collection 
methods (for example, using a phone survey for one group and an in-
person survey for the other) creates the risk of generating bias. The 
same is true of collecting data at diff erent times for the two groups (for 
example,  collecting data for the treatment group during the rainy season 
and for the comparison group during the dry season). That is why the 
procedures used to measure any outcome indicator should be formu-
lated very precisely. The data collection process should be exactly the 
same for all units. Within a questionnaire, each module related to the 
program should be introduced without aff ecting the ﬂow or framing of 
responses in other parts of the questionnaire. In fact, when possible, it is 
best to avoid  making any distinction between treatment and comparison 
groups in the data collection process. In most cases, the agency conduct-
ing the data collection (or at least the individual surveyors) should 
not  have a reason to know the treatment or comparison status of the 
 individuals in the survey.
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One important decision to make is how to measure the outcome 
 indicators, including whether through traditional questionnaire-based 
 surveys and self-reported questions or through other methods. In recent 
years,  several advances have been made in measuring key outcomes or 
behaviors that are relevant for impact evaluation. Advances include reﬁ ning 
methods to collect self-reported data through questionnaires, as well as 
techniques to measure key outcomes directly.
Questionnaire design has been the subject of signiﬁ cant research. Entire 
books have been written about how best to measure particular indicators in 
speciﬁc contexts, including on the way to phrase questions asked in house-
hold surveys.1 There is also a growing evidence base on how best to design 
questionnaires to collect agricultural data, consumption data, or employ-
ment data to maximize their precision.2 Some recent evidence comes from 
randomized experiments testing diff erent ways of structuring question-
naires and comparing their reliability.3 Accordingly, questionnaire design 
requires attention to international best practice, as well as local experiences 
in measuring indicators. Small changes in the wording or sequencing of 
questions can have substantial eff ects in the data collected, so that great 
attention to details is essential in questionnaire development. This is espe-
cially important when attempting to ensure comparability across surveys, 
including, for instance, to measure outcomes repeatedly over time. Box 16.3 
discusses guidelines related to questionnaire design and provides additional 
references.
A growing set of techniques has been developed to obtain direct mea-
surement of outcomes. For instance, in the health sector, vignettes are 
sometimes used to present particular symptoms to health workers and to 
assess whether the provider recommends the appropriate treatment 
based on established guidelines and protocols. Such vignettes provide a 
direct measure of health providers’ knowledge. Recent evaluations are 
relying on standardized patients (also known as incognito or simulated 
patients) to visit health  centers and directly assess the quality of services 
delivered.4 In the education sector, many evaluations seek to assess pro-
gram impacts on students’ learning. To do so, a range of learning assess-
ments or direct measures of students’ skills is used. Similarly, various test 
batteries have been developed to directly measure cognitive, linguistic, or 
motor development among young children in the context of impact evalu-
ations of early childhood development interventions. Progress has also 
been made to obtain direct measures of skills among adults, including 
socioemotional skills or personality traits. Besides direct measurement of 
skills, a growing number of impact evaluations seek to obtain measures of 
teaching quality through direct observations of teachers’ behaviors in the 
classroom.
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Box 16.3: Designing and Formatting Questionnaires
Although questionnaire design in impact 
evaluations is integral to the quality of the 
data, it is often overlooked. Designing a 
questionnaire is a complex, long, and itera-
tive process involving many decisions along 
the way about what can be measured and 
how. The applied impact evaluation meth-
ods course at the University of California, 
Berkeley (http://aie.cega.org) provides a 
guide to questionnaire design, outlining three 
phases: content, drafting, and testing. 
Throughout these phases, the module high-
lights the importance of involving relevant 
stakeholders, allowing enough time for 
repeated iterations and careful testing:
1. Content. Determine the content of a 
survey by fi rst defi ning the effects that 
need to be measured, the observation 
units, and correlations with other factors. 
These conceptual defi nitions will then 
need to be translated into concrete indi-
cators.
2. Drafting. Draft questions to measure the 
selected indicators. This is a critical step, 
as the quality of the data relies on it. The 
module provides more in-depth recom-
mendations on the wording of questions, 
the organization of the survey, format-
ting, and other key considerations.
3. Testing. Test the questionnaire on three 
levels: the question, the module, and the 
whole survey.
The format of the questionnaire is also 
important to ensure quality data. Because 
different ways of asking the same survey 
question can yield different answers, both 
the framing and the format of the ques-
tions should be the same for all units to 
 prevent any respondent or enumerator bias. 
UN (2005) makes six specific recommenda-
tions regarding the formatting of question-
naires for household surveys. These 
recommendations apply equally to most 
other data collection instruments:
1. Each question should be written out 
in full in the questionnaire, so that the 
interviewer can conduct the interview by 
reading each question word for word.
2. The questionnaire should include precise 
definitions of all the key concepts used 
in the survey, so that the interviewer can 
refer to the definition during the inter-
view if necessary.
3. Each question should be as short and 
simple as possible and should use com-
mon, everyday terms.
4. The questionnaires should be designed 
so that the answers to almost all ques-
tions are precoded.
5. The coding scheme for answers should 
be consistent across all questions.
6. The survey should include skip patterns, 
which indicate which questions are not 
to be asked, based on the answers given 
to the previous questions.
Once a questionnaire has been drafted by 
the person commissioned to work on the 
instrument, it should be presented to a 
team of experts for discussion. Everybody 
involved in the evaluation team (policy mak-
ers, researchers, data analysts, and data 
collectors) should be consulted about 
whether the questionnaire collects all the 
information desired in an appropriate fash-
ion. Review by a team of experts is neces-
sary but not suffi cient, as intensive fi eld 
testing is always primordial.
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Direct observation of key outcomes is particularly important when the 
outcomes of interest may be hard to elicit truthfully from respondents. For 
instance, to avoid relying on self-reported data to measure outcomes 
related to crime or violence, some impact evaluations have embedded 
trained researchers in sample communities for them to observe subjects’ 
behavior directly using ethnographic methods. Such direct observation 
can circumvent issues with self-reported behaviors, and can provide more 
accurate information when done well. Recent technological advances also 
allow direct measurements of a range of human behavior, and thus can 
help limit the use of self-reported data. Examples include direct observa-
tion of the timing and intensity of use of improved cookstoves, and direct 
 measures of water quality, latrine use, and indoor temperature using elec-
tronic sensors.
Impact evaluations typically rely on a mix of traditional questionnaire-
based surveys and other methods aimed at directly observing the outcomes 
of interest. For instance, in the context of impact evaluation of results-based 
ﬁ nancing in the health sector, a range of indicators are measured through 
complementary sources (Vermeersch, Rothenbühler, and Sturdy 2012). 
A health facility survey includes a facility assessment to measure the main 
characteristics of the facility, a health worker interview to measure health 
worker characteristics, and patient exit interviews to measure services 
delivered, as well as indicators of quality of care through a mix of vignettes 
and direct observation. A household survey includes household-level data 
on household and individual behavior, such as frequency of facility visits, 
care received, and health expenditures, as well as individual-level modules 
on female and child health. In addition to anthropometric measurement, 
biometric tests are collected to measure directly the prevalence of anemia, 
malaria, or HIV. Finally, community questionnaires capture community 
characteristics, services, infrastructure, access to markets, prices, and 
 community-level shocks.
In addition to developing indicators and ﬁ nding the most appropriate 
way to measure them, another key decision when collecting new data is the 
data collection technology to be used. Traditional data collection methods 
collect data based on paper, and later digitize that data, often through a 
 double-blind data entry approach, which involves two separate agents digi-
tizing the same information, before the data are compared to check for 
inaccuracies. Following recent technological advances, computer-assisted 
data collection tools have become prevalent. Data collection through appli-
cations installed on smartphones or tablets can speed up data processing, 
but also provide opportunities for real-time data quality checks and data 
validation. Box 16.4 discusses some of the pros and cons of electronic data 
collection.
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Box 16.4: Some Pros and Cons of Electronic Data Collection
Computer-assisted personal interviewing 
(CAPI) provides an alternative to traditional 
pen-and-paper interviewing (PAPI). In CAPI, 
the survey is preloaded onto an electronic 
device, such as a tablet or smartphone. 
The interviewer reads the questions from 
the screen and enters the answers immedi-
ately into the device. Various software 
and applications have been developed for 
CAPI data collection. The pros and cons of 
CAPI must be carefully considered by the 
evaluation team.
Some pros:
• Electronic data collection can improve 
data quality. In a randomized experiment 
designed to compare CAPI and PAPI for a 
consumption survey in Tanzania, Caeyers, 
Chalmers, and De Weerdt (2012) found 
that data from paper surveys contained 
errors that were avoided in electronic 
surveys. The researchers discovered that 
the errors in the PAPI data were corre-
lated with certain household characteris-
tics, which can create bias in some data 
analysis.
• Electronic data collection programs can 
include automated consistency checks. 
Certain responses can trigger warning 
messages so that data entry errors are 
minimized and any issue is clarifi ed with 
the respondent during the interview. For 
example, Fafchamps and others (2012) 
studied the benefi ts of consistency 
checks in a microenterprise survey in 
Ghana. They found that when consis-
tency checks were introduced, the stan-
dard deviation of profi t and sales data 
was lower. However, they also found 
that most of the time, a correction was 
not required: 85 percent to 97 percent 
of the time, respondents confi rmed the 
original answer.
• Interviews can be shorter and easier to 
conduct. When CAPI is used, the fl ow 
of the questionnaire can be personal-
ized to better guide interviewers through 
skip patterns and to minimize mistakes 
and omissions in the questionnaire. In 
a household survey in Tanzania, CAPI 
interviews were, on average, 10 percent 
shorter than similar questionnaires col-
lected on paper, Caeyers, Chalmers, and 
De Weerdt (2012) found.
• Electronic data collection eliminates the 
need for manual reentry of data. This 
can reduce costs and speed up data 
processing.
• The use of technology can bring a range 
of indirect benefi ts. For example, by using 
tablets or smartphones, GPS coordinates 
can easily be collected, or photographs 
can be taken. Experimental variations 
in the survey content can also be intro-
duced. With some software, parts of the 
interview can be recorded in order to 
facilitate quality and monitoring checks.
Some cons:
• The fi xed costs tend to be higher for 
CAPI than PAPI, although the variable 
costs can be lower. The upfront cost of 
purchasing and programming electronic 
devices may be prohibitive for smaller 
impact evaluation budgets. Suffi cient 
time is also needed up front to ensure 
proper programming and testing of the 
electronic questionnaires, which often 
comes after paper questionnaires have 
already been developed.
(continued)
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It is very important that the data collection instrument be piloted and 
ﬁeld-tested extensively before it is ﬁnalized. Extensive piloting of the instru-
ment will check its adequacy for the local context and its content, and any 
alternative formatting and phrasing options, as well as data collection 
 protocols, including the technology. Field-testing the full data collection 
instrument in real-life conditions is critical for checking its length and for 
verifying that its format is suffi  ciently consistent and comprehensive to 
 produce precise measures of all relevant information. Field-testing is an 
integral part of preparing the data collection instruments.
Conducting Fieldwork and Undertaking Quality Control
Even when you commission data collection, a clear understanding of all the 
steps involved in that process is crucial to help you ensure that the required 
quality control mechanisms and the right incentives are in place. The entity 
in charge of collecting data will need to coordinate the work of a large num-
ber of diff erent actors, including enumerators, supervisors, ﬁeld coordina-
tors, and logistical support staff , in addition to a data entry team composed 
of programmers, supervisors, and the data entry operators. A clear work 
plan should be put in place to coordinate the work of all these teams, and the 
work plan is a key deliverable.
Before data collection begins, the work plan must include proper training 
for the data collection team. A complete reference manual should be 
 prepared for training and used throughout ﬁeldwork. Training is key to 
• Specifi c technical expertise is needed to 
program electronic questionnaires and 
set up processes to manage the fl ow of 
data collected electronically. In develop-
ing countries with low information tech-
nology capacity, this may be diffi cult to 
fi nd. It is also more challenging to develop 
software for questionnaires that are not 
in English or a Romance language.
• Technological issues can disrupt data col-
lection or hinder data consolidation in a 
secure location. Problems can arise during 
data collection when the electronic device 
has a small screen or an interface that is 
unfamiliar to interviewers. The risk of theft 
is also higher for electronic devices than 
paper surveys. Finally, the consolidation 
and synchronization of data in a secure 
location require clear protocols to mini-
mize risk of data loss. Electronic transfers 
of data are convenient but require a mini-
mum level of connectivity.
Sources: Caeyers, Chalmers, and De Weerdt 2012; Fafchamps and others 2012.
Box 16.4: Some Pros and Cons of Electronic Data Collection (continued)
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ensuring that data are collected consistently by all involved. The training 
process is also a good opportunity to identify the best-performing enumera-
tors and to conduct a last pilot of instruments and procedures under normal 
conditions. Once the sample has been drawn, the instruments have 
been  designed and piloted, and the teams have been trained, the data 
 collection can begin. It is good practice to ensure that the ﬁeldwork plan 
has  each  survey team collect data on the same number of treatment and 
 comparison units.
As discussed in chapter 15, proper sampling is essential to ensuring the 
quality of the sample. However, many nonsampling errors can occur while 
the data are being collected. In the context of an impact evaluation, a 
 particular concern is that those errors may not be the same in the treatment 
and comparison groups.
Nonresponse arises when it becomes impossible to collect complete data 
for some sampled units. Because the actual samples used for analysis are 
restricted to those units for which data can be collected, units who choose 
not to respond to a survey may make the sample less representative and can 
create bias in the evaluation results. Attrition is a common form of nonre-
sponse that occurs when some units drop from the sample between data 
collection rounds: for example, migrants may not be fully tracked.
Sample attrition due to nonresponse is particularly problematic in the 
context of impact evaluations because they may create diff erences between 
the treatment group and the comparison group. For example, attrition may 
be diff erent in the two groups: if the data are being collected after the 
 program has begun to be implemented, the response rate among treatment 
units can be higher than the rate among comparison units. That may hap-
pen because the comparison units are unhappy not to have been selected or 
are more likely to migrate. Nonresponses can also occur within the ques-
tionnaire itself, typically because some indicators are missing or the data 
are incomplete for a particular unit.
Measurement error is another type of problem that can generate bias if it 
is systematic. Measurement error is the diff erence between the value of a 
characteristic as provided by the respondent and the true (but unknown) 
value (Kasprzyk 2005). Such a diff erence can be traced to the way the ques-
tionnaire is worded or to the data collection method that is chosen, or it can 
occur because of the interviewers who are ﬁelding the survey or the respon-
dent who is giving the answers.
The quality of the impact evaluation depends directly on the quality of 
the data that are collected. Quality standards need to be made clear to all 
stakeholders in the data collection process; the standards should be particu-
larly emphasized during the training of enumerators and in the reference 
manuals. For instance, detailed procedures to minimize nonresponse or 
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(if acceptable) to replace units in the sample are essential. The data collec-
tion agency must clearly understand the acceptable nonresponse and attri-
tion rates. To provide a benchmark, many impact evaluations aim to keep 
nonresponse and attrition below 5 percent. The target will depend on the 
timing of the impact evaluation and the unit of analysis: attrition would be 
expected to be relatively lower for a survey occurring shortly after the base-
line survey, and relatively higher for long-term impact evaluation tracking 
individuals many years later. Higher attrition rates would also be expected 
in very mobile populations. Survey respondents are sometimes compen-
sated to minimize nonresponse, though the introduction of such compensa-
tion needs to be carefully considered. Sometimes, once all units to be tracked 
have been identiﬁ ed, a subsample of these units is randomly selected for 
very intensive tracking, which may include additional eff orts or some form 
of compensation. In any case, the contract for the data collection agency 
must contain clear incentives, such as higher compensation if the nonre-
sponse rate remains below an acceptable threshold.
Well-deﬁned quality assurance procedures must be established for all 
stages of the data collection process, including the design of the sampling 
procedure and questionnaire, the preparation stages, data collection, data 
entry, and data cleaning and storage.
Quality checks during the ﬁeldwork should be given a very high priority 
to minimize errors for each unit. Clear procedures must exist for revisiting 
units that have provided no information or incomplete information. 
Multiple ﬁlters should be introduced in the quality control process: for 
instance, by having enumerators, supervisors, and if necessary, ﬁeld coordi-
nators revisit the nonresponse units to verify their status. The question-
naires from nonresponse interviews should still be clearly coded and 
recorded. Once the data have been completely digitized, the nonresponse 
rates can be summarized and all sampled units fully accounted for.
Quality checks should also be made on any incomplete data for a particu-
lar surveyed unit. Again, the quality control process should include multiple 
ﬁlters. The enumerator is responsible for checking the data immediately 
after they have been collected. The supervisor and the ﬁeld coordinator 
should perform random checks at a later stage.
Quality checks for measurement errors are more diffi  cult but are crucial 
for assessing whether information has been collected accurately. 
Consistency checks can be built into the questionnaire. In addition, supervi-
sors or quality controllers need to conduct spot checks by participating in 
interviews to ensure that the enumerators collect data in accordance with 
the established quality standards. Back-checks or quality audits can be 
undertaken among a subsample of the impact evaluation survey to ensure 
that the data collected are accurate. This is sometimes done by having a 
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quality controller collect a subset of the questionnaire with a respondent, 
and comparing the response with those previously obtained by an enumera-
tor with the same respondent.
Field coordinators or members of the evaluation team should also 
 contribute to quality checks to minimize potential conﬂicts of interest 
within the survey ﬁrm. You may also consider contracting with an external 
agency to audit the quality of the data collection activities. Doing that can 
signiﬁcantly limit the range of problems that can arise as a result of lack 
of  supervision of the data collection team or insuffi  cient quality control 
procedures.
Ultimately, it is critical that all steps involved in checking quality are 
requested explicitly in the terms of reference when commissioning data 
collection.
Processing and Storing the Data
Data processing and validation is an integral part of the collection of new 
survey data. It includes the steps to digitize information in paper-
and-pencil surveys, as well as the steps to validate data for both paper-
and-pencil  surveys and electronic data collection using laptop 
computers, smartphones, tablets, or other devices. When working with 
paper-and-pencil  surveys, a data entry program must be developed and a 
system put in place to manage the ﬂow of data to be digitized. Norms and 
procedures must be established, and data entry operators must be care-
fully trained to guarantee that data entry is consistent. As much as pos-
sible, data entry should be integrated into data collection operations 
(including during the pilot-testing phase), so that any problems with the 
data collected can be promptly identiﬁed and veriﬁed in the ﬁeld. Overall, 
the quality benchmark for the data entry process should be that the raw 
physical data are exactly replicated in the digitized version, with no 
modiﬁcations made to them while they are being entered. To minimize 
data entry errors, a double-blind data entry procedure can be used to 
identify and correct for any remaining errors. A computer assisted ﬁ eld 
entry (CAFE) approach can be used, which  collects data in a paper- 
and-pencil survey, and then digitizes it in the ﬁ eld and immediately vali-
dates it to identify errors and inconsistencies.
For both paper-and-pencil surveys and surveys relying on electronic 
data collection, programs can be developed to perform automatic checks 
for nonsampling errors (both item nonresponse and inconsistencies) 
that may occur in the ﬁeld and to validate data. If the validation process 
is integrated into the ﬁeldwork procedures, incomplete or  inconsistent 
data can be referred back to the ﬁ eldworkers for on-site veriﬁcation. 
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This kind of integration is not without challenges for the organizational 
ﬂow of ﬁeldwork operations, but it can yield substantial gains in quality, 
diminish measurement error, and increase the statistical power of the 
impact evaluation. The possibility of using such an integrated approach 
should be considered explicitly when data collection is being planned. 
The use of new technologies can facilitate those quality checks.
As discussed, data collection comprises a set of operations whose 
 complexity should not be underestimated. Box 16.5 discusses how the 
data collection process for the evaluation of the Atención a Crisis pilots 
Box 16.5: Data Collection for the Evaluation of the Atención a 
Crisis Pilots in Nicaragua
In 2005, the Nicaraguan government 
launched the Atención a Crisis pilot program. 
A study was set up to evaluate the impact of 
combining a conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
program with productive transfers, such as 
grants for investment in nonagricultural 
activities or vocational training. The Atención 
a Crisis pilot was implemented by the minis-
try of the family, with support from the 
World Bank.
A randomized assignment in two stages 
was used for the evaluation. First, 106 target 
communities were randomly assigned to 
either the comparison group or the treat-
ment group. Second, within treatment com-
munities, eligible households were randomly 
assigned one of three benefi t packages: a 
conditional cash transfer; the CCT plus a 
scholarship that allowed one of the house-
hold members to choose among a number 
of vocational training courses; and the CCT 
plus a productive investment grant to 
encourage recipients to start a small nonag-
ricultural activity, with the goal of creating 
assets and diversifying income (Macours, 
Premand, and Vakis 2012).
A baseline survey was collected in 2005, 
a fi rst follow-up survey occurred in 2006, and 
a second follow-up survey was conducted in 
2008, two years after the intervention ended. 
Rigorous quality checks were put in place at 
all stages of the data collection process. 
First, questionnaires were thoroughly fi eld-
tested, and enumerators were trained in 
both class and fi eld conditions. Second, fi eld 
supervision was set up so that all question-
naires were revised multiple times by enu-
merators, supervisors, fi eld coordinators, 
and other reviewers. Third, a double-blind 
data entry system was used, together with a 
comprehensive quality-check program that 
could identify incomplete or inconsistent 
questionnaires. Questionnaires with missing 
information in certain questions or inconsis-
tencies were systematically sent back to the 
fi eld for verifi cation. These procedures and 
requirements were explicitly specifi ed in the 
terms of reference of the data collection fi rm.
(continued)
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in Nicaragua yielded high-quality data with very low attrition and item 
nonresponse and few measurement and processing errors. Such high-
quality data can be obtained only when data quality procedures and 
proper incentives are put in place at the moment of commissioning data 
collection.
At the end of the data collection process, the data set should be delivered 
with detailed documentation, including a complete codebook and data 
 dictionary, and stored in a secure location (see box 16.6). If the data are being 
collected for an impact evaluation, then the data set should also include 
complementary information on treatment status and program participa-
tion. A complete set of documentation will speed up the analysis of the 
impact evaluation data, help produce results that can be used for policy 
making in a timely fashion, and facilitate information sharing and potential 
replication.
In addition, detailed tracking procedures 
were put in place to minimize attrition. At 
the start, a full census of households resid-
ing in the treatment and control communi-
ties in 2008 was undertaken in close 
collaboration with community leaders. 
Because migration within the country was 
common the survey fi rm was given incen-
tives to track individual migrants throughout 
the country. As a result, only 2 percent of 
the original 4,359 households could not be 
interviewed in 2009. The survey fi rm was 
also commissioned to track all individuals 
from the households surveyed in 2005. 
Again, only 2 percent of the individuals to 
whom program transfers were targeted 
could not be tracked (another 2 percent had 
died). Attrition was 3 percent for all children 
of households surveyed in 2005 and 5 per-
cent for all individuals in households sur-
veyed in 2005.
Attrition and nonresponse rates provide a 
good indicator of survey quality. Reaching 
very low attrition rates required intense 
efforts by the data collection fi rm, as well as 
explicit incentives. The per unit cost of a 
tracked household or individual is also much 
higher. In addition, thorough quality checks 
added costs and increased data collection 
time. Still, in the context of the Atención a 
Crisis pilot, the sample remained represen-
tative at both the household and the individ-
ual levels three to four years after the 
baseline, measurement error was mini-
mized, and the reliability of the evaluation 
data was ensured. As a result, the long-term 
impacts of the Atención a Crisis pilots could 
be convincingly analyzed.
Source: Macours, Premand, and Vakis 2012.
Box 16.5: Data Collection for the Evaluation of the Atención a Crisis Pilots in Nicaragua (continued)
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Additional Resources
• For accompanying material to the book and hyperlinks to additional resources, 
please see the Impact Evaluation in Practice website (http://www.worldbank 
.org /ieinpractice).
• For a guide to questionnaire design, see the module on “Applied Fieldwork 
Techniques” in the applied impact evaluation methods course at University of 
California (http://aie.cega.org).
• For blog posts about data collection, see the curated list on the World Bank 
Development Impact blog (http://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations).
• For more information on data collection, see the following:
  – Fink, Arlene G., and Jacqueline Kosecoff . 2008. How to Conduct Surveys: 
A Step by Step Guide, fourth edition. London: Sage.
  – Iarossi, Giuseppe. 2006. The Power of Survey Design: A User’s Guide for 
Managing Surveys, Interpreting Results, and Inﬂuencing Respondents. 
 Washington, DC: World Bank.
  – Leeuw, Edith, Joop Hox, and Don Dillman. 2008. International Handbook 
of Survey Methodology. New York: Taylor & Francis Group.
Box 16.6: Guidelines for Data Documentation and Storage
The key guideline in data documentation is 
to keep a record of all impact evaluation 
data. This includes data collection proto-
cols,  questionnaires, training manuals, and 
the like. The World Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank, and the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, among others, have 
open data initiatives where this data is made 
publicly available via a data catalog.
Data storage can be broken up into three 
categories: microdata, macrodata, and iden-
tifi cation (ID) control fi les.
• Microdata are data at the level of the unit 
of observation that are made anonymous 
and do not include any information iden-
tifying the individuals. Relevant identify-
ing variables have been anonymized with 
IDs, which are linked only to respondent 
information in ID control fi les.
• ID control files contain the full informa-
tion before it is made anonymous. They 
should be saved only in a secure server 
and never included in a data catalogue.
• Macrodata include all supporting docu-
ments that are relevant to the interpre-
tation of the microdata, such as a data 
dictionary, codebook, description of the 
study design, and questionnaires.
Cataloguing macrodata and microdata 
helps protect the security of the data and 
also  follows international standards on data 
storage. Central data catalogues are much 
less vulnerable to malfunction or hacking 
than a computer hard drive or portable stor-
age device. Within certain data catalogues, 
the data can be password-protected for a 
period of time before becoming publicly 
available.
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• For more on data collection activities and data quality oversight, see the World 
Bank Impact Evaluation Toolkit, Module 5 on Data Collection (http://www 
.worldbank.org/health/impactevaluationtoolkit). The module includes several 
examples of survey progress reports, ﬁ eld manuals, and training programs for 
households and health facilities.
• For a variety of materials for guidance on preparing a survey, see the  Inter- 
American Development Bank Evaluation hub (http://www.iadb.org 
/ evaluationhub). In the Data Collection section, you can download
  – A questionnaire designer manual
  – A data entry manual
  – Consent forms, sample questionnaires, data entry programs, and ﬁ eldwork 
manuals for several diff erent types of surveys, including surveys for house-
holds, communities, health facilities, schools, and farmers
  – Links to further examples of survey questions and questionnaires
  – Links to guidelines for quality data collection
  – Links to tools available on the International Household Survey Network 
(IHSN) website for data storage and management.
• For more on why data documentation is important, how it can be done, and 
who within the evaluation team is responsible for it, see the World Bank 
Impact Evaluation Toolkit, Module 6 on Data Storage (http://www.worldbank 
.org / health/impactevaluationtoolkit).
Notes
1. See references in Grosh and Glewwe (2000) and UN (2005). See also Muñoz 
(2005); Iarossi (2006); Fink and Kosecoff  (2008); and Leeuw, Hox, and Dillman 
(2008), which provide a wealth of practical guidance for data collection.
2. See McKenzie and Rosenzweig (2012) for an overview of recent advances.
3. For examples of such experiments, see McKenzie and Rosenzweig (2012) on 
general issues; Beegle, Carletto, and Himelein (2012) on agricultural data; 
Beegle and others (2012) on measuring household consumption; and Bardasi 
and others (2011) on labor data.
4. For examples of innovations in measuring outcomes, see Holla (2013); Das and 
Hammer (2007); and Planas and others (2015). 
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CHAPTER 17
Conclusion
Impact Evaluations: Worthwhile but 
Complex Exercises
Impact evaluation is about generating evidence about which programs 
work, which do not, and how to improve them to achieve better develop-
ment outcomes. That can be done in a classic impact evaluation framework, 
comparing outcomes between treatment and comparison groups. Impact 
evaluations can also be conducted to explore implementation alternatives 
within a  program, to test innovations, or to look across programs to assess 
comparative performance.
We argue that impact evaluations are a worthwhile investment for many 
programs. Coupled with monitoring and other forms of evaluation, they 
enhance the understanding of the eff ectiveness of particular policies; they 
contribute to improved accountability for program managers, governments, 
funders, and the public; they inform decisions about how to allocate 
scarce development resources more effi  ciently; and they add to the global 
store of knowledge about what works and what does not in the ﬁ eld of 
development.
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Checklist: Core Elements of a Well-Designed 
Impact Evaluation
Impact evaluations are complex undertakings with many moving parts. The 
following checklist highlights the core elements of a well-designed impact 
evaluation:
¸ A concrete and relevant policy question—grounded in a theory of 
change—that can be answered with an impact evaluation
¸ A robust methodology, derived from the operational rules of the pro-
gram, to estimate a counterfactual that shows the causal relationship 
between the program and outcomes of interest
¸ A well-formed evaluation team that functions as a partnership between a 
policy team and a research team
¸ A respect for ethical standards and consideration of human subjects in the 
design and implementation of the evaluation and related data collection, 
as well as attention to open science principles to ensure transparency
¸ A sample with suffi  cient statistical power to allow policy-relevant 
impacts to be detected
¸ A methodology and sample that provide results generalizable for the 
population of interest
¸ High-quality data that provide the appropriate information required for 
the impact evaluation, including data for the treatment and comparison 
groups, data at baseline and follow-up, and information on program 
implementation and costs
¸ An engagement strategy to inform policy dialogue through the imple-
mentation of the impact evaluation, as well as an impact evaluation 
report and associated policy briefs disseminated to key audiences in a 
timely manner.
Checklist: Tips to Mitigate Common Risks in 
Conducting an Impact Evaluation
We also highlight some tips that can help mitigate common risks inherent in 
the process of conducting an impact evaluation:
¸ Impact evaluations are best designed early in the project cycle, ideally as 
part of the program design, but at least before the program to be evalu-
ated is implemented. Early planning allows for a prospective evaluation 
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design based on the best available methodology and will provide the time 
necessary to plan and implement baseline data collection in evaluation 
areas before the program starts.
¸ Impact evaluation results should be informed by complementary process 
evaluation and monitoring data that give a clear picture of program 
implementation. When programs succeed, it is important to understand 
why. When programs fail, it is important to distinguish between a poorly 
implemented program and a ﬂawed program design.
¸ Baseline data should be collected, and a backup methodology should be 
built into your impact evaluation design. If the original evaluation design 
is invalidated—for example, because the original comparison group 
receives program beneﬁts—having a backup plan can help you avoid hav-
ing to throw out the evaluation altogether.
¸ Common identiﬁ ers should be maintained among diff erent data sources 
for your units of observation so that they can be easily linked during the 
analysis. For example, a particular household should have the same 
identiﬁer in the monitoring systems and in baseline and follow-up impact 
evaluation surveys.
¸ Impact evaluations are useful for learning about how programs work 
and for testing program alternatives, even for large ongoing programs. 
Well-designed impact evaluations can help test innovations or provide 
insights on the relative eff ectiveness of various goods and services deliv-
ered as a bundle in existing programs. Embedding an additional pro-
gram innovation as a small pilot in the context of a larger evaluation can 
leverage the evaluation to produce valuable information for future deci-
sion making.
¸ Impact evaluations should be thought of as another component of a pro-
gram’s operation and should be adequately staff ed and budgeted with the 
required technical and ﬁnancial resources. Be realistic about the costs and 
complexity of carrying out an impact evaluation. The process of designing 
an evaluation and collecting a baseline from scratch can typically take a 
year or more. Once the program starts, the treatment group needs a suffi  -
cient period of exposure to the intervention to aff ect outcomes. Depending 
on the program, that can take anywhere from one year to ﬁve years, or 
more for long-term outcomes. Collecting one or more follow-up surveys, 
conducting the analysis, and disseminating the results will also involve 
substantial eff ort over a number of months and years. Altogether, a com-
plete impact evaluation cycle from start to ﬁnish typically takes at least 
three to four years of intensive work and engagement. Adequate ﬁnancial 
and technical resources are necessary at each step of the way.
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Ultimately, individual impact evaluations provide concrete answers to 
speciﬁc policy questions. Although these answers provide information that 
is customized for the speciﬁc entity commissioning and paying for the eval-
uation, they also provide information that is of value to others around the 
world who can learn and make decisions based on the evidence. For exam-
ple, cash transfer programs in Africa, Asia, and Europe have drawn lessons 
from the original evaluations of Colombia’s Familias en Acción, Mexico’s 
Progresa, and other Latin American conditional cash transfer programs. In 
this way, impact evaluations are partly a global public good. Evidence gener-
ated through one impact evaluation adds to global knowledge on that 
 subject. This knowledge base can then inform policy decisions in other 
countries and contexts as well, with appropriate attention to external 
 validity. The international community has been moving rapidly toward scal-
ing up support for rigorous evaluation.
At the country level, more sophisticated and demanding governments 
are looking to demonstrate results and to be more accountable to their core 
constituencies. Increasingly, evaluations are being conducted by national 
and subnational line ministries and government bodies set up to lead a 
national evaluation agenda, such as the National Council for Evaluation of 
Social Development Policies in Mexico and the Department of Performance 
Monitoring and Evaluation in South Africa. Evidence from impact evalua-
tions is also being used to inform budgetary allocations made by congress 
and parliament at the national level. In systems where programs are judged 
based on hard evidence and ﬁnal outcomes, programs with a strong evi-
dence base to defend positive results will be able to thrive, while programs 
lacking such proof will ﬁnd it more diffi  cult to sustain funding.
Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, as well as national development agencies, donor 
 governments, and philanthropic institutions, are also demanding more and 
better evidence on the eff ective use of development resources. Such evi-
dence is required for accountability to those lending or donating the money, 
as well as for decision making about where best to allocate scarce develop-
ment resources.
A growing number of institutions dedicated primarily to the production 
of high-quality impact evaluations are expanding, including ones from the 
academic arena, such as the Poverty Action Lab, Innovations for Poverty 
Action, and the Center for Eff ective Global Action, and independent agen-
cies that support impact evaluations, such as the International Initiative for 
Impact Evaluation (3ie). A number of associations bring together groups of 
evaluation practitioners and researchers and policy makers interested in the 
topic, including the Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation and 
regional associations such as the African Evaluation Association and the 
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Latin American and Caribbean Economics Association Impact Evaluation 
Network. All these eff orts reﬂect the increasing importance of impact 
 evaluation in international development policy.
Given this growth in impact evaluation, being conversant in the language 
of impact evaluation is an increasingly indispensable skill for any develop-
ment practitioner—whether you run evaluations for a living, contract impact 
evaluations, or use the results of impact evaluations for decision making. 
Rigorous evidence of the type generated through impact evaluations can be 
one of the drivers of development policy dialogue, providing the basis to 
support or oppose investments in development programs and policies. 
Evidence from impact evaluations allows policy makers and project manag-
ers to make informed decisions on how to achieve outcomes more cost-
eff ectively. Equipped with the evidence from an impact evaluation, the 
policy team has the job of closing the loop by feeding those results into the 
decision-making process. This type of evidence can inform debates, opin-
ions, and ultimately, the human and monetary resource allocation decisions 
of governments, multilateral institutions, and donors.
Evidence-based policy making is fundamentally about informing 
 program design and better allocating budgets to expand cost-eff ective pro-
grams, curtail ineff ective ones, and introduce improvements to program 
designs based on the best available evidence. Impact evaluation is not a 
purely academic undertaking. Impact evaluations are driven by the need for 
answers to policy questions that aff ect people’s daily lives. Decisions on how 
best to spend scarce resources on antipoverty programs, transport, energy, 
health, education, safety nets, microcredit, agriculture, and myriad other 
development initiatives have the potential to improve the welfare of peo-
ple across the globe. It is vital that those decisions be made using the most 
rigorous evidence possible.
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Italicized terms within the deﬁ nitions are also deﬁned elsewhere in the glossary.
Activity. Actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, 
technical assistance, and other types of resources, are mobilized to produce 
speciﬁc outputs, such as money spent, textbooks distributed, or number of partici-
pants enrolled in an employment program.
Administrative data. Data routinely collected by public or private agencies as part 
of program administration, usually at a regular frequency and often at the point of 
service delivery, including services delivered, costs, and program participation. 
Monitoring data are a type of administrative data.
Alternative hypothesis. The hypothesis that the null hypothesis is false. In an 
impact evaluation, the alternative hypothesis is usually the hypothesis that the inter-
vention has an impact on outcomes.
Attrition. Attrition occurs when some units drop out from the sample between one 
round of data collection and another, for example, when people move and can’t be 
located. Attrition is a case of unit nonresponse. Attrition can create bias in the impact 
estimate.
Average treatment effect (ATE). The impact of the program under the assumption 
of full compliance; that is, all units that have been assigned to a program actually 
enroll in it, and none of the comparison units receive the program.
Baseline. The state before the intervention, against which progress can be 
assessed or comparisons made. Baseline data are collected before a program or 
policy is implemented to assess the before state. The availability of baseline 
data  is  important to document balance in preprogram characteristics between 
treatment and comparison groups. Baseline data are required for some quasi- 
experimental designs.
GLOSSARY
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Before-and-after comparison. Also known as pre-post comparison or reﬂexive 
comparison. This strategy tracks changes in outcomes for program beneﬁciaries over 
time, using measurements before and after the program or policy is implemented, 
without using a comparison group.
Bias. In impact evaluation, bias is the diff erence between the impact that is calcu-
lated and the true impact of the program.
Causal effect. See impact.
Census. A complete enumeration of a population. Census data cover all units in the 
population. Contrast with sample.
Cluster. Units that are grouped and may share similar characteristics. For example, 
children who attend the same school would belong to a cluster because they share 
the same school facilities and teachers and live in the same neighborhood.
Clustered sample. A sample composed of clusters.
Comparison group. Also known as a control group. A valid comparison group will 
have the same characteristics on average as the group of beneﬁciaries of the pro-
gram (treatment group), except for the fact that the units in the comparison group 
do not beneﬁt from the program. Comparison groups are used to estimate the 
counterfactual.
Compliance. Compliance occurs when units adhere to their assignment to the 
treatment group or comparison group.
Context equilibrium effects. Spillovers that happen when an intervention aff ects 
the behavioral or social norms within a given context, such as a treated locality.
Control group. Also known as a comparison group (see deﬁ nition).
Correlation. A statistical measure that indicates the extent to which two or more 
variables ﬂ uctuate together.
Cost-benefit analysis. Estimates the total expected beneﬁts of a program, com-
pared with its total expected costs. It seeks to quantify all of the costs and beneﬁts of 
a program in monetary terms and assesses whether beneﬁts outweigh costs.
Cost-effectiveness analysis. Compares the relative cost of two or more programs 
or program alternatives in terms of reaching a common outcome, such as agricultural 
yields or student test scores.
Counterfactual. What the outcome (Y) would have been for program participants if 
they had not participated in the program (P). By deﬁnition, the counterfactual can-
not be observed. Therefore, it must be estimated using a comparison group.
Coverage bias. Occurs when a sampling frame does not exactly coincide with the 
population of interest.
Crossover design. Also called a cross-cutting design. This is when there is random-
ized assignment with two or more interventions, allowing the impact of individual 
and combined interventions to be estimated.
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Data mining. The practice of manipulating the data in search of particular results.
Dependent variable. Usually the outcome variable. The variable to be explained, as 
opposed to explanatory variables.
Difference-in-differences. Also known as double diff erence or DD. Diff erence-in-
diff erences compares the changes in outcomes over time between the treatment 
group and the comparison group. This eliminates any diff erences between these 
groups that are constant over time.
Effect size. The magnitude of the change in an outcome that is caused by an intervention.
Effectiveness study. Assesses whether a program works under normal conditions 
at scale. When properly designed and implemented, results from these studies can 
be more generalizable than effi  cacy studies.
Efficacy study. Assesses whether a program can work under ideal conditions. 
These studies are carried out under very speciﬁ c circumstances, for example, with 
heavy technical involvement from researchers during implementation of the pro-
gram. They are often undertaken to test the viability of a new program. Their results 
may not be not generalizable beyond the scope of the evaluation.
Eligibility index. Also known as the forcing variable. A variable that ranks the 
 population of interest along a continuum and has a threshold or cutoff  score that 
determines who is eligible and who is not.
Enrolled-and-nonenrolled comparisons. Also known as self-selected  comparisons. 
This strategy compares the outcomes of units that choose to enroll and units that 
choose not to enroll in a program.
Estimator. In statistics, an estimator is a rule that is used to estimate an unknown 
population characteristic (technically known as a parameter) from the data; an 
 estimate is the result from the actual application of the rule to a particular sample of 
data.
Evaluation. A periodic, objective assessment of a planned, ongoing, or completed 
project, program, or policy. Evaluations are used to answer speciﬁc questions, often 
related to design, implementation, or results.
Evaluation team. The team that conducts the evaluation. It is essentially a partner-
ship between two groups: a team of policy makers and program managers (the policy 
team) and a team of researchers (the research team).
Ex ante simulations. Evaluations that use available data to simulate the expected 
eff ects of a program or policy reform on outcomes of interest.
Explanatory variable. Also known as the independent variable. A variable that is 
used on the right-hand side of a regression to help explain the dependent variable on 
the left-hand side of the regression.
External validity. An evaluation is externally valid if the evaluation sample accurately 
represents the population of interest of eligible units. The results of the evaluation can 
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then be generalized to the population of eligible units. Statistically, for an impact 
 evaluation to be externally valid, the evaluation sample must be representative of the 
population of interest. Also see internal validity.
Follow-up survey. Also known as a postintervention survey. A survey that is ﬁelded 
after the program has started, once the beneﬁciaries have beneﬁted from it for some 
time. An impact evaluation can include several follow-up surveys, which are some-
times referred as midline and endline surveys.
General equilibrium effects. Spillovers that happen when interventions aff ect the 
supply and demand for goods or services, and thereby change the market price for 
those goods or services.
Generalizability. The extent to which results from an evaluation carried out locally 
will hold true in other settings and among other population groups.
Hawthorne effect. Occurs when the mere fact that units are being observed makes 
them behave diff erently.
Hypothesis. A proposed explanation for an observable phenomenon. See also, null 
hypothesis and alternative hypothesis.
Impact. Also known as causal eff ect. In the context of impact evaluations, an impact 
is a change in outcomes that is directly attributable to a program, program modality, 
or design innovation.
Impact evaluation. An evaluation that makes a causal link between a program or 
intervention and a set of outcomes. An impact evaluation answers the question: What 
is the impact (or causal eff ect) of a program on an outcome of interest.
Imperfect compliance. The discrepancy between assigned treatment status and 
actual treatment status. Imperfect compliance happens when some units assigned to 
the comparison group participate in the program, or some units assigned to the treat-
ment group do not.
Indicator. A variable that measures a phenomenon of interest to the evaluation 
team. The phenomenon can be an input, an output, an outcome, a characteristic, or 
an attribute. Also see SMART.
Informed consent. One of the cornerstones of protecting the rights of human sub-
jects. In the case of impact evaluations, it requires that respondents have a clear 
understanding of the purpose, procedures, risks, and beneﬁ ts of the data collection 
that they are asked to participate in.
Inputs. The ﬁnancial, human, and material resources used for the intervention.
Institutional Review Board (IRB). A committee that has been designated 
to  review, approve, and monitor research involving human subjects. Also 
known  as an independent ethics committee (IEC) or ethical review board 
(ERB).
Instrumental variable. Also known as instrument. The instrumental  variable method 
relies on some external source of variation or IV to determine treatment status. 
Glossary 329
The IV inﬂ uences the likelihood of participating in a program, but it is outside of the 
 participant’s control and is unrelated to the participant’s characteristics.
Intention-to-treat (ITT). ITT estimates measure the diff erence in outcomes 
between the units assigned to the treatment group and the units assigned to the com-
parison group, irrespective of whether the units assigned to either group actually 
receive the treatment.
Internal validity. An evaluation is internally valid if it provides an accurate estimate 
of the counterfactual through a valid comparison group.
Intervention. In the context of impact evaluation, this is the project, program, 
design innovation, or policy to be evaluated. Also known as the treatment.
Intra-cluster correlation. Also known as intra-class correlation. This is the degree 
of similarity in outcomes or characteristics among units within preexisting groups 
or clusters, relative to units in other clusters. For example, children who attend the 
same school would typically be more similar or correlated in terms of their area of 
residence or socioeconomic background, relative to children who don’t attend this 
school.
Item nonresponse. Occurs when data are incomplete for some sampled units.
John Henry effect. The John Henry eff ect happens when comparison units work 
harder to compensate for not being off ered a treatment. When we compare treated 
units with those harder-working comparison units, the estimate of the impact of the 
program will be biased: that is, we will estimate a smaller impact of the program than 
the true impact that we would ﬁnd if the comparison units did not make the addi-
tional eff ort.
Lack of common support. When using the matching method, lack of common 
support is a lack of overlap between the propensity scores of the treatment or enrolled 
group and those of the pool of nonenrolled.
Local average treatment effect (LATE). The impact of the program estimated for 
a speciﬁ c subset of the population, such as units that comply with their assignment 
to the treatment or comparison group in the presence of imperfect compliance, or 
around the eligibility cutoff  score when applying a regression discontinuity design. 
Thus the LATE provides only a local estimate of the program impact and should not 
be  generalized to the entire population.
Matching. A nonexperimental impact evaluation method that uses large data sets 
and statistical techniques to construct the best possible comparison group for a given 
treatment group based on observed characteristics.
Mechanism experiment. An impact evaluation that tests a particular causal mech-
anism within the theory of change of a program, rather than testing the causal eff ect 
(impact) of the program as a whole.
Minimum detectable effect. The minimum detectable eff ect is an input for 
power calculations; that is, it provides the eff ect size that an impact evaluation 
is  designed to estimate for a given level of signiﬁ cance and power. Evaluation 
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samples need to be large enough to detect a policy-relevant minimum detectable 
eff ect with suffi  cient power. The minimum detectable eff ect is set by considering 
the change in outcomes that would justify the investment in an intervention.
Mixed methods. An analytical approach that combines quantitative and 
qualitative data.
Monitoring. The continuous process of collecting and analyzing information to 
assess how well a project, program, or policy is performing. Monitoring usually 
tracks inputs, activities, and outputs, though occasionally it also includes outcomes. 
Monitoring is used to inform day-to-day management and decisions. It can also be 
used to track performance against expected results, make comparisons across 
 programs, and analyze trends over time.
Monitoring data. Data from program monitoring that provide essential informa-
tion about the delivery of an intervention, including who the beneﬁ ciaries are and 
which program beneﬁ ts or outputs they may have received. Monitoring data are a 
type of administrative data.
Nonresponse. Occurs when data are missing or incomplete for some sampled 
units. Unit nonresponse arises when no information is available for some sample 
units: that is, when the actual sample is diff erent from the planned sample. One form 
of unit nonresponse is attrition. Item nonresponse occurs when data are incomplete 
for some sampled units at a point in time. Nonresponse may cause bias in evaluation 
results if it is associated with treatment status.
Null hypothesis. A hypothesis that might be falsiﬁed on the basis of observed data. 
The null hypothesis typically proposes a general or default position. In impact 
 evaluation, the null hypothesis is usually that the program does not have an impact; 
that is, that the diff erence between outcomes in the treatment group and the com-
parison group is zero.
Open science. A movement that aims to make research methods more transparent, 
including through trial registration, use of preanalysis plans, data documentation, 
and registration.
Outcome. A result of interest that is measured at the level of program beneﬁ cia-
ries. Outcomes are results to be achieved once the beneﬁciary population uses 
the project outputs. Outcomes are not directly under the control of a program- 
implementing agency: they are aff ected both by the implementation of a program 
(the activities and outputs it delivers) and by behavioral responses from beneﬁ -
ciaries exposed to that program (the use that beneﬁ ciaries make of the beneﬁ ts 
they are exposed to). An outcome can be intermediate or ﬁnal (long term). Final 
outcomes are more distant outcomes. The distance can be interpreted in terms of 
time (it takes a longer period of time to get to the outcome) or in terms of causal-
ity (many causal links are needed to reach the outcome and multiple factors 
inﬂ uence it).
Output. The tangible products, goods, and services that are produced (supplied) 
directly by a program’s activities. The delivery of outputs is directly under the  control 
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of the program-implementing agency. The use of outputs by beneﬁ ciaries contrib-
utes to changes in outcomes.
Placebo test. Falsiﬁ cation test used to assess whether the assumptions behind a 
method hold. For instance, when applying the diff erence-in-diff erences method, a 
placebo test can be implemented by using a fake treatment group or fake outcome: 
that is, a group or outcome that you know was not aff ected by the program. 
Placebo  tests cannot conﬁ rm that the assumptions hold but can highlight cases 
when the assumptions do not hold.
Population of interest. A comprehensive group of all units (such as individuals, 
households, ﬁ rms, facilities) that are eligible to receive an intervention or treatment, 
and for which an impact evaluation seeks to estimate program impacts.
Power (or statistical power). The probability that an impact evaluation will detect 
an impact (that is, a diff erence between the treatment group and comparison group) 
when in fact one exists. The power is equal to 1 minus the probability of a type II 
error, ranging from 0 to 1. Common levels of power are 0.8 and 0.9. High levels of 
power are more conservative, meaning that there is a low likelihood of not detecting 
real program impacts.
Power calculations. Calculations to determine how large a sample size is required 
for an impact evaluation to precisely estimate the impact of a program: that is, the 
smallest sample that will allow us to detect the minimum detectable eff ect. Power 
calculations also depend on parameters such as power (or the likelihood of type II 
error), signiﬁcance level, mean, variance, and intra-cluster correlation of the outcome 
of interest.
Probabilistic sampling. A sampling process that assigns a well-deﬁned probability 
for each unit to be drawn from a sampling frame. They include random sampling, 
stratiﬁ ed random sampling, and cluster sampling.
Process evaluation. An evaluation that focuses on how a program is implemented 
and operates, assessing whether it conforms to its original design and documenting 
its development and operation. Contrast with impact evaluation.
Propensity score. Within the context of impact evaluations using matching  methods, the 
propensity score is the probability that a unit will enroll in the program based on observed 
characteristics. This score is a real number between 0 and 1 that summarizes the inﬂ u-
ence of all of the observed characteristics on the likelihood of enrolling in the program.
Propensity score matching. A matching method that relies on the propensity score 
to ﬁ nd a comparison group for a given treatment group.
Prospective evaluation. Evaluations designed and put in place before a program is 
implemented. Prospective evaluations are embedded into program implementation 
plans. Contrast with retrospective evaluation.
Quasi-experimental method. Impact evaluation methods that do not rely on ran-
domized assignment of treatment. Diff erence-in-diff erences, regression discontinuity 
design, and matching are examples of quasi-experimental methods.
332 Impact Evaluation in Practice
Randomized assignment or randomized controlled trials. Impact evaluation 
method whereby every eligible unit (for example, an individual, household, busi-
ness, school, hospital, or community) has a probability of being selected for treat-
ment by a program. With a suffi  ciently large number of units, the process of 
randomized assignment ensures equivalence in both observed and unobserved 
characteristics between the treatment group and the comparison group, thereby rul-
ing out selection bias. Randomized assignment is considered the most robust method 
for estimating counterfactuals and is often referred to as the gold standard of impact 
evaluation.
Randomized promotion. Instrumental variable method to estimate program 
impacts. The method randomly assigns to a subgroup of units a promotion, or 
encouragement to participate in the program. Randomized promotion seeks to 
increase the take-up of a voluntary program in a randomly selected subsample of 
the population. The promotion can take the form of an additional incentive, stimu-
lus, or information that motivates units to enroll in the program, without directly 
aff ecting the outcome of interest. In this way, the program can be left open to all 
eligible units.
Random sample. A sample drawn based on probabilistic sampling, whereby each 
unit in the sampling frame has a known probability of being drawn. Selecting a ran-
dom sample is the best way to avoid an unrepresentative sample. Random sampling 
should not be confused with randomized assignment.
Regression analysis. Statistical method to analyze the relationships between a 
dependent variable (the variable to be explained) and explanatory variables. 
Regression analysis is not generally suffi  cient to capture causal eff ects. In impact 
evaluation, regression analysis is a way to represent the relationship between the 
value of an outcome indicator Y (dependent variable) and an independent vari-
able that captures the assignment to the treatment or comparison group, while 
holding constant other characteristics. Both the assignment to the treatment and 
comparison group and the other characteristics are explanatory variables. 
Regression analysis can be univariate (if there is only one explanatory variable; 
in the case of impact evaluation, the only explanatory variable is the assignment 
to the treatment or comparison group) or multivariate (if there are several 
explanatory variables).
Regression discontinuity design (RDD). A quasi-experimental impact evaluation 
method that can be used for programs that rely on a continuous index to rank poten-
tial participants and that have a cutoff  point along the index that determines whether 
potential participants are eligible to receive the program or not. The cutoff  threshold 
for program eligibility provides a dividing point between the treatment group and 
the comparison group. Outcomes for participants on one side of the cutoff  are com-
pared with outcomes for nonparticipants on the other side of the cutoff . When all 
units comply with the assignment that corresponds to them on the basis of their 
eligibility index, the RDD is said to be “sharp.” If there is noncompliance on either 
side of the cutoff , the RDD is said to be “fuzzy.”
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Results chain. Sets out the program logic by explaining how the development 
objective is to be achieved. It articulates the sequence of inputs, activities, and out-
puts that are expected to improve outcomes.
Retrospective evaluation. An evaluation designed after a program has been imple-
mented (ex post). Contrast with prospective evaluation.
Sample. In statistics, a sample is a subset of a population of interest. Typically, the 
population is very large, making a census or a complete enumeration of all the values 
in the population impractical or impossible. Instead, researchers can select a repre-
sentative subset of the population (using a sampling frame) and collect statistics on 
the sample; these may be used to make inferences or to extrapolate to the popula-
tion. This process is referred to as sampling. Contrast with census.
Sampling. A process by which units are drawn from a sampling frame built from the 
population of interest. Various alternative sampling procedures can be used. 
Probabilistic sampling methods are the most rigorous because they assign a well-
deﬁned probability for each unit to be drawn. Random sampling, stratiﬁed random 
sampling, and cluster sampling are all probabilistic sampling methods. Nonprobabilistic 
sampling (such as purposive or convenience sampling) can create sampling errors.
Sampling frame. A comprehensive list of units in the population of interest. An 
adequate sampling frame is required to ensure that the conclusions reached from 
analyzing a sample can be generalized to the entire population. Diff erences between 
the sampling frame and the population of interest create a coverage bias. In the pres-
ence of coverage bias, results from the sample do not have external validity for the 
entire population of interest.
Selection. Occurs when program participation is based on the preferences, deci-
sions, or unobserved characteristics of participants or program administrators.
Selection bias. The estimated impact suff ers from selection bias when it deviates 
from the true impact in the presence of selection. Selection bias commonly occurs 
when unobserved reasons for program participation are correlated with outcomes. 
This bias commonly occurs when the comparison group is ineligible or self-selects 
out of treatment.
Sensitivity analysis. How sensitive the analysis is to changes in the assumptions. 
In the context of power calculations, it helps statisticians to understand how much 
the required  sample size will have to increase under more conservative assumptions 
(such as lower expected impact, higher variance in the outcome indicator, or a 
higher level of power).
Significance. Statistical signiﬁ cance indicates the likelihood of committing a 
type I error, that is, the likelihood of detecting an impact that does not actually 
exist. The signiﬁcance level is usually denoted by the Greek symbol α (alpha). 
Popular levels of signiﬁcance are 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent. The 
smaller the signiﬁ cance level, the more conﬁ dent you can be that the estimated 
impact is real. For example, if you set the signiﬁ cance level at 5 percent, you can 
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be 95 percent conﬁdent in concluding that the program has had an impact if you 
do ﬁ nd a signiﬁ cant impact.
Significance test. A test of whether the alternative hypothesis achieves the prede-
termined signiﬁ cance level in order to be accepted in preference to the null 
 hypothesis. If a test of signiﬁcance gives a p value lower than the statistical signiﬁ -
cance (α) level, the null hypothesis is rejected.
SMART: Speciﬁ c, measurable, attributable, realistic, and targeted. Good indicators 
have these characteristics.
Spillovers. Occur when the treatment group directly or indirectly aff ects outcomes 
in the comparison group (or vice versa).
Stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). The basic requirement that 
the outcome of one unit should be unaff ected by the particular assignment of treat-
ments to other units. This is necessary to ensure that randomized assignment yields 
unbiased estimates of impact.
Statistical power. The power of a statistical test is the probability that the test will 
reject the null hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true (that is, that it will 
not make a type II error). As power increases, the chances of a type II error decrease. 
The probability of a type II error is referred to as the false negative rate (β). Therefore 
power is equal to 1 − β.
Stratified sample. Obtained by dividing the population of interest (sampling frame) 
into groups (for example, male and female), and then drawing a random sample 
within each group. A stratiﬁed sample is a probabilistic sample: every unit in each 
group (or stratum) has a known probability of being drawn. Provided that each 
group is large enough, stratiﬁed sampling makes it possible to draw inferences about 
outcomes not only at the level of the population but also within each group.
Substitution bias. An unintended behavioral eff ect that aff ects the comparison 
group. Units that were not selected to receive the program may be able to ﬁ nd good 
substitutes for the treatment through their own initiative.
Survey data. Data that cover a sample of the population of interest. Contrast with 
census data.
Synthetic control method. A speciﬁ c matching method that allows statisticians 
to estimate impact in settings where a single unit (such as a country, a ﬁ rm, or a 
hospital) receives an intervention or is exposed to an event. Instead of comparing 
this treated unit to a group of untreated units, the method uses information about 
the characteristics of the treated unit and the untreated units to construct a syn-
thetic, or artiﬁ cial, comparison unit by weighing each untreated unit in such a way 
that the synthetic comparison unit most closely resembles the treated unit. This 
requires a long series of observations over time of the characteristics of both the 
treated unit and the untreated units. This combination of comparison units into a 
synthetic unit provides a better comparison for the treated unit than any untreated 
unit individually.
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Theory of change. Explains the channels through which programs can inﬂuence 
ﬁnal outcomes. It describes the causal logic of how and why a particular program, 
program modality, or design innovation will reach its intended outcomes. A theory 
of change is a key underpinning of any impact evaluation, given the cause-and-eff ect 
focus of the research.
Time-invariant factor. Factor that does not vary over time; it is constant.
Time-varying factor. Factor that varies over time.
Treatment. See intervention.
Treatment group. Also known as the treated group or the intervention group. The 
treatment group is the group of units that receives an intervention, versus the com-
parison group that does not.
Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT). TOT estimates measure the diff erence in out-
comes between the units that actually receive the treatment and  the comparison 
group. 
Type I error. Also known as a false positive error. Error committed when rejecting 
a null hypothesis, even though the null hypothesis actually holds. In the context of an 
impact evaluation, a type I error is made when an evaluation concludes that a 
 program has had an impact (that is, the null hypothesis of no impact is rejected), 
even though in reality the program had no impact (that is, the null hypothesis holds). 
The signiﬁcance level is the probability of committing a type I error.
Type II error. Also known as a false negative error. Error committed when accepting 
(not rejecting) the null hypothesis, even though the null hypothesis does not hold. In 
the context of an impact evaluation, a type II error is made when concluding that a 
program has no impact (that is, the null hypothesis of no impact is not rejected) even 
though the program did have an impact (that is, the null hypothesis does not hold). 
The probability of committing a type II error is 1 minus the power level.
Unit. A person, a household, a community, a business, a school, a hospital, or other 
unit of observation that may receive or be aff ected by a program.
Unit nonresponse. Arises when no information is available for some subset of 
units, that is, when the actual sample is diff erent than the planned sample.
Unobserved variables. Characteristics that are not observed. These may include 
characteristics such as motivation, preferences, or other personality traits that are 
diffi  cult to measure.
Variable. In statistical terminology, a symbol that stands for a value that may vary.
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